

**The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014:  
Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?**

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**Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen  
Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel**

**vorgelegt von**

**Peter Eitel**

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**Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause**

**Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick**

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**Abstract:** *This paper examines the role that surprise played in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, particularly for Germany. It finds that the phenomenon of surprise was unanimously observed by those scrutinizing Crimea's annexation, but its role or effect not been systematically examined. Rather, surprise was neglected as a possibly decisive factor. Based on an analysis of its own data set on the annexation of Crimea in 2014, this research comes to the diametric assumption that surprise was decisive for the outcome of the annexation. Moreover, the analysis finds that the decisive surprise was planned and contrived by Russia. The conditions not by keeping Russia's opponents in the dark about its true intentions, but at reassuring them in the false alternative. In attempting to assess the diametrically opposed assumptions about the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea through a recourse to the theoretical debate on the role of surprise and deception in strategy, the paper finds that both explanations find their expression in the schools of strategic thought. Where you stand on surprise depends on where you sit in strategy. While this shoes the continued relevance of strategy, it leaves the central question of this research intractable until unambiguous evidence on how Russia annexed Crimea is available. The paper argues that the disregard of surprise as an element of strategy in the debate about the annexation of Crimea, especially in Germany, is a sign of increasing strategy blindness. Against the backdrop of the intra-German debate on Germany's international responsibility, which has been ongoing since 2013, the work suggests a cross-departmental examination of the phenomenon of surprise, as well as the establishment of a chair for strategic studies at a German university.*

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**List of Abbreviations:**

Allgemeine Rundfunkanstalten Deutschland	ARD
Bundesnachrichtendienst	BND
European Union	EU
Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union	EaP
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	NATO
United States of America	U.S.

*To my parents*

# ***I. Introduction***

*Unlinked from its strategic results, the significance of surprise is trivialized.<sup>1</sup>*

Richard K. Betts

## **1. Research Interest and Relevance**

This research analyses which role surprise had for the annexation of Crimea 2014 in general, and for Germany specifically.

The interest in the subject was raised by co-incidence, during a panel-discussion about Germany's future role in foreign and security policy in the spring of 2014, shortly after Crimea had been annexed by Russia. The topic of the discussion was how Germany could assume more international responsibility and live up to its economic and political weight in foreign and security policy, a theme that has been looming large in the German debate since in 2012. At that time, with a view to the upcoming 2013 federal elections, a paper was published authored by the who-is-who in Germany's foreign and security policy of the time with the title 'New Powers, New Responsibility' was published and gave rise to a debate that is yet to be concluded<sup>2</sup>. The core argument of the paper: The international environment in which Germany operates has changed, and so has Germany's role in it. It has gained new powers, and along with these new powers come new international responsibility. This in turn would require Germany to become a more strategic actor.

During the discussion, one of the panellists, a member of Germany's Federal Foreign Office's planning staff, referring to the recent Russian annexation of Crimea, argued that to achieve this, Germany would need to improve its ability to cope with surprise. The statement was the spark that ignited the interest in this research. It was the developments that occurred since that emphasise the relevance for this endeavour.

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<sup>1</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 329-343, p. 334.

<sup>2</sup> Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Marshall Fund Berlin (eds.): *New Power New Responsibility Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world*, Berlin, October 2013.

Considering the unexpected developments that followed, the diplomat almost appears like the mythological Pandora: the unexpected rise of ISIS in June 2014, the migration crisis in Europe in the summer of 2015, BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and a global pandemic bringing the world to a sudden halt in 2020 all mark events that were unexpected but had grave impact. The world has come “out of joint”, as Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier observed in February 2016<sup>3</sup>.

The foreign minister and the diplomat were not the only Germans that observed the increased prevalence of surprise in the international context. For example, former Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, in an effort looking at the world writ-large, observes: „In foreign policy, however it [surprise] is a new – and a considerable – problem ... we cannot prepare for what is coming, and must permanently be prepared for the unexpected.”<sup>4</sup>

Building on the observation of the increasing prevalence of surprises, but with the optimism that the "new normal" can be "managed", numerous efforts have been made in Germany since 2014 to counter future surprises - from the establishment of special foresight institutions and courses of study<sup>5</sup>, to new methods and means of raising awareness of future developments<sup>6</sup>, to attempts to identify areas where surprises are likely<sup>7</sup>. What is striking here is that, in contrast to the efforts to hedge against future surprises and despite the generally shared observation among German politicians, experts and academics about the increasing frequency of surprises, the phenomenon itself and the study of its causes hardly received any systematic attention in the German debate - neither in general nor in the context of any of the surprise events between 2014 and 2020. The question of why Germany was surprised seemed less relevant than the question of how future surprises could be prevented. While the forward-looking focus is understandable given the often-grave consequences of unexpected events, it remains important to understand

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<sup>3</sup> Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: „Die Welt aus den Fugen – was hält uns zusammen?“, speech held at the Bertelsmann Forum 2016, 15.02.2016, online available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/160215-bm-bertelsmann-forum/278660> , last accessed 11.04.2021.

<sup>4</sup> „In der Außenpolitik ist sie aber ein neues - und beträchtliches- Problem....Wir können uns nicht mehr auf das vorbereiten, was kommt, und müssen ständig auf Überraschungen gefasst sein. Expect the unexpected - Erwarte das Unerwartete!“ , see: Ischinger, Wolfgang: Welt in Gefahr, Econ, Berlin 2018, p.37

<sup>5</sup> For example the Free University offers a Masters Program in Futurology, see: <https://www.ewi-psy.fu-berlin.de/v/master-zukunftsforschung/index.html> , last accessed 10.04.2021.

<sup>6</sup> For example the Bundeswehr University in Munich undertook a comprehensive research program into ‘Methods of Future Analysis’, see: <https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-ip/projekte/weiterentwicklung-der-methoden-der-zukunftsanalyse> , last accessed 10.04.2021.

<sup>7</sup> Fischer, Sabine; Klein, Margarete (eds): Denkbare Überraschungen: Elf Entwicklungen, die Russlands Außenpolitik nehmen könnte, SWP-Studie, 2016 S 15, Juli 2016, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2016.

whether generalisable causes can be identified for the phenomenon and whether there are specific causes that have led German policymakers in particular to be repeatedly surprised in the recent past.

This is also evident in the German debate in the context of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. For example, Hans Kundnani states regarding Crimea that "the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was a strategic shock for Germany"<sup>8</sup>. However, although the author assesses Germany's Russia policy and whether it changed with the annexation of Crimea, Kundnani does not show what exactly the shock was, why it was strategic for Germany, nor does he discuss what triggered the shock event or what Putin and Russia might have had to do with it.

Hans Kundnani is no exception to a general observation: the phenomenon of surprise hardly plays a role in the German debate on international relations in general and in studies of war, international conflicts and crises in particular. Between Waldemar Erfurth's 1938 work *Die Überraschung im Kriege*<sup>9</sup>, which informed much of the Wehrmacht's offensive operations in the early days of World War II, and today, only one German-language article on surprise could be found, dating from 1988: a two-pager in the journal *Europäische Wehrkunde*, written by former Bundeswehr Major General Hanno Graf von Kielmannsegg<sup>10</sup>. He argues that even in the event of the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union would still have the inclination to seek surprise with a conventional military attack. However, von Kielmannsegg's fears were quickly judged obsolete by the surprise end of the Cold War: The Cold War ended peacefully, without a decisive military battle between the superpowers. In the absence of ideological rivalry, the feeling prevailed that there was no longer any reason to fear a Soviet surprise attack, nuclear or conventional. Thus, German contributions play no role in the debate on the phenomenon of surprise, which was particularly lively during the Cold War<sup>11</sup>.

Much of this can be explained out of German history, but language is also a factor here, as publications in German are rarely considered in the international debate.

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<sup>8</sup> Kundnani, Hans: 'Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East', in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94 No. 2, p.175. March/April 2015

<sup>9</sup> Erfurth, Waldemar: *Die Überraschung im Kriege*, Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1938.

<sup>10</sup> Kielmannsegg, Hanno von: 'Die vergessene Gefahr der strategischen Überraschung', in: *Europäische Wehrkunde*, Vol.4, Issue 87, Bonn, 1988, pp. 211-212. The author warns that the risk of strategic surprise by conventional military attack has been forgotten – and that the Soviet Union had a legacy of seeking to leverage surprise.

<sup>11</sup> A recent and comprehensive overview is provided in: Cancian, Mark F.: *Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.

However, the observation of surprise on the one hand, but its neglect as a potentially decisive factor for the overall outcome and the exploration of its generalisable causes can be observed not only in the context of the German Crimea debate, but also in the broader, 'Western' debate on the annexation of Crimea. Although surprise is a frequently observed aspect of the annexation of Crimea, the focus that guided the debate following the annexation was on two other aspects: First, on the question of the legality of Russia's action<sup>12</sup>. Secondly, the question of whether the annexation of Crimea was a carefully executed plan or whether it was a rush job followed by Russian muddling through played a central role.

The very day after Crimea was 'officially' annexed into the Russian Federation, the *BBC's* John Simpson concludes that "The whole operation was very cleverly planned and executed. But there is absolutely no doubt about what it was - a remarkable, swift and largely bloodless coup."<sup>13</sup> A little later, Thomas Gutschker, writing for the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, reveals "Putin's battle plan", tracing it back to 2013, when Western intelligence agencies discovered that small groups of Russian special forces had been secretly deployed to Crimea, and warned of a possible Russian invasion of Crimea<sup>14</sup>. In February 2015, the German weekly *DieZeit* reported that a Russian strategy document that preceded the annexation of Crimea was published in Russia's *Novaya Gazeta*, confirming the widely held belief that the annexation of Crimea was the result of a long-term plan<sup>15</sup>. The plan, the article argues, was developed by a think tank that advised the Kremlin on marketing and strategy.

At the same time, there was also the opposite assumption - that Putin and Russia acted spontaneously, and that the annexation of Crimea was characterised by Russian ad-hocism rather than Russian strategic and operational art. Shortly after Crimea was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Shaun Walker writes for the *Guardian* that the search for the Russian plan is a futile effort. The decision itself, the article argues, was a snap decision with deeper roots in Putin's biography and Russian history; a "knee-jerk reaction" to recent events in Ukraine and a sense of living in an unjust international system. That it was a short-term decision made by a

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<sup>12</sup> Merkel, Reinhard: 'Die Krim und das Völkerrecht: Kühle Ironie der Geschichte', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 08.04.2014, Frankfurt, 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Simpson, John: 'Russia's Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful', in: *BBC World Affairs*, 19.03.2014, London, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Gutschker, Thomas: 'Putin's Schlachtplan', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07.09.2014, Frankfurt am Main, 2014.

<sup>15</sup> Dobbert, Steffen; Grosev, Christo; Dülffer, Meike: 'Putin und der geheime Ukraine-Plan', in: *Die Zeit*, 26.02.2015, Hamburg, 2015.

very small number of people under Putin's leadership is further demonstrated by the fact that even Russian newspapers at the time "reported that all their government sources had been caught completely off guard"<sup>16</sup>. As further evidence for the assumption that the decision to annex Crimea was made on the spot, the article quotes a Kremlin-linked analyst, Sergei Markov, who states that "the original plan was not to annex Crimea[...]". Therefore, instead of looking for Putin's master plan, it would be more purposeful to look into the question of why Putin annexed Crimea and why "the Russian president simply snapped and decided it was time to act unilaterally"<sup>17</sup>. However, what role surprise played for Russia, both as a possible trigger for the snap-decision argument and as a possible means to secure the overall goal of annexing Crimea, was not considered by either camp looking at Russia's plan for annexing Crimea.

In sum, this research, by assessing the role surprise played for the 2014 annexation of Crimea in general, and for Germany in particular, fills several research-gaps: First, it considers a phenomenon whose frequency is increasing and whose effects are negative for governments, and asks for generalisable causes; second, it considers it in the context of an empirical case, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a case of historical significance in which the phenomenon of interest was widely observed but did not play a central role in the debate. Third, it looks at the phenomenon with a particular focus on Germany, whose claim to assume more international responsibility seems particularly challenging in a world characterised by surprises. Lastly, the results of this research are presented in English to provide a contemporary German perspective on surprise.

## 2. Structure

The present study consists of five parts. In contrast to the usual approach of theoretical anticipation, which first considers theoretical explanations for the phenomenon in question and then examines which theory most convincingly explains the empirically recorded reality, this study first considers the empirics before resorting to theory to better explain the findings on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea.

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<sup>16</sup> Walker, Shaun: 'Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?', in: *The Guardian*, 23.03.2014, London, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Walker, Shaun: 'Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?', 23.03.2014.

### **3. Surprise as trivia of the annexation of Crimea?**

First, a selection of previously published works on the annexation of Crimea as well as on Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea will be considered in order to assess what role surprise has been assigned to the outcome of the annexation of Crimea in these previous works. It turns out that surprise, while unanimously observed, has not been analysed in terms of its role in the overall outcome. Although various explanations for the occurrence of surprise in the context of annexation can be identified, for most of the works examined, the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea and for Germany is negligible for the overall outcome, and rather a side effect of annexation than a key element for it. An aspect that would make it into the "trivial" section of a film encyclopaedia if the annexation of Crimea were a film and not a bitter reality. The literature review shows that this is also the conclusion of those who test the assumption Russia helped create the conditions for the surprise through deliberate deception and information operations. These approaches also fail to explain how exactly the targeted deception contributed to the surprise in the context of the annexation and what this meant for the outcome of the annexation. Thus, the role of deception in the annexation of Crimea remains just as random - and thus not comprehensible.

### **4. The challenge of tracing surprise.**

Having identified from the literature reviewed some assumptions about why surprise occurred, and what role it had in the outcome, the challenge was how to proceed from here. By analysing how the literature reviewed had reached its conclusions, it was possible to elicit clues for how to proceed in this research project. On the one hand, it became apparent that most of the reviewed papers pay little attention to methodological and theoretical considerations. On the other hand, a common feature is found in the perspective from which the case is viewed: The case is viewed from hindsight - that is, the starting point of the works considered is the outcome known only from hindsight. However, this approach seems ill-suited to the research interest of examining surprise and its role for the annexation of Crimea and for Germany in particular. To understand the role of surprise and to better understand why it happened, this research argues that it is first necessary to establish what was expected before the unexpected outcome became known. This requires taking the perspective that was offered when the outcome - Russia's annexation of Crimea - was still unknown.



The difference between the two perspectives can be described using the example of a jigsaw puzzle. The works examined all looked at the pieces of the puzzle with knowledge of the picture that the correctly assembled puzzle pieces produce. It is different when it comes to the question of why something seemed surprising and what effects the unexpected event had on the further course of events. Here, the researcher must find out which picture was expected by the puzzlers involved when looking at only the pieces of the puzzle, but without knowing the final picture. It is therefore a matter of first looking at the expectations that turned out to be wrong in retrospect before conclusions can be drawn about what exactly was surprising, why it was surprising and what role the surprise played in the outcome of the annexation of Crimea.

### **5. Which Sources, which data? How much information is enough?**

Another question that arose after the literature review was what sources of data should be consulted to find what was expected before the unexpected. Here, the first obstacle to overcome was the validity of the data - a problem that, as this paper notes, is inherent in all efforts to study the annexation of Crimea. This also explains why much about the annexation and how it took place remains controversial to this day. The fact is that to this day, high-quality data, such as discussions of government minutes, are not accessible to the researcher, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the question of sources and data is particularly challenging because, in contrast to the lack of availability to high quality sources and data, the universe of available secondary data overwhelms the individual researcher<sup>18</sup>.

Taken together, these aspects inherent to the case present the researcher with a dilemma: either abandon the study at this point, as meeting academic standards is rendered impossible by the available data; or compromise on academic standards on the grounds that the case is of historical significance and in the hope that, even if academic standards must be compromised and academically at best a specific explanation of an individual case can be expected, valuable insights into the case and policy-making can be found. This study resolves the dilemma by choosing the latter. However, it differs from the literature discussed on the annexation of Crimea in that it identifies the inherent problem of the case for academic consideration, reflects on it, and describes a comprehensible and falsifiable way out.

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<sup>18</sup> The search term "annexation of Crimea" generates 2.9 million results in Google search: [https://www.google.com/search?q=Annexation+of+Crimea&rlz=1C1CHBF\\_deDE822DE822&oq=Annexation+of+Crimea&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i22i30l9.3762j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com/search?q=Annexation+of+Crimea&rlz=1C1CHBF_deDE822DE822&oq=Annexation+of+Crimea&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i22i30l9.3762j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

**6. A continuous analysis of the daily coverage of one media source from the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in October 2013 until the annexation of Crimea in April 2014.**

Instead of relying on several secondary sources without a priori defined selection criteria, as was often observed in the literature considered, the third part of this study is limited to an in-depth analysis of a single source: the reporting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD). To minimise the risk of selection bias of the selected contributions and the data they contain, a continuous, daily analysis of ARD's coverage was conducted from 29 October 2013 until the Russian Duma officially welcomed the peninsula as a member of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014<sup>19</sup>. A total of 349 ARD reports and news items were identified, transcribed, translated and analysed for the third part of this study. The focus of the investigation is the question of which expectations about further developments can be ascertained from the reporting, especially from the German government perspective, which turned out to be false after Crimea was annexed by Russia on 18 March.

**7. A diametrical conclusion on the role of surprise: Created by Russian deception, and decisive for the outcome.**

The results of this analysis, which are reproduced and discussed in the fourth part of this study, are diametrically opposed to previous conclusions about the role of surprise for the Russian annexation of Crimea, but especially for Germany. It concludes that an unexpected event - the disappearance of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich on the night of 21 February - triggered the developments that led to the annexation of Crimea, and that the announcement during the EU Council crisis summit on 06 March 2014 by the Crimean regional government to hold a referendum on the regional parliament's decision on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation determined the outcome.

The analysis of ARD's reporting suggests that two surprising events are of different nature: The disappearance of Yanukovich came like a bolt from the blue and surprised both Germany and Russia. Regarding the decisive surprise on 06 March 2014, however, the analysis of ARD's coverage concludes that it was brought about by deliberate Russian, and in particular Putin's, subterfuge: Rather than creating the conditions for surprise by increasing ambiguity, as previous

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<sup>19</sup> This has the additional advantage of covering the two different observation periods identified in the German and broader debate on the annexation of Crimea, see fn 17.

attempts have argued with little specificity, this research finds that Putin's ruse was to create certainty about the false alternative.

Putin wanted his opponents to believe that another Georgia war was imminent. His stratagem to achieve this expectation was the military. The expectation of an imminent repeat of developments in Georgia in 2008, when Russia baited the new Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili into responding to Russian military manoeuvres near the Georgian border in the false expectation that NATO would come to his aid, set the stage for the surprising event that shaped the outcome: the announcement by the Crimean regional government during the EU Council summit on 6 March 2014. But while Russia's military manoeuvres intended to mirror a Georgia-like scenario were Putin's central stratagem, the Russian president himself was Russia's chief "stratagemist" - and Angela Merkel the main target of his ruse. The analysis of the ARD coverage makes it clear that Putin did not use these calls to dispel the German chancellor's doubts about Russian intentions, but to confirm and reinforce her pre-existing image of Russia and its president. The principle applied both to the role of the military and to telephone diplomacy with the German chancellor: Putin's Georgia strategist exploited prejudices of his opponents to create the false expectation that another Georgia was imminent.

The effect of Putin's orchestrated surprise on 6 March 2014 was that it determined the outcome. The referendum that was announced on 06 March could no longer be averted and was held on 16 March 2014. Unsurprisingly, the regional parliament's decision was overwhelmingly approved, and on 18 March the Crimean Peninsula, previously an autonomous republic on the territory of Ukraine, became part of the Russian Federation.

Hence the difference in the assessment of the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany compared to the works discussed in the literature review could not be greater. It is diametrical. While in the assessed works, surprise was random and its effect on the overall outcome negligible, the analyses of the ARD coverage suggests that surprise was decisive to outcome, and deliberately brought about by Russian subterfuge. In addition, the analysis suggests a direct link between Russian deception and the decisive surprise event on March 6, and identifies a deceptive pattern: Russia's strategic ploy was to make the opponent certain of the wrong option. Instead of increasing uncertainty, it increased certainty about this false option.

## **8. Where you stand on surprise, depends on where you sit in strategy.**

But how can this difference be explained? The assumptions on the role of surprise and deception for the annexation of Crimea drawn from the analyses of ARD's reporting are diametrical to those identified in previous works. The fourth part of this endeavour therefore seeks to better understand and explain this difference through a recourse to theory. It does so by turning to the theoretical debate about strategy, and considers the relationship between strategy, deception and surprise.

This also addresses the lack of theory that was observed in previous works. While broadly speaking, the annexation of Crimea can be considered as a case of international relations, the question this research raises is too specific for International Relations theories. It asks whether surprise can be decisive in competition and conflict among states, and how it can be achieved. Therefore, rather than seeking to better explain the diametrical conclusions about the role of surprise (and deception) by turning to the grand theories of international relations, this research considers the role surprise and deception played in the theoretical considerations about strategy as in this context the question what is decisive for the outcome of conflict, competition, crisis and war between states is central.

It finds that the discussion about the relationship between surprise, deception and strategy is as old as are intellectual musings on strategy. While there is agreement that surprise is a psychological effect that can serve as a great force multiplier, two distinct notions on the utility of surprise as decisive for the outcome of war are identified in classical strategy: the direct approach, best captured by the Prussian war-theoretician Carl von Clausewitz, and the indirect approach, best captured by the British war-correspondent Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart. While Clausewitz acknowledges the utility at the tactical level of war, where it should be actively sought as it serves as a great force-multiplier, the Prussian godfather of strategy is critical of strategic utility of surprise. To him, surprise in war is rarely decisive, as in war, only the battlefield engagement can be decisive. The focus on the decisive battlefield engagement is also why Clausewitz is critical of the means to achieve surprise, cunning and deception. To him, they are a waste of time and effort, and a weapon of last resort for the morally inferior. To Sir Liddell-Hart and the adherents of the indirect-approach, on the other hand, surprise causes dislocation of the adversary, and is therefore ultimately decisive. Consequently, the indirect-approach holds deception in favourable terms, and has little moral quarrels about using it. The reason for this is that unlike the disciples of the direct approach who seek the decisive battle of

annihilation, the votaries of the indirect approach consider it the acme of skill to win without fighting, and search for ways to evade costly battlefield engagements. The two positions make answering the question of the role of surprise for strategy intractable. Where you stand on surprise, depends on where you sit in strategy.

This does not change by the findings of the study on the relationship between strategy and surprise in the nuclear age. While surprise remains a central element of the strategy debate, given the threat of a devastating, unexpected nuclear first strike, the question of the potential strategic effect of surprise no longer arises. The technological development of the nuclear weapon dissolved the doubts that Clausewitz and the students of the direct approach had about the role of surprise in strategy. An unexpected thermonuclear attack could well have strategic effect<sup>20</sup>. This had consequences for the debate on surprise in strategy. Instead of pursuing the question of the strategic relevance of surprise, i.e. its ability to decide the outcome of war, two other questions moved to the centre of the debate on strategy in the nuclear age of the Cold War. One is the question of why governments fall victim to surprises; the other is whether surprises could be prevented in the future.

The examination of the strategy debate on the phenomenon of surprise in the nuclear age shows that towards the end of the Cold War there was widespread agreement on the causes for the emergence of surprises. At the heart of the matter is the realisation that surprise arises even though, in retrospect, it can be determined that information was available that could have pointed to the subsequent surprise<sup>21</sup>. The question was why existing, correct information was not considered. Of particular relevance was the human factor and the cognitive filters that make it difficult to interpret new information correctly. Another factor identified as filtering the correct interpretation of information was the idiosyncrasies inherent in groups and bureaucratic structures, which were described as of special relevance in the intelligence environment. Finally, while presented as of secondary importance compared to the causes inherent in a government affected by surprise, cunning and deception of the adversary were also described as potential causes of surprise. The reason for this suppression of planned, adversarial action as a causal agent of surprise can be justified by the observation of this paper that the debate on

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<sup>20</sup> Consequently, the military units that would deliver such weapons were 'strategic'. Whether this conflation of technological capabilities and strategy has led to the increasing illiteracy in strategy this paper finds merits further research.

<sup>21</sup> See in particular: Wohlstetter, Roberta: *Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, a seminal work in the study of surprise, which examines the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and is the first to point out the paradox of governments being taken by surprise despite information that could have prevented later surprise.

strategy in the nuclear age is unilaterally based on Carl von Clausewitz's axioms on the strategic value of surprise and the direct approach<sup>22</sup>.

There was also agreement in the extensive debate on the phenomenon of surprise during the Cold War on the question of turning away future surprises: Future surprises cannot be prevented. It is this point where a new attitude developed towards the end of the Cold War, again under the impact of technological developments, this time in the field of information gathering and data processing. In contrast to the pessimistic assessments, they come to the conclusion that technological advances at least give reason for hope to rule out surprises in the future<sup>23</sup>. The debate between the two schools also for the first time considers the question of how to approach the study of the phenomenon of surprise<sup>24</sup>. Previous approaches have been criticised for their lack of scientific rigour, so that despite the unity of the research, it is not possible to speak of a theory on the emergence of surprises for governments. This criticism was countered by the argument that the phenomenon of surprise confronts the researcher with a fundamental dilemma, since its characteristics do not allow it to be grasped through a Procrustean bed of scientific rigour, thus making the development of a generalisable theory in the strict scientific sense impossible<sup>25</sup>.

The debate about the suitability of the phenomenon for scientific study equally marks the end of the strategic debate about surprise. With the end of the Cold War, and the perception of the end of the nuclear threat, interest in surprise also faded and moved out of the centre of the strategy debate. However, it did not disappear entirely, and for considerable time changed from a pessimistic outlook on the ability to prevent surprise to an optimistic one. This changed when Nassim Taleb published his successful work *Black Swan* in the wake of the collapse of the world financial markets in 2008<sup>26</sup>. However, it took until the late 2010s until the phenomenon was more systematically considered, especially from the field of military studies in the United States of America. This renewed debate is marked by the pessimistic notion that surprises will

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<sup>22</sup> This view is held by Barton Whaley, see Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint).

<sup>23</sup> Levite, Ariel: *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987.

<sup>24</sup> Levite, Ariel: 'Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy"', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, 345-349.

<sup>25</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 329-343.

<sup>26</sup> Taleb, Nassim K.: *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Random House, New York, 2007.

continue to dominate the international environment in the future. Instead of avoiding them, it is smarter to find a ways of coping with them<sup>27</sup>.

### **9. The continued relevance of strategy or the alarming signs of ‘strategy blindness’?**

Irrespective of the question whether surprise can be ruled out in future, in recent research even more than in the strategy debate on surprise in the Cold War era, the decoupling of the question of the role of surprise for the outcome of a war, the fundamental in the strategy debate of the pre-nuclear era, but above all the two fundamentally different attitudes that can be found on this in the debate, is increasingly receding into the background.

This is also evident in the research and debate on the annexation of Crimea as a whole, in which the core question: "what was decisive for the outcome" has been conducted detached from earlier findings of the strategy debate on this question.

However, if one relates the two assumptions about the role of surprise in the outcome of the Russian annexation of Crimea that this thesis has identified in the previous chapters, it becomes clear that these can be explained by the strategy debate on the general relationship between surprise and strategy from the pre-nuclear era. Those who argue that the role of surprise and deception in the annexation of Crimea is negligible and accidental find confirmation in Carl von Clausewitz and the direct approach to strategy. And the conclusion drawn from the data analysis conducted for this research can be explained by Basil H. Liddell Hart's theses on the strategic utility of deception and surprise. Both perspectives are given a set of possible, generalisable causes for surprise in the context of Crimea, without, however, being able to determine with certainty what exactly was causal for the surprise, in general as well as specifically for Germany.

However, this means that it does not resolve the dichotomy of assumptions about the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, but confirms both views: where one sits on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea depends on where one sits in the strategy.

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<sup>27</sup> Cancian, Mark F.: *Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts*, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.



Although this result prevents a clear answer to the question of which assumption about the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea elaborated in this paper is better explained by the theoretical insights about the role of surprise in strategy, and in this respect is not completely satisfactory, conclusions arise from the observation of the decoupling of the debate about the annexation of Crimea as well as in the context of the phenomenon of surprise from its core question. The first is that from the perspective of strategy, surprise, even if its value for the overall outcome is debatable, is a factor that, if observed, should not be neglected. Surprise is important. And if there is no surprise, it should always be expected. Because surprise is always in the future. Second, this research has shown that while thinking about the role of surprise in strategy is as old as thinking about winning wars, the debate has undergone significant shifts in focus - from examining its role in winning wars before the advent of the nuclear weapon to asking what causes governments to fall victim to surprise and whether and how this can be prevented in the future. Thirdly, as already observed in the context of the debate on the annexation of Crimea, the debate on the role of surprise in strategy became increasingly decoupled from its theoretical foundations. Therefore, even more important than an examination of the phenomenon of surprise, against the background of theoretical recourse, seems to be the apparent knowledge about strategy.

## **10. Policy Recommendations**

Against the background of these findings and in line with its interest especially in Germany's foreign and security policy, this study concludes with two recommendations for further reflection in the context of German foreign and security policy. The first is to undertake a thorough, government-wide examination of the main events that have taken the German government by surprise since the Arab Spring in 2011<sup>28</sup>. The results should be submitted to a broad, media-led public debate, especially in the German Bundestag. Such investigations and debates are not without precedent and have been conducted, for example, in the United States after the 9/11 attacks on behalf of the government, or as part of large and adequately funded research projects examining various surprise events and their origins<sup>29</sup>. While neither example could prevent future surprises, both efforts contributed to improved self-awareness that reduced

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<sup>28</sup> For example the inquiry into the terror attacks on the New York World Trade Centre on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, online available at: <https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> , last accessed: 10.04.2021

<sup>29</sup> For example: Nolan, Janne E.; MacEachin, Douglas; Trockman, Kristine: *Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic Surprise: Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, 2006.



vulnerability to surprises and triggered structural and procedural changes in policymaking that contributed to more resilient and adaptive policies.

The second recommendation aims to increase competence in matters of strategy in Germany by establishing an academic chair in strategic studies - of which there is currently none in Germany. While there were good reasons why Germany did not think about strategy in the past, the track record of the last thirty years as a sovereign nation suggests that opening the strategy box is unlikely to lead to Germany planning the next war of aggression. Rather, it could help Germany to be better able to take on more international responsibility and make the German debate on strategic issues less guided by assumptions shaped by the past. Moreover, it would be an opportunity for Germany to develop its own contemporary and forward-looking understanding of strategy, which, as this study shows, goes beyond engagement on the battlefield: while the principles of strategy remain relevant, the face of its object, war, conflict, crisis and competition between and among states, has changed fundamentally, as has the geopolitical context in which they take place. Not dealing with these changes in the strategic environment always carries the risk of being taken by surprise. Finally, such a chair could help bring a German perspective to the broader debate on strategy.

## **11. Closing Remarks**

In closing, a few remarks what this research is not. It does not ask whether the annexation of Crimea could have been prevented; neither does it search for someone to blame for the events. It also does not seek to judge on the legal or moral aspects of the annexation. The verdict in this regard, that Russia broke international law, and committed an act of aggression, is out – and fully shared by the author. However, the verdict does not change history, and should not deflect from considering what happened. Furthermore, this research did not set out to find a silver bullet to prevent surprise, as others had done. Lastly, it this research was never intended as an attempt to better understand Russia, or its leader Vladimir Putin. As important and relevant such an effort is, the individual limitations of the researcher, especially pertaining to the lack of command of the Russian language.

This research limits itself to the question which role surprise played for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. The objective is to contribute to a better understanding of a phenomenon that in recent years has widely been observed, but rarely been analysed with a view to its strategic effect. The axiom to this endeavour the conviction that a better

understanding the underlying drivers of an empirically observable, problematic phenomenon improves the ability to cope and deal with this problem.

The longer the author studied the phenomenon of surprise the more the inherent complexity of the seemingly simple word surprise became apparent. And the longer the author contemplated the existing assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, the more confusing the web of explanations appeared. As if looking through a kaleidoscope, what was described seemingly depended on who looked. The following work is an attempt to do justice to this complexity and to make it comprehensible using the annexation of Crimea as an example. It hopes to be of relevance to all those involved in academia and policy making that must take decisions against the inherent uncertainty of the future, and constantly worry about their expectations about the future being falsified by unexpected events.

## **12. Acknowledgements**

This work on the elusive phenomenon of surprise in the highly dynamic and volatile context of international relations would not have ended if it were not for the support and guidance of many. For their patience, guidance, their willingness to share their expertise and experience I am tremendously grateful. In times of despair, they motivated me to carry on. In times of certainty, they cautioned me to look again. When I was lost in the web of my own doing, they took the time to listen and help order my thoughts again. When in self-doubt, they made me understand that this is a known side-effect of a doctorate. Most importantly, they never stopped believing in me and the value of conducting this research.

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They made this research better and stronger. The shortcomings are entirely my own.

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## ***II. Literature review***

Despite the plethora of publications that followed Russia's seizure of the peninsula, none specifically addresses the role of surprise and its relationship to the annexation of Crimea<sup>30</sup>. Therefore, the objective of the following review of a selection of earlier publications is to distil which role these works attributed to surprise in the context of Crimea's annexation, and which explanations are offered as to why surprise occurred. There are two parts to this literature review. The first part scrutinizes a selection of literature that represent the wider debate about the annexation of Crimea. The second reviews a selection of publications that specifically focus on Germany in the context of the annexation.

### **1. The wider debate about the annexation of Crimea: which role for surprise?**

In the wider debate about the annexation of Crimea, three dimensions received heightened attention: Understanding Putin; Putin's ability as strategic leader; and what was decisive for the annexation, traditional military operations, or information operations. The following will review a selection of works addressing these dimensions.

#### **1.1. Understanding Putin**

Of special relevance and interest was the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Understanding him, it was assumed, would be equal to understanding Russia's rationale – and not understanding him equal to great risk, as Fiona Hill points out:

*“A misreading of this man – now one of the most consequential international political figures and challenges to the US-led world order since the end of the Cold War – could have catastrophic consequences. Russia's 8.000 nuclear weapons (and the vehicles to deliver them to any point on the globe) underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is, what he wants, how he thinks and why”<sup>31</sup>.*

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<sup>30</sup> A Google search of 'annexation of Crimea' and its German equivalent, 'Annektion der Krim' produces 1,5 million and 203.000 results respectively.

<sup>31</sup> Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 72:3, 2016, pp 140-144, p. 140.

That such an understanding of the Russian president was not present prior to the annexation of Crimea was pointed by John Mearsheimer, one of the most eminent neo-realist International Relations scholars. He argues that ‘the West’ has to blame itself for pushing Russia into the behaviour witnessed in Ukraine and Crimea, because it neglected Russian interests and broke promises made to Russia since the end of the Cold War. Russia, in Mearsheimer’s neo-realist reading, behaved perfectly rational, and the West pursued policies oblivious to likely Russian reactions to its own behaviour. Better understanding Putin and his logic would be the best bet against surprise<sup>32</sup>.

### *1.1.1. Why Putin annexed Crimea*

Numerous efforts were undertaken to get a better grasp of what Putin wants, how he thinks and why. In 2016, Stephen Treisman critically analyses the existing explanation why Russia (or Putin) decided to annex Crimea and identifies three dominant patterns of explaining the annexation of Crimea with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin<sup>33</sup>.

The first such pattern he calls “Putin the defender”<sup>34</sup>. Fearing that with his crony, Ukrainian president Yanukovich having disappeared, and a new government in his place hostile to Russian interests, and closely connected with Western powers, Ukraine will soon not only join the European Union (EU), but also NATO, Putin decided to step in to pre-empt further NATO eastward enlargement. Others focus more on the competition between the EU and Russia. They find that from the Russian president’s perspective a closer association of Ukraine with the EU would equal the end of Putin’s own regional integration project, the Eurasian Customs Union, in which Ukraine played a central role. In sum, these scholars argue that the reason why Putin annexed Crimea was in defence of vital Russian interests.

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<sup>32</sup> Mearsheimer, John J.: ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin’, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93 No. 5, September/ October 2014, Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, pp 77-84, 85-89.

<sup>33</sup> Treisman, Daniel: ‘Why Putin took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin’, in: *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 95 No 3, May/June 2016, pp. 47 - 54, p. 48, Council on Foreign Relations, 2016. Stefan Meister offers a similar characterisation in a summary review critically assessing prevailing explanations of the annexation of Crimea, and why they are flawed, see: Meister, Stefan: ‘Fünf Illusionen über das System Putin’, in: *Arbeitspapiere für Sicherheitspolitik*, Nr.6/2015, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, 2015; another good overview of the dominant explanations of the Russian president is, see: Walker, Shaun: *Ukraine and Crimea: ‘What is Putin Thinking’*, in: *The Guardian*, 23.03.2014, London, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Treisman, Daniel (2016): *Why Putin took Crimea*, p. 48.

The second pattern Treisman calls “Putin the imperialist”<sup>35</sup>. According to Treisman, this reading builds on another statement by Putin, in which the Russian president described the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy in history. In this view, rebuilding the former Soviet Union’s spheres of influence and power status, has been Putin’s calling ever since he assumed presidency in 1999. This is evidenced by his *New Russia* or *Novo Rossija* agenda, which seeks to instil a new sense of Russian self-esteem and patriotism, not only in Russia, but among all Russian speakers. Crimea should therefore be regarded the climax of a “gradually unfolding systematic project on part of the Kremlin to recapture the lost lands of the Soviet Union”<sup>36</sup>, as Treisman put it. The annexation of Crimea was thus an act that used an opportune moment to realize a long-standing plan.

A third pattern that could be observed in the prevalent explanations why Putin annexed Crimea, “Putin the populist”<sup>37</sup>. Unlike the previous patterns, this explanation does not look at the external dimension as being the root cause for Vladimir Putin’s decision to seize Crimea. Rather, it emphasises the Russian domestic dimension – and the assumption that the best distraction from domestic crises are international crisis<sup>38</sup>. For the first time since his re-election, Putin’s popularity rates dropped – from over 80% after the election, to below 60% at the beginning of 2014. The annexation of Crimea was hence an act with the sole intention to rally support behind Putin and his course by instigating an external crisis.

Despite the differences between these explanations why Putin annexed Crimea, they have one notion in common: their axiom is that the annexation of Crimea should not have come as a surprise and point to indicators that could – and should – have warned about the risk of Putin waiting for an opportunity to further his objectives.

However, not only does this invoke the response that with hindsight, one is always blessed with 20/20 vision, it also invites additional questions in relation to this research: could surprise have been averted had decision-makers heeded to the authors of these publications? Had the authors consistently pointed to Russia waiting for an opportunity to annex Crimea before? What were

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<sup>35</sup> Treisman, Daniel (2016): Why Putin took Crimea, p. 47.

<sup>36</sup> Treisman, Daniel (2016): Why Putin took Crimea, p. 50

<sup>37</sup> Meister, Stefan: ‚Putin richtig verstehen: warum die Ukraine Krise eine Russland Krise ist‘, in: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (ed): *DGAP-Standpunkt*, Nr. 6, Berlin, 2014; Taylor, Adam: ‘Is there a link between Putin’s approval rating and aggressive Russian foreign policy?’, in: *The Washington Post*, 26.11.2018, Washington, 2018.

<sup>38</sup> A popular and humorous account of this tendency is presented in the Hollywood Movie ‘Wag the Dog’, starring Robert de Niro.

the obstacles that led to this disregard? Another notion is shared by those pointing to the signals in the past – they do not consider Putin a great strategist, but an opportunist willing to exploit every instrument and opportunity to further his interests.

### 1.1.2. *Gambler vs. Strategist*

#### 1.1.2.1. The Gambler

Stephen Treisman rejects these characterisations of Putin as imperialist, revanchist or populist. Instead, he argues finds that:

*“Putin’s seizure of Crimea appears to have been an improvised gambit, developed under pressure, that was triggered by the fear of losing Russia’s strategically important naval base in Sevastopol.”*<sup>39</sup>

In other words: *Putin is a gambler*. The decision to annex Crimea was not taken because of the president’s hurt feelings about the course of history, his dwindling domestic support, or his worry about Russia’s sphere of influence, but about the naval base in Sevastopol.

To come to this conclusion, Treisman argues, one needs to ask *how* the decision to annex Crimea was taken, instead of seeking to explain *why*. With this question in mind, Treisman finds a process that was lacking strategic vision and a plan.

First and foremost, Putin had no plan for Crimea at the onset. This was confirmed to Treisman in a personal conversation with Vladimir Putin himself: “Putin told me, at a reception in Sochi in October 2015, that the operation to seize Crimea was “spontaneous” and was “not at all planned long in advance”<sup>40</sup>.

According to Stephen Treisman’s analysis of events, at the beginning of the military operation, Putin was still in control of events, and could have called off the operation<sup>41</sup>. But with time progressing, and the West furious about Russian military manoeuvres on Crimea, he found himself trapped – and had no exit strategy. In fact, Treisman argues that “a week after the

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<sup>39</sup> Treisman, Daniel: *Why Putin took Crimea*, p. 48.

<sup>40</sup> Treisman, Daniel: *Why Putin took Crimea*, p. 47.

<sup>41</sup> Treisman, Daniel: *Why Putin took Crimea*, p 52



beginning of the operation, Putin had not yet decided on annexation”<sup>42</sup>. This, Treisman opines, can be concluded when looking at the political aspects of the annexation:

*“[t]he clearest evidence against a consistent plan for territorial expansion is the chaotic way in which the Crimean intervention unfolded. Although the military component ran smoothly, its political aspects at times revealed an almost farcical lack of preparation.”*<sup>43</sup>

For Treisman, all of this goes to show Putin’s inability as a leader and strategist, and demonstrates his gambling approach to international politics. This, he argues, has serious implications for Western leaders needing to deal with the Russian president:

*“A rational imperialist can be contained, but the appropriate response to a gambler who makes snap decisions based on short-term factors is less clear. In both Crimea and Syria, Putin has sought to exploit surprise, moving fast to change facts on the ground before the West could stop him”*<sup>44</sup>.

Like the publications he went to criticize, Treisman, acknowledges surprise. However, in Treisman’s analysis surprise is not something peculiar to the annexation of Crimea, or caused by Western negligence of Russia, but idiosyncratic to the Russian president. Because he is a gambler, and not a strategist, these surprises are unforeseeable consequences of knee-jerk decisions by the Russian president, but not part of a Russian strategy, let alone a plan.

Thus, Treisman offers a decidedly different reading why and how Putin surprised his antagonists. Unlike the previously discussed approaches which argue that surprise occurred because of self-delusion and a lack of understanding of the Putin’s motives, Treisman argues that surprise was caused by Putin’s irrational and erratic nature – and the outcome of a dilemma the Russian president had created for himself.

While Treisman makes a convincing argument to shift the attention from why Russia annexed Crimea to how it was annexed, he fails to address the question himself in his zeal to characterize the Russian president as a gambler: Firstly, because he mainly considers how the decision was taken, and dependent on that how Crimea was annexed. Secondly, because his central argument,

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<sup>42</sup> Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea., p. 52

<sup>43</sup> Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea p. 48.

<sup>44</sup> Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea, 54

that this can be observed by lack of a plan at the onset, the farcical nature of the political process, which suggests that Putin send the military without having considered the political outcome is not convincing: After all, Crimea *was* annexed by Russia despite the chaos, and irrespective of the question whether it was according to a plan or according to the situation.

The more interesting aspect in how Russia annexed Crimea therefore appears to be in the question what role the political process had in relation to the overall outcome; how it compared to the role of the military component; and which of each contained surprise Putin could then exploit.

#### 1.1.2.2. Strategist

Finally, Fiona Hill, former national security advisor to U.S. president George W. Bush and well known for her expertise on the Soviet Union and Russia, offers a reading of the Russian president that is diametrically opposed to Treisman's characterisation. Unlike the latter, Fiona Hill characterizes the President as being very methodical in his decision making – and in fully accordance with the methods he obtained in his formation as a KGB official.

Hill is critical of earlier explanations why Putin decided to annex Crimea, too. Although agreeing that Russia's assertive course has roots deep in her political culture, its self-perception as the underdog that is not taken seriously, a "regional power", Fiona Hill criticizes existing explanations for only offering conventional descriptions of Putin – "[...] a "run-of-the-mill" autocrat, or a petty kleptocrat who is focused on saving his own skin, shoring up his regime, and siphoning off state assets [...] he is dubbed as a naked opportunist, or, at best, a talented tactician."<sup>45</sup>

Hill's key argument is that earlier attempts overlook the question what makes Putin stand out from the leaders he deals with: the fact that he is a former KGB operative, and not a member of the political class who has built a career in party politics and political backrooms. And that he approaches running the country as a former KGB agent – including doing away with all oversight mechanisms, as Hill finds that "[t]he Russian presidency and the Russian constitution

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<sup>45</sup> Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 72:3, 2016, p. 141.

are essentially fused, with each guaranteeing each other. [...] [Putin] is the operative that runs himself”<sup>46</sup>.

The former U.S. National Security Advisor argues that to comprehend how this shapes analyses and policy choices of the Russian president, it is essential to understand Putin’s formation as KGB agent. The chief ability the KGB sought to invoke in its operators was to be able to deal with and adapt to the unexpected.

*“This is something all operatives learned at the KGB: operations inevitably go wrong; events throw off the best-laid plan. You have to keep your options open and have backup plans. You must be willing to improvise last minute exit stratagems, and make the most of unexpected opportunities, if you are to live to fight another day and keep one step ahead of your adversaries. Putin’s next steps always depend on how everyone else reacts”*<sup>47</sup>

This mindset coupled with no institutional constraints keeping him from swiftly translating decisions into action distinguish Putin from his democratic counterparts. It is this what makes him so hard to understand for Western leaders, unpredictable, and seemingly following a different logic.

Hill also points out how Putin’s KGB background influences his interactions with other nations:

*“His KGB training taught him to focus on individuals, not on societies. His mission was to target vulnerabilities of individuals to manipulate him to his advantage. Putin does not pay attention to larger social or political dynamics, as long as he knows how to – as he puts it – “work with people” and “work with information” at the top of any system to get his way.”*<sup>48</sup>

However, as Hill points out, Putin’s individual and systematic strengths are also what she considers his biggest weakness: The inability to understand his adversaries, the ‘West’: “[...] their motives, their mentality, and also, their values and principles”<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, p. 141.

<sup>47</sup> Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, p. 141.

<sup>48</sup> Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, p. 141.

<sup>49</sup> Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, p. 143.

Therefore, when Putin seeks to interpret Western behaviour, he falls back to "his age old threat perception"<sup>50</sup> that

*" [...] Western efforts to promote democracy and liberal markets abroad as nothing less than the continuation of "active measures" by Western intelligence agencies to undermine their enemies political systems and pursue regime change in selected counties [...] everything Western leaders and analysts say about Russia's internal weaknesses [...] or the inevitability that Putin will fail in securing his objectives, or that the state will be pulled apart by domestic tensions, gets Putin's antennae up."*<sup>51</sup>

According to Hill, Putin considers these efforts to be a direct threat, to which he reacts forcefully. However, the Russian president is acutely aware that reacting forcefully against the U.S. and the 'West' is difficult, as they are far superior to Russia's military and economic clout. To off-set this power-imbalance, according to Hill the Russian president again resorts to the KGB operators handbook: "[...] in an "asymmetric" struggle with the United States, Putin and Russia have to be innovative, catch the West off guard, and fight dirty."<sup>52</sup>

In sum, unlike the previously discussed attempts at understanding Putin and his rationale to annex Crimea, Fiona Hill does not specifically focus on Crimea – her focus is Vladimir Putin only. The key to understanding him his background and training as KGB operator. Fiona Hill's analysis of Putin's methodological toolbox from the KGB, and how it impacts his style of government as well as the way he conducts his foreign policy challenges the previous findings on several dimensions:

- She points to the fact that Putin does not believe in plans, as they are liable to go wrong; instead, he puts a premium on flexibility and adaptability and the ability to create and exploit unexpected opportunities. While she does not call Putin a strategist, she outlines strategic maxims that guide Putin's actions – straight from the KGB's how to be an operator textbook.
- In dealing with other nations, Putin only considers the individuals represented the political top-level, whose minds he aims to manipulate to his own interest.

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<sup>50</sup> Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', p. 143.

<sup>51</sup> Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', p. 143.

<sup>52</sup> Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', p. 144.

- Putin is overly sensitive about the relationship with ‘the West’ and is acutely aware of the West’s technological, economic and military superiority. His strategy is too off-balance to balance his perceived adversary by inducing surprise.

In other words, Hill argues that Putin may after all be a strategist for the very fact that his strategy is asymmetric to the notion of strategy held by his perceived adversaries. Putin’s strategy operates based on broad maxims – flexibility, adaptability, improvisation, surprise – whereas the strategy of his adversaries operates based on a plan.

While Fiona Hill does not point to the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, her analysis suggests that from Putin’s perspective, surprise is of strategic relevance to Putin. And while she does not explain how surprise was achieved in the annexation of Crimea, she nonetheless provides a clue how Putin goes about it in general: by targeting and manipulating the mindset of individuals at the very top of government – not of the general public.

#### 1.1.3. *Putin and surprise*

The previously discussed examinations of the Russian president share the observation that to the Russian president, surprise is of utmost relevance. They, too, acknowledge surprise have played a role in the annexation of Crimea. This notwithstanding, their characterisations of the Russian president and what role surprise plays for him are diametrical:

- Surprise is the outcome of Putin’s inability as a strategist; it is an expedient of his inability to act strategically, but not the outcome of a (pre-planned) strategy.
- Surprise is a strategic maxim for Putin; For Putin, strategy lies not in a plan, but in the maxims flexibility, adaptability, and exploitation of unexpected opportunities.

Despite a unequivocal acknowledgement that surprise is relevant in the context of Crimea and Putin, with the exception of those arguing that the West is to blame itself for being surprised, none of these works describe how Putin goes about to achieve surprise – because before it can be exploited, it needs to be created. This requires looking at more depth at the question Stephen Treisman rightfully raised but failed to answer – *how* Crimea was annexed.

## 1.2. A pivot to information operations vs. the continued relevance of the battlefield

### 1.2.1. *Pivot to Information Operations: Information operations as central to the annexation of Crimea*

A key role in the debate how Crimea was annexed was a blog entry by Mark Galleotti in July 2014, in which he reprinted a speech delivered by Valeri Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, on the future shape of war, and what can be learned about the future of war by considering early 20<sup>th</sup> century Soviet military intellectuals. The speech was delivered in before Crimea was seized, and much of it read like a blueprint for the way Russia then went about it<sup>53</sup>. The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ Galleotti had uncovered, provided a possible conceptual framework of a plan, and if not that, then at least it provided very strong evidence for the assumption that Crimea followed a detailed plan authored by Putin and his military. It fell very nicely into the emerging narrative that the annexation was planned well in advance, and the execution of a plan.

The Gerasimov Doctrine was quickly adopted by many, and in conjunction with the hard to argue away fact that Russia did annex Crimea a ‘new way of war’ was diagnosed. Soon this new way of war received its own name: ‘Hybrid War’.

The term ‘hybrid war’ existed prior to 2014<sup>54</sup>. But only in the aftermath of Crimea’s annexation and Russia’s subsequent activities in Eastern Ukraine, its perceived meddling with elections in the United States, BREXIT, and supporting divisive political movements in other countries it received heightened attention<sup>55</sup>. A comprehensive study led by NATO-researchers developed the following definition of hybrid warfare:

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<sup>53</sup> Galleotti, Marc: ‘The Gerasimov-Doctrine and Russian Non-linear War’, in: In Moscows Shadows, 06.07.2014, online available: <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>, last accessed 29.03.2021. Since then, Marc Galleotti has acknowledged that it is wrong to speak of a ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and deduct implications on contemporary Russian warfare from the speech, and publicly excused himself, see: Galleotti, Marc: ‘I’m sorry for creating the Gerasimov-Doctrine’, in: Foreign Policy, 03.05.2018, online publication available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/>, last accessed 29.03.2021

<sup>54</sup> See Stoker, Donald; Whiteside, Craig: ‘Blurred Lines: Gray Zone Conflict and Hybrid War – Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking’, in: *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 73, No. 1, Winter 2020, Article 4.

<sup>55</sup> A good German language summary and discussion of the hybrid war concept can be found in Asmussen, Jan; Hansen, Stefan; Meiser, Jan: ‘Hybride Kriegsführung – eine neue Herausforderung?’, in: *Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Nr.43, Dezember 2015, Kiel, 2015.

*“[Hybrid Warfare is] the synchronised use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects. [...] Hybrid warfare is asymmetric [...] and [...] shares an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war. This sets hybrid warfare apart from the attrition-based approach to warfare, where one matches the strength of the other, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to degrade the opponent’s capabilities.”<sup>56</sup>*

The concept of hybrid war and the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ were often seen in relation – with Gerasimov’s doctrine providing the Russian military with the grammar to implement this new type of war. The key enabler for Russian power projection, it was held, were Russia’s superior information operation skills. Skills of non-kinetic effect, that require creativity, create ambiguity, and aim at the cognitive elements of war. Key evidence was the observation that from the beginning Russia, made aggressive use of propaganda, and was keen to exploit the opportunities provided by social media to pursue her aims in Ukraine and Crimea.

However, this research is neither interested in assessing the applicability of ‘hybrid warfare’ concept, nor the impact of General Gerasimov’s speech about the value of Soviet military intellectuals and their relevance to contemporary warfare. Nor is it interested in the intricacies of information operations. Instead, the following will examine whether previous publications have established an interrelationship between information operations and surprise in the annexation of Crimea.

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<sup>56</sup> Multinational Capability Development Centre (ed.): Understanding Hybrid Warfare, January 2017, p. 8; available online: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/647776/dar\\_mcdc\\_hybrid\\_warfare.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_hybrid_warfare.pdf)

1.2.1.1. Crimea as a test case for Russia's 'new way of war': Which role of information operations.

Russia's information operations in Ukraine received heightened attention. Of key interest to research were the characteristics of Russia's information operations<sup>57</sup>. In addition, attention was given their intended target audience<sup>58</sup> and to the themes or narratives<sup>59</sup> employed by Russia and the channels and agents<sup>60</sup> used by Russia for its information operations. What is apparent in these attempts is that they tend to focus on the Russian speaking audiences both domestically in Russia and the Russian speakers abroad.

A good example is a report analysing Russia's information campaign against Ukraine prepared by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, published in 2015. It finds that

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<sup>57</sup> One of the core interests in the analyses of Russian information operation was to identify patterns of Russian information operations. In "The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a Case Study" Jolanta Darczewska identifies five features of the Russian information campaign during the annexation of Crimea:

- "massive and long-lasting impact (repeat the same themes over and over again)
- Desired information (manipulate messages to play upon the fears of ethnic Russians in Ukraine)
- Emotional agitation (use themes that will make ethnic Russians in Ukraine act out of irrational anger)
- Clarity (present Ukrainian conflict in simple terms of good and evil)
- Supposed obviousness (match propaganda messages with widely held Russian myths and legends),

see: Darczewska, Jolanta: 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study', in: Centre for Eastern Studies(ed): *Point of View*, Number 42, May 2014, p. 25.

<sup>58</sup> Three audience groups are distinguished by these studies: the Russian domestic audience, the Russian speaking audience abroad, and international audience or "the West". Much attention was given to the domestic and Russian speaking audience as target groups, while the international audience played a lesser role.

<sup>59</sup> In relation to the domestic and Russian speaking audience, several dominant themes were employed by Russia:

- positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in Opposition to "decadent" Europe;
- positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union;
- Promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs [...];
- Portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country;
- Referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine's population;
- dividing the West by utilising the different EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historical justifications to legitimize Russia's actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea referendum), see: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed): *Analysis of Russia's information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective*, Riga, 2015; for a more detailed description of the communications themes employed by Russia, see Kofman et al, appendix A, p 79 – 83

<sup>60</sup> Channels: Russia employed various channels to deliver these messages to their target audiences. Of particular role was the state-controlled TV, where synchronized messages could be delivered to both the domestic and the international audience. Furthermore, it made widespread use of the Internet and social media, targeting mass audiences of with messages generated automatically by so called "bots". Traditional means, like newspapers, leaflets or billboards were also employed. Agents: In addition to the media outlets, Russia made use of different agents. These range from formal agents, like Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov, or other Russian politicians and experts to informal agents abroad that support the Russian cause.



*“[...] Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question.”<sup>61</sup>*

But not only did the report find that information operations are central to Russia’s operations, it also concludes that the “[c]risis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long-term strategy”<sup>62</sup>.

The NATO Centre of Excellence considers the annexation of Crimea to be a test case for Russia’s new way of war:

*“Looking at the execution of the Crimea operation, it can be concluded that Russia has been preparing to conduct a modern type of warfare where media and other information channels are an important part of the war theatre, and Crimea [...] an important test case. It proved that by applying the elements of the new type of warfare, victory can be ensured without open military conflict and deployments of large amounts of hard military power to the conflict area”<sup>63</sup>.*

The authors of the report identify several characteristics of the Russian information campaign:

*“thorough Target Audience Analysis; dominance in the information field by speedy production of large quantities of information and its effective distribution; blockage or disruption of hostile information channels; using an asymmetric approach to rebuff the effect of a stronger information subject; effective multi-conduit message distribution; applying social management processes to the target country with social, political, economic and mental changes being achieved through manipulation; gaining the prerogative by surprise attacks; developing one’s own information sources to be able to compete with other countries in the information field; and abusing the lack of clear*

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<sup>61</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.4.

<sup>62</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.5.

<sup>63</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.26.

*definitions and restrictions on international peacetime information influencing activities*”<sup>64</sup>.

Somewhat contradictory, when it comes to the question whether information operations not only played a central, but a decisive role, the authors point out that the effect of all these characteristics of Russia’s information operation in the annexation of Crimea they identified would not have come to full fruition if it would not have been for the “Russian Special Forces (so called “polite men”) on the ground who acted in accordance with the strategy to minimize bloodshed and apply strategic communication intent”<sup>65</sup>. The magic of Russia’s new warfare is therefore not so much a question of the prerogative of the kinetic military operations or the information operations element aiming at hearts and minds, but the seemingly seamless and synchronized implementation of cognitive and physical elements of war.

According to the NATO report, Russia’s new way of war has four characteristics: “escalation, dominance, speed, momentum and deception”<sup>66</sup>. The NATO Centre of Excellence finds that “deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay”<sup>67</sup>. A key feature of Russian deception, the authors argue<sup>68</sup>, is the rapid dissemination of “false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories”<sup>69</sup>. The aim is to delay the adversary’s analysis and decision process, as investigating and disproving this information “requires a lot of time, effort, and resources”<sup>70</sup>. While the report does not establish a direct link between deception and surprise, it is a logical conclusion that delaying the information and decision process increases the risk of the adversary being taken off-guard. More simply: Deception can be regarded as a method to surprise. However, it remains unclear whether the author’s consider deception as part of Russian military tactics or of its information operations – nor whether deception specifically

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<sup>64</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26

<sup>65</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26.

<sup>66</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26.

<sup>67</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 5.

<sup>68</sup> Interestingly, in the report’s discussion about Crimea as a test case of Russia’s new type of warfare, the subchapter on deception considers a different incident, the downing of the passenger flight MH-17<sup>68</sup>. It finds that the focus of Russian deception in this case here is on the dissemination of false or wrong information, with the objective to misguide and manipulate the audience.

<sup>69</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 5.

<sup>70</sup> NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed.): Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 5.

aims to surprise the adversary, or merely to increase the likelihood of the adversary being caught off guard.

In sum, while the report makes a strong case for the importance of information operations to the ‘new’ Russian way of war and concludes that the annexation of Crimea had been planned long in advance, they are less verbose on the interrelation between information operations and surprise. In fact, they do not consider surprise much at all. This notwithstanding, the report suggests that the relationship between information operations and surprise can be found in the term deception, as it may lead Russian adversaries’ analysis to lag behind the actual developments on the ground, and eventually be caught by surprise. However, the report does not allow for a conclusion to which realm deception belongs – the kinetic-military realm or the non-kinetic information operations realm, nor how exactly deception was employed to create which surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea.

#### 1.2.1.2. Russian Strategic Deception

The role of deception in Russia’s information operations has been the subject of a study commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs published in 2016. Rather than seeking to answer the question about the relative role of information operations, and whether Russia was implementing a long-term plan, the study narrowly focuses on Russian deception<sup>71</sup>. One of the reasons for this is that to the authors, “ ‘hybrid war’ as a concept for Russian operations proved to be of little analytical value”<sup>72</sup>.

Deception on the other hand “can be traced to Russian military thinking and it captures an essential feature of the Russian strategy: alteration of the target audiences’ perception of reality to secure strategic objectives”<sup>73</sup>.

Unlike previous attempts analysing Russian information operations, the study is not limited to Russian speaking audiences, or Russian language media and social media platforms. Instead,

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<sup>71</sup> A similar approach was adopted in: Meister, Stefan; Puglierin, Jana (eds): Meister, Stefan; Puglierin, Jana : ‚Perzeption und Instrumentalisierung: Russlands nicht-militärische Einflussnahme in Europa.‘, in: *DGAP kompakt*, Nr. 10, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., Berlin, 2015.

<sup>72</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016, p. 16. Emphasis in original.

<sup>73</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p. 16.

the Finnish volume measures “Russian propaganda and disinformation, here collectively called strategic deception”<sup>74</sup>, in non-Russian speaking countries.

According to the editors, strategic deception differs from standard deception. Deception merely aims to hide an object, “for example as Russia successfully did with the invention of ‘little green men’ during the Crimean operation”<sup>75</sup>, because it seeks to influence the cognition of the adversary. “[...] Strategic on the other hand means that perception(s) of reality based on actual facts on the ground are replaced with simulacra that look real but are artificially created and controlled”<sup>76</sup>. This is done by “using a full spectrum of means from political, informational, economic, financial, and military spheres”. The aim of deception is to put the adversary “into a defence posture and off balance, and thus, conditions are created for (military) surprise”<sup>77</sup>.

Two preliminary assumptions guide the Finnish investigation: The first is that there is a certain congruence between Soviet and contemporary Russian strategic deception. The second is that a distinction must be made between strategic deception aimed at the domestic audience, and strategic deception aimed at international audiences: while the main objective of Russian propaganda and disinformation inside Russia is to win over public support for its actions, “regarding the West [...] Russian communication is not aimed at convincing the decision-makers, but at dazzling the public audience by providing numerous alternative narratives to Western ones”<sup>78</sup>.

The study is not seeking to measure the effect of strategic deception, however: “In this research, we will not study the impact of Russian propaganda and disinformation on target countries above”<sup>79</sup>. In other words, the study does not consider the role strategic deception had in the annexation of Crimea.

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<sup>74</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p.16.

<sup>75</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p. 16.

<sup>76</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p.15.

<sup>77</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p. 16.

<sup>78</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p., 17.

<sup>79</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, p. 16.

Rather, the intention is “to analyse the emergence and evolution of metanarratives about the conflict in Ukraine used in Russia for deception purposes”<sup>80</sup>. On the bases of this analysis the authors seek to “ascertain the main policy objectives of Russian strategic deception inside Russia and in selected countries of the European Union”. It is somewhat mysterious how these main policy objectives can be ascertained if the effect of the means to achieve them – strategic deception – are not considered.

Instead, the Finnish investigation identifies a distinctive vocabulary of the Russian metanarrative, which is then attributed to various channels using this vocabulary categorized in three levels– official statements, mainstream media and the “local blogosphere”<sup>81</sup>. Of these channels, the investigation only examines the first two levels. How the distinctive vocabulary is put into action by these two channels is examined by case studies. These case studies, grouped by country, analyse the prevalence of the metanarratives in the scrutinized countries’. Each case looks at four events, for which the prevalence of the Russian metanarrative in the public discourse of the analysed country is examined.

- The official annexation of Crimea on 16 March 2014.
- The burning of the Trade Union Buildings in Odessa on 2 May 2014.
- The downing of the MH 17 flight on 17 July 2014.
- The emergence of the humanitarian catastrophe narrative in August 2014.

The investigators limit the time frame of analyses to the week *following* each of these events, as they “assume that this time period will be sufficient for tracing the appearance of the major narratives”<sup>82</sup>. In that period, the authors of each case study measure the frequency of appearance and the variability of use in the events studies. In doing so, it is hoped to gain new insights on the scale and intensity of Russian propaganda and disinformation in the target country.

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<sup>80</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, p.53.

<sup>81</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, p., p. 55-58

<sup>82</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, p.58.

The report has six main conclusions<sup>83</sup>:

- 1) The influence of Russian metanarratives on mainstream media remains largely limited. Although the analysed European media quotes, it does not adapt the Russian metanarratives.
- 2) If they were present, it was due to already existing preferences by the given news channel, “not because Russian metanarratives were strong enough to transform the views of the media.
- 3) Generally speaking, the dealing with the Russian meta-narrative by European media was “conscious”.
- 4) The most effective channels for misinformation proved to be the Russian state officials like President Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, or the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry. The systematic use of metanarratives by Russian diplomacy, the editors’ note in their concluding remarks, also is an indication for the continuity of Soviet strategic deception,
- 5) There are limits to the effect of information operations. The authors “did not find a single case of Russian information measures resulting in any meaningful changes in the policies of the countries examined”.
- 6) Well grounded, fact-based knowledge and the willingness to invest into gathering it is the best guard against strategic deception.

To summarize, unlike the previously discussed publication, the study commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International affairs goes to great lengths to fulfil academic standards – and develops a research framework and methodology for its undertaking. While it is helpful to ascertain the prevalence of Russian metanarratives, it allows only for few conclusions on the interplay of strategic deception and its aim, surprise, in relation to the annexation of Crimea.

Firstly, the definition of strategic deception offered raises questions: To the authors, it is synonymous to propaganda and disinformation. But why is there a need to “collectively call propaganda and disinformation strategic deception”? Are they really the same? How does this relate to previous research on propaganda and disinformation, and why is the term strategic deception needed? What role does disinformation and propaganda play in Russia’s overall

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<sup>83</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, p.312.

information operations, are they exclusive to information operations, or are they applied by the military as well? Also, the distinction between strategic deception and standard deception is somewhat nebulous: while the editors consider them to be distinct, they argue that they use the same means – channels of communication – and share the same aim: to surprise the adversary.

Secondly, the authors make no effort to consider what makes the deception they set out to measure ‘strategic’ – which relates to the effect, not to the means applied to achieve this effect. This lack of concern about the term ‘strategic’ can also be observed when considering the timeframe, the study applies to measure the ‘strategic deception’. Whereas the authors describe the aim of “strategic deception to create the conditions for surprise”, they only consider the prevalence of their metanarratives *after* the surprise events, while at the same time failing to pin-point the surprise event. This may explain why the report could not identify substantial policy changes in the examined cases.

Thirdly, there seems to be a mismatch between the actors analysed and the effect observed. To the authors, the objective of “strategic deception” is “not aimed at convincing decisionmakers, but at dazzling the public audience by providing numerous alternative narratives to Western ones “. But what is the role of the wider audience in the creating the conditions for surprise, and why is it more important – strategic – than the decisionmakers in this regard? In addition, if the objective is to dazzle the public with alternative narratives, how are these alternative related to create the condition for surprise – and can their prevalence as antecedent condition for surprise be measured with data produced after the surprise event?

In sum, while the Finnish study aims at fulfilling high academic research standards, there appears to be a mismatch between what they set out to measure, antecedent conditions, effect, and relevant actors. This may be academically satisfying, however, the policy conclusions that can be drawn are somewhat limited. Furthermore, for this research’s interest, while it suggests a link between surprise, information operations, and (strategic) deception, it does not help to clarify how exactly they are interrelated. Like all previous attempts, surprise plays an important role – but neither is it made clear what exactly what was surprising in the annexation of Crimea, nor how this surprise was brought about.



1.2.2. *The continued relevance of the battlefield and military operations*

This leaves the last dimension considered in the context of the annexation of Crimea – the relationship between military operations, information operations, and the annexation of Crimea.

Interestingly, neither the NATO Report, nor the investigation commissioned by the Finnish Institute for international Affairs into Russian strategic deception, conclude that the information operations were decisive for the annexation of Crimea *alone*. Both stress the importance of the traditional military-operational aspect in the peninsula's seizure and consider their simultaneous and seamless application to be the key to success. But due to the focus on the information operation aspect, both attempts also fail to provide exactly how this simultaneous application looked like, and which – with the knowledge of hindsight – was decisive.

Amongst the first critical voices about the focus on the information operation component was Andrew Monaghan. In thorough research of changes to Russian military fighting power<sup>84</sup> he finds that Russia had only paid little attention to information operations. Much rather, the Russian military was concerned with applying the operational lessons learned from its key post-Cold War operations, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia. Rather than paying attention to 'hybrid warfare', a term that remained hyphenated in Russian for a long time, Monaghan argues that Western scholars should refocus on how Putin has fused Russia's power projection capabilities, vesting all authority with the President and the presidential administration. While Monaghan suggests that herein lies Putin's 'Grand Strategy' he is cautious about Russian efficiency and argues that this should not imply that Russia had identified the silver military bullet<sup>85</sup>.

Another study that considers the role of the military in the annexation of Crimea is a edited by Andrew Kofman and published by the RAND Corporation. This study directly addresses the question what was ultimately decisive for the annexation of Crimea – the military operational aspects, or the information operations. The study concludes that in the annexation of Crimea, information operations played only a marginal, if any, role: "The Russian information campaign

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<sup>84</sup> For an excellent reflection on the concept of fighting power see: Sloane, Michael: 'Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory', in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 88., Issue 2, March 2012, pp. 243-263.

<sup>85</sup> Monaghan, Andrew: 'Putin's Way of War: The 'War' in Russia's 'Hybrid War'', in: *Parameters*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2016, p. 66. For an excellent analysis how this pertains to Putin to act strategically, see: Monaghan, Andrew: 'Putin's Russia: shaping a 'grand strategy'?', in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 5, September 2013, pp. 1221-1236.



accompanying its military movements was no more than a minor contributor to what proved to be a conventional takeover”, helped by a number of “unique contextual factors”<sup>86</sup>. Crucially, it argues that the campaign was “a by-product of the general information campaign to convince the Russian domestic audience that Ukraine’s interim government was the result of an illegitimate coup”. While Kofman and his co-authors accept that Russia was engaged in information operations, they do not consider them to be decisive for the overall campaign. To them, in relation to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the role of information operations cannot be traced and measured.

The study does not debunk the role of information operations without having conducted its own assessment of the information operation component<sup>87</sup>. However, like the NATO report on Russia’s information operation, the study only takes into consideration the effect of Russian information operations in the Russian language domain, and it uses the same set of data used by these studies, namely Russian TV stations, and public statements by Putin, his foreign minister Sergey Lawrow or the Kremlin. Much of the RAND findings on the information operations element therefore echo the findings of the previously discussed NATO-report.

Kofman and his co-authors find that the annexation of Crimea was not the product of long-term planning and rest this on the observation that Russia appeared ill prepared to manage the political process of the annexation. It was an ad-hoc decision taken by Putin after the flight of then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich during the night of the 21<sup>st</sup> of February. To the authors, the annexation of Crimea was not the consequence of planning, but a reaction to the dynamic situation on ground. They argue that this becomes apparent by the mixed messaging after the peninsula had been seized. It consisted “of a series of loosely connected messages rather than a carefully considered narrative.

In other words, they also mirror the findings Stephen Treisman had offered earlier on how the decision to annex Crimea, as well as how it then subsequently happened. However, while share Treisman’s observations that it was a snap-decision that led to the annexation, they see different

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<sup>86</sup> Kofman, Michael; Migacheve, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (eds.): ‘Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, RAND Corporation, RR-1498-A, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. XI. Online available at: [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1498.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html), last accessed 29.03.2021. These factors include: confined geography of the peninsula, proximity to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine; legitimate transit arrangements for Russian forces; historical legitimacy of Russian military presence, shared language, culture and other social ties.

<sup>87</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017 appendix A, p 79 – 83.

objectives driving the decision: For Treisman, it was taken to secure the Naval Base in Sevastapol – and the annexation of Crimea the outcome of a dilemma Putin had created himself. To Kofman and his co-authors, securing the Naval Base was part of the swift military operations that aimed at gaining as much as possible – ideally the peninsula.

While the authors find that the role of information operations cannot be traced or measured, the RAND study finds that surprise played a decisive role for the campaign. This findings is based on a single piece of evidence, a protocol of a secret meeting of the Ukrainian National Security Council held on 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, the day after the storming of the Crimean regional parliament, that to the authors goes to show that the Ukrainian leadership was so gravely stunned by the unexpected appearance of heavily armed men and a Russian military snap exercise at their border, that it refrained from ordering its at this moment still superior military to stay in the barracks. They feared that Russia was attempting to lure them into firing the first shot, so that they could claim their response to be a case of self-defence<sup>88</sup>:“The Ukrainians government immediately understood that there were Russian forces on Crimea, but could not discern their ultimate intent, and therefore chose restraint”<sup>89</sup> This gave Russia enough time to re-enforce, so that the Russian forces would at least equal, ideally outweigh the Ukrainian forces on Crimea, as to rule out a military response.

In other words: Had Russia not surprised the Ukrainians so effectively, then the operation would highly likely have taken a less favourable turn for Russia.

The authors find that surprise was achieved by deception. However, they argue that Russia only employed tactical and operational military deception. On the tactical level, it was able to convince the local population that the armed men were a friendly force. On the operational level, Russia disguised its true intentions to the Ukrainians, and thereby delayed their response<sup>90</sup>.

This notwithstanding, the authors find that Russia’s tactical and operational deception had strategic level impact:

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<sup>88</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. 9.

<sup>89</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. 23.

<sup>90</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p 23.

*“At the strategic level, the West mistook Russian tactics aimed to create plausible deniability. As signs of an effort to negotiate a political settlement and then de-escalate, rather than to annex the peninsula. Western officials urged caution and sought to freeze the conflict, thinking Moscow might be seeking an off-ramp to the crisis. [...] The deception also afforded Russia multiple entry points for disengagement and plausible deniability should the operation gone awry. It was in fact, Russia’s exit strategy”<sup>91</sup>.*

Thus, to the RAND researchers, Russian tactical and operational deception, more by incident than by intention, led to strategic level impact, as the West was unable to uncover Russia’s deceptive tactics and therefore cautioned restraint. But if the West represented the strategic level, then the question is whether Ukraine was the only intended victim of deception and ultimately surprise. And, related to that, whether Russian deception was at play in relation to ‘the West’, with the intention to influence decision-makers in a particular way, or only aimed at the wider Russian speaking audience? How did this effect the decision to urge the Ukrainian government to caution restraint?

To The RAND researchers these questions are not relevant and conclude that this surprise was not achieved by the application of Russian information operations or the consequence of long-term planning. Rather, it was the result of Russia’s military-operational ability “to leverage mobility, speed of action [...] and the capability to command forces securely at the small-unit level”<sup>92</sup> that ensured it could then leverage surprise strategically<sup>93</sup>.

Hence, according to the authors, Russia’s military surprise attack coincidentally had strategic effect, enabling Russia to annex Crimea by creating a window to re-enforce its military presence on the peninsula while keeping Ukraine’s international partners guessing about Russia’s next step. To Kofman et al, this effect was not planned or foreseen, but a co-incidence of a surprise attack aimed to take the Ukrainian government off-guard that was then further exploited by Russia and the Russian military. Hence, while the authors acknowledge a force-multiplying effect of surprise that even had impact on the strategic level, what its role for the overall

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<sup>91</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> Kofman et al (eds.): Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. XI.

<sup>93</sup> A finding echoed by Lawrence Freedman, see: Freedman, Lawrence: Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019.

outcome was remains unclear. It furthermore remains unclear from the study how military deception at the operational and tactical level differs from the deception as part of information operations that was considered by other works on Crimea. How are they different, how are they similar? Can they be distinguished? Lastly, if ‘the West’ represented the strategic level in the context of the annexation of Crimea, then it remains unclear from the account why Russia only aimed to surprise and stun the Ukrainian government into inaction. To achieve the strategic aim to annex Crimea, it would seem that the ‘strategic level’, that is the West, and how it would react to Russian military manoeuvres on the Crimean Peninsula, especially against the backdrop of the preceding months of ever-increasing tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia, was also considered by Russia. Unfortunately, however, this is not further explored in the RAND study edited by Andrew Kofman.

### **1.3. Summary: The role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea in the wider debate**

The previous literature review on the annexation of Crimea outlined and discussed a selection of the available literature about the annexation of Crimea with the aim to distil the findings of these works on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea.

Often these publications assume diametrical positions, as was especially witnessed in the debate about the role of information operations and military operations. These differences remain unresolved, however, as until now, no view could *prove* its position for lack of unambiguous evidence. This is an interesting observation, as despite hindsight, and a plethora of publications and investigations into the annexation of Crimea, the case appears like a kaleidoscope – everyone who gets a turn sees things a little different, without being able to prove that this view resembles reality best or better than previous views. This is also true when considering earlier findings and which role they attribute surprise for the annexation of Crimea.

Despite the differences, however, there are also commonalities. One of them is observance of surprise. Without exemption all reviewed publications attribute surprise to have played a role in the annexation of Crimea. Although surprise has not been the research focus of the previously reviewed works, several assumptions why surprise occurred in the context of the annexation of the Black Sea peninsula can be identified in the available literature:

- The 'West' was surprised due to self-delusion about Russia, Putin, and his motives.
- Putin is a gambler and acts irrationally and erratic. Surprise must always be expected.
- Putin is a strategist, and actively pursues a strategy of surprise to off-set Russian disadvantages when directly confronting the West.
- Strategic deception as part of Russian information operations created the conditions for surprise.
- As a co-incident of military tactical and operational deception, surprise rendered strategic level effects.

However, they fail to explain the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea due to gaps on several dimensions:

- What is the effect of surprise on the overall outcome?
- What is the exact relationship between information operations, deception, strategic deception, and surprise? What between military operations, deception, and surprise? What between surprise and strategic surprise?
- What exactly was the surprise/surprising in the annexation of Crimea, and how does it relate to the overall outcome?
- What role for Putin? Is surprise part of his ability as a strategist, or is it an expression of his gambler nature? How did he contribute to surprise?
- Who was the victim of surprise? Ukraine? The Russian speaking audience? The 'West' (who is it?)

In sum, while the phenomenon of surprise is universally observed, which role it had for the annexation of Crimea remains intractable from the selection of literature reviewed for the first part of this literature review.

## 2. Germany and the annexation of Crimea: which role for surprise?

As for the annexation of Crimea and the early days of the on-going Ukraine crises in general, Germany's role in the context of the annexation of Crimea has received considerable attention for two reasons: Germany's special relationship with Russia and Germany's role in the context of the annexation of Crimea. Prior to the review of the literature considering Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea, it seems important to provide a short background on these aspects:

### 2.1. Germany and Russia: It's complicated

What many refer to as 'special relationship' between Germany and Russia prior to the annexation of Crimea developed over shared history and close economic ties. Many of Germany's Western allies, especially the United States had long been critical of what they perceived as German proximity with Russia. But not only Germany's allies were critical. Germany's Russia policy is highly contested domestically as well, as the following outline of the developments in the German-Russian relationship under Angela Merkel shows.

At the beginning of her chancellorship, the relation between the two countries were especially close, best exemplified by a "modernization partnership", which was signed during Angela Merkel's first grand coalition in 2008<sup>94</sup>.

At that time, Germany's foreign minister was Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Steinmeier's first term in the office of federal foreign minister ended in 2009, when his Social Democratic Party experienced a dramatic election result and was voted out of government. Although being victorious in the 2009 federal elections, Angela Merkel did not gain enough votes to rule without a coalition partner and entered a coalition with the liberal FDP party led by Guido Westerwelle for the next 4 years. Guido Westerwelle assumed the office of the foreign minister.

For long, Germany had been considered Russia's best friend in Europe for a number of reasons, but especially for the shared history as well as their economic interdependencies between the two countries. To some, this policy was advocated by *Russland-Versteher*, or Russia-understanders, which refers to policy-makers seeking to understand Russia rather than set

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<sup>94</sup> Petersburger Dialog e.V.: 'Modernisierungspartnerschaft', online available at: <https://petersburger-dialog.de/modernisierungspartnerschaft/>, last accessed 29.03.2021.

Russia its limits. Often, but not exclusively, these Russia-Understanders belonged to the Social Democratic Party and seeing themselves in the lines of former chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, trying to bring new life to the slogan of choice, *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement).

However, Merkel's second government, made up of her conservative CDU and the liberal FDP, continued the foreign policy towards Russia of the previous government. It was the head of the liberal party and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, who signed a second modernisation partnership, that even was to include questions on military modernisation and security in 2010.<sup>95</sup>

At that time, the Russian president was Dimitri Medvedev, while Putin had become prime minister. Although Dimitri Medvedev could never escape the shadow of Putin, and despite the beginning of his presidency in 2008 marked by the 5-day war with Georgia, his approach to Berlin and other Western capitals was more cooperative than his predecessors.

The re-election of Putin gave renewed rise to a debate in Berlin about him and his policy styles, and whether the cooperative stance of German policy towards Russia can continue in German policy circles. Many policymakers in Berlin remembered well that just before ending his second presidential term, the Russian president had already given a taste of how he views the world. In 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, a conference founded during the Cold War to provide a dialogue platform for the two sides of the curtain, Putin was the first Russian president to ever visit the conference. In spite of hopes and contrary to expectations, Putin used the conference stage to lash out at 'the West': He described a world dominated by the single-superpower USA that had overstepped its borders in every aspect, accused NATO and the EU of imposing their will on countries, criticised the eastward-expansion of NATO for bringing military infrastructure close to the Russian territory and warns the military alliance of further escalation. Following the thundering speech by the outgoing Russian president, participants asked whether the world was entering a new Cold War<sup>96</sup>.

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<sup>95</sup> Lavrov, Sergei; Westerwelle, Guido: 'Die deutsch-russische Modernisierungspartnerschaft', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.05.2010, Frankfurt, 2010.

<sup>96</sup>Fischer, Sebastian: 'Putin schockt die Europäer', in: *Der Spiegel*, 10.02.2007, Hamburg, 2007. Available online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/sicherheitskonferenz-in-muenchen-putin-schockt-die-europaeer-a-465634.html> , last accessed: 29.03.2021.



Half a year later, in August 2007, for the first time since 1992, Russian long-range bombers entered British airspace<sup>97</sup>. A year later, in 2008, and just over 100 days after his successor Medwedew took over the presidential office, there was a five-day war with Georgia.

In 2012, Putin became Russian president again, and with it, Russian politics turned increasingly authoritarian. Congruent with the nationalist tone that undergirded his narrative of a *Nowo Rosija* or New Russia approach, the government was getting tougher on those critical of it. This became very visible when in early 2012, when government forces brutally cracked down on protesters on Moscow's *Volotnaya Square* after they had taken to the streets following what many considered rigged regional elections.

None of this was forgotten within German policy circles, and those critical of Germany's ongoing cooperative stance it called out the "Russlandversteh'er" in a parliamentary debate about Germany's Russia policy in November 2012<sup>98</sup>. The debate is noteworthy, as it is not common practice that the German Bundestag discusses the policy the German government should assume vis-à-vis another country in a plenary-session<sup>99</sup>.

However, the debate must also be considered in the domestic German context, and the upcoming 2013 federal elections. Merkel's coalition with the liberal FDP was not a success-story. Especially evident was the difference in the relationship of Angela Merkel to her liberal foreign minister Westerwelle and the relationship she enjoyed with his predecessor Frank-Walter Steinmeier. But not only was Angela Merkel unhappy about the coalition-partner, so was the electorate. The FDP had lost much of its appeal to voters soon after it was elected by introducing policies many voters considered to be clientelist<sup>100</sup>.

Interestingly, Guido Westerwelle, the liberal foreign minister, continued and even expanded the 'modernisation-partnership' with Russia, as for many within Angela Merkel's conservative party, the Social-Democrats were those being too permissive of the Russian government. The Bundestag debate initiated by CDU parliamentarians that were also critical of Merkel of not

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<sup>97</sup> Harding, Luke; Mac Askill, Ewen: 'Putin revives long-range bomber patrols', in: *The Guardian*, 18.08.2007, London, 2007.

<sup>98</sup> See also Heinrich, Alexander: 'Deutliche Worte', in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): *Das Parlament*, 2012, No. 47-47, Berlin 2012.

<sup>99</sup> Schulze, Ingo: 'Diffamiert als „Russlandversteh'er"', in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31.03.2014, München, 2014.

<sup>100</sup> See for example: Focus (ed): 'FDP in Erklärungsnot', in: *Online Focus*, 15.11.2010. Available online at: [https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/parteien-hotel-steuer-fdp-in-erklaerungsnot\\_aid\\_471675.html](https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/parteien-hotel-steuer-fdp-in-erklaerungsnot_aid_471675.html), last accessed 29.03.2021.



being conservative enough can therefore also be understood as an attempt by those fearing that in a second grand-coalition, which the polls at the time already indicated as being likely, the social-democratic coalition partner would seek continue or even expand its traditional line of *Russlandverstehen* or “understanding Russia” approach to Russia. Calling them out in a parliamentary debate may thus have been a move designed to hedge against just that and signal a red line for the potential upcoming coalition treaty negotiations.

The polls proved to be correct, and in 2013, amidst raging protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities that followed a decision of the Ukrainian government to withdraw from an agreement with the European Union that had been negotiated since 2009, Merkel signed the second coalition treaty with SPD in November 2013, after painstakingly long coalition treaty negotiations. The policy towards Russia was considered in these negotiations.

From the beginning, Merkel’s second grand coalition with the SPD, again with Frank-Walter Steinmeier as her foreign minister, was confronted with an increasingly assertive Russia. But it took Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 until Germany changed its policy towards Russia. Whether this surmounts to a paradigm change in Germany’s Russia policy, or whether it was just a temporary stiffening of relations, remains an important question in the German debate<sup>101</sup>.

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<sup>101</sup> Adomeit, Hannes: ‚Bilanz der deutschen Russlandpolitik seit 1990‘, in: Krause, Joachim et al (eds): *SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen*, Issue 4, No. 3, June 2020, pp. 276 – 292.

## **2.2. Germany, the Ukraine-crisis, and the annexation of Crimea: Germany for the first time at the geopolitical centre-stage since the Cold War ended**

The bone of contention that let loose the dynamics that ultimately led to the annexation of Crimea and an ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine was the agreement that the European Union had been negotiating for with 6 former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative since 2009. This joint EU initiative “aims at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation.”<sup>102</sup> The agreement between the EU, its member states and the six former Soviet republics on a closer association with the European Union – but not membership – was to be signed on the occasion of the third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013.

The negotiations about the agreement had been ongoing since 2009, when the Eastern Partnership Initiative was officially launched following a proposal by Sweden and Poland the year earlier. Germany used the opportunity of the inception summit in Prague 2009 to especially highlight the dire economic situation and general political instability in the region, which had greatly been increased by Russia’s illegal occupation of Georgian territory following the five day war between the two unequal rivals the year before and a “gas war” with Ukraine. At that time, the German chancellor was Angela Merkel, and her Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier – Merkel’s first grand coalition government between the conservative CDU and the social-democratic SPD. Russia criticized the initiative, and accused the EU of “trying to carve out a new sphere of influence in what Moscow defines as its region of “privileged interest [...]”<sup>103</sup>

According to one commentator at the time the former Soviet republics “seem divided between Moscow and Brussels and are playing one off against the other.”<sup>104</sup>

This notwithstanding, four years after the EaP Initiative was officially launched in Prague, an association agreement was reached, to be signed by the heads of states of the parties of the agreement at the EU Council summit in Vilnius on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 Vilnius.

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<sup>102</sup> European External Action Service (ed): ‘Eastern Partnership’, online available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/419/Eastern%20Partnership](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/419/Eastern%20Partnership), last accessed 29.03.2021.

<sup>103</sup> Lungescu, Oana: ‘EU reaches out to troubled East’, in: *BBC News Prague*, 07.05.2009, Prague, 2009.

<sup>104</sup> Lungescu, Oana: ‘EU reaches out to troubled east’.

However, the signing ceremony turned sour by Ukraine's stepping back from signing the agreement that was to associate the country more closely with the European Union.

The EaP agreement was the bone of contention for the developments and dynamics that followed. Although the agreement became less central in light of these developments, it played a role throughout. However, at the very latest with the withdrawal of Ukraine from signing the association agreement, the antagonism between Russia and 'the West' over Ukraine became more and more apparent. And in this antagonism that found an interim climax in the annexation of Crimea, Germany played an unusually exposed role and lead the crisis management efforts.

The EaP Agreement also is the backdrop for the second reason why Germany's role in the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea received heightened attention: that the country, especially Chancellor Merkel played a key role throughout – "In fact her actions allowed Germany to assume geopolitical leadership of Europe for the first time since 1945"<sup>105</sup>. The point of interest here is how this leadership was performed was also an important topic on the German role in the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea. While some, like Elizabeth Pond attest the German government to have lived up to the expectations, others, like Hans Kudnani, argues that German leadership was at least lukewarm, as during the crisis that ultimately led to the annexation of Crimea, Germany continued to be torn between East and West<sup>106</sup>. The different assessments on Germany as a geopolitical leader offered by Kudnani and Pond notwithstanding, both make clear that it was the German chancellor and her foreign minister that assumed the role of "negotiator-in-chief" on behalf of 'the West', and directly engaged with their Russian counterparts Putin and Lawrow. They also point to the strong economic interdependence between Russia and Germany, that compromised Germany's brokering position towards Russia in the eyes of its Western allies from the beginning.

Taken together, the two reasons for Germany receiving specific attention also explain why for most of these efforts do not specifically address the annexation of Crimea, but instead refer to the 'Ukraine crisis', of which Crimea is part. As Stefan Meister argues, from the German government perspective, the 'Ukraine crisis' was chiefly a 'Russia crisis'<sup>107</sup>. The relationship

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<sup>105</sup>; Kudnani, Hans; Pond, Elizabeth: Germany's real role in the Ukraine crisis: Caught between East and West, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 2, March/April 2015, pp. 173 – 177.

<sup>106</sup> Kudnani, Hans: 'Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East', in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94 No. 2, pp.175 - 177. March/April 2015; See also: Adomeit, Hannes: 'Bilanz der deutschen Russlandpolitik seit 1990'.

<sup>107</sup> Meister, Stefan: 'Putin richtig verstehen: warum die Ukrainekrise eine Russlandkrise ist', in: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (ed): *DGAP-Standpunkt*, Nr. 6, 2014, Berlin.

with Russia, especially with Putin has been a contested domestic issue prior to the annexation of Crimea. As the beginning of the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine coincided with the German federal elections, many efforts begin their observation with unilateral decision by the Ukrainian president from signing an agreement with the European Union that would associate his country closer with the E.U., and end the observation with the annexation of Crimea, as it marks a climax in the developments, but also a shift in Germany's policy towards Russia, as it agrees to punitive measures against Russia in the form of sanctions.

In addition to the assessment of how it fared in its leadership role, Germany was mostly considered as a key actor within the broader context of 'the West'<sup>108</sup>, or the European Union<sup>109</sup>. The question guiding these efforts however was less to provide a better understanding of what just happened, why and how, but the same question that had been posed to the German government already: how should 'the West' shape its policy towards an assertive and authoritarian Russian government after Crimea had been annexed<sup>110</sup>. Surprise, though, was not specifically considered.

### **2.3. Which role of surprise for Germany in the German debate about the annexation of Crimea?**

However, as the following literature review will show, the question whether surprise could have been averted, and who is responsible for surprise features in the debate revolving around the annexation of Crimea in the German context.

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<sup>108</sup> See for example: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (ed): ‚Die Ukraine-Krise und der Westen‘, in: *Politische Studien* (München), 66 (Mai-Juni 2015) 3, München, 2015, pp. 12-53.

<sup>109</sup> See for example: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): ‚Ukraine, Russland, Europa‘, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, No. 47–48/2014, Berlin, 2014; Schröder, Hans-Henning: ‚Lehren vom Majdan: Russland, die Ukraine und die EU.‘ In: *Russland-Analysen*, Nr. 272, February 2014, p.2 . A valuable approach on how the E.U. fared during the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea is offered by Peter Schmidt, who examines the strategic assumptions of the European Union that ultimately failed. Unlike traditional „strategic blunder“ literature, which tends to focus on the intelligence agencies or the military, Schmidt offers a highly useful approach to assess political blunders, by identifying premises held by the EU that were proven wrong by the developments, see: Schmidt, Peter: ‚Reasons for Big “Blunders” —EU Policy towards Ukraine‘, in: *L'Europe en Formation* 2016/3 (n° 381), pp 73 – 100, 2016.

<sup>110</sup> See for example: Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas: Was lehrt der Ukraine-Konflikt? In: *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, Vol. 11, No. 4, S.521-531, Wiesbaden, 2018.

2.3.1 *A primary source-based account: How the German government experienced the annexation of Crimea.*

An early attempt to make sense of the annexation of Crimea is provided by Andreas Rinke, head of the Reuters News Agency office in Berlin, in a contribution in *Internationale Politik*, titled: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’ – ‘how Moscow lost Berlin’ as early as May 2014<sup>111</sup>. It is an attempt to make sense of the developments that had just occurred and focusses on the German-Russian interaction between July 2013 and April 2014. He finds that initially, the German government was hesitant to change course, but argues that under the impression of Putin’s actions on Crimea was forced to change its traditional ‘balancing’ policy towards Russia: harsh words followed by no substance.

Unlike the previously discussed literature, which relies heavily on secondary sources for its conclusions, Rinke, who published his contribution two months after the peninsula had been seized by Russia exclusively relies on primary sources from the German government involved in the crisis for his conclusions.

An additional difference to the previously discussed works on the annexation is that to Rinke, as to most German commentators and analysts, the time-period that is considered is much longer – dating back to summer 2013, when first signs of Russias change of course in relation to Ukraine became feasible. In his attempt order and structure the events and developments that occurred in this period, Rinke distinguishes 6 phases, summarized in Table .1

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<sup>111</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, in: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Politik (ed): *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 69, No. 3, May/June 2014, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, 2014, pp. 32-45.

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Disillusionment</b>	<b>Protests in Kyiv. Escalation</b>	<b>Russia isolates itself</b>	<b>Rupture</b>	<b>Shock</b>	<b>Preventing spillover</b>	
<i>Duration</i>	01.07. - 28.11.2013	29.11.2013 - 31.01.2014	01.01. - 20.02.2014	21.02. - 02.03.2014	02.03. - 06.03.2014	06.03. - 18.03.2014	
<i>Key dates</i>	<p><b>28.11.2013:</b> Ukrainian President Yanukovich refuses to sign Eastern Partnership Association Agreement with the EU.</p>	<p><b>29.11.2013:</b> Beginning of Mass Protests in Kyiv as response to non-signature comes as surprise for all sides involved. <b>04.12.2013:</b> Acting German Foreign Minister Westerwelle visits Maidan protesters. <b>17.12.2013:</b> newly elected Foreign Minister Frank-Walter-Steinmeier calls Russia's pressure on Ukraine "outrageous".</p>	<p><b>14.02.2014:</b> Steinmeier in Moscow to meet Lavrov and Putin. <b>19.02.2014:</b> German French government summit. <b>20/21.02.2014:</b> Ger/Fra/Pol Foreign Ministers help broker a deal between protesters and Yanukovich government, signed by all sides, initialled by Russian envoy.</p>	<p><b>21./22.02.2014:</b> Yanukovich flees Ukraine. <b>23.02.2014:</b> US warns Russia to not intervene military. <b>22.02.2014:</b> Beginning of pro-Russian protests in Eastern Ukraine. <b>23.02.2014:</b> Merkel calls Putin; Putin appears cooperative. <b>27.02.2014:</b> protesters occupy regional parliament in Crimea. <b>28.02.2014:</b> Merkel calls Putin; Putin assures no regular Russian troops in Crimea, defends demands of pro-Russian population in Crimea.</p>	<p><b>02.03.2014:</b> Phone call Merkel / Putin: Putin for the first time acknowledges relationship between militias in Crimea and Russian armed forces. <b>05.03.2014:</b> Steinmeier meets with Lavrov and Kerry in Paris. <b>06.03.2014:</b> amidst EU Council meeting discussing sanctions, news is that the referendum has been moved ahead to 16.03.2014.</p>	<p><b>11.03.2014:</b> Merkel speech in Bundestag preparing MPs for sanctions against Russia (several members of her own party voiced empathy for Russian behaviour). <b>13.03.2014:</b> Merkel states that Russia uses methods of 19th and 20th century. <b>16.03.2014:</b> Referendum on Crimea deciding for joining Russian Federation. <b>17.03.2014:</b> additional US and EU sanctions against Russia. <b>18.03.2014:</b> Putin gives speech in Duma, signs accession of Crimea to Russia.</p>	<p>After 19.03.2014</p>

Table 1: The six phases how Moscow lost Berlin by Andreas Rinke

Throughout these 6 periods, Andreas Rinke identifies several events he characterises as ‘surprising’ to the German government.

#### 2.3.1.1. Ukrainian U-turn on Association Agreement with European Union

The first surprise is the Ukrainian president’ refusal to sign the EU Eastern Partnership Agreement (EaP) on the occasion of the EU-Council summit on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 in Vilnius. According to Rinke it was clear to the German government that Putin had pressured the Ukrainian president to stay away from signing the deal. According to his sources it was motivated by Putin’s desire to include Ukraine into his own economic bloc, the Eurasian Customs Union. Putin’s pressure was the key driver that led to a change of policy amongst those in the German government that had traditionally called for a more friendly course towards Russia – the *Russlandversteher*.

Rinke does not provide much detail on how Putin exerted this pressure on Yanukovich, or whether he did so with the intention to surprise Germany or the European Union. He only points out that Putin and Yanukovich met on several occasions, and that Putin had voiced concerns over “technical issues” that would prevent Ukraine to become a member of his Customs Union if it signed the deal.

Rinke describes the effect of Yanukovich refusing to sign the EaP association agreement in Vilnius: “In Berlin and Brussels, there is a deep seated feeling of shock and having been defeated.”<sup>112</sup>

#### 2.3.1.2. Mass protests in Kyiv

The second surprise event, according to Rinke not anticipated by neither Russia nor Germany, was the mass-protests that immediately followed Yanukovich’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 and lasted until the last week of February 2014. Rinke argues that from the German perspective, the persistence of the protesters and the inability of Yanukovich to end the protests, leads Putin to change his policy towards Yanukovich. Had he first offered the Ukrainian president financial assistance to alleviate him from the dire economic situation the country found itself in until then, now he increased pressure on him<sup>113</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 36.

<sup>113</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 36.

In his account, Rinke does not offer details on how Putin exerted this pressure on Yanukovich. In addition, this observation is somewhat contradictory to the observation by the German government, to whom Yanukovich's walking away from the EaP association agreement signing ceremony was the result of Putin putting pressure on Yanukovich.

The German government, under the impression that the mass protests are pro-European, and despite the "poison of mistrust Yanukovich's withdrawal had triggered"<sup>114</sup>, continued to hope that there is still a chance for the association treaty to be signed by Ukraine. Due to the German assumption that Putin is unlikely to escalate the situation in Ukraine before or during the upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi, efforts undertaken by German and E.U. diplomats to convince Putin that the association agreement is neither a threat to Russia, nor does it preclude Ukraine's membership in the Customs Union, are further intensified. An additional reason for this is the assumption held by the German government that if the domestic situation in Ukraine is not resolved before the end of the Sochi Olympic games on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February 2014, a Russian escalation must be feared.

Rinke reports that on 14<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, now German Foreign Minister for the second time, visits Moscow and speaks with Putin and Lavrov. His efforts to lobby their support for the establishment of an international contact group and an OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine are ill-fated. Rather, Putin and Lawrow bemoan Western interference into Ukraine's domestic affairs – and ensure that the territorial integrity of Ukraine will be observed.

Shortly after the foreign minister's failed Moscow mission, on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February, violence erupts in Kyiv, leaving many dead and wounded. According to Rinke in this moment Germany becomes a key player in the management of the crisis<sup>115</sup>. He argues that so far, diplomatic efforts were led by the European Union's High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Füle, but did not reach much. Furthermore, during the escalation on Maidan High Representative Ashton was preoccupied with negotiations with Iran to convince the country to desist a further build-up of its nuclear program.

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<sup>114</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 37.

<sup>115</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 38.



According to Rinke, the new German role as the West's chief negotiator becomes evident after a meeting of the Franco-German Council of Ministers held on the 19<sup>th</sup> of February 2014. On the following day, Germany, together with France and Poland, took the lead in helping to broker an agreement between the protesters in Kyiv and other (western) Ukrainian cities, and the Yanukovich government. On 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2014 an agreement was signed. Russia was also present as Viktor Yanukovich had asked them for their support, only initialled the agreement.

#### 2.3.1.3. The president's gone, long live the president? Yanukovich's disappearance

On 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2014, despite the agreement, a third surprise occurs – Ukrainian president Yanukovich flees Ukraine. According to Rinke, in the wake of this surprise development, the domestic conflict in Ukraine turns into “an open international conflict”<sup>116</sup>.

From the German perspective, the signing of the agreement, meant that the pro-Western opposition would take over the government in Kyiv, which led Putin to change “to Plan B, in order to maintain Russian influence in strategically important regions in Ukraine”<sup>117</sup>. The main driver for this change was Putin's “fear that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union [Russia] may now also lose control over the northern Black Sea Region, and alongside with it, access to the Mediterranean”<sup>118</sup>. However, as the unnamed sources Rinke references point out, “these developments were not clearly discernible at the time”.

By all accounts, an overnight disappearance of a president who had just signed an agreement after months of domestic crisis is an extraordinary event. However, the hindsight assessment of one of Andreas Rinke's sources leaves unclear whether it was Yanukovich's disappearance, or the agreement that triggered Putin's change of plans. It raises the additional question why Russia would then have initialled the agreement if it would lead to such deterioration of its position, or whether Russia was involved in the disappearance of Yanukovich.

At the time this meant that the German government did not focus on Russia and the developments on Crimea. Instead, the main attention given to the Ukrainian domestic situation. Under the impression of far reaching decisions taken by the new government in Ukraine that triggered pro-Russian protests in Eastern Ukraine on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, the main effort by

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<sup>116</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 38.

<sup>117</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 38.

<sup>118</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 38.

the German government was to prevent the Ukrainian government to undertake further steps that may lead to a splitting of the country or civil war.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February, the last day of the Sochi Winter Olympics, Andreas Rinke accounts for a warning to Russia to not intervene into Ukraine militarily issued by the U.S. national security advisor, Susan Rice. He also mentions that on the same day Merkel calls Putin, who appeared cooperative: Putin, too, wishes a stable Ukrainian government capable of acting and supports the notion that Ukraine's territorial integrity must be retained<sup>119</sup>.

The cooperative tone notwithstanding, according to Andreas Rinke's sources there are growing concerns about the Russian motives in Berlin. The disappointment about the developments that followed the diplomatic efforts to negotiate between the opposing sides in Kyiv looms large in the German chancellery and foreign ministry. In addition, there are increasing signals that Crimea might opt for a secession. On 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, the regional parliament in Crimea is occupied, a Russian flag hoisted on the building, and a referendum about the future of Crimea announced for the end of May 2014. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, armed men without insignia storm the airports of Simferopol and Sevastopol. These armed militia-men, Rinke argues, "have formed weeks before and in parallel to the Maidan protests, and it is insinuated that they are steered by Moscow"<sup>120</sup>. This is denied by Putin in another phone conversation with Merkel on the same day, in which he states that there are no regular Russian troops active on Crimea. However, he also 'expressly' supports the demands of the pro-Russian Crimean population during the call.

Rinke does not characterise these events as surprise, but as signals that Crimea might opt for secession. This is noteworthy, as in the previously discussed literature about the annexation of Crimea, it is usually these events, that in addition to the disappearance of Yanukovych, are characterised as surprising.

#### 2.3.1.4. The decisive call

According to Rinke's sources, the 02<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014 marks a decisive turning point in the German Russian relations, as during this call, "Putin omits for the first time that the militias

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<sup>119</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 38ff

<sup>120</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', p. 39

operating on Crimea have direct links with the Russian troops.”<sup>121</sup> According to Rinke’s sources, the phone call leads “international crisis diplomacy to run at full speed.”<sup>122</sup>

It furthermore led to a re-assessment of the German governments’ analysis of Russia’s intention in relation to Crimea. According to Rinke, the German chancellor and her foreign minister speak on the phone several times before and after the phone call with Putin. “There is broad agreement in the internal analysis: Russia indeed plans for the secession of Crimea. Both [Merkel and Steinmeier] feel deceived and lied to by the Russian president”<sup>123</sup>.

Consequently, there was also agreement between the two German top-decision makers personally involved in the developments when it came to the appropriate response by the German government: Germany, the EU, the West must take a tougher stance on Russia if they want to keep their chances to make Putin change his mind. Following the motto “We have to see what is still possible with Russia”<sup>124</sup>, Rinke identifies three policy objectives the German government pursued simultaneously following the phone call between Merkel and Putin on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March:

- To help Ukraine stabilize economically with EU funding.
- Move Russia to “international coordination about and with Ukraine” through the establishment of an International Contact Group.
- Prepare sanctions to signal Putin how serious the situation is.

Rinke also points out that the German government imposed itself a deadline for reaching these objectives before re-considering “what is still possible with Russia”: the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, when the EU Council was to convene for a summit in Brussels<sup>125</sup>.

Rinke continues that once the German government had decided what it was aiming for and gave itself a deadline to achieve these objectives, the decision was swiftly operationalized – with Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier taking a leading role as ‘the West’s’ chief negotiator in the field just a week after he had brokered the deal in Kyiv.

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<sup>121</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 40.

<sup>122</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 40.

<sup>123</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 40.

<sup>124</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 40.

<sup>125</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

Unfortunately, Andreas Rinke makes no mention whether the ‘decisive’ phone call also contained elements of surprise. He leaves open whether it was ‘decisive’ because the German chancellor did not expect the anonymous paramilitary forces that were occupying strategic locations on the Crimean Peninsula had direct links with Russian military forces, or whether other aspects related to this omission led to the change of German policy.

#### 2.3.1.5. The shock: a referendum

Already on the day following the decisive phone call, Rinke’s account continues, the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March, Steinmeier has to convince his European colleagues at an EU Foreign Minister summit – here, “he ha[d] to fight to not yet impose sanctions”, which he ultimately succeeded in<sup>126</sup>. Rinke reports that following his performance at the Foreign Ministers summit, on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March, he meets his Russian colleague Lavrov for an informal dinner in Geneva. While the Russian foreign minister used the opportunity to repeat the Russian charges against the new Ukrainian government, its neo-fascist ideology, that it came to power by an illegal coup d’état and that the West is to blame for the chaos in Ukraine, the German foreign minister sought to convince his colleague to accept the idea of an international contact group and return to the negotiating table -and accept Ukraine at it, too. Unlike on the previous day with his E.U. colleagues, Steinmeier failed in his informal endeavour with his Russian counterpart.<sup>127</sup>

However, as Rinke accounts, he was to have a second chance on the following day– this time supported by the U.S. secretary of state, John Kerry, the French foreign minister Laurent Fabius and UK’s foreign secretary William Hague. The informal foreign ministers meeting in Paris began with a direct interaction between John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov, which lasted much longer than anticipated – however, again to no avail. The bilateral meeting was followed by a meeting between all foreign ministers present in Paris. According to Rinke, the four NATO foreign ministers almost convinced Sergey Lavrov of the idea to establish an international contact group – “until he gets a phone call from Moscow [...] and postpones the talks.”<sup>128</sup> An outcome that could not be changed even by a phone call from Angela Merkel to the Russian president.

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<sup>126</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

<sup>127</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

<sup>128</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

This meant that the end of the self-imposed deadline had passed without being able to move Russia back to the negotiation table by the self-imposed deadline, the 6<sup>th</sup> of March. According to Rinke, the German government – this time Angela Merkel representing Germany at the EU Council – “intended to discuss two types of sanctions”<sup>129</sup>: in a first step the freezing of diplomatic contacts and, as a second step, the freezing of assets and the imposition of visa-restrictions.

However, the summit ended with a much tougher EU response than the German government had intended. During the negotiations amongst the EU member states’ heads of state, the news broke that the Crimean government announced that the referendum had been moved ahead again, this time to the 16<sup>th</sup> of March. This had “massive influence on the debate amongst the heads of state”<sup>130</sup>, and instead of the two-step sanctions approach proposed by Germany, the 27 member states agreed to a three-step sanction regime, adding economic sanctions if Russia destabilizes further parts of Ukraine. Angela Merkel, too, Rinke accounts, takes a much tougher stance from that moment on<sup>131</sup>.

Andreas Rinke describes the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU Council summit as a shock. The Oxford dictionary describes the word shock as “a strong feeling of surprise as a result of something happening, especially something unpleasant; the event that causes this feeling.”<sup>132</sup>

Thus, Rinke’s primary source-based description of the impact of the news during the EU Council summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March suggests that in the series of surprise events identified, the announcement of the Crimean regional parliament is the event that marks the strongest feeling of surprise. Unfortunately, he does not explain why this referendum was particularly surprising or considers its effect in the context of the overall outcome. Instead, from Andreas Rinke’s chronological account that considered how, and under which circumstances German policy towards Russia changed between late Summer 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in

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<sup>129</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

<sup>130</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

<sup>131</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 41.

<sup>132</sup> The Oxford Dictionary online, see:

[https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/shock\\_1#:~:text=%5Bcountable%2C%20usually%20singular%2C%20uncountable,terrible%20shock%20the%20other%20day](https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/shock_1#:~:text=%5Bcountable%2C%20usually%20singular%2C%20uncountable,terrible%20shock%20the%20other%20day) , last accessed: 29.03.2021

spring 2014, the phone call between the German chancellor and the Russian president on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March was decisive for Germany.

#### 2.3.1.6. The inevitable outcome: annexation by referendum

Following the EU Council summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, in addition to agreeing to impose sanctions against Russia in the E.U. framework the German government tried to convince the Russian government to not support the holding of the referendum – while making clear that it would not acknowledge its outcome. However, to no avail. The course of history could not be changed anymore: the referendum was held on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March, and the ethnic-Russian dominated Crimean population voted in favour of joining the Russian Federation.

Following the referendum, the last phase Rinke discerns begins: the beginning of the escalation, with Germany and the ‘Western’ governments taking punitive action against Russia in the form of sanctions. At this point, Rinke notes that “all actors acknowledge that they have assumed for too long that Putin follows the same logic as the West; but he follows his own”.<sup>133</sup>

Rinke argues that German policy between the federal chancellery and foreign office was well coordinated. The differences, at best, were nuances. As one of his sources “jokingly” states about the differences: “[O]ne sides wants to set Russia its limits, while maintaining the channels of communication – the other wants to maintain the channels of communications while setting Russia its limits.”<sup>134</sup>

The harmonic interplay between the two German strategic-decision makers as well as their bureaucracies, Rinke finds, is much helped by three factors: Firstly, the German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, traditionally in favour of maintaining closer ties with Russia, had felt betrayed and lied to by Russia – and also learned that Russia could not be moved in this question. More precisely, he felt that Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov whom he had known for such a long time could not be moved. Secondly, on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, then leader of the Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, met with Vladimir Putin in person, and “returns sobered up about Russia”<sup>135</sup>. According to Andreas Rinke, these personal experiences of the two leading figures of the Social Democratic Party – the “Russia -Understander Party”-, helped

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<sup>133</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 43.

<sup>134</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 42.

<sup>135</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 42.

the German government to take a unified stance in confronting the German private sector, who was critical of economic sanctions<sup>136</sup>. The third element that according to Rinke helped the agreement within the German government was what Rinke describes as “congruence” of the German and the U.S. position, as “despite all statements about U.S. resolve”, the United States also “warned the eastern Europeans to not shoot beyond the aim”<sup>137</sup>. At the end of the day, Russia, Rinke found, was too important for the United States to find solutions for other conflicts, be it in Syria, Iran, or the Near and Middle East.

Rinke suggests that from the German government’ perspective at that time, a repeat of the annexation of Crimea in Eastern Ukraine was unlikely, due to the military and logistical complexities of such an attempt. Therefore, Berlin repeats its call for an Exit-Strategy in policies towards Russia, “as Russia is not going to leave Europe”<sup>138</sup>. Rather than escalation, this suggests that Germany was trying ways to convince its partners and Russia to identify ways to wind back the sanctions that were just imposed. As Rinke writes: “After [the referendum] the German government in principle remained with the triad “talks with Moscow”, “if necessary, sanctions” and “Aid for Ukraine””. Hence Germany’s strategy for dealing with Russia have not changed substantially after Crimea was annexed, and remained de-escalatory rather than escalatory.

In closing his account, Rinke even reports a sense of self-complacency amongst the German government, when he cites one of his anonymous sources at the end of his account, arguing that despite the unwanted outcome on Crimea, other than following the war with Georgia in 2008, war was averted, and Russia will pay a heavy price for its renewed landgrab<sup>139</sup>.

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<sup>136</sup> Here Andreas Rinke raises an interesting development in the domestic German debate, as he points out that at that time, in Angela Merkel’s CDU, who had been leading the criticism of the *Russlandversteher*, had turned into *Russlandversteher*, many members had developed sympathy for the Russian, but antipathy for the Ukrainian course, causing the German government to continue to caution the Ukrainian government against any steps that could escalate the situation prior to the referendum, see: Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 43.

<sup>137</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 42.

<sup>138</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 44.

<sup>139</sup> Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’, p. 44.



### 2.3.1.7. Summary: A primary source-based account

Andreas Rinke argues that between July 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Germany and the German top-leadership experienced several surprise events – Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the association treaty; the mass-protests that followed in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine; Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine after a deal had been brokered between him and the protesters; the announcement of the Crimean regional government to hold a referendum about the peninsula joining the Russian Federation.

Unlike in the research on the annexation of Crimea discussed in the previous chapter, which often is unspecific about what exactly, or which event was surprising, Andreas Rinke accounts that from a German government perspective, there were several surprise events he clearly identifies. He even distinguishes their quality, by characterising the unexpected announcement of the Crimean regional government as a shock, to characterise the event as an occasion when the German government’s feeling of surprise was especially strong. However, even though he is more specific in pointing out which event was surprising than other scholars, this review finds that in relation to the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, Rinke, too, raises more questions than he answers.

This is also true for the explanations why the German government was surprised on the various occasions that could be identified in *Wie Moskau Berlin verlor*. In this context it also becomes apparent that the reliance on primary-source oral interviews only is a dual-edged sword for research: While Rinke’s reliance on primary sources provides rich insight into the German reading of Russian courses of action, it is problematic from the researcher’s perspective, as they have opted to speak with Rinke on the premise of anonymity. While there is no reason to doubt the validity of the statements of the sources to provide valid insights into what happened, it cannot be assessed with how many individuals Rinke spoke, where they work in government, and what their relationship to the decision-making during the crisis was. That the reliance on interviews with primary sources may be problematic from a research perspective is furthermore shown in the variance of explanations why surprise occurred to the German government found in Andreas Rinke’s article. Three different explanations why the German government was taken off-guard could be identified:



- a. it was not possible read Putin's next step during the situation, because everything was marred with ambiguity – and certainty was gained in hindsight, after Russia had created facts on the ground. At the time, the rapid developments made it impossible to process and analyse incoming information correctly.
- b. The German government had been suffering from mirror imaging: “for too long, one has been operating on the premise that Putin follows the same logic as the West; but instead, he followed his own”, which inhibited it from separating the wheat from the chaff.
- c. Merkel and Steinmeier were deceived and lied to by Putin personally.

While each of these explanations why the German government was surprised may stand on its own, they could equally have been at work at the same time, or at different times in relation to different events. Unfortunately, Rinke does not observe the discrepancy that becomes apparent in his primary sources' statements', and thus does not offer any further explanations.

Like the literature reviewed in the first part of this literature, Andreas Rinke argues that Russian deception has contributed to the German government being caught unaware. However, unlike previous literature, which considered deception to either be aimed at the wider public, or be a military operational practice, Rinke suggests that from the German government perspective, deception was directed at the top-leadership involved, and done by the Russian president personally. However, Rinke fails to detail how exactly Putin deceived Merkel and Steinmeier.

Instead, Rinke argues that the decisive moment in the relationship between Germany and Russia was a phone call between Merkel and Putin on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March and argues that it was Putin's admonition that the anonymous paramilitary troops had direct links with the Russian military, which led the German government to change its stance towards Moscow. At the same time Rinke insinuates that it was this admission that triggered the sensation by Merkel and Steinmeier that Putin had deceived them and lied to them. What does not become clear from Rinke's account, however, is whether this admonition by Putin was a surprise to Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and how Putin had contributed to creating the conditions for it. This question becomes especially pertinent when considering that between the first appearance of unidentifiable men using Russian military equipment occurred 72 hours earlier – and that besides taking the Crimean regional parliament hostage and replacing the pro-Russian governor that had been elected just a week earlier with an even more pro-Russian governor, hoisted an

oversize Russian flag over the occupied building. Taken together, from Andreas Rinke's primary source based attempt the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea from a German perspective remains unfathomable.

### 2.3.2. *Surprise despite warning? A view from the German foreign intelligence service*

Although Andreas Rinke identifies multiple events that were surprising to the German government, in his chronological tracing of events from the German government perspective and offers various explanations as to why surprise occurred to the German government, he does not ask whether the German government could have averted these surprise events. To the contrary. For one, he does not link the premises and assumptions guiding the German policy to those events characterised as surprising, making them appear freak events, bolts from the blue impossible to anticipate – and thus to prevent. Secondly Andreas Rinke draws an image of a harmoniously functioning German government, where seemingly everything was 'under control' despite these unexpected developments. Even though the outcome is not what the German government had aspired and fought for, Rinke closes his account on a note of complacency he ascribes to one of his sources – under the circumstances, the German government and its allies fared better than it had before, when Russia occupied Georgia in 2008.

However, a year after Rinke's publication, an article appeared in the German daily newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* drawing a different picture about the inner workings of the German government before and during the crisis. In an article that was published a year after Crimea's annexation in March 2015, under the title '*Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND*' (Sometimes even Putin is surprised by the BND) the German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is discussed in the context of foreign and security policy decision-making the role of service prior and during the Ukraine crisis specifically addressed<sup>140</sup>. It suggests that even if the annexation of surprise may not have been prevented by the German government, the developments should not have come as a surprise, as the intelligence service had provided warning that Russia might seek a more assertive course since the war with Georgia.

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<sup>140</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: 'Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 09.03.2015, Frankfurt, 2015.

The article is one of the rare media publications about how the German foreign intelligence service goes about its business and discusses its role in the German policy and decision-making process.

#### 2.3.2.1. Institutional framework: the place of intelligence in Germany's foreign and security policy architecture

The BND is under the direct responsibility of the German federal chancellery. As a subordinate federal authority, it has its own president and bureaucracy but reports to intelligence coordinator in the chancellor's office. The primary consumer for BND intelligence is the federal chancellery and the federal ministries. On a daily base intelligence dossier grouped by regions are sent to the corresponding department heads in the chancellery and federal ministries. If at this level the incoming information is considered to require urgent action, the information will be passed up the federal chancellery's hierarchy. The chancellor herself will be taken into the loop last, and from her intelligence coordinator personally.

The newspaper article also describes how these dossiers are structured: They typically describe three scenarios, which are based on estimates the BND extrapolates from the information it collects and analyses. However, the service usually refrains from making political conclusions, as "this is a political task"<sup>141</sup>.

#### 2.3.2.2. A disputed agency: the role of intelligence in Germany's foreign and security policy

The article reports that within the German government, the BND is not undisputed, and has lost influence especially since Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2005. From the onset of her chancellery, her relationship with the German intelligence services has been a rather distant one. The authors of the article argue that her biographical background, being born in the German Democratic Republic and having experienced first-hand the methods and means of the Eastern German intelligence service Stasi, had made her sceptical about the role of intelligence services. While this points to idiosyncrasies in Angela Merkel's relationship to intelligence services, the article points out that her predecessors showed similar levels of disinterest: Like her predecessors she does not participate in the weekly intelligence briefing, which is usually held at the level of state-secretary, the highest ranking officials in a German federal ministry. This

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<sup>141</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

notwithstanding, the German chancellor is also characterised as not entirely rebuffing the services of the BND, as she “sometimes requests briefings, but she prefers broader crisis reports over purely intelligence-based briefings”<sup>142</sup>.

According to the article, not only the chancellor is cautious about German foreign intelligence service and its analysis. As the article points out, her reluctance is mirrored in the federal chancellery as well as by the federal foreign office. Both, the article reports consider the BND as “alarmistic”, and according to the article, particularly the foreign office had rejected intelligence reports on Russian military modernization since the Georgia War 2008. The estimates that Russia may choose a more aggressive and militaristic foreign policy course offered by the BND were not considered for political reasons. “They would stand in the way of deepening strategic relationships.”<sup>143</sup> And therefore, as the article points out “German politics bet on partnership instead of changing its policies”<sup>144</sup>.

#### 2.3.2.3. Could the annexation of Crimea be foreseen, and surprise be averted?

The article also asks its sources if an annexation of Crimea was a scenario the BND had identified, reported and discussed with the political leadership? According to the source consulted for the publication, such a scenario was discussed at the Foreign Offices policy and plans unit shortly after the Georgia War in 2008, but soon dismissed as “unlikely” by the diplomats.

However, the article goes on to argue that Even if it had been taken up as a likely scenario – foreseeing that Putin would decide to annex Crimea would have been impossible, “a high ranking security official” cited in the article argues: “To be able to have known about this decision, one would have had to run Putin as a source”<sup>145</sup>. To the official’s mind, the decision was a snap decision taken personally by Putin and very few individuals, after his Ukrainian crony, Viktor Yanukovich, unexpectedly fled the country. For Putin, this came equal to defeat, and instead of welcoming Yanukovich in Moscow, he only offered him exile in Rostov/Don. Initially, the source is paraphrased, Putin continues to leverage his influence through Yanukovich’s political party in Ukraine. “The decision to annex Crimea is taken only after the

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<sup>142</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

<sup>143</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

<sup>144</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

<sup>145</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

party announces its dissolution, the status of the Russian language is threatened and the lease agreement for the Russian naval base in Sevastopol is being questioned by the new Ukrainian government”.<sup>146</sup>

In other words, it was an ad-hoc decision, a knee-jerk reaction taken by the Russian president alone, some days after the disappearance of Yanukovich, impossible to foresee and warn against. This notion is very similar to that offered by Stephen Treisman in his characterisation of the erratic leader Putin discussed in the previous chapter. This notwithstanding, the article insinuates that even if the exact moment and circumstances may have been unforeseeable, it should not have come as a surprise by German decision makers as the its intelligence service had long reported about Russia’s military modernization and increasingly assertive foreign policy in its neighbourhood. The article this concludes by stating:

“What politics was lacking was a sensorium which conclusions one had to draw from the developments in Russia [...] Berlin assumed the best case, even it had to close at least one eye for this”<sup>147</sup>

#### 2.3.2.4. Summary: a view from Germany’s foreign intelligence service

Whereas Andreas Rinke identifies several events that were surprising for the German government, and is concise about the dates of these events, the FAZ article considers only one surprise: it characterizes the ‘entire’ annexation of Crimea as surprise. This is also distinct to the literature about the annexation of Crimea discussed in the previous chapter. While here it was found that often it was difficult to identify what exactly was surprising, as the term is used but none of the previously discussed attempts equated the annexation of Crimea – the outcome - with surprise. Instead, the majority considers the annexation of Crimea as a process marked by surprises. However, framing the annexation of Crimea itself as surprise leads to the question what exactly was surprising about it – a question already raised in the previous chapter.

Like Andreas Rinke, the article published in the FAZ relies on primary sources for its argument. The newspaper-article shining a light on the perspective of the German foreign intelligence service BND thus gives reason to question the image of “harmonious crisis management” within the German government. Much more importantly for this research, it questions the

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<sup>146</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

<sup>147</sup> Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘.

reasons why surprise occurred to the German government. It rejects the assumption of surprise events occurring like bolts from the blue, and that it was impossible to foresee at the time what Putin may have in mind. It makes no mention that Russian deception was of concern. It even suggests that the German government need not have been surprised, as the German intelligence had been warning the government repeatedly that Russia might change its foreign policy from cooperative to confrontative.

Clearly, the BND had a perspective on what had occurred that differed not only in nuances to those held in the chancellery and foreign ministry and did not feel its position was adequately represented in the public discourse. Therefore, when reading the article, one cannot help to get the sensation that the German foreign intelligence community was seeking to set their own record straight, by putting the blame at the political top-level. According to the article, the intelligence services had provided the German political decision-makers with warning that could have enabled them to foresee the course Russia took, but the concerns voiced were rejected as alarmist.

In the context of Russia's annexation of Crimea, however, the article makes the point that the exact moment was impossible to foresee, as it was a snap-decision taken by Putin himself. This is akin to the finding of Stephen Treisman, who argues that surprise occurred chiefly because of the idiosyncrasies of Vladimir Putin, which are beyond reason and rationality. However, unlike Treisman who argues that surprise was inevitable because of Putin, the FAZ article suggests that surprise could have been prevented had it not been for the German political decision-makers.

In other words: The German government was surprised by the annexation of Crimea not because it lacked warning, but because the warning was politically unwanted for. This echoes those studies discussed in the previous chapter that argue that surprise was caused by self-delusion, and the unwillingness by political decision-makers to consider available signals. It is distinct from this argument brought to the fore by historians and scholars of strategy, however, as unlike the more academic works that with the knowledge of hindsight provides fitting signals for the eventual outcome, the analysis offered by (German) intelligence services is part of the policy-process; even if dismissed, it is discussed within the complex undertaking captured by the terms government and policy. Secondly, it is distinct as the analysis is not provided with the knowledge of hindsight, but with a view to reduce the uncertainty of the future. These

differences, however, do not question the findings offered by those arguing that ‘the West’ has to blame itself, but rather strengthens them, as it suggests that the signals identified with the luxury of hindsight were known before the outcome were known to the German government, but actively rejected.

Lastly, the FAZ article makes no reference at all to the role of Russian deception or information operations, an aspect observed unanimously in the previously discussed works. This may imply that the German foreign intelligence service does not attribute any role to it or that the German foreign intelligence could provide accurate warning because it had de-ciphered Russian deceptive efforts. It may also imply that from the BND’s perspective Russian deception did not play any role in the context of the annexation of Crimea. The article suggests yet another alternative, however: by putting the blame on the political decision-makers, and charging them to not have heeded to the advice that in hindsight turned out to be accurate, insinuates that the level of self-delusion that reigned in the German government was so high, that Russian deception efforts are a negligible factor when it comes to explaining why the German government was surprised. More simply put: the surprise was home-made, and the consequence of ignorance, rather than of another nations attempts to manipulate the perception of reality. This ignorance required no further feeding by Russian deception.

### 2.3.3. *Willing partners for Russian propaganda? The role of media in the German debate about Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea*

In hindsight, the revelations of the FAZ publication appear explosive enough to set in motion a more systematic enquiry why the German government was surprised. After all, a government agency accused the German political leadership with failure. But the issue was not taken up further in the debate.

The opposite was true for the public debate that followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea about the role of the media<sup>148</sup>. According to a survey conducted in late 2014, “[...] more than 50% of respondents do not believe the media coverage of the Ukraine conflict in Germany. The reasons

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<sup>148</sup> For example, Germany’s leading public broadcasting station, ARD, was heavily criticized for its Russia-critical reporting: Bidder, Benjamin: ‚Programmbeirat wirft ARD „antirussische Tendenzen“ vor‘, in: Der Spiegel, 23.09.2014, Hamburg 2014; for a profound analyses of the German media coverage of Russia, see Pörzgen, Gemma: ‚Das Russlandbild in den deutschen Medien‘, in : Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): *Dossier Russland*, Bonn, 09.05.2018. Online available at: <https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/russland/47998/russlandbild-deutscher-medien> , last accessed 29.03.2021.



mentioned for this critical view include the feelings that reports are one sided and not objective (31%) and that there is even disinformation”<sup>149</sup>.

This criticism was particularly loudly voiced by actors known to be “friendly” towards Putin and Russia, like Gerhard Schröder or Helmut Schmidt, both former SPD chancellors: both argued that the reporting on Russia is biased. But there was no shortage of those arguing the opposite: reporting was pro-Russian. This argument was more in fashion with those belonging to the conservative spectre of German party politics, who were highly critical of Russia, Putin – and social-democrats as well as left leaning journalists<sup>150</sup>.

Both criticisms contained the notion that at least in part, the media is to blame for what happened – and if there had been different reporting, than there might have been different courses Germany could have taken. Because the either too critical or too friendly reporting about Russia and the situation in Ukraine created perceptions that had a negative impact on political decision-making. This provided an alternative scapegoat for the mistakes that according to the German intelligence service were the responsibility of political decision-makers both views on the role of the media could agree on. Unlike the criticism of the government by its own government agency, however, the media scolding led to formal inquiries to assess the objectivity in reporting of the German public broadcasting stations on Russia, the developments in Ukraine and on Crimea. Interestingly, in the heat of the argument no one asked what the role of the media, and what is reported, has on the decision-making in the German government.

The inquiries showed that there was no empirical evidence to the charges being made<sup>151</sup>. This is also the finding of Nicole Ahler’s chapter on Germany in the already discussed edited volume “Fog of Falsehood” commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs<sup>152</sup>. Unlike the account of Andreas Rinke and the report published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which consider the time before Russia annexed Crimea, Ahler, staying true to the methodology

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<sup>149</sup> Burkhard, Fabian: ‘Analyse: Die Ukraine Krise in den deutschen Talkshows’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): *Dossier Ukraine*, Bonn, 24.06.2014. Online available at: <https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/ukraine/187151/analyse-die-ukraine-krise-in-den-deutschen-talkshows> , last accessed 29.03.2021.

<sup>150</sup> Bidder, Benjamin: ‘Programmbeirat wirft ARD „antirussische Tendenzen“ vor’, in: *Der Spiegel*, 23.09.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>151</sup> Pörzgen, Gemma: ‘Das Russlandbild in den deutschen Medien’

<sup>152</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood*, 2016, p.136.



developed for the overall volume, only considers the week after Crimea was integrated into the Russian Federation by a pompous (if not pathetic) event in the Russian Duma presided over by Vladimir Putin. To reach her conclusions, Ahler assesses a selection of Germany media outlets that are selected on the base of their political orientation, from conservative to progressive.

The general criticism on the overall volume applies to the chapter on Germany as well, but the case study too shows that the German media could not be considered servile instruments in Putin's propaganda machinery, but dealt with Russian propaganda "professionally"<sup>153</sup>.

In sum, although soon after the annexation of Crimea there were voices in Germany arguing that the media is at least in part responsible for the unforeseen events in Ukraine and on Crimea, thus offering an additional explanation as to why the German government was surprised, this hypothesis was falsified soon. However, the direction of the debate and inquiries that something unforeseen had occurred, and in its aftermath Germany was in search of who to hold responsible.

#### 2.4. Summary: The role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea

The previous review of a selection of publications concerned with Germany and the annexation of Crimea shows that the German government, was taken off guard by the events that ultimately led to the annexation of Crimea. As to the question what exactly was surprising for the German government two diverging views can be distinguished in literature.

- There were several events surprised the German government between November 2013 and March 2014.
  - o The decision of the Ukrainian government to not sign the EU Association Agreement, 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013.
  - o The mass-protests in Kyiv after the refusal to sign the agreement.
  - o The disappearance of Ukrainian president Yanukovich after an agreement had been signed with the protesters, 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 2014.
  - o The announcement of a referendum by the Crimean regional parliament during the EU Council summit, 06<sup>th</sup> of March 2014.

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<sup>153</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood, 2016, p.136.

- There was only one surprise: The annexation itself.

Three explanations why the German government was caught off guard were identified in the literature discussed for this section:

- Everything was marred by ambiguity, and impossible to foresee Putin's steps. When and why he took the decisions became discernible only with hindsight.
  - a. Mirror Imaging: Germany was surprised because it thought that the Russian president would act on the same rational premises as the German government.
  - b. Putin deceived Merkel and Steinmeier.
- Germany was surprised despite warning; Accurate warning was available and made known to the policy level, but not considered. The role of deception is negligible.
- German media reporting was biased, leading to a distorted perception of the developments in Ukraine and concerning Russia, and therefore caused surprise.

Overall, it was found that the works that consider the role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea mirrors the findings of the review of the wider debate on the annexation: Surprise is universally observed, but its effect for the overall outcome is intractable.

In addition, the previous discussion has furthermore demonstrated that many of the gaps and inconsistencies in relation to surprise in the annexation of Crimea that were observed already in the literature dealing with the annexation of Crimea in general, can be identified in the literature looking at Germany and the annexation of Crimea as well:

- The effect of surprise on the overall outcome is not considered. In the case of several surprise events: how are they similar, how do they differ? What is the difference between a shock event and a surprise event? What is the difference between a shock-event and the feeling of shock after a surprise event? What role for surprise in the decisive event?
- The role of deception is observed, but how exactly it contributed to surprise is not considered.

- Why exactly was the German government surprised if it had been warned by its intelligence service?

### **3. Methodological Remarks**

So far, this research has only considered and reviewed the findings of available literature about Germany, surprise and the annexation of Crimea. However, little has been said about how these efforts reached their results. This is much helped by the fact that except for the investigation by the Finnish Institute on International Affairs<sup>154</sup>, none of the publications discussed above pays overly detailed attention to methodological considerations or undertake efforts to establish a research framework.

#### **3.1. Which theory?**

Above all, it is mostly theory-free. However, this is not to say that the annexation of Crimea and Russia's aggressive foreign policy turn in 2013/2014 did not play a role in the debate about international relations theories—quite the contrary - it particularly provided the school of realism and neo-realism a case in point. It is not by coincidence that it was John J. Mearsheimer, one of the most prominent representatives of the neo-realist school in international relations, that argued that the West ought to blame itself for the turn in the relationship with Russia by neglecting Russia. The same was true for realism – its heydays dated back to the age of the Cold War and nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, which realism could neither foresee nor explain, it lost appeal, and got more and more neglected. For realism and neo-realism, the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia somewhat marks their 21<sup>st</sup> century renaissance – because Russia's turn it could explain<sup>155</sup>.

Probably the most important factor for this is that the interest in the annexation of Crimea originated much more from its relevance to policy than its relevance to academia. Marking the first change of borders by military force in Europe since the end of the second world war, the annexation of Crimea is an event of historical importance.

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<sup>154</sup> Exceptions for example are: Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood*, 2016. Or: Darczewska, Jolanta: *The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare*, 2016. Both rely on theories from the field of communications science.

<sup>155</sup> See for example: Belloni, Roberto, Della Sala, Vincent, Viotti, Paul (Eds.): *Fear and Uncertainty in Europe The Return to Realism?*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2019.

While there is little doubt that Crimea is a case of historical importance, and since then is regularly referred to as a paradigm-changing moment for the international context, the notion to ‘cut straight to the cheese’ that characterises the majority of the literature discussed in the previous chapter leaves open the question what Crimea is a case of – the previous discussion has shown several points of view how the annexation of Crimea could be analytically framed: for example, it could be viewed as a case of international relations, or case of a inter-state conflict, each of which are subject to theoretical considerations.

### **3.2. Quantitative or Qualitative**

Most of these case studies are of qualitative nature. An exception is made by studies seeking to measure the impact of Russian information operations or identify communicative patterns of Russian propaganda and in which contexts they can be observed – and how often. Such studies, like the NATO Centre of Excellence report on Russia’s new way of war, or the investigation by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs take a quantitative approach, for example by counting the frequency of communicative patterns and drawing conclusions and policy recommendations from that.

### **3.3. Single Case Study, Small-n and large-n comparative approaches**

As a case of historical importance and high policy relevance, the annexation of Crimea often was studied as a single-case in-depth case study. However, due to the immediately ensuing Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed rebels began a civil war for independence shortly after the annexation of Crimea, it has also been analysed as a comparative case, particularly in relation to the Hybrid War debate. However, these comparative case studies are mostly small-n studies, like the comprehensive volume commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs.

### **3.4. Sources**

The bulk of sources of the more academically oriented policy research relies on is secondary sources, in which media plays a key role. In the context of the annexation of Crimea, media, is not only used as a source, but also analysed as an actor – for example in Germany, where investigations and special committees were set up to investigate whether the media had reported a distorted image of Russia that had a negative effect on public perception, or in Russia, where the media is state-controlled.

The role of Russia's media in relation to propaganda and deception in the annexation of Crimea received great attention. As a result, Russian media publications from TV, newspapers, and social media have been very systematically examined, both before and after the annexation of Crimea. This somehow contrasts to the reporting of media outside Russia or Ukraine, where the analysis of media sources is less systematic<sup>156</sup>.

Other secondary sources include government documents or statements by heads of state or high-ranking officials.

Primary sources, for example government officials, or journalists involved in the developments, were more often used in the literature scrutinizing Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea. For example, Andreas Rinke's attempt to order the events in Ukraine since November 2013 from a German perspective. Published just two months after the annexation, his account relies heavily on the insights gained from interviews with German government officials that spoke on the base of anonymity. More journalistic publications, like the article published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* also make use of primary sources. Although the use of primary sources greatly contributes to a better understanding of the developments at the time from the German perspective, the views offered on why the German government was surprised by the primary sources are sufficiently conflicting to raise more questions than they provide answers.

### 3.5. Quality of Data

“Data quality can be defined as the state of completeness, validity, consistency, timeliness and accuracy that makes data appropriate for a specific use.”<sup>157</sup> In the previously discussed literature, it is especially the more quantitative research into Russia's information operations and their role in the annexation of Crimea that specifically addresses the question of data quality.

A general aspect related to the quality of data and the annexation of Crimea is that the quality of data could only be defined after Crimea was annexed – not before. So, whether data was

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<sup>156</sup> The exception being: Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood*, 2016.

<sup>157</sup> Government of British Columbia: 'BC Government Information Resource Management Glossary', in: Government of British Columbia (ed): *Data Administration Forum*, online resource available at: [https://web.archive.org/web/20070409044243/http://www.cio.gov.bc.ca/other/daf/IRM\\_Glossary.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20070409044243/http://www.cio.gov.bc.ca/other/daf/IRM_Glossary.htm) , last accessed 29.03.2021.

“appropriate for a specific use” only became apparent with the knowledge of hindsight. However, as the competing explanations why and how Crimea was annexed discussed above show, despite the knowledge of hindsight, despite knowing the outcome, how this outcome came about remains contested. Thus, the “truth” is yet to be uncovered – especially as there is hardly any reliable data on Russia – be it the decision making of President Putin or on how the military operation unfolded. It is also true, however, for the German government, or indeed, many other “Western” actors involved.

It can be safely assumed that such data will not be accessible for research for a long time to come. Without having access to them, the researcher interested in the annexation of Crimea must be aware of the limitations to the quality of data, and how this affects the relative value of the research outcome. A particular risk is selection bias, using data that fits the desired research outcome, rather than the other way around.

In the previously discussed literature, a distinction can be made between efforts that consider data from before the annexation and those that consider secondary data about the annexation that was made available after Crimea had become part of the Russian Federation. The previous notion is more common in Germany, as from the German perspective the annexation of Crimea can not be distinguished from the preceding crisis in Ukraine. The latter notion is more prevalent in those efforts that seek to explain how Russia annexed Crimea, and which role traditional military operations and modern information operations had for the overall outcome.

### **3.6. Summary: Methodological Remarks**

None of the previously discussed publications on Crimea is methodologically flawless or fulfils the highest academic standards. This notwithstanding, all the previously discussed publications have provided valuable insights into a case of high historical importance, and offer lessons learned for the future.

#### **4. Discussion of the findings: Which role for surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany?**

The previous chapters discussed the findings of a selection of publications on the annexation of Crimea with two main perspectives: the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea and the role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea. The key finding of this discussion for this research is that while the phenomenon of surprise is unanimously observed, its relationship with the overall outcome is not systematically considered. What exactly was surprising, why it was surprising, as well as the role of surprise for the overall outcome – Crimea's annexation by Russia - remain intractable.

This notwithstanding, the review of a selection of literature allows to identify three general assumptions as to why surprise occurred. While some argued that the West was surprised due to self-delusion, not wanting to see what was apparent and known, others argued that surprise was inevitable due to Putin's irrational style of leadership. Others still considered that deception – be it military operational, or as an element of Russia's information operations – to have contributed to surprise in the annexation of Crimea. Deception receives more systematic attention than surprise, and three assumptions in relation to deception were identified: Russia and Putin employed deception. Deception created the conditions for surprise; deception served to increase ambiguity, and keep Russia's adversary guessing about your intentions.

However, the discussion of the previous literature highlighted that no specific explanation how Russian deception in the context of the annexation of Crimea created the conditions of surprise is offered. While there is a shared notion in the previous works that deception was employed to increase ambiguity, how this ambiguity specifically contributed to surprise has not been detailed in the reviewed literature.

This gap also provides a point of connection for this research's interest, the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. Because if it can be established that surprise was the direct effect of Russian deception, then surprise would become tractable, allowing to consider its role for the overall outcome. However, in order to be able to consider if and how Russian deception contributed to creating the conditions for surprise, surprise first needs to become tractable.

In absence of earlier systematic attempts with this objective in mind, the question is how to proceed from here.

#### **4.1. Tracing surprise: How to recollect what was expected before the unexpected happened.**

The core challenge for this research is thus to make surprise tractable, as this would allow to address not only the core questions for this research, but also allow to re-consider the findings of previous works.

Previous research has made unexpected events by pointing to the events that were surprising. They limit their view to on the unexpected. This approach however merely allows the characterisation of an event as surprising but disconnects the events from the period during which the event was not expected. More simply put they explain+++++++ the case with the luxury of hindsight and already knowing the outcome. However, to trace what exactly was surprising, and why, it is necessary to consider first what was expected instead of merely describing the unexpected that is known to have been unexpected with the luxury of hindsight.

A closer look at the sources and data used by the previously discussed research provides an explanation for this focus on the known unexpected outcome: The reviewed sample of literature looking at the annexation of Crimea heavily relies on secondary sources that were published *after* the peninsula was annexed, whereas the reviewed sample of literature on the role of Germany in the context of Russia's annexation of Crimea to the contrary relies heavily on primary sources that were approached *after* the annexation.

However, to understand what was surprising, why it was surprising, and what effect the unexpected had on the outcome it is first important to understand what was expected *before* the unexpected happened. Thus, rather than making surprise tractable by pointing out the unexpected, this research will seek to make surprise tractable by seeking to find out what was expected to happen before the unexpected happened.

Using a jig-saw puzzle as an example makes apparent that the difference between the two perspectives is not trivial. A jig-saw may have 500 or 1.000 pieces, small and of mosaic character, with plenty of different and often confusing shapes. The objective is to puzzle them together so that pieced together they represent an image. To achieve the objective, the jig-saw



puzzler is helped by the fact that he is given the image his 500 or 1.000 pieces must represent when they are fitted together. The outcome is known and provides a guideline to structure the 500 or 1.000 pieces. But what if one only had the pieces, without the image? What did the jigsaw puzzler expect the 500 or 1.000 pieces to represent before he saw the image?

For this research, finding out these expectations before the unexpected happened is key. Only if the assumptions and premises about the future that were proven wrong later can be identified the reasons for the mismatch between what was expected and what eventually happened can be considered more systematically, and the effect of being caught unaware on the outcome be grasped.

The question is which data and sources should be considered to find out what was expected before the outcome was known, that is both available to the researcher and of manageable proportions, and how to go about it.

#### **4.2. Which sources, which data**

To remain in the image of the puzzle with an unknown picture: The question of sources and data corresponds to the decision where to look for the pieces of the puzzle. This decision is guided by considering the likelihood of finding as many pieces that ultimately belong to the image as possible.

One option would be to increase the number of primary sources consulted for the research. An increased number of sources could be further refined by allocation of sources to government agencies involved or differentiate them by the level of government they represent – diplomats, intelligence officers, policy-officials, and decision-makers, for example. While this is likely to provide an even more refined picture of the developments prior to the annexation of Crimea, and the identification of potentially competing assumptions that were guiding different segments of the German government at the time, it would be provide yet another “hindsight” perspective.

Another option would be to seek access to governmental archives, with the aim to obtain as many minutes and protocols of government meetings and interactions among leading political decision makers in Germany as possible, hoping to get the most complete picture of which

assumptions were guiding the German government at the time, when they are unexpectedly proven false, and whether there are some indications as to why these miscalculations occurred. Such data would have the additional advantage of being an unbiased representation of the thinking at the time, as written documents will have remained unchanged since they have been produced. Unfortunately, access to such data is not granted. It can be expected that even if access to some documentation is granted, or made available for the researcher, it is likely to be scattered, still leaving gaps. Lastly, even if one would have access to such archives, the amount of data to collect, systematize and analyse would overwhelm the individual researcher.

The difficulties related to availability of government documentation explains why works considering the annexation of Crimea regularly resort to media reports as their secondary sources when tracing the events and developments before Crimea was annexed by Russia on the 18<sup>th</sup> of April 2014. While the media is a secondary source only, it offers certain advantages:

- Availability: unlike governmental documentation, media reporting is open access, and thus available for the researcher.
- Continuity: media reports 24/7, allowing for a continuous observation over a period.
- Media and politics: although it cannot be expected that decision-makers disclose themselves fully, they will give statements and interviews outlining their views and intended policy responses. This is especially true in democracies observing the freedom of the press. In addition, media often offers several perspectives on political developments.
- Structural similarity: there is a structural similarity between the media and policy, as both work against the inherent uncertainty of the future but are required to extrapolate assumptions about future developments from the incoming information; like analysts, journalists need to confirm the validity of their information, and consider the implications of validated information in their context.

These advantages notwithstanding, it is important to be aware that there are also key differences between journalists and government analysts and decision-makers in policy:

- The principal role of media and journalism is to provide the public with verifiable information about events that lie in the past – known events. The job of media is not to

consider possible future adverse developments, and devise ends, ways and devise means to this prevent this eventuality. This is the task of government.

- Neither the governmental analyst nor the journalists must take a decision on how to act upon incoming information against the inherent uncertainty of the future, similar to subject-matter experts engaged in policy-advocacy offering ‘policy recommendations’, or activists. This means that they also do not share the decision-makers immediate burden: that she or he will be held directly accountable for decisions taken despite an uncertain future at a moment when the uncertainty has been replaced by certainty – and wrong decisions may come at great cost.
- Unlike governmental analysts, who work in a rigid and strictly hierarchical bureaucracy, and which are required to develop an organisational position, journalists enjoy much more liberty to develop and present their individual interpretation of the event if it is based on verifiable facts, and clearly earmarked as opinion or comment. In practical terms this means that the government analyst is required to take on his organisation’s position even if her or his reading deviates, thus offering a unified position, journalists are not – leaving a cacophony of opinions and interpretations of an event for the consumer to consider.

The most important difference, however, is that the media is not the government. For this research, which is interested in the German government’s assumptions that were proven wrong by unexpected events, this is not trivial. There are three aspects to this difference.

The first concerns the role of media to inform the public – in this regard, media also will contain statements from government representatives, be it in the form of interviews or by reporting statements made by members of the government. However, these elements are only a fraction of reporting, albeit an important one. While these interviews and statements are the data-gems for this research, it cannot be expected that they represent the view of the entire government, or even the individual asked. This may be because the individual has no interest or desire to disclose the full reading or intentions, or it may be because elements that were key to the interviewee were considered less relevant to the interviewer and journalist and vice-versa.

The second aspect is more of practical nature for the researcher analysing media data for government positions: the chief task is to distinguish between the opinions and analyses that is offered by reporters and journalist, and information that provides insights into how the

government viewed the situation, and which steps it intends to take. In the cacophony of opinions available, it is easy to confuse them.

The third aspect is related to this: while media is not the government, it also is one source of information for the government – in fact, most governments are very media sensitive. Therefore, although the opinions and interpretations of events offered by media ARE NOT the governments views, it is safe to assume that they are at least considered by government analysts, in addition to sources of information privy to the government, like intelligence reports or diplomatic cables. However, for this research this means that it can be assumed that if something is reported in media, it is also known to the government. Adding to this that for its reporting, journalists tap into government sources, while maybe not being able to account for all factors that lead to the governments decision-making during a crisis, the readings offered in the reporting will roughly represent the most dominant notions held within the government and policy-circles.

In sum, despite the limitations, using media sources offers the researcher interested in trying to find out what was expected before the unexpected occurred a good place to look for the pieces that make up the image that resembles the expectations before the unexpected happened.

#### **4.3. How much information is enough?**

A key challenge when trying to piece together a puzzle with an unknown image is to decide on the number of pieces the image has. Thus, after having decided where to look for the pieces of the puzzle, it first needs to be considered how many pieces there are overall – and how many of them are needed to identify the unknown image.

Was it the scarcity of data to be expected from primary sources, when considering media as a source, the opposite is the case – the researcher is confronted with an overwhelming amount of sources to consider and data they produce to consider. In its entirety, the amount of data media sources and data they produce overwhelms the individual researcher.

However, the previously discussed efforts have implicitly or explicitly indicated ways to reduce the number of sources by establishing criteria for their selection and thereby to the reduction of sources and data to consider.

The first concerns the timeframe to be analysed. The previous discussion has identified four different views on the the question of which timeframe to consider for analysing the annexation of Crimea:

- An extended historical view putting the annexation of Crimea into the context of Russia since the end of the Cold War in 1989<sup>158</sup>.
- From late summer 2013 until the official integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation on the 18<sup>th</sup> of April 2014.
- The period between the disappearance of Victor Yanukovych during the night of the 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2014 and the official integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation on the 18<sup>th</sup> of April.
- One week after the official integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation on the 18<sup>th</sup> of April.

The issue which timeframe to consider is a key criterion when trying to identify what was expected before the unexpected occurred. To remain in the image of the jig-saw puzzle, it strongly impacts on the amount of pieces to look at.

For example, the timeframe *after* the unexpected occurred that was considered in ‘Fog of Falsehood’ is unlikely to provide valid insights beyond the observation that what had happened had been unexpected. It is simply the wrong scope for this undertaking interested in before the surprise expectations. Equally taking the extended historical view and considering the period since 1989 would be beyond the scope of this undertaking, blurring the clarity of the findings. However, a merging of the medium- and short-term views seems feasible.

The second criterion for the selection of sources and data that could be observed in the previously discussed works concerns the type of media consulted – this question is especially pertinent for those that considered the information operation element of the annexation. Media types considered were traditional media, like newspapers, television or radio, as well as digital media outlets, with a particular emphasis on social media.

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<sup>158</sup> For example, Mearsheimer takes such an extended historical view, see: Mearsheimer John J.: Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, 2014.

The third criterion used for source selection in the previously considered works was media origin. Especially the efforts that considered the role of Russian information operations took into account Russian state TV, both domestic stations as well as Russia Today, Russia's international propaganda outlet. Although the role of social-media, and especially the Russian *facebook* equivalent *vkontakte* was argued to have been a considerable element of Russian information operations, on closer inspection it becomes apparent that none of the discussed works undertakes a thorough social-media analysis, as it is argued that a systematic content analysis would overwhelm the individual research<sup>159</sup>.

An exception to the focus on the Russian state-media is the comprehensive study 'Fog of Falsehood' into Russian deception<sup>160</sup>. To conclude on the impact of Russian deception in the EU – member states, each case considers a selection of the media published in the country in question. For example, the media selected by Nicole Ahler, who considers how Russian deception affected German media, has been chosen on the grounds to cover the normative spectrum of German media outlets, ranging from liberal-progressive to national-conservative<sup>161</sup>. Hence, a fourth criterion that can be identified for source selection in the literature on the annexation of Crimea is to consider the normative-ideological underpinning of a media outlet.

Lastly, the editors of 'Fog of Falsehood', introduces a fifth selection criterion that could serve to limit the number of sources to consult and overcome biased selection of media sources and data they produce: media quality. None of the case studies scrutinizes what is commonly referred to as yellow press – media, which is considered to uphold lower standards of professional standards.

Taken together, these criteria are helpful to limit universe of media- sources and the data they produce to consider for the individual researcher. However, they do not suffice to answer the question how much information is required and where to look for it to identify the image – this requires also to consider how the data produced by the sources is analysed.

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<sup>159</sup> For example: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia's information campaign against Ukraine, 2015

<sup>160</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood, 2016.

<sup>161</sup> Ahler, Nicole: 'Russian Strategic Communication reflected in the German media', in: Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016, pp. 131 – 146.

#### **4.4. Conclusion: A continuous assessment of a single media source between October 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014**

Two approaches can be identified in the previously discussed works. The first is a continuous assessment of a pre-defined data set over a pre-defined timeframe, like in the case studies provided in 'Fog of Falsehood'. The second is to consider only data that is known to be a piece of the final image and take it from where it can be found.

Arguably, the latter is the less complex challenge, and carries much lower risk to get lost in the thick of information. However, to trace what was expected before the unexpected occurred, a continuous assessment prior to the event that marks the outcome is required.

In sum, although previous research offers expedients to overcome the challenges in relation to the selection of sources, quality and volume of data, the amount of possible sources to consult, and the volume of data requiring analysis they produce still overwhelms the individual researcher interested in tracing what was expected before the unexpected occurred. This makes further containment necessary.

Rather than throwing the towel on this research in the face of the large amount of data and the associated difficulties, this effort will proceed by drastically reducing the number of sources considered, while simultaneously increasing the depth of analysis by both extending the timeframe for analysis and by a continuous assessment of an unbiased selection of data. Concretely put, rather than considering a selection of sources, where the selection criteria are unclear, as seen in previous attempts, this research will limit itself on a single media source for data, and provide an in-depth analysis of its day-to-day reporting: The German public broadcasting network ARD.

Building on the criteria identified in previous works, the following aspects were considered to identify ARD to be a suitable source for making surprise tractable by finding out what was expected before the unexpected happened<sup>162</sup>:

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<sup>162</sup> An additional point about the selection of ARD as the sole source for data in an attempt to identify what was expected before the unexpected occurred is the fact that there are two public broadcasting stations in Germany, that both offer the same merits: day to day coverage and full, free of charge archival access. It could be argued that this research should consider the reporting of both ARD and ZDF. However, the intent here is

1. **Origin and Originality:** This research is interested in both the role of surprise to the annexation of Crimea, as well as the role of surprise to Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea. As this researcher does not speak Russian, and Russian media has been subject to extensive scrutiny already, considering German media as a source addresses a source and data gap, especially against the backdrop of Germany's leading role in the context of the annexation.
2. **Media Type:** Unlike an individual newspaper, homepage, or Facebook-profile, ARD is a media-network that combines all types of media except hard-copy print: television, radio, and online. In addition, there is a variety of news formats.
3. **Continuity:** ARD provides daily news coverage in a variety of news formats in their program.
4. **Quality:** As a public broadcasting station, financed by taxpayers, ARD is committed to uphold high-levels journalistic professionalism and accountability for its work.
5. **Availability:** As a public broadcaster, the ARD news archive makes available the entire reporting within the ARD-network free of charge. The archive allows to search news items by keyword or date of publication, and thereby allows for a systematic, day-to-day analysis.
6. **Reach:** Although the media landscape has undergone tremendous changes in the age of digitalisation, the ARD tagesschau news is by far the most widely viewed news in Germany, being viewed by around 10% of the German population every evening.

The volume of data by ARD alone is considerable: between the 29<sup>th</sup> of October and the 18<sup>th</sup> of March, ARD features a total of 349 news items covering the developments in Ukraine and on Crimea<sup>163</sup>. The search criterium to identify the 349 items was the date. This ensured that no

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*not* to scrutinize to what extent a selection of media outlets has correctly and timely reported everything that with the knowledge of hindsight is known to be relevant, but to get the best possible idea of the expectations about future developments in and around Ukraine held by the German government that were proven wrong by something that happened unexpectedly. The objective of this chapter is not to provide a media comparison.

<sup>163</sup> Not all 349 news items that were identified in the archive were shown in the ARD 'evening news' called ARD *tagesschau*. The 349 items identified cover the entire spectrum of ARD news reporting: the reporting aired during ARD's late news called *tagesthemen*, the news produced for the ARD radio broadcasting network, contributions that were made available online on *tageschau.de* only, special news formats like ARD *Brennpunkt* providing immediate in-depth background information on breaking developments, or regular in-depth formats like *Bericht aus Berlin*, a weekly in-depth TV show covering German politics. At times, there were redundancies in reporting – for example a repetition of an evening news item during the late news show. This can be observed more when the situation in Ukraine was not in the centre of media attention. However, the more dynamic and fluid the situation in Ukraine and Crimea became, the less repetitive reporting became, and the more important it appeared during the analysis of the reporting for this research to consider each element of



news item escapes the researcher, as well as unbiased selection of the data available. Rather than repeating the reporting chronologically, the following chapter will discuss the key findings of the analysis of ARD news as it pertains to this research's interest and the assumptions on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea identified in the literature discussed in the previous section. The full data set used for the remainder of this chapter can be found in Annex 1.

As many of the items are moving images with oral information, an in-depth analysis requires their transcription, and as the language of this research is English, translation by the researcher. While this activity greatly adds to a better understanding of what had been expected before the unexpected occurred, the preparation of the data for analysis is labour intensive, and cannot be eased by the application of artificial intelligence – it requires the full mind of the researcher.

This research is guided by two research interests related to the annexation of Crimea. The first interest is to assess is the role of surprise for Germany in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea; the role surprise played for the overall outcome, the annexation of Crimea, the

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reporting. A second observation that can be made is the varying the frequency of reporting on Ukraine by ARD news over the period of observation. At the beginning of the observation period, the reporting is discontinuous, and increases before and after key political events, like EU Council or EU foreign minister summits. It is followed by a period by hardly any reporting on Ukraine 17<sup>th</sup> of December, the day Angela Merkel's second grand coalition cabinet was sworn in and Russia and Ukraine announced their bilateral credit agreement, and the end of January, there is little to no reporting. A short spike can be observed again around the EU-Russia summit at the end of January 2013 and the annual Munich Security conference immediately after the summit, an event bringing together global leaders in foreign and security Germany. In 2014, the conference celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> edition, and the domestic German dynamics as well as Ukraine played a mutually supporting role keeping the media's attention. Following the conference, another fortnight passes with Ukraine playing only a minor role in reporting. However, starting with the escalation of violence in Kyiv mid-February, Ukraine, and shortly thereafter the developments on Crimea a thoroughly covered; in accordance with the speed of developments following the escalation of violence in Kyiv, the number reporting increases, peaking with the EU Council on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, when the news about the Crimean regional government and parliament's decision to join the Russian Federation and hold a referendum on this decision spoiled the EU summit. While Crimea, Ukraine and Russia are still featured prominently in reporting until the referendum on the 16<sup>th</sup>, little is added to the findings for this research. As Andreas Rinke observed, while the German government remained highly active, from then on it was facing the inevitable, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. Possibly the best measure for the relevance ARD allocates to breaking news or developments, is the special news format *Brennpunkt*, as it is a format that interrupts and delays the normal ARD evening program for 15minutes, to provide additional information to the audience. A typical *Brennpunkt* issue would be for example natural catastrophes, like the floods of the Elbe river in the Czech Republic and Germany in 2002. In recent years, the number of *Brennpunkt* shows has increased somewhat, but the costs incurred for interrupting and delaying a program, risking losing viewers is a step that continues to be considered carefully. As an indication for the relevance ARD reporting gave the developments in Ukraine over time, the following table shows the number of news item corresponding with the phases identified. It also shows the number of *Brennpunkt* formats that were aired in each phase considered in the following analysis. The varying frequency of reporting can also be expressed in numbers: While in the fourteen days between the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February and the 06<sup>th</sup> of March 158 news items are reported and four *Brennpunkt* editions shown, in the two months between November 2013 and the end of 2013, only 58 news items can be counted.

second. Mindful of the findings of earlier works, and how they reached their conclusions, the core objective of the analyses of ARD's reporting is to identify what had been expected before surprise occurred, and draw conclusions from it as to the role of surprise (and deception) in the context of the annexation of Crimea.

To this end, the following questions guided the analysis of the ARD reporting:

1. The role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea:
  - Which events are reported as surprising or unexpected?
  - What had been expected to happen before the surprise occurred?
  - Which effect did the unexpected event have for the overall outcome?
  
2. The role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea
  - Which events came as a surprise to the German government?
  - What did the German government expect to happen before the unexpected occurred?
  - Why did they come as a surprise to the German government?
  - Did Putin and/or the Russian government play a role in raising false expectations, and if so, how?
  - Which effect did Germany's surprise have on the overall outcome?

Mindful of the limitations involved when relying on a single source, but also aware of the obstacles for the researcher, the following section will discuss the core findings in relation to surprise, Germany and the annexation of Crimea of a chronological analysis of the 349 news items that were available at the ARD news homepage *tagesschau.de* archive<sup>164</sup> with a view to consider these findings in relation to the conclusions on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea especially to Germany identified in the previous chapters.

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<sup>164</sup> For the entire data set used for the following section, see Annex 1.

### ***III. Tracing Expectations before the Unexpected: A day to day analysis of ARD reporting on Ukraine and Crimea from 29.10.2013 to 18.04.2014.***

#### **1. Key Findings: A competing hypothesis on the role of surprise**

Overall, the analysis of ARD-reporting on the crisis of Ukraine and Crimea between the 29<sup>th</sup> of October 2013 and the 18<sup>th</sup> of March 2014 suggest an additional hypothesis of how the Crimean Peninsula was annexed, and the role surprise and deception played in it:

This analysis finds that:

- Surprise played a decisive role in the annexation of Crimea. A surprise events marks the beginning and defines the outcome.
- Russian deception directly contributed to creating the conditions for the surprise event that defined the outcome.
- The German political leadership, especially German chancellor Angela Merkel was the target of President Putin's deceptive efforts, as it had assumed the lead role of 'Western efforts' and was considered the strategic antagonist to Russian interest in Ukraine and on Crimea<sup>165</sup>.
- The conditions for surprise were created not by increasing ambiguity, with the aim to keep the adversary guessing, but to make the adversary certain about the wrong intention. To achieve this, the military was Putin's stratagem.

In entire period of observation multiple unexpected events can be observed; however, only two of these events can be causally linked to the annexation of Crimea. The analysis of ARD's reporting suggests that they had a decisive effect on the outcome.

- a. The disappearance of the Ukrainian president Yanukovich during the night of the 21<sup>st</sup> of February, after he had signed an agreement with the opposition after

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<sup>165</sup> This also means that the annexation of Crimea cannot be fully explained without considering the role of Germany. While Ukraine was the locus of Russian aggression, the target was 'the West', led by Germany and its role in Ukraine – helping a pro-Western government come to power in Kyiv after months of protests.

months of protests and increasing violence. It was causal for the developments that led to the annexation of Crimea.

- b. The announcement of the Crimean regional government that the regional parliament had voted to join the Russian Federation, and that there will be a referendum to confirm this vote during the EU-Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March. It defined the outcome.

However, the two decisive surprise events are quite different in nature. The analysis of ARD data suggests that the disappearance of Yanukovich came as a bolt from the blue for both Germany and Russia. It was not the consequence of Russian deceptive efforts, and no direct Russian interference can be observed. To the contrary, data suggests that the Ukrainian president fled his country without prior consultation with the Russian president, and thereby caught the Russian president off-guard<sup>166</sup>. It was a decisive surprise nonetheless in the sense that it marks the beginning of the developments which ultimately led to the annexation of Crimea – as for example Pearl Harbor drew the United States into the Second World War.

It was furthermore decisive because the disappearance of the Ukrainian president provided Russia and President Putin with the ingredients to exploit for deception and thus ultimately surprise the adversaries: the assumptions or expectations that guided his adversaries' thinking about the relationship between Victor Yanukovich and the Russian President, the patterns of behaviour of Vladimir Putin, as well as Putin's interest in Ukraine, which became apparent in the crisis-ridden preceding months, during a tug-of-war between the EU and Russia about Ukraine<sup>167</sup> that became apparent when Victor Yanukovich walked away from signing an agreement with the European Union that would have associated his country closer with the EU.

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<sup>166</sup> ARD reporting does not explicitly state that the disappearance was surprising to Putin or Russia. However, that there had been no contact about Yanukovich's disappearance becomes evident in reporting, as the Ukrainian president confirms that he had no heard from the Russian president for a period of time – suggesting that he acted on his own judgment, which ARD correspondents comment as "interesting", see: Lilischkies, Udo: 'Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim', in: ARD (eds): *tagesthemen*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. It is also indicated by the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier during an interview on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, almost a week after the disappearance of Yanukovich, where he argued that his disappearance "could not have been foreseen by anybody", see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: 'Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea', in: ARD (eds): *Bericht aus Berlin*, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 2014.

<sup>167</sup> Grytsenko, Oksana; Taylor, Ian: 'Ukraine U-turn on European pact was agreed with Vladimir Putin', in: *The Guardian*, 26.11.2013, London, 2013.

Just a few days later, together with the Russian President, a bilateral credit agreement intended to prevent Ukraine's – and his domestically contested president's – bankruptcy, is signed<sup>168</sup>.

These premises were:

- Putin requires Ukraine for his own geopolitical vision, the Eurasian Customs Union<sup>169</sup>.
- Putin has no moral hesitation to use pressure and deceive and lie to achieve his objectives<sup>170</sup>.
- Putin will not escalate the situation before the end of the Winter Olympics in Sochi 2014<sup>171</sup>.
- Yanukovich is fully controlled by Putin, as his corrupt system of cronies relies on Russia. He undertakes no step without prior consultation of Vladimir Putin<sup>172</sup>.

Putin greatly contributed to them by his stick and carrot policy vis-à-vis the Ukrainian government, his secret diplomacy that undermined efforts to associate Ukraine closer with the European Union through the Eastern Partnership Initiative<sup>173</sup>.

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<sup>168</sup> Bock, Olaf: 'Ukraine: Präsident Janukowitsch unterzeichnet Vertrag mit Russland', in: ARD (eds): *tagesschau*, 17.12.2013, Hamburg, 2013.

<sup>169</sup> Küstner, Kai: "'Die Zeit läuft davon'", ARD Hörfunkstudio-Brüssel, 18.11.2013, Brüssel, 2013.

<sup>170</sup> See: Lilischkies, Udo: 'Putin doesn't take the EU serious', in: ARD (eds): *tagesthemen*, Der Kommentar, 28.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014, or: Stöber, Sylvia: 'Tsar attitude and KGB methods', in: ARD(eds): *tagesschau.de*, 28.01.2014, online-publication available at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ruslandpolitik100.html>, last accessed 29.03.2021.

<sup>171</sup> This premise becomes apparent in ARD's reporting about the 50<sup>th</sup> Munich Security Conference, where the situation in Ukraine and Russia's role in it played an important role, see: Rau, Sabine: 'Live from the Munich Security Conference', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 31.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014. Less important, however, than the signalling of the new German government that it is willing to take more responsibility. The discrepancy between what reporting on the conference suggests being a fundamental disagreement on what this new German responsibility looks like, and what is in hindsight referred to as the 'Munich Consensus' merits further exploration, as it would seem the disagreement still awaits resolution. That the disagreement prevailed of consensus becomes especially apparent in an interview with the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in the aftermath of the conference, see: Roth, Thomas: 'Live-Interview mit Frank-Walter Steinmeier', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 03.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>172</sup> Stöber, Sylvia: 'Tsar attitude and KGB methods', 2014.

<sup>173</sup> The wrath this invoked with the German government becomes apparent during the swearing in ceremony of the German government on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 2013, the same day Yanukovich and Putin announce the bilateral credit agreement. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, newly sworn in Foreign Minister, who during his campaigning lobbied for closer relationship with Russia, used the opportunity to call recent Russian behaviour "outrageous", see: Rinke, A: *Wie Moskau Berlin verlor*, 2014, p. 35. ARD reporting only mention that Putin acted clandestinely to undermine the EU's efforts to associate Ukraine closer, but fails to provide specifics. These are provided in a background piece published by Reuter News Agency, see: Piper, Elizabeth: 'Special Report: Why Ukraine spurned the EU and embraced Russia', in: Reuters (eds): *Emerging Markets*, 19.12.2013, London, 2013. Also: Spiegel-Staff: 'How the EU Lost Ukraine', in: *Spiegel International*, 19.12.2013, Hamburg, 2013.

While none of these premises that the analysis of ARD's reporting up until the unforeseeable disappearance of Victor Yanukovich can be translated into concrete expectations, ARD reporting after the disappearance suggests that they nonetheless were instrumental in shaping the expectations considering the developments that followed<sup>174</sup>.

To use the example of the jigsaw-puzzle again, and the quest of this research to trace what had been expected before the image to piece together became known, this means that although it is not possible to conclude from data what *exactly* was expected, it is possible to discern the corner-pieces that make up the images that those involved in the crisis might have had when trying to guess the final image.

This becomes evident when considering the premises and the range of expectations against the nature the surprise event that shaped the outcome: the referendum about the Crimean regional parliament's decision to join the Russian Federation on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March. Data suggests that Putin and Russia used these premises to weave a web of deception intended to make his adversaries certain about the wrong option, and thereby create the conditions for the surprise event that was decisive for the outcome: the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU Council summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March. For it to be effective as surprise, Putin needed to make sure that his adversaries thought that he would adopt patterns of behaviour known in the past, in which hard power and the military played a key role. Concretely, Putin's deception was to make his adversaries certain that they are facing a repeat of the Georgia-scenario. To achieve this, the military and ambiguity-increasing acts were his chief stratagem, covering his real intention: to deal 'the West' a political surprise.

Without having considered ARD reporting from late October 2013 to the disappearance of Victor Yanukovich neither the premises that informed the expectations about Russian behaviour in the German government, nor the central role Germany had assumed would have become apparent. However, the key findings for the role of surprise and deception in the annexation of Crimea are found in the reporting between the disappearance of Victor Yanukovich and the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU Council summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2013. Therefore, the following discussion will be limited to these

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<sup>174</sup> One expectation that does become apparent in reporting but cannot be confirmed from data directly to have been shared by the German government is that it was expected that Russia would attempt to re-install Yanukovich as Ukrainian president.

two surprise events, their interrelationship and how this pertains to Germany in more detail, as it is in this period the role of surprise and deception in the annexation of Crimea becomes most strongly evident<sup>175</sup>. Following the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, the outcome is clear: Crimea will become part of the Russian Federation.

A key challenge for this research that is particularly interested in the expectations and premises held by the German government, and seeks to uncover them by an in-depth analysis of the reporting on Ukraine and Crimea by ARD, one of the two German public broadcasting networks, is the observation that between the signing of the Maidan Agreement on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February and the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2014, the two decision-makers of the German government directly involved in the crisis-management, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, are most noted by their silence. It changes with effect of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014, when Germany again assumes a leading role in the crisis management in and around Ukraine.

The same is true for Vladimir Putin – however, unlike the German government, which had been very outspoken in the previous months, the Russian President’s public appearance in the entire period of reporting analysed is very little. In fact, he gives his only extended press statement on the situation in Ukraine and on Crimea on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2014 only.

Data suggests that the two surprise events that mark the beginning and the outcome of what is called the annexation of Crimea are very different in nature: The first one, Victor Yanukovich’s disappearance, came as a surprise to both the German and the Russian government with no traces of direct Russian interference that led Yanukovich to run away; the second, the announcement of the referendum on during the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, however, was only surprising to Germany, and was the direct outcome of Russian deception.

Nonetheless, data allows to draw some conclusions on the German government’s thinking and Russian deception when they were most noted by their absence. As the following chronological account from Yanukovich’s disappearance in the night of the 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2014 to the EU-

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<sup>175</sup> For example, data suggests that Russia employed deceptive practices throughout the period of observation. However, neither was it of the same level of sophistication as the deception employed after the disappearance of Victor Yanukovich, nor does data suggest it was overly successful in leading to surprise. The three types identified were (1) secrecy and cover, (2) ambiguity increasing, (3) certainty about wrong alternative, see also Part IV in this research.



Council summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March will show, considering the interrelationship between these two events makes apparent what Germany was falsely expecting, and how Russia contributed to it with deception. Russia's deceptive pattern built on the same premises that barred the German government from reading the impact of Yanukovych's disappearance correctly initially.

## **2. A chronological account: from Yanukovych's disappearance on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February to the EU-Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2014**

### **2.1. A highly ambiguous situation and phoney diplomacy: from Yanukovych's disappearance to the decisive call between Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014.**

#### *2.1.1. A fugitive president, the end of the Winter Olympics, and noise from Crimea*

ARD reporting suggests that instead of considering the likelihood of the mysterious disappearance of the Ukrainian president being just as surprising to Russia as it was to the German government<sup>176</sup>, it was assumed that the Russian government is the master of puppets behind the disappearance – and that what Russia has in mind will become clearer when the fugitive ex-president re-appears.<sup>177</sup>

This notwithstanding, with the closing ceremony for the Winter Olympics on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February, and a perception that Putin had experienced defeat in Ukraine all eyes were on Russia<sup>178</sup>. There was much uncertainty after Yanukovych's disappearance, especially since “whether Russia continues to support the Ukrainian government is an open question.”<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> It may well be the mirror-image that prevented President Putin from not considering the likelihood that there could have been NO direct 'Western' involvement in the mass-protests following Ukraine's withdrawal from the EaP Association Agreement, but the sudden mass-display of EU flags on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 just as surprising to 'Western' governments.

<sup>177</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‚Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim‘, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>178</sup> The notion that „Russia had lost” and the EU achieved a diplomatic success was especially strongly put forward in a commentary during the tagesthemen late news by Jörg Schönenborn, see: Schönenborn Jörg: ‘Eine kluge Strategie der Außenminister’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, Der Kommentar, 21.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>179</sup> Osten, Demian von: ‘Nach dem Umsturz in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.



In these considerations Crimea played an important role early on. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, immediately after the Maidan-agreement and coinciding with Yanukovych's disappearance ARD's online news portal *tagesschau.de* publishes a background piece arguing that Russia might try to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, when Russia after a five-day war with Georgia occupied the two Georgian territories Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia<sup>180</sup>. On the following day, after reports of pro-Russian mass-protests and violent clashes on the peninsula, and the announcement by the new, pro-Russian governor to stop paying taxes to the central government in Kyiv<sup>181</sup>. Thomas Roth, ARD late news *tagesthemen* anchor with extensive experience in Russia, observes:

“One scenario that many fear is that Crimea will simply separate itself, and then regards itself Russian”<sup>182</sup>

However, in the same show Ina Ruck, ARD Moscow correspondent covering the closing ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics, Russia appears to be in a “state of emotional stupor” because “his geopolitical dreams about the Eurasian customs Union” are “worthless” without Ukraine<sup>183</sup>.

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of February, in a background report by Golineh Atai aired during ARD *tagesthemen* late-news, the question is raised if Russia “would consider using military force to support the protests” to an eminent expert on Russia, Fyodor Lukyanow. The expert does not consider it likely, unless an extreme situation would occur<sup>184</sup>.

All the mentioning and worries about Crimea and their later materialisation notwithstanding in ARD's reporting following the Maidan agreement and the disappearance of the Ukrainian president notwithstanding – they played second fiddle. Reporting was more strongly focussed

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<sup>180</sup> Stöhr, Sylvia: ‘Gefährliche Geopolitische Spiele’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau.de*, published online 22.02.2014, available at: <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-analyse100.html>, last accessed 29.03.2021.

<sup>181</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Ukraine – der Tag danach’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 23.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>182</sup> Roth, Thomas: ‘Anmoderation’ in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 23.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>183</sup> Ruck, Ina: ‘Russian reactions to the developments in Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 23.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. She also reports that Angela Merkel had spoken with Vladimir Putin and Yuliya Timoshenko on the phone, however without providing details about the call.

<sup>184</sup> Atai, Golineh: ‘Interessenslage der Ukraine an Russland’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

on the economic and political situation in Kyiv. Economic, because the country remained on the brink of bankruptcy; political, because the country now faced a threefold crisis<sup>185</sup>:

- the Maidan-Agreement was highly contested among the Maidan-opposition, with one side threatening violence with the risk of escalating into civil war.
- the rejection of the agreement by the population in Eastern Ukraine, which could lead to a split of the country;
- a fugitive president and no government in place to negotiate with.

Thus reporting shows that while Crimea was already identified as a place to watch after the Maidan agreement was reached, and the risk that Russia might consider a military response considered, the domestic issues of Ukraine, especially its dire economic situation are the central focus of reporting until the 25<sup>th</sup> of February. This day marks the day with least reporting on Ukraine, and it is merely reported that Catherine Ashton had visited the Ukrainian capital<sup>186</sup>.

#### 2.1.2. *Let the games begin: The snap exercise on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 2014*

On the 26<sup>th</sup>, the domestic situation remains the key focus on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February. On this day, the transitional government in Kyiv is announced. It is reported that among the first acts of the government is the dissolution of the Berkut-police forces, who had supported the government against the protesters in the streets in Kyiv. Furthermore, reports mention that there have been clashes between pro-Russian and protesters and those supporting the new government in the Crimean capital Simferopol.

That Putin had ordered a massive snap-exercise on the Ukrainian borders on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February “to test the readiness of the troops” was worth the introductory phrase, but received no further consideration in the reporting of the day.<sup>187</sup> As previous works on the annexation of Crimea have argued, this research finds that the ordering of the snap-exercise on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February was the first Russian step in a series of escalations that would end in the integration of the Crimean peninsula by a flawed referendum, backed up by military power.

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<sup>185</sup> The threefold crisis is described in the evening news in the situation report on Ukraine, see: von Osten, Demian: ‘Nach dem Umsturz in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>186</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Umbruch in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 25.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>187</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Umbruch in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 26.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

The event receives astonishingly little attention in ARD reporting on the 26th of February 2014. However, from hindsight, and as ARD reporting in the following days makes evident, it was instrumental in playing to the premises about Russian patterns of political behaviour, as well as to the identified risk that Russia might seek to pull another Georgia on Crimea, which Putin would exploit to weave his web of deception until the 6th of March, when his true intentions were revealed.

2.1.3. *'Little green men' or the return of Yanukovych?*

On the following day, the 27<sup>th</sup> of February it becomes more apparent why the snap-exercise received little attention. The premises about Putin's relationship with the fugitive Ukrainian ex-president that seemingly kept the ARD journalists to pay more attention to the surprise attack on the Crimean regional parliament by unknown, heavily armed men in the morning of the 27th of February. This day marks a key date in the literature published after the annexation of Crimea published. It is considered as a key development in reporting, however, on the 27<sup>th</sup>, the focus is elsewhere: the re-appearance of Victor Yanukovych in Russia, and his announcement to hold a press-conference. Another premise distracting from the developments that ultimately turned out to be decisive becomes apparent in the reporting during the day – the notion that the snap-exercise ordered on the previous day must be considered as typical Russian “sabre-rattling” after having suffered defeat in Ukraine.

ARD reports about the storming of the parliament, as well as of the announcement by the Crimean regional government that it intends to hold of a referendum, in the evening news. However, the focus of reporting is threefold<sup>188</sup>: firstly, it continues to be on the Ukrainian domestic situation, as the new government is sworn in during the day. Secondly, Russia's military manoeuvres on Ukraine's south-eastern border, as well as the news that Putin also put the Russian Air Force on high alert are considered. For the covering ARD correspondent, Ina Ruck, things are clear: the exercise is "sabre-rattling, and exactly like this the manoeuvres must be understood" and can be explained with the hurt feelings of the Russian president after loosing out in Ukraine<sup>189</sup>. An additional report outlines that NATO Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that "NATO has no indicators that Russia wants to interfere militarily"<sup>190</sup>, but that NATO is watching the situation closely. And thirdly on the day the new government was sworn in, the fugitive now ex-president re-appeared in Russia, and announced a press conference for the following day<sup>191</sup>.

The third and last aspect that served to replace the 'little green men' that appeared so important in hindsight, and confirms that at least to the mind of ARD reporting, the premise about the relationship between Yanukovych and Putin was still guiding expectations. The interview with Udo Lilischkies, the ARD correspondent in Kyiv with a long track record in the post-Soviet world, is revealing in this sense: firstly, it exposes the premise on the relationship between Putin and Yanukovych, and what this means for Russia's future course; secondly it shows that the focus still very strongly was on the political and economic situation in Kyiv, and the 'little green men' given a far lesser priority.

*Caren Miosga: "Yanukovych today announced he will give a press statement from Russia, and that he still regards himself as the legitimate president: What does this mean for the relationship between Moscow and Kyiv?"*

*Udo Lilischkies: "Well, that it is currently not very harmonic. What I find particularly interesting is that apparently the Kremlin has not finally decided how far it is willing to go. Concerning the legitimacy of the new government in Kyiv, in the periphery of the Russian*

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<sup>188</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Lage in der Ukraine', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 27.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>189</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Lage in der Ukraine', 27.02.2014.

<sup>190</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Lage in der Ukraine', 27.02.2014.

<sup>191</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Lage in der Ukraine', 27.02.2014.

*government much warlike language can be overheard. For example, that the new government is a government of fascists and extremists that have purged themselves to power with violence, that they are not legitimate. However, so far, we have not heard from either Putin or Medwedew themselves. The same goes for the case, or mystery, of Yanukovych. Here in Kyiv, he is being searched for mass murder, while he asks Russia for protection - which Russia is likely to grant, it is being said. But so far, we haven't seen him [J in Russia], and we have only heard that Russia will grant his wish for protection by security circles. But it has not been confirmed by Putin or Medwedew. I think that only if Yanukovych would really appear tomorrow in Rostow/Don, then it will become clear how the Kremlin has positioned itself - and that it is willing to accept this dramatic new low point of relations with the West.”<sup>192</sup>*

Thus, although uncertainty continued to prevail about Russian intentions, the re-appearance of Yanukovych, and his announcement of a press conference for the following day, gave way to the expectation that the press conference – if it occurs – will indicate how far the Kremlin “is willing to go”.

Taken together, ARD reporting of the events on the 26th and the 27th of February shows that the events that were described as decisive from hindsight, at the time received little attention. In fact, Crimea, which had featured so prominently in reporting and likely scenarios for Russian responses immediately after the Maidan agreement had been signed, had slipped on the backbench of reporting focus on the 27<sup>th</sup>.

#### *2.1.4. Replacing expectations: Yanukovych out, Georgia in*

The 28<sup>th</sup> of February marks the changeover of focus in the news – and the replacement of assumptions on Russian courses of action. The dominant expectation that Russia’s next steps could be deduced from Yanukovych’s moves was dropped, and swiftly replaced with the ‘Georgia-scenario’, which referred to the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in 2008<sup>193</sup>.

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<sup>192</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 27.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>193</sup> The war ended with Russia occupying the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, hence the name.

From the 28<sup>th</sup> of February onwards, the focus was firmly on the developments on Crimea, and Russia's role in it. This change of focus – and expectations - occurs throughout the day, and again revolves around the anticipations coupled with Yanukovych's press appearance.

His press appearance, which took place in the afternoon of German time, and was thus prior to the evening news, and what it revealed left the journalists “with something to think about”, as Ina Ruck reports during an interview in the afternoon news<sup>194</sup>: Yanukovych himself – possibly unintentionally, giving away much of his character – casts strong doubts about the assumptions held about his relationship with Putin and Russia by his disclosure that he “had not spoken with [Putin] personally” about his plea for protection<sup>195</sup>. In other words, his re-appearance helped little in understanding better how far Russia was willing to go. With his statement, Yanukovych took himself off the chess-board – or out of the puzzle's image.

The press-conference in Rostow/Don marks the last time the fugitive ex-president plays a key role in reporting. What is interesting about this in the context of reporting is the fact that there was no reflection of the fact that Yanukovych had effectively taken himself of the chessboard, and what this may imply for Russian intent, even though it was acknowledged as something to ponder. Instead, the pondering was dropped and the focus on Yanukovych somewhat elegantly replaced with a focus on Crimea. This becomes evident in the interview with Udo Lilschkies, who on the previous day had been clear about his expectations in relation to Yanukovych and Putin's next steps. Even though noting that “Yanukovych said something very interesting” Lilschkies observed “In Rostow/ Don we saw what appears to be the confirmation that the Kremlin has opted for open confrontation.”<sup>196</sup>

However, the news of the day locates this conclusion not in Rostow/Don, where the ex-president held his press-conference, but on the Crimean Peninsula. There was no connection provided between Yanukovych's press-conference, and the news of the day from Crimea that indicated that Russia was opting for open confrontation. However, in the context of the

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<sup>194</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Yanukovych's Press Conference in Russia', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 28.02.2014, 15:00, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>195</sup> Ruck, Ina: 'Yanukovych's Press Conference in Russia', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 28.02.2014, 15:00, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>196</sup> Lilschkies, Udo: 'Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

developments on Crimea, the key question was whether Russia was unfolding a scenario like it had in Georgia in August 2008 – a question raised by the newly sworn in Ukrainian government. The *tagesschau* evening news, taking up on the raid on the peninsula's regional parliament from the previous day, report that the Ukrainian Minister of Interior, confirms Russian troop presence on Crimea and calls the events from the previous day an “invasion and occupation of Crimea by Russia.”<sup>197</sup>

In the *tagesthemen* late news of the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, it is reported that since the surprise attack on the previous day, 2.000 additional Russian soldiers have arrived on Crimea. It is furthermore strongly insinuated by the correspondent reporting from Simferopol, Crimea's capital, that the masked men without insignia are Russian soldiers, despite not being able to confirm this<sup>198</sup>. The newly sworn-in Ukrainian president Alexander Turtschinow is reported to be more precise than his minister of interior when he tells the international press that “everything follows the scenario which Russia used when it occupied Abkhazia”, but that unlike Georgia in 2008, “Ukraine will not let itself be provoked.”<sup>199</sup>

Asked whether the Abkhazia-scenario is an adequate analogy, ARD correspondent Ina Ruck argues that there are indeed many aspects that remind of this scenario. However, she also expresses doubts whether Russia is willing to risk the international isolation that would be the consequence of such a course<sup>200</sup>.

#### 2.1.5. *Where is the German government?*

The 28<sup>th</sup> also marks the day when both the two political decisionmakers directly involved in the previous developments, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Angela Merkel, re-appear in reporting for the first time since the Maidan agreement.

While there are no direct statements on the unfolding situation on Crimea from either, what is reported allows for an insight on how the situation in Ukraine was assessed, especially from the

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<sup>197</sup> In the reporting, ARD does not want to confirm the claim that the unidentifiable ‘green men’ were Russian troops, as the Crimean government did. However, it was strongly insinuated, especially in the live report from Simferopol, see: Atai, Golineh: ‘Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>198</sup> Atai, Golineh: ‘Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>199</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>200</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014.

reporting on Frank-Walter Steinmeier's visit to Washington – his first official trip since taking up office as Germany's foreign minister for the second time on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 2013. The report on the trip makes apparent, that in relation to Ukraine, the chief focus of the German foreign minister was the economic situation in Ukraine – prior to visiting his counterpart John Kerry in Washington, he meets the president of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine LaGarde to consult with her on how to prevent the economic collapse of Ukraine. The IMF president sees “no reason to panic”<sup>201</sup>, and assures that the IMF stands ready. In the meeting with John Kerry, however, the situation in Ukraine was only one item on the agenda, as the German had a difficult bone to pick in the context of the U.S. German relations, as they had taken a serious blow when it was revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had been tapping into German government communications. The revelations in 2012 marked a low-point in the U.S.-German relations. Especially in Germany, a heated debate ensued, leading to the issue playing an important role in the 2013 elections. To overcome the low-point with Germany's strategic ally, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the German government had lobbied for a “no-spy-agreement” to be signed by the two countries. The German foreign minister had hoped that his visit would mark a breakthrough on this question – however, even though the report stresses the friendly atmosphere of the encounter, Steinmeier bites on granite with his intent. The U.S. has no interest in such an agreement<sup>202</sup>.

The report on the visit of Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Washington suggests that on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, two days after unknown men stormed the Crimean parliament and hoisted a Russian flag, the situation in Ukraine and on Crimea was not the only concern the German government had. From the reporting about the German Foreign Minister's visit to Washington it appears to have been viewed as dicey, but manageable if the economic situation can be resolved, and priority was given to an issue that was peculiar the German-U.S. relationship, and of special domestic relevance in Germany in the previous federal elections<sup>203</sup>.

Angela Merkel on the other hand appears in a different context on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February – it is reported that Russian president Putin calls the German chancellor during the day. In this call,

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<sup>201</sup> Hassel, Tina: 'Steinmeier zu Besuch in Washington', in: ARD (eds): *tagesschau*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>202</sup> Hassel, Tina: 'Steinmeier zu Besuch in Washington', in: ARD (eds): *tagesschau*, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>203</sup> The issue had been one of the four most decisive topics for the outcome of the federal elections in 2013, see: ARD (eds): 'Bundestagswahl 2013', online dossier available at: <https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2013-09-22-BT-DE/index.shtml>, last accessed 29.03.2021.



according to the report, the Russian president “urges de-escalation, and repeats that Russia fully accepts the sovereignty of Ukraine”<sup>204</sup>. It is the only information about the content of the call that is reported, as the phone call between Moscow and Berlin, provides the bridge for the reporting to juxtaposing it to what is happening on the ground: “we are experiencing the exact opposite [...] many people here are reminded of the Abkhazian scenario.”<sup>205</sup> However, there is no indication as to what the German chancellor said in the conversation, or whether she shared the ARD’s correspondent observations.

This notwithstanding, the reporting of the 28th marks a key shift in the focus of reporting. With Yanukovich taking himself off the chess-board, a key assumption guiding the expectations about Russian courses of action was proven wrong. Although it was acknowledged that this required thinking about what Russia might have in mind instead, the developments on and around Crimea that had begun already two days ago led to simply replace the premise about Yanukovich with a new premise: That Russia will resort to patterns of behaviour in the past. This premise also led to the adoption of a concrete expectation, or scenario: that Russia will seek to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, when it lured the Georgian government into responding to Russian military pressure, thereby giving Russia grounds to claim a right of self-defence. In the context of the reporting since Yanukovich’s disappearance, this is particularly interesting, as this was risk had been discussed for Crimea early on, but was side-lined by the domestic situation in Kyiv, and the expectations around Yanukovich.

As for the German government’s leadership directly and personally involved in the developments, data does not allow to draw this conclusion – however, the report about Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s trip to Washington, as well as Angela Merkel’s silence after the phone-call with Vladimir Putin that so starkly differed from the realities on the ground on the peninsula, suggest that the German government was still hesitant in its assessment: it considered the biggest risk for further escalation the new Ukrainian government, and the domestic dynamics that might lead to irrational acts. Hence, even if not explicitly, on the eve of the 28<sup>th</sup> of February it seems that essentially the German government shared the assessment that the Georgia scenario was unravelling. After all, it was the newly elected and politically inexperienced Georgian president Saakashvili that committed an error by betting on NATO’s

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<sup>204</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014.

<sup>205</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014.

solidarity and military backing Russia could exploit. A situation that seemed all too similar with that in Ukraine at the end of February 2014.

2.1.6. “Will there be war?” *The Duma approval, 01.03.2014*

Whereas the events on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February received a lot of attention after Crimea had been annexed, with “little green men” becoming almost a synonym for how Russia annexed the peninsula but were noted more in passing in ARD-reporting, the opposite is true for the events on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March. On this day, news break of an approval granted by the Russian parliament, the *Duma*, to a request from President Putin that will allow him to use military force in the entire territory of Ukraine to protect the rights of ethnic Russians. In the previously discussed works that were published after the annexation of Crimea on the other hand, the event did not feature prominently – and if so, not as an unexpected event.

However, unlike the storming of the Crimean parliament, where it is difficult to observe the level of surprise in data, as other developments ranked higher on the agenda, the news about the Duma’s authorisation of Putin’s request to deploy troop in the entire territory of Ukraine were clearly reported as surprising in ARD<sup>206</sup>. Furthermore, contrary to the previously discussed literature published after the annexation of Crimea, it was this event that changed the heading from ‘Domestic Crisis in Ukraine’ to “International Conflict between Russia and Ukraine”<sup>207</sup>, and thus the conceptualisation of the nature of the conflict. It shows the impact the decision had on the expectations, at least within the group of journalists that had been covering the situation from Moscow, Kyiv and Simferopol in the recent days. The big question now was whether Russia is about to invade neighbouring Ukraine. Hence, on the 1st of March, the expectations about the image of the jig-saw puzzle were truly clear. Considering the recent news the big question now was: Will there be war?

An interesting observation the analysis of the attempts to resolve this question in ARD reporting reveals is that while there was an acute sense of uncertainty about Russian the probability of

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<sup>206</sup> Unlike the storming of the regional parliament on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February, the Duma approval on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March led to an ARD *Brennpunkt* special news interrupting and delaying the scheduled program. See: ARD (eds): *Brennpunkt*, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim’, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>207</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Russischer Militäreinsatz auf der Krim’, in: ARD (eds): *tagesschau*, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. In the following days, the situation on Crimea was referred to as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Interestingly, this framing implies that there was no ‘Western’ role.

war initially, this sense of uncertainty is replaced by an acute sense of certainty about how to read the recent developments, and what therefore to expect from Russia<sup>208</sup>. Reporting furthermore makes apparent how this sense of certainty is reached – by focussing on the incoming information that confirmed the premise, that Russia will not deviate from historically known patterns of behaviour.

It was especially the reports that Russia was effectively in control of the peninsula that led to the growing sense of certainty amongst the reporting ARD-correspondents<sup>209</sup>. While the readings of Russia's intentions still differ between the individual journalists covering the situation, the variation is only in nuances<sup>210</sup>. There is agreement that Russia will not intervene or actively seek a military solution. First and foremost, because there was no need to intervene anymore, but also because Russia would not risk international isolation. Therefore, the Duma decision and the threat of a Russian invasion is merely “serious sabre rattling” and to create a “pure pressure scenario” with the objective to make sure that Russia continues to have a say on the future of Ukraine – but in the end, Russia will agree to a negotiated solution<sup>211</sup>.

The premises leading to this shared expectation and certainty at the end of the reporting day become apparent from reporting. Responding to the plea to Russia “to come to its help to re-establish security” by the newly elected Crimean regional government, a leading ARD-journalist, Jörg Schönenborn, observes: “This reminds us in fatal fashion of the times when the

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<sup>208</sup> This is indicated in the closing comments of the anchor for the ARD *Brennpunkt* special news shown on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, Jörg Schönenborn. It is also one of the rare moments that tickle the humour of the analyst: Schönenborn closes the special news feature by stating that due to the uncertainty of what will happen next, all journalists covering the story are on duty, and the ensuing program will be interrupted if there are any further developments. He then wishes the viewers great joy in watching the following show with the name “one side will win”., see: Schönenborn, Jörg: ‘Concluding Remarks’ in: ARD (eds.): *Brennpunkt*, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim’, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>209</sup> That the men without insignia are Russian troops is first confirmed by Golineh Atai during the tagesschau evening news, see: Atai, Golineh: ‘Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. During a live interview in the *Brennpunkt* special news immediately after the 20:00 tagesschau evening news, Atai states that Russia had already taken full control of the peninsula, and does not require any further troops, see: Atai, Golineh: ‘Live-Interview from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): *Brennpunkt*, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim’, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>210</sup> The notional differences become evident in the *Brennpunkt* special news. However, these differences were overcome in the *tagesthem* late news 2 hours later, where covering journalists were unambiguous about their expectation that Russia will not go to invade Ukraine. Already the heading indicates this: was the *Brennpunkt* titled “Psycho War on Crimea”, the *tagesthem* heading for the news about Ukraine was “strong sabre rattling” see: Ruck, Ina: ‘Die Ukraine-Krim-Krise spitzt sich zu’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthem*, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>211</sup> See especially the interviews and reports by Ina Ruck, ARD's Moscow correspondent on the 01<sup>st</sup> of March 2014.

Soviet Union let itself be called for help against external aggression from its Soviet brother people.”<sup>212</sup> Already during the tagesschau evening news, his colleague Udo Lilischkies reports that this plea “had been expected by many”<sup>213</sup>.

In other words, the journalists observed parallel patterns of behaviour between Russia on Crimea, and that of the former Soviet Union and socialist ‘brother nations’ during the Cold War, an epoque sthat had ended almost 3 decades earlier. Much more dominant in reporting however was the tendency to compare Russian behaviour with the situation prior to the five-day war with Georgia in 2008.

This can also be seen in what both ARD journalists, as well as a Russia expert that regularly advises the German government interviewed for the *Brennpunkt* special news, consider as a remaining risk for the situation to escalate into a war. The risk identified by all is to be found in Ukraine: if Kyiv decides to respond to the provocation – like Saakashvili did in Georgia 2008 - then Russia has put everything in place to make its ensuing military operation appear legal; and considering the troop movements and occupation of strategic locations of Crimea, the war would be a quixotic undertaking by Ukraine. Hence, data suggests that on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, a repetition of the Georgia scenario was seen as the biggest risk on Crimea on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March<sup>214</sup>.

While the two historical analogies about known behaviour steered from Moscow’s Kremlin that served as premises in shaping expectations differ in many aspects, they have one thing in common: they consider patterns of Russian behaviour in the past and extrapolate them with a sense of linearity to the situation faced on Crimea on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March.

Instead of considering how the incoming information differs from known patterns of Russian behaviour, incoming information was used to confirm pre-existing knowledge<sup>215</sup>. Except for

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<sup>212</sup> ARD (eds.): *Brennpunkt*, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim’, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>213</sup> Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Russischer Militäreinsatz auf der Krim’, in: ARD (eds): *tagesschau*, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>214</sup> The views discussed are put forward during the *Brennpunkt* special news that were aired in response to the Duma approval on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2014.

<sup>215</sup> This tendency becomes apparent already in the context of the storming of Crimea’s regional parliament on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February. Although on that day it is mainly the distraction by the re-appearance of Yanukovych in Russia that prevents to consider the events in more detail, on the following day the “Georgia scenario” becomes the dominant theme, leading to an exclusive focus on the “military aspect” of the annexation of Crimea. This is best exemplified in when the military snap exercise is characterised as typical Russia sabre-rattling. The categorization of these the snap-exercise and the storming of the parliament with men wearing no

the call for help by the newly elected Crimean regional government to Russia, which confirms such known patterns of Russian behaviour, nothing related to what earlier efforts have called “the political aspect”<sup>216</sup> of the annexation of Crimea was considered in any depth in ARD reporting, as none of them fitted into the historical patterns of Russian behaviour.

The other two, however, that a new, pro-Russian government had been installed on that day<sup>217</sup>, and that this government announced that it would move the date of the previously announced referendum considerably ahead<sup>218</sup>, suffered the same fate as the initial announcement to hold a referendum by the Crimean regional parliament in the wake of the surprise seizure of the regional parliament on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February: negligence. To interfere in local politics with the cunning objective to hold a referendum – that is, to let the people speak, as 2 years later the UK did with Brexit - was not in the books about Russia or Putin. That Russia would use deceit, set a trap for its adversaries while trying to appear acting legitimately, or to keep the adversaries guessing about the true intentions, and that this inevitably involves Russia flexing its military muscle, however, was.

#### 2.1.7. *Merkel's continued hesitance*

As was the behaviour of Vladimir Putin. Since the beginning of the tug-of-war about Ukraine with the EU in November 2013, he again and again had demonstrated that he cannot be trusted. And had he not called the German chancellor on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, urged de-escalation, only to grant the Duma's permission to invade anywhere in Ukraine the very next day? While there is no mentioning of his phone conversation with Angela Merkel on the previous day it is highly unlikely that the discrepancy was entirely lost on the ARD correspondents that had been covering the events in the previous days and weeks from Moscow, Kyiv and Simferopol, all with experienced and recognised Russia expertise.

However, this research's interest is not to better understand how media interpreted the events at the time, but the German government.

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insignia as 'Russian-style' surprise events known from previous Russian patterns of behaviour also explains why in reporting, neither event is characterised as overly surprising.

<sup>216</sup> For example Treisman, Daniel: 'Why Putin took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin', 2016.

<sup>217</sup> The new government had already been elected on the previous day. With the luxury of hindsight, it appears as if this is the only key event that was reported not reported on the day of its occurrence, which emphasises the high-quality of ARD's overall coverage of the developments in and around Ukraine.

<sup>218</sup> From the 25<sup>th</sup> of May to the 30<sup>th</sup> of March 2014.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, the German political top-leadership breaks its silence on the developments in and around Ukraine. Already before learning about the Duma's authorisation for Putin to deploy the Russian military, Angela Merkel somewhat fretfully states that she "is worried about the situation", but also that she is "engaged with the political leadership of Ukraine and Russia". A statement that according to ARD reporting, she repeats after speaking with the new Ukrainian prime minister, Arsenij Yatseniuk, on the phone. The message she sent was 'worried but engaged' – but allows for little conclusions about her thinking beyond what she said. It is a rather ambiguous statement – and may either be considered a cunning move to shroud how she reads the situation, or as a sign of uncertainty. Considering Angela Merkel's self-acknowledged tendency to only act "when she has reached the firm grounds of certainty"<sup>219</sup>, the latter appears more likely, but cannot be confirmed from ARD's reporting.

What ARD reporting furthermore shows is that at that time Angela Merkel was already under pressure to respond to the developments. Already earlier – which means just hours after the German Foreign Minister left Washington – the U.S. president had called the "Russian activities on Crimea an act of aggression and a breach of international law", an assessment which the Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski echoed just a little later.

Angela Merkel's ambiguous and short statement on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March does not allow to conclude that the German chancellor had a substantially different reading than two of its closest and most important allies, or the journalists covering the story. Considering that the Russian president had just lied to her when he pledged de-escalation in a phone call he initiated, suggesting that he wanted to lie to the German chancellor about his real intention to escalate the situation himself on the next day by requesting the Duma's approval for him to order the deployment of Russian forces in the entire territory of Ukraine, as well as Merkel's past experiences with the Russian president would suggest that she may well have shared the judgment by Barack Obama and Radoslaw Sikorski.

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<sup>219</sup> See Gaus, Günther: 'Angela Merkel', in: rbb (eds): *Zur Person: Porträts in Fragen und Antwort*, 28.10.1991, Berlin, 1991. Online available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQBSlPEZcel&t=4s>, last accessed 30.03.2021. When asked where she believes this idiosyncrasy has its roots, the then rising star from the east – Angela Merkel was born in the GDR, who had just emancipated herself from the towering 'Chancellor of Unity' Helmut Kohl, argues that her professional background in fundamental research in the field of nuclear physics may have caused this *deformacion profesionale*. She also associates this trying to get to the bottom of things approach with her tendency to remain silent until she is certain to have reached this bottom.

Why she chose to remain ambiguous can thus only be speculation. Three explanations appear plausible on the 1st of March: The first is that despite her personal disliking and distrust of the Russian president, her experience as well as Germany's historic and economic ties with Moscow also told her that it was better for Germany to find a solution with Russia than one that would entrench it even further. That Germany's national economic interest, especially its energy dependency kept it from assuming a more decisive position considering the blatant steps by Russia was a key explanation for Germany's hesitance after Crimea had been annexed<sup>220</sup>. The second explanation is that on the 1st of March, the German chancellor considered the risk that an irrational act by the new Ukrainian government might trigger a war between the two post-Soviet countries, as is suggested from the reporting of Frank-Walter Steinmeier's visit in Washington on the previous day, and thus share the Georgia-scenario assessment. The third is that the German chancellor opted to remain hesitant because she considered that if she would join Barack Obama and Radoslaw Sikorski in singling out Russia, then reaching a diplomatic solution would be made *nee* impossible, as Russia would be cornered as the aggressor from the onset – and not agree to any diplomatic solution.

That a negotiated solution would be “without alternative”, to use a phrase that to some observers has become synonymous for Angela Merkel's style, however, became clear only after Angela Merkel had spoken – and the decision was taken in Washington, not in Moscow, Brussels, Berlin or Warsaw: in an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, a military response was ruled out<sup>221</sup>. However, to send a clear message to the Russian president that “every intervention will come with a cost”<sup>222</sup> as U.S. President Barack Obama had stated prior to the meeting, economic responses were to follow.

Devoid the option to respond militarily – even if hurriedly scrambled together, the European NATO-Allies would not have been able to mobilize the required force levels, let alone have an

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<sup>220</sup> Especially Hans Kudnani stresses the dilemma German was facing in its dealings with Russia, see: Kudnani, Hans; Pond, Elizabeth: *Germany's real role in the Ukraine crisis: Caught between East and West*. For Hannes Adomeit on the other hand the economic interrelationship is a self-made dilemma, which has its root cause in Germany's blue-eyed policy towards Russia since 1990, see: Adomeit, Hannes: *Bilanz der deutschen Russlandpolitik seit 1990'*, 2020.

<sup>221</sup> Miosga, Caren: 'Live Interview mit Tina Hassel, Washington', in: ARD (eds): *tagesthemen*, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>222</sup> Miosga, Caren: 'Live Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington', 01.03.2014.



idea of how a military response to the complex military situation on the ground on Crimea could look like, or stop Russia from what already appears to be a *fait accompli* – the debate amongst the ‘Western’ nations from that decision onwards revolved around sanctions – and how drastic these sanctions should be<sup>223</sup>.

Therefore, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, despite the U.S. and Polish governments calling out the Russian invasion – which had been ongoing in plain sight for 48 hours – the response reported by ARD from ‘Western governments’, including the German government, are possibly best captured with how Tina Hassel describes the mood in Washington after the decision to rule out a military response: “Essentially, everyone is clueless and impotent”<sup>224</sup>.

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<sup>223</sup> This cannot disprove the findings about Ukraine’s initial military superiority, and the conclusion that Russia may have been deterred to act further had there been an immediate response by the forces stationed on Crimea. However, it proves that in relation to the developing situation on Crimea, President Obama, the United States, NATO and ‘the West’ certainly showed the same restraint as George W. Bush and the West did back then: they pulled a Bismarck, and questioned why they should risk to escalate the limited conflict on Crimea to what might turn into a hot war between NATO forces and Russia. This suggests that even had they been prepared to respond militarily, they would not have decided differently for political considerations. During the Berlin Balkan Conference in 1878, which dealt with the ongoing the Balkans-Crisis, the Prussian chancellor famously said: "Die Händel auf dem Balkan sind mir nicht die gesunden Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Grenadiers wert.", which translates into “The quarrels on the Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pommerian Grenadier”. On Bismarck and his changing perception through time: Gall, Lothar: Bismarck – der weiße Revolutionär, pp 709 – 733, Propyläen-Verlag, Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Wien, 1980.

<sup>224</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Live Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington’, 01.03.2014.



3. **From a diplomatic solution is still possible to a new division in Europe: From Putin's call on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March to the EU Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2014.**

3.1. **From very certain that a diplomatic solution is possible and without alternative...: Frank-Walter Steinmeier's interview with ARD Brennpunkt.**

With respect to the German government, this changes with the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March. Data suggests that for the German government, the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March was indeed decisive<sup>225</sup>. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, the German government appeared very certain about what was at stake and what to do about it:

The key evidence in data for this reading is an extensive live-interview with the German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the weekly political background show about the key topics moving political Berlin, *Bericht aus Berlin*.

- The situation is at risk to develop into another Georgia; a reversal is only possible if the new Ukrainian government can be kept from irrational act, and if both Russia and Ukraine can be moved to the negotiating table.
- Russia will continue its military posturing and destabilisation policies, but not risk initiating a war.

This notwithstanding, to Frank-Walter Steinmeier's mind "a reversal is still possible"<sup>226</sup>. To convince Russia to return to the negotiating table, would require to not cut off the channels

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<sup>225</sup> However, the effect of the phone call was not that Germany changed its approach to Russia or adopted a tougher stance. Data clearly shows that Germany takes a stance that warns against toughening up against Russia too soon, and pledges for a political solution for which it assumes responsibility following the phone-call as a broker. The fact that the Federal Chancellery and Angela Merkel let publish a press-statement in which the international treaties Russia was violating are cited does not change this observation, as the press statement ends on the note that President Putin had agreed to consider Angela Merkel's proposal of an international contact group, which would chaperone the dialog between Russia and Ukraine. It indicates much more strongly that at that point, Germany was willing to look beyond the treaty violations if the proposal for a contact group is taken up.

<sup>226</sup> The German foreign minister lays out how he believes this "reversal" looks like and how he intends to achieve it. Thus, in the interview, for the first time since the beginning of the observation, the German government gives itself a strategy: "We must try, beyond the strong statements, to return to politics. And this can only work out if we bring Russia and Ukraine into direct dialogue. If this is not possible that they talk directly, then there are other things that can be agreed, for example that the OSCE is asked to establish what we call a fact-finding mission with which we want to verify what is really going on on Crimea and in Eastern

of communication with Russia, which finger-pointing or punitive action would both certainly achieve<sup>227</sup>. While not stating it explicitly, possibly to not snub at the new Ukrainian government, as the original sin that led to the war in Georgia was committed by the Georgian Prime Minister Saakashvili by losing temper and falsely judging his ties to U.S. friends, the German Foreign Minister's interview makes evident that the German leadership personally involved was now very certain what it was looking at<sup>228</sup>: the risk of another Georgia in 2008, the event that broke the already uneasy relationship between Moscow and NATO after the Cold War. Therefore, during the interview, the German Foreign Minister does not call out the recent Russian actions as illegal from an international law perspective<sup>229</sup>.

To counter the risk of a renewed war as witnessed in Georgia, the German foreign minister lays out how he believes this "reversal" looks like and how he intends to achieve it. Thus, in the

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*Ukraine. But this is not, so to speak, the solution. For example, a part of the solution could be that we agree on an international contact group, in which the Europeans, the United Nations, but also Russia and Ukraine are part.*" ARD Bericht aus Berlin, Live-Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,.

<sup>227</sup> The foreign minister argues that punitive actions against Russia, like kicking the country out of the G-8, as the U.S. Foreign Secretary Kerry had suggested, could be counterproductive when he states: "This is an issue that the heads of EU governments will certainly discuss this week. There are discussions amongst them. One group says, 'we must send a strong signal now and exclude Russia', while others – and I am closer to them – argue that the G8 is the last format in which we and Russia are directly talking. Should we really sacrifice this last remaining format? I think we must see that we contribute to a de-escalation in Ukraine, and not speak to soon of any possible toughening-up. In case of doubt, this will not help", see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: 'Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea', in: ARD (eds): *Bericht aus Berlin*, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 2014.

<sup>228</sup> To this end, the new Ukrainian government had contributed by passing the so-called 'language-law', which banned Russian as second official language in Ukraine. The Foreign Minister, who on the eve after the agreement he had helped to broker watched the agreement being booed on Kyiv Maidan, and threats of violence by ultra-nationalist groups of the opposition, was acutely aware that these forces now were also part of the government, and as in the case of their leader, Alexei Tiagnibok, held key positions in Ukraine's security sector. Unlike in the case of Russia, where nothing seemed to deviate from known patterns of behaviour and led to a sense of certainty about what to expect from Russia, the most incalculable actor was the government in Ukraine, that had just moved from its headquarters on the streets of Maidan to the houses of government. This is alluded to by Mr. Steinmeier during the interview, when unlike the other allied 'Western' governments that had called out Russia as the sole villain, the German foreign minister emphasises that the Ukrainian government is not without responsibility either. He even pleads "to the Ukrainian government to portray itself as the government of all Ukrainians, and therefore the law that had just been passed, the language law, has to be taken back". As for Russia and its recent actions, The German foreign minister considers the Russian soldiers on Crimea to be in breach with the lease agreement about the use of Crimea as base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia, but not breaching international law, which he only mentions at the very end of the interview: "[...]it must be that Russian soldiers return to their barracks and stick to the lease agreement between Russia and Ukraine [...].", see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: 'Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea', in: ARD (eds): *Bericht aus Berlin*, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 2014.

<sup>229</sup> Instead, he considers the Russian soldiers on Crimea to be in breach with the lease agreement about the use of Crimea as base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia – which he only mentions at the very end of the interview.

interview, for the first time since the beginning of the observation, the German government gives itself a strategy:

*“We must try, beyond the strong statements, to return to politics. And this can only work out if we bring Russia and Ukraine into direct dialogue. If this is not possible that they talk directly, then there are other things that can be agreed, for example that the OSCE is asked to establish what we call a fact-finding mission with which we want to verify what is really going on on Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. But this is not, so to speak, the solution. For example, a part of the solution could be that we agree on an international contact group, in which the Europeans, the United Nations, but also Russia and Ukraine are part.”<sup>230</sup>*

Asked whether he believes that a negotiated solution is feasible, the foreign minister refers to a phone call between the new Ukrainian prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk and his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev, which he considers a positive signal, even though he is uncertain whether it can be considered a breakthrough<sup>231</sup>. He also cautions against expecting too much – a fast, simple, and straight solutions. Rather, the German foreign Minister expects a political solution with the parameters he outlined before to be a process, when he argues:

*“This will not be one conversation, and one agreement, but we must now – as often is the case in such gridlocked conflicts, look for options to prevent further escalatory steps, and get the conflicting partner to talk to each other[...].”<sup>232</sup>*

There are two additional noteworthy aspects from the interview with the German Foreign Minister on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014. The first is raised by the German Foreign Minister’s response to the question whether the German government should have engaged with Vladimir Putin on Ukraine much earlier. The minister responds laughingly, and nonchalantly points out that much earlier would not have been possible for him, as he was in office for only two months. He also points out his visit to Moscow on the 14<sup>th</sup> of February, just five days before the joint

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<sup>230</sup> Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014.

<sup>231</sup> He stated: “[...] whether it is a breakthrough, but it is at least a hint that today the new Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatseniuk and Prime Minister Medvedev for the first time talked to each other.”

Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014.

<sup>232</sup> Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014.

mission with his Polish and French colleague to Kyiv and argues that “[o]n this occasion, the topic of Ukraine was not quite as hot, but was already present as a discernible crisis.”<sup>233</sup>

The data analysed for this research between the beginning of the tensions with Russia around Ukraine in November 2013 and the German Foreign Minister’s official visit, however, made apparent that indeed the crisis had been very discernible for months by then. More interesting, and relevant, however is the fact that when reviewing the ARD reporting from Steinmeier’s visit, it becomes apparent that despite all the changes to the context that had occurred since then until the day of the interview – that is, 16 days or 384 hours ago, changing the nature of the conflict from a domestic Ukrainian crisis to a situation short of international war – the German way out of the maze remained unchanged<sup>234</sup>.

The second aspect concerns the Foreign Ministers characterisation of the disappearance of Victor Yanukovych, which makes evident that to his reading, this event “was unforeseeable”<sup>235</sup>. This confirms that the disappearance had been a surprise to the German government, and the concise speaking German foreign minister also leaves room for interpretation that the effect on the Russian government may have been the same. However, it remains unclear from the statement when the German government had reached this reading, and whether this judgment was reached prior to the asylum-seeking fugitive ex-president Yanukovych’s taking himself off the chessboard on the 28<sup>th</sup>, or before.

Thus, ARD reporting confirms the finding that the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014 marks a decisive date for the German government in the context of the annexation of Crimea. It breaks its silence and assumes both a position and strategy.

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<sup>233</sup> Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014.

<sup>234</sup> On the same day, the German Interior Minister Friedrich resigned because of his role in dealing with the investigations against a Member of Parliament suspected to be involved in child-pornography, Sebastian Edathy, which was the focus of reporting of the day. Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to Moscow, however, did not feature prominently, see: Mayer-Rüth, Oliver: ‘Bundesagrarminister Friedrich zurückgetreten’, in: ARD (eds.) *tagesschau*, 14.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>235</sup> Frank-Walter Steinmeier mentions this in the context of the question asking whether Germany should have engaged earlier. He states: “Maybe yes, but I personally felt during the negotiations only at that point, with the more than 80 fatalities, Yanukovych was willing to consider helping to structure the political future of the country. That he then did not want to be part of this new order was unforeseeable but has created the vacuum that others filled.”, Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014.

However, data contradicts the notion that the date was decisive because the German political leadership directly involved, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Angela Merkel, feeling “deceived and personally lied to” following Putin’s revelation that the man wearing no national insignia are directly linked to the Russian military, hardened their stance towards Russia. To the contrary, data suggests that the biggest risk was seen in the new government in Ukraine, whereas Russia ‘could be talked to’.

Therefore, from the interview on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March by the Foreign Minister it may be concluded that at that point, the German government was very certain that it was looking at a “Georgian scenario” on Crimea.

This notion is also mirrored in the reporting during the day. Here, the phone call played only a side-role, further putting in question the centrality it plays in Andreas Rinke’s account. Instead, three other aspects dominated reporting during the day, all under one headline – is war imminent: news about Ukrainian defectors on Crimea, the formation of volunteer corps across Ukraine – including the pro-Russian east – to defend Ukraine against the expected Russian invasion, and the international crisis response trying to prevent further deterioration, and Germany’s role in it.

Consequently, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, the risk of war continued to dominate the headlines despite the assessment of Russia was that it would not risk initiating a war against Ukraine.<sup>236</sup> The reason for the perceived continued war-threat becomes apparent during an interview with ARD correspondent Udo Lilischkies. Prompted by his colleagues’ question about the options left for the Kyiv government, he points to the source of the renewed uncertainty about the possibility

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<sup>236</sup>The introduction by ARD *tagesthemen* anchor-woman Caren Miosga sums up the sensation at the time her introductory remarks: “We are on the brink of a catastrophe”, the Ukrainian prime minister said today. And on the same day he lost an important ally. Irrespective of international warnings, the Russian president seems fully determined to not let Ukraine go from his chokehold: In what came little short of a cloak and dagger operation, Putin annexed Crimea. And nobody wants to preclude anymore that he will expand to the eastern regions of Ukraine, where many Russian-born Ukrainians live. Like [U.S. Sec. of State] John Kerry, who today threatens to kick Russia out of the G8, the entire West is admonishing and grouching, but yet looks stunned. Because military support from NATO [for Ukraine] could invoke a conflict of larger proportions one doesn’t want to imagine.” Interestingly, the *tagesthemen* anchor-woman speaks of the annexation as already have occurred. This again casts doubts on the conclusion that a swift military response to the Russian aggression by the Ukrainian troops stationed on Crimea may have prevented Russia from annexing Crimea, as it points to the fact that ‘Western’ governments were invariably tied with the new Ukrainian government, which at that time had only been in office for 96hours. Miosga, Caren: ‘Anmoderation’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 02.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

of war: “Putin’s hints that he will also defend the interests of ethnic Russian in Eastern Ukraine has electrified people”<sup>237</sup>. The risk, however, was not Putin, who coolly moved ahead with his plans, but the uncertainty how electrified Ukrainians, especially the ultra-nationalist elements that now were part of the government, would respond.

During the interview, the anchor-woman also touches on the phone call between Merkel and Putin. It becomes apparent in her question that at the time the late-news were aired, there had not yet been confirmation about the content and outcome of the call, or a press release by the Federal Chancellery: “Putin, we hear this evening, is said to have accepted Angela Merkel’s suggestion to establish a contact group.”<sup>238</sup> In his response to the rumours about Putin’s acceptance of the German suggestion to establish a contact group, her Kyiv-based colleague Udo Lilischkies responds:

*“We have [...]just heard what his head of government, prime minister Medwedew, just said: that the Kyiv government has violently taken over power, and their government will end in another revolution and bloodshed. This sounds much less conciliatory and open for dialog. Putin always had been fairly moderate, while his military and intelligence services unfolded the scenario we are witnessing now. What we are also witnessing here is an increasingly aggressive Russian propaganda, as the people call it here, against Ukraine. For example, the Russian border guards claim that there is an exodus of 140.000 Ukrainians leaving for Russia and asked for asylum, that there are even indicators for a humanitarian crisis. The Ukrainian border guards deny this, says this is complete non-sense, and that the numbers are as usual. In a nutshell: the propaganda, the psychological mobilization in Russia is running at highest speed, therefore one may doubt whether the conciliatory tone of Putin really is what some ... [pauses] hope to be able to read from it.”<sup>239</sup>*

In other words, he charges the German foreign minister’s assessment as wishful thinking, as everything appears to be gearing up for conflict. Reversal is not possible. To the journalist’s mind, Putin *always* plays the good cop, while his military and intelligence services ruthlessly move ahead with their scenario, tightening the noose around the new Ukrainian government until they respond, and Russia can claim to act in accordance with international law when it

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<sup>237</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Anmoderation’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 02.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>238</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 02.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>239</sup> Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, 2014.

launches a full on invasion into its neighbouring brother-country. Its aggressive propaganda that is also received in Ukraine will only add oil to an already looming fire. Putin wants the Ukrainians to respond.

The difference in what to expect between the experienced foreign minister and seasoned journalist with specific Russia-expertise notwithstanding, the base assessment is the same: it all follows the pattern before the war in Georgia.

### **3.2. “The day before war?” and “signs of de-escalation”, 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2014.**

The following day, 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 2014, marks the date when the risk of a direct military confrontation between Ukraine and Russia about Crimea looms largest in reporting. It was asked whether this “is this the day before the outbreak of war”. Again, it was Russia playing with the fuse of the powder-keg: President Putin ordered another military snap-exercise, this time on Russia Western border – or NATO’s eastern flank. There too were rumours of a Russian ultimatum for the Ukrainian forces on Crimea to surrender.

Much attention was paid to the German, EU and international diplomatic efforts to bring the conflicting parties back to the negotiating table and come to Ukraine’s economic aid receive, and the EU Foreign Minister Meeting in preparation of the EU Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March was covered extensively. What becomes apparent from reporting is that the positions of the EU members vary greatly, with the Eastern and Central Eastern European Member States demanding the EU to act with punitive measures, and even contemplate a military response, others are more cautious. The summit postpones a verdict on sanctions, which indicates that the German foreign minister could convince his EU-colleagues that now is the “hour of diplomacy”, and not of punitive actions<sup>240</sup>.

Did the reporting of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March focus on the threat of war vs. the hour of diplomacy, reporting on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March focusses on the conciliatory tone that was read into the Russian president’s first TV interview on Ukraine and Crimea since the beginning of the dispute in late

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<sup>240</sup> The reporting during of the meeting also comments on the dilemma the EU faces in dealing with Russia, especially due to the dependency on Russian energy supplies, see: Bohne Marcel: ‘Krisentreffen der EU-Außenminister’, in: ARD(eds): *mdr-Brussels Radio*, 03.03.2014, Brussels, 2014.



2013. From “is this the day before the outbreak of war”, the headline shifted to “signs of de-escalation”, and “Putin open for negotiations”<sup>241</sup>.

Putin’s press conference confirmed all preconceptions about him: the assumption about his tendency to resort to deception, when he continued to cover the true origin of the unidentifiable armed men; his tsarist attitude, and the grief about the collapse of the Soviet Union, by the style he presented himself to a group of pre-selected, Russian journalists; and above all the expectation that despite all sabre-rattling, Putin will eventually agree to a negotiated settlement by his conciliatory tone<sup>242</sup>.

The climax of ‘Western’ crisis resolution efforts was to be on the following day, the 05<sup>th</sup> of March. On this day U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry was to meet with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lawrow for bilateral talks in Paris, followed by a joint dinner with the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the French Foreign Ministry.

The meeting is covered by ARD with much detail, with live-interviews from Paris already during the mid-day and afternoon news, and reporting does suggest that some saw signs for hope. However, as the reporting during the ARD-tagesthemen late news makes evident, the hopes were not fulfilled. With a body language strongly contrasting with his self-confident presence during the *Bericht aus Berlin* interview just 72 hours earlier, Frank-Walter Steinmeier appears tired and concerned, and comments on the outcome of the informal Paris summit with undisguised disappointment:

*“I am not happy about the overall result. I am at best content that all those we spoke to signalled that they will not contribute to a further escalation of the of the situation. But difficult days remain ahead of us.”*<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Considering the notable absence of Putin, which had repeatedly been commented on by various ARD journalists, it is astonishing that when he finally appeared before the (carefully selected) press, the fact that he did was not considered in any depth. Furthermore, it is astonishing that hearing and seeing Putin striking a conciliatory tone is reported as a sign of de-escalation after the notion of a conciliatory Putin had so strongly been rejected by Udo Lilischkies on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March.

<sup>242</sup> Virnich, Birgit: ‘Putin verteidigt Krim-Intervention’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 04.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>243</sup> Fröder, Ellis: ‘Außenministertreffen zum Ukraine-Konflikt’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 05.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.



**3.3. ... to very wrong: The EU Council Summit and the announcement by the Crimean regional government about the regional parliament's decision to join the Russian Federation and hold a referendum about this decision on the 6th of March 2014.**

Despite the setback, making clear that Russia could not be moved back to the negotiating table before the EU Council Summit on the following day, ARD reporting on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March suggests that the German delegation led by Chancellor Merkel went to the EU Council summit remained committed to the course outlined by her Foreign Minister on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March<sup>244</sup>. Prior to departing for the summit, Angela Merkel stated her intentions:

*“This means we will also look at sanctions of different kinds. Whether these must be imposed now, or not, will be decided by us depending on the progress of our diplomatic efforts.”*<sup>245</sup>

Hence, the package the German government wanted to discuss merely contained a warning signal in relations to Russia, that if there was to be no return to the negotiating table, then sanctions would be considered. Considering the decidedly different stance especially of Central- and Eastern European EU members already reported in the context of the EU Foreign Ministers meeting a few days earlier, the willingness to look at sanctions but stepping on the break to impose them by introducing the conditionality of progress of the diplomatic efforts appears likely more intended to appease the concerned EU member states than to punish Putin. In any case, it was old wine in old hoses – it was essentially the same proposition the German Foreign Minister had made on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, with the exception that now the German government was willing to “look” at sanctions. The political, diplomatic solution as outlined

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<sup>244</sup> One reason that gave the German top-leadership involved in the crisis some ground for hope may have been that already on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March, the EU Commission President Barroso announced an 11 billion Euro financial aid package for Ukraine – a signal that in respect to the other core objectives of the German government at the time, one had been achieved, providing some confidence that the other objectives might follow. The positive news about the EU's ability to agree on massive substantial aid package for Ukraine and the new government may have contributed to the confidence that the second objective, to bring Russia back to the negotiating table, was equally feasible, and the course of the previous days had shown that the Russians were talking. And then, even despite Steinmeier's disappointment of the outcome of the informal Paris summit, possibly the highest level informal foreign minister summit of the former ideological blocks since the end of the Cold War the Russians have asked to postpone negotiations, not to end them.

<sup>245</sup> Bohne, Marcel: 'Auf der Suche nach dem Minimalkonsens', in: in: ARD (eds.): *mdr-Brussels Radio*, 03.03.2014, Brussels, 2014.

by her Foreign Minister was ‘without alternative’ when Merkel arrived at the Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup>.

During the summit, however, the news about the announcement of the new Crimean governor about the decision of the regional parliament to join the Russian Federation and to hold a referendum about it within ten days, fell into the negotiations between the heads of state.

The news changed the outcome of the EU Council dramatically. Germany now had to give in to the demand on the imposition of sanctions. From those in favour of this step, the summit was considered a success. That this was the direct effect of the news from Crimea was pointed out by the Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, who at the end of the summit stated: "We have achieved more than we could have expected only a few hours ago"<sup>246</sup>. There was only one element that had changed the circumstances in the previous hours – the news about the referendum.

The reactions of the German government starkly contrast from those of Donald Tusk. Deviating from the usual ARD reporting conduct that refrains from commenting on outer appearance of members of government and conclusions to be drawn from it, an ARD *Brennpunkt* shown on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March describes the reaction of the German foreign minister:

*“Shamefacedness loomed large after this shock was triggered by the speaker of the Crimean parliament. You will be able to see this in a moment when you look at the facial expression of the German Foreign minister – a deeply upset foreign minister stood before the cameras just before this show.”*<sup>247</sup>

The German foreign minister introduced in this fashion is shown, and provides the following assessment of the recent development:

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<sup>246</sup> Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 06.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. This almost jubilant Polish perspective notwithstanding, the EU Council's decision still adopted some of the German positions. On the one hand, the summit decided to impose a first, relatively moderate sanctions regime. Depending on the success of the diplomatic efforts to get Russia back to the negotiating table, and refraining from further escalations especially in Eastern Ukraine, additional, broader sanctions hitting entire economic sectors would be implemented. To be ready to impose these sanctions in case of no diplomatic progress, the EU-Council furthermore decided that these sanctions already be prepared by the EU Commission.

<sup>247</sup> Stempel, Michael: 'Anmoderation', in: ARD (eds.): *Brennpunkt: Ukraine vor der Spaltung*, 06.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

*“We must make it clear to us – a new division in Europe, a speechlessness between the West and Russia would make it impossible to bring any of the larger conflicts, in Iran, in Syria, to a resolution”<sup>248</sup>*

The statement caught immediately after the EU Council summit ended brutally exposes the emotional state the German foreign minister is in – disappointment at least. Taking into consideration that the foreign minister just a couple of days ago confidently wiped away the risk of renewed confrontation between “East and West”, and equally confidently proposed a way out of the maze – diplomacy and a political solution – this should not be a surprise.

Angela Merkel’ response to the news is much less emotional than that of her foreign minister, but make very clear that the 6<sup>th</sup> of March marks a decisive turning point for her<sup>249</sup>. Firstly, ARD reports that the German chancellor deems “the referendum, which was announced today” illegal<sup>250</sup>.

Secondly, ARD reporting strongly stresses the point that “the German chancellor that had long favoured a dialogue oriented course”, but “at the meeting of the EU heads of state, the usually so hesitant chancellor saw no other way than to decide in favour of punitive action”<sup>251</sup>.

Thirdly, it is under the impression of the news received during the EU Council summit, the German chancellor shines a light at her experience of dealing with the Russian president in the previous days.

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<sup>248</sup> Stempel, Michael: ‘Anmoderation’, 06.03.2014.

<sup>249</sup> Which may also have been helped by a poll on how German’s view Russia and the situation in Ukraine, showing that under the impression of recent months, Germans were of the impression that Putin is not trustworthy, and a tougher stance by the German government should be taken against him, see: Schönenborn, Jörg: ‘Deutschlandtrend 1’, in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 06.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

<sup>250</sup> In the report, however, Angela Merkel’s statement does not explicitly say that. Her focus is on the legality of the announced referendum – and even in this context, Angela Merkel is at pains not to use the term ‘legal’ when she states: *“If such a referendum is requested on a base that doesn’t even exist, to assume that it is possible to bring about an opinion-building process within ten days, then this to my mind has not the least to do with any sound preparation of elections or referenda.”* See: Scharkus, Bettina: ‘EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 06.03.2014.

<sup>251</sup> Scharkus, Bettina: ‘EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 06.03.2014.

*“We don’t wish for [imposing additional sanctions], we wish for a diplomatic process, and will direct all efforts in this direction. But it must also be clear that – we have now experienced many disappointments in this regard – we are also ready to act.”*<sup>252</sup>

According to Andreas Rinke, all three aspects led the German government already on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March to adopt a tougher stance towards Russia<sup>253</sup>. Data suggests to the contrary, and that it was under the impression of the announcement of the Crimean regional government that these decisions were taken. Furthermore, taking into consideration the different emotional appearances displayed especially by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, but that are also captured in Merkel’s accessory sentence hinting at ‘disappointments’, it seems that the two German decision-makers personally involved felt ‘deceived and lied to’ on the 6<sup>th</sup>. Because it is the news that break into the EU Council summit meeting that make clear: A reversal is NOT possible. Russia has no interest in a negotiated solution.

The decisions taken at the EU Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, and the changes on the German government’s position it had, therefore did not change the outcome anymore. It was defined on the 6<sup>th</sup>, by the surprising announcement that the Crimean regional parliament will hold a referendum on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March to join the Russian Federation. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of March it was officially welcomed.

## **4. Discussion of the findings**

### **4.1. Why the surprise on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March was strategic to Germany and ‘the West’.**

The fact that the announcement on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March shaped the outcome alone would suffice to qualify the surprise news as strategic – as D-Day on the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1944 is considered a strategic victory for what ultimately led to Nazi Germany’s defeat, even though Germany’s surrender was still another bloody year away.

However, there are two additional aspects that qualify the surprise as strategic. Firstly, for Germany, the surprise was strategic because it nullified the strategy – no punitive actions, a

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<sup>252</sup> Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 06.03.2014.

<sup>253</sup> Rinke, Andreas: 'Wie Moskau Berlin verlor', pp. 40-41.

diplomatically reached political solution - it had adopted under the assumption that 'a reversal is still possible' on the 2nd of March. Putin had no interest in finding a negotiated solution – but instead presented his political solution, and slamming the door for a negotiated solution in doing so.

Secondly, this is also why the surprise effect on Germany cannot be decoupled from that for 'the West': the nature of the surprise on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March was not military; it was not a military surprise attack, like Pearl Harbor, that led to a war or ended it, like D-Day. It was the presentation of a – however flawed and illegal – *political solution*. Moreover, it used instruments of legitimization that could have been the outcome of a political solution negotiated with the help of the 'West': a parliamentary decision followed by a referendum. It thereby turned two key 'Western', or liberal principles – the freedom of choice and the people as the sovereign - against those that were upholding these principles in the past. It robbed the 'West' of its chief argument that it had been voicing since the beginning of the mass protests in Kyiv: freedom of choice, and power to the people<sup>254</sup>. But what if the people did not want to turn westwards, but east? What complicated the situation further was the fact that the demographic reality on Crimea made the counter-argument – that is their true desire to 'turn west' is oppressed by an authoritarian regime – exceedingly difficult in general, but against the backdrop of the highly polarized domestic Ukrainian context since the beginning of the protests in November 2013, even more difficult.

The decision of the Crimean regional parliament to join the Russian Federation, and the announcement to hold a referendum mirrored this very notion – however, with the outcome that

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<sup>254</sup> This is the message for example Guido Westerwelle, Frank-Walter Steinmeier's predecessor sent when he visited the protesters in Kyiv when he was already only acting foreign minister, as the coalition treaty negotiations the followed the September Federal Elections 2013 had not yet been finalised, and Germany was represented by an acting government. On Westerwelle's visit to Kyiv, see: Ruck, Ina: 'Machtkampf in der Ukraine', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesschau*, 04.12.2013, Hamburg, 2013. Another example of the role 'freedom of choice' and power to the people was in the EU-Russian tug-of-war about Ukraine is an interview with Elmar Brok, head of the EU foreign relations committee and long-standing conservative EU parliamentarian during the tagesthemen late news on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January 2014, in which Elmar Brok states in his closing remark: "We must make clear that no country has the right to interfere in another country's trade negotiations by blackmailing the victim by increasing commodity prices. It must be made clear to Putin that every country has the right to choose for itself, the decision does not take place in Moscow, nor in Brussels. The UKR population must be given the right to decide for itself"., see: Roth, Thomas: 'Interview mit Elmar Brok, MdEP, zur aktuellen Lage', in: ARD (eds.): *tagesthemen*, 27.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014.

the freedom of choice would not mean turning westwards, turning democratic – but turning eastward, turning Russian.

Of course, the Russian claim that the decision of the Crimean parliament or the referendum are in factual accordance with the freedom of choice, and the rule of (international) law, was as farcical then as it is today. Politically though, and at the time it was tremendously difficult to argue away without being forced to question whether past actions by “the West” had not also been in violation of these principles. Even more difficult when considering that in the months prior to the annexation, ‘Western’ politicians have repeatedly been calling for the freedom of choice and power to the people in relation to the protests in Kyiv. Now the Crimean regional government offered its people the freedom of choice by holding a referendum on a decision the parliament had already taken.

The strategic effect of the surprise event thus went far beyond Crimea, and aimed at the core principle of ‘the West’ and liberal democracies: freedom of choice and power to the people. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, from the Russian perspective, there was no freedom of choice – and if so, ‘the West’ was the ultimate judge whether the choice was correct. The political surprise on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, however, introduced a political alternative. If “freedom of choice” is without alternative – then what freedom of choice is there? Thus, the annexation of Crimea marks the beginning of the liberal order being strategically challenged by a revisionist power: Putin’s Russia. The surprise event on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March marked its beginning – BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump and increasing support for populist demagogues in liberal democratic countries were to follow. And as often is the case – when two sides quarrel, the third is lucky. China, already identified by the United States as strategic competitor, had just been gifted with its key opponent having to open a second front and divert its efforts.

#### **4.2. Why Germany was surprised.**

In many cases competing priorities – like the German federal elections in 2013, and the long coalition-treaty negotiations that followed, leaving the German government fully focussed on domestic policy paying less attention to the developments in Ukraine - contributed to the German government being caught by surprise. Another example of competing priorities could be observed in relation to the domestic situation in Ukraine. Throughout the period of

observation, the political situation and the economic situation in Ukraine demanded attention. The question was, which one was more important, and which one needs to be considered first. A third example of competing priorities that contributed to Germany being taken off guard is Frank-Walter Steinmeier's visit to Washington, where seemingly the bilateral relationship was given a higher priority than the situation in Ukraine. The visit was also heavily impacted by an issue dear to the heart of the German domestic audience, as the foreign minister tried to use the occasion to address the revelations that the United States had been engaged in broad intelligence gathering in Germany, including the private phone conversations of the German chancellor. Consequently, neither the situation on Crimea, where armed men had seized the regional parliament and raised a large Russian flag, nor the re-appearance of the fugitive ex-president, or the contested language-law introduced by the new government played a role in the reporting of the visit. And lastly, there were other international crises that required the attention of international policymakers: Especially the situation in Syria, but also the developments around Iran required the attention of foreign policy-makers – and here the situation was made even more delicate by realisation that these international conflicts can not be addressed without Russia<sup>255</sup>.

However, the key contributing factor to Germany being taken off-guard identified in the data analysed for this chapter were assumptions guided by false premises in relation to the situation in Ukraine, on Crimea and Russia's role in it. At the latest on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2014, in Frank-Walter Steinmeier's interview, both the premise and the expectations about the future become apparent: The developments on and around Crimea have the potential to turn into another Georgia. While Russia will not invade, it is fully prepared for the use of military force if the new Ukrainian government conducts an irrational act giving Russia a legitimate (even if dubious) reason to use its military.

The premise here is that Russian behaviour will not deviate from patterns of behaviour it had previously shown, a premise which suggests that the level of innovation expected in Russian

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<sup>255</sup> Whether other causes, for example frictions in the interplay of government as was indicated by the argument that the German foreign intelligence had warned the German government of the likelihood of such a scenario on Crimea, played a role cannot be concluded from the data analysed for this chapter. Nor can the notion of harmony offered by Andreas Rinke be confirmed.



policies was fairly moderate<sup>256</sup>. The expectation was a repetition of the developments that led to a war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, in which Russia lured the newly elected, pro-Western Georgian president Saakashvili into firing the first shot.

This premise – and the expectation deducted from it – led to overlook those elements of information that ultimately shaped the outcome of what is referred to ‘the annexation of Crimea’: The local political developments set in-motion and controlled by the Kremlin on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February under the cover of heavily armed men wearing no insignia and that raised a large Russian flag over the regional parliament.

Data shows that the political events that ultimately shaped the outcome were reported, and thus could have been considered<sup>257</sup>. However, neither are there indications that they were considered by the covering journalists, nor by the political decision-makers involved. Instead there was a tendency to look how incoming information fit into an already existing image: the Georgia scenario.

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<sup>256</sup> This also leads to overlook the developments within Russia that occurred as a consequence of the Georgia War. As Margarete Klein convincingly argues, the Russian Georgia operation and the lessons learned led to a large modernization effort of the Russian forces. Although military reform and modernisation often is a slow process, the six years that separate the Georgian War and the situation on Crimea is enough to have led to some changes in the way Russian military will operate. See: Fischer, Margarete: ‚Militrische Implikationen des Georgienkrieges: Zustand und Reformbedarf der russischen Streitkrfte‘, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed): *SWP-Aktuell*, 2008/A74, Oktober 2008, Berlin, 2008.

While the military modernisation that was backed by a massive spending programme certainly had an effect on the military operational aspects on Crimea – as the RAND study by Andrew Kofman details – but there were not only military reforms between the Georgia War and the annexation of Crimea. An example may suffice for this point: the Apple iPhone had been introduced to the market in 2007, one year before the Georgia War. In its wake, communication and information flows have experienced the most profound change since the invention of the Gutenberg printing press. The effect, however, was much quicker, and not limited to a world-region. Today, the whole world is connected through our pocket. While it may be argued that the digital age, and the ‘revolution of military affairs’ triggered by it, had impacted the context of military operations much earlier, and were seen as early as in the first Iraq War (24/7 news coverage), their role in letting ourselves call our age the ‘Digital Age’ pales in comparison with Apple’s smartphone technology and how it impacted on the lives across the globe. Thus, the context in which the annexation of Crimea occurred was fundamentally different to that of Georgia due to non-military changes.

<sup>257</sup> This observation strengthens the argument that surprise occurred to the German government despite warning. Specifically in the context of the German debate, where it was indicated that the German foreign intelligence service BND had warned the German government about Russian motives in relation to Crimea since the Georgia War, it raises the question whether the German intelligence had considered the signals that were reported, or whether within the German intelligence service the observed tendency that incoming information was analysed for similarities to known patterns of behaviour, or whether there was room in the intelligence analyses for dissimilarities.



### **4.3. How Russian deception contributed to Germany's surprise.**

Data has shown that in the period between the disappearance of Victor Yanukovych after the Maidan agreement, and the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU-Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, the Russian president did everything he could to support this specific reading of the situation. This distinguishes it from Russian deception and deceptive practices that could be observed from data between November 2013 until Yanukovych's disappearance, which do not aim to create a specific, false image, but aim to increase the overall ambiguity of the situation – for example in the lead up of the bilateral credit agreement the Putin and Yanukovych announced on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 2013, or the notable silence Putin maintained between October 2013 and the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2014.

Data does not allow any conclusions as to when the decision was taken by Putin to annex Crimea, nor when the decision was taken to pursue a strategy based on deception and strategic surprise. Neither – like the previous efforts seeking to explain the annexation of Crimea – can it prove that this indeed was his strategy, nor whether the strategy followed a detailed plan drawn much earlier. Therefore, as has been stressed already on the onset of this chapter, the finding on Russian deception and how it contributed to surprise can at best add another hypothesis on the existing assumptions on how Crimea was annexed by Russia, specifically on the role of deception.

This notwithstanding, data allows to identify a pattern of Russian behaviour that served to support the creation of this specific false expectation by the German government.

#### *4.3.1. The military: Putin's stratagem*

The first unambiguously Russian step after the disappearance of Yanukovych is the ordering of a snap-exercise on Ukraine's Eastern border on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 2014. In Georgia, 6 years earlier, just weeks before the war broke out, there were Russian military exercises on Georgia's northern border<sup>258</sup>.

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<sup>258</sup> Anonymous: 'Russia holds military exercise in the north Caucasus', *North Caucasus Weekly*, Vol. 9, No. 28, 17.07.2008, available online: <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-holds-military-exercises-in-the-north-caucasus/>, last accessed 31.03.2021.

The deceptive pattern is introduced on the following day. Whereas the snap-exercise only introduces one alternative – Russia will use (or not use) the military – the following Russian military escalations that are discernible from hindsight always introduce two alternatives: a military option, and a political option. From the 27<sup>th</sup> onwards, each military escalation by Russia was accompanied by a political escalation. Each time, the focus of the data analysed for the previous chapter, was firmly on the military angle, and risks involved, while neglecting the political developments.

- On the 27<sup>th</sup>, the Crimean regional parliament is seized by heavily armed men, that later raise a Russian flag. The governor of the peninsula is replaced, and the parliament announces the holding of a referendum on the future status of autonomy of Crimea.
- On the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, the Duma authorises the Russian president to use the Russian military in the entire territory of Ukraine to protect ethnic Russians. The Crimean regional government announces that the referendum will be considerably moved ahead and calls on the Russian government to come to its help.
- On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, another phone call between Merkel and Putin occurs. Putin acknowledges that the paramilitary troops operating on Crimea have direct links with the Russian military – but also indicates that he is willing to consider the German suggestion of an international contact group to resolve the conflict.

Hence, the military takes a central role in the deceptive strategy aiming to make Russia's adversaries believe that another Georgia is unravelling – it is Putin's stratagem. However, as the referendum that ultimately shaped the outcome – the annexation of Crimea – goes to show: the military was NOT decisive. It was, however, the key enabler for the non-military annexation that followed.

#### 4.3.2. *Vladimir Putin: Russia's chief stratagematist*

The other key Russian actor involved in creating this specific, false expectation about the future within the German government is the Russian president. Unlike in the case of the military escalation covering the ultimately decisive political developments, which could be seen across the globe, the Russian president chose to remain publicly silent, but seek direct engagement. Although there were phone calls between Putin and Barack Obama reported in the period of

observation, it is clear that the Russian president directly interacted most frequently with the German chancellor Angela Merkel, which is evidenced by numerous phone-calls. The widely observed notion that these phone-calls are evidence to Germany actively assuming a leading role in international crisis responses is not confirmed by data – data shows that in the period identified as decisive for the annexation of Crimea, the Russian president also took the initiative to reach out to the German chancellor. Considering the findings of Fiona Hill on Vladimir Putin and his KGB operators' mentality, this suggests that Germany may not only have assumed a leading role in the context of the annexation of Crimea because it wanted to, but also because Putin chose Germany as the victim of his deceptive plan.

- On the 28<sup>th</sup>, Vladimir Putin initiates a call to Angela Merkel, in which he urges de-escalation, but also expresses his support of the pro-Russian supporters on Crimea.
- On the 1<sup>st</sup> of March Putin receives the Duma's authorisation to use troops in neighbouring Ukraine, a request he had personally filed.
- On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, following the Duma's authorisation for the use of military force in the entire territory of Ukraine, Putin acknowledges in a call with Merkel that the paramilitary troops that had begun to operate on the peninsula since the 27<sup>th</sup> of Crimea and by then had taken de facto control, had direct links with Russia, but also indicates that he is willing to consider the German suggestion of an international contact group to resolve the conflict.

In his phone calls with the German chancellor, it appears as if the Russian president did everything to confirm the suspicions long held against him by the German chancellor, the effect of which was that the German chancellor would believe that Putin would not hesitate to react if Ukraine commits a mistake, but would not risk a military intervention for fear of the international repercussions. At the latest on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March, following his phone call with Angela Merkel and the interview of the German foreign minister Steinmeier outlining the German response, it becomes apparent in reporting that the German government had adopted the reading of the situation the Russian president wanted it to have: that there is a risk of a repetition of a war like in Georgia: the powder to the keg is generously poured onto Crimea by Russia - but the sparkle that may lead to its explosion may come from the fires still smouldering in Kyiv.

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Whether the Russian president has a specific liking of Sushi is not known. However, in the context of the poisoning of Alexander Litwinenko, the Russian foreign intelligence community to which the Russian president proudly counts himself, has shown that it is fully aware of the applicability of Sushi for the pursuance of sinister aims: the former KGB spy Litwinenko would not have expected that the inside of the Sushi he ordered and confidently indulged in had been prepared with Polonium, leading to a horrible and slow death for an unwanted person.

For the annexation of Crimea, it seems from the analyses of ARD reporting, Putin yet again showed his ability to apply the universe of sushi-variations to realpolitik, but in inverted form and on a strategic level: Had the Russian lead-up to the Georgia War been a standard Sushi, where the raw fish is covered by rice wrapped in algae, the annexation was very much like an inside-out sushi role. Here, the fish forms the outside of the roll, while the rice forms the centre. It is arguably much more complex to produce, as it is much more difficult to create the adhesiveness required for the sushi to maintain its form. In offering his opponents the fish first, however, Putin made sure that his adversaries would be certain that they are looking at the Russian sushi they knew from the past. The longer they looked at it, the more certain they became. Only when biting on it his adversaries realized, that the Sushi they expected was nothing else than the sushi-version of a Potemkin village – but by then, it was already too late. There never was a Georgia to be prevented<sup>259</sup>. Putin took Crimea without fighting, but by the cunning use of a referendum backed by a gun.

#### **4.4. Discussing the findings of this analyses in the context of findings in previous works**

In the absence of certainty and unambiguous proof about the annexation of Crimea, neither falsify nor confirm the findings of earlier works about the annexation of Crimea. Rather, the findings of the preceding analysis provide yet another turn of the kaleidoscope the annexation of Crimea. Therefore, the view that has been described in the previous section must be considered as an additional hypothesis on the annexation of Crimea.

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<sup>259</sup> As implied by one of the primary sources consulted by Andreas Rinke. That “another Georgia was prevented” implies that a Georgia was at stake. This research suggests the opposite, by arguing that Putin WANTED his opponents to believe “another Georgia” was at stake.

The findings of the previous section furthermore the research gaps that were identified in the discussion of prior works:

- It related the effect of surprise to the overall outcome.
- It details the nature of the surprise event, rather than merely observing that an event has been surprising.
- It provides a systematic relationship between creating the conditions for surprise – deception – and its effect.
- It details the role of the Russian president in creating the conditions for surprise.
- It shows that Germany – not Ukraine or ‘the West’ – was the intended victim of Russian deception.

In addressing these gaps, however, the findings surmount to an additional, competing hypothesis on the annexation of Crimea: According to this research, surprise was decisive for the outcome, and the conditions for surprise were created by Russian deception that aimed to make its victim certain about the wrong option. To achieve this aim, Putin exploited premises about him and Russia that became apparent in the previous months and years. The stratagem in Russia’s deception that created the space for the decisive surprise event during the EU Council Summit on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March was the military. It served two functions: to confirm the pre-existing images about Russia and Putin on the one hand, and to provide a cover-up for the developments that ultimately proved decisive – the political developments on Crimea that were set in motion by the paramilitaries that stormed the regional Crimean parliament on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2014.

The hypothesis this research puts forward, especially the finding that surprise was decisive for the outcome of the annexation of Crimea, and that Russian deception created the conditions for this surprise strongly differs from the dominant view in earlier publications arguing that surprise and deception were intractable in the context of the annexation of Crimea beyond the military operational aspects. The conclusions drawn from the analyses of ARD’s reporting are the exact

opposite<sup>260</sup>: Surprise was decisive for the outcome; it was achieved by Russian deception; Russian deception aimed at increasing certainty about the wrong alternative.

This leads to the final question this research will address before concluding its systematic analysis of the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany – what role for surprise (and deception) in strategy. Considering the role of surprise in strategy will not only help to consider the variation in the findings about the role of surprise in this research and previous findings, but it also allows to reflect on the question whether there is a role for surprise (and deception) in strategy general, and whether the findings this research puts forward have been considered can be explained by the more abstract knowledge about the interrelationship of surprise, deception and strategy.

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<sup>260</sup> In the context of earlier research discussed for this undertaking, the findings presented by Fiona Hill on the Russian president and how his background as a KGB-operator influences both his readings of international politics, as well as it defines how he goes about it most closely resemble the findings made in this research. While Fiona Hill however only considered how the KGB-background impacts on Vladimir Putin and how this sets him apart from his contemporary heads of state across the globe, and thus provides a psychogram of the Russian president, this research provides a case study confirming many of her assumptions of the Russian president. See: Hill, Fiona: 'Putin: the one man show the West doesn't understand', 2016.

## **IV. On the relationship between surprise, deception, and strategy**

### **1. Preliminary Remarks**

As had been shown in the discussion about the methodological underpinnings of the previously published works reviewed for this undertaking, little attention was paid to the question which theory could explain the annexation of Crimea best. Instead, most researchers opted “to cut straight to the empirical cheese” and wasted no time with such considerations. Broadly speaking, the annexation of Crimea may be considered a case of inter-state conflict, and thus a case belonging to the realm of international relations. However, the scope the common schools of International Relations, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, apply to explain the relations between states appears to broad and unspecific for the purpose of the following chapter.

Instead, rather than turning to the theories about the relationship between states in general, this effort will consider the theoretical findings of what is decisive in case of conflict between states. This is the quintessential question that is considered by literature on strategy, which focusses on how to win in competitive environments. Therefore, the following will review and discuss the theoretical findings on the role of surprise in strategy.

It is astonishing that neither surprise nor deception, despite their unanimously agreed role in the annexation of Crimea have received so little systematic scrutiny in general, but in the context of strategy specifically – especially when one considers the quintessential role the question whether Crimea’s annexation was an indication of Putin’s strategic ability or incapacity: Deception and Surprise are as old as war and conflict, and thus strategy: A classic example is the Trojan Horse. More recent examples that come to mind are the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, or the Allied D-Day surprise attack on the coast of Normandy. Considering the United States as a victim of surprise, in their contemporary contribution *Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives*, Lani Kass and J. Phillip J. London list additional unexpected events:

*“[...]the February 1979 invasion of Vietnam; the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the September 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran; the 1982 Argentine invasion of*

*the Falklands, and the August 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Likewise, Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and Odysee Down (Libya) all involved successful surprise and deception by the belligerents.*"<sup>261</sup>

However, not only the United States was caught off guard. For example, Israel was surprised by the coordinated Syrian-Egyptian attack in 1973. So was the Soviet Union when in 1971 U.S. president Richard Nixon visited communist China to re-establish the relationship between the two Pacific-nations. Germany, on the other hand, seemingly has not been caught off-guard since the end of the Second World War.

Furthermore, unexpected events are not limited to military operations, nor to the 20<sup>th</sup> century: Consider the surprise visit of U.S. president Nixon in China 1971; or, in the field of economics, the Asian financial crisis of 1998, or the global financial markets collapsed leading to the global financial crisis; natural disaster like in 2004, when much of Southeast Asia was hit by a devastating Tsunami; the use of surprise by non-state actors, as during the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001; or of socio-political nature, like in 2012, the Arab Spring unexpectedly changed much of the long-standing political realities in the countries affected.

The list continues: in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, and a terror group so far not considered, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria swiftly took control of much of the territories of the two countries; in 2016, the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union, and Donald Trump was elected as the 45<sup>th</sup> president of the United States – against all polls.

While this list is not exhaustive, it makes evident that surprise events occur throughout history – and are likely to occur, in future as well. As Colin S. Gray notes: “Surprise is not merely possible, or even probable, it is certain”<sup>262</sup>. It should therefore not be astounding that surprise and deception have received considerable attention in literature on war and conflict. A discussion of these earlier findings with the objective to develop a better understanding of the interrelationship of surprise and deception and strategy are discussed in the following chapter.

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<sup>261</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: *Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives*, in: *Orbis*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2013, p.63.

<sup>262</sup> Gray, Colin S.: *Another Bloody Century: The Future of War*, p. 25, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005.



### 1.1. Definition

Consulting the Oxford Dictionary of English makes apparent that the interrelationship between war and surprise can also be traced in the definition and etymology of the term surprise.

It defines ‘surprise’ as an unexpected or unanticipated event or fact<sup>263</sup>, and points to the etymology of the term: Its Medieval Latin root *suprehendere* means “to seize”, which is also the meaning of the Old French term *surprendre*. In Old Middle English the term surprise, refers to “unexpected seizure of a place or attack by troops”<sup>264</sup>.

The German term *ueberraschen* is a composite term based on the Germanic adjective *rasch*, meaning “quick, speedy”, and adverb *über*, meaning “too”. “Überraschen” was originally used to describe a sudden attack – too sudden to guard against it. Thus, the Germanic term *ueberraschen* adds speed and suddenness to something unexpected happening.

Russian knows three terms for surprise, *сюрприз* (*syurpriz*), *Неожиданность* (*neoschidannost*), and *Внезапность* (*Vnezapost*). While *syurpriz* is a lent term capturing the element of “unexpectedness”, the two latter, Slavic terms, much like the German “ueberraschen”, consider the time element of the unexpected, stressing suddenness or abruptness.

The military origin of the term, however, does not mean that surprise and its effect is limited to the military realm, nor to governments. In fact, surprise is an everyday experience for most people. While individuals also make up the government, this research is concerned with surprise when it happens to a government.

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<sup>263</sup> Online version of the Oxford Dictionary, see: <https://www.lexico.com/definition/surprise> , last accessed 30.03.2021.

<sup>264</sup> The differences between the “orthodox school” and the “revisionist school” are summarized in: Cancian, Mark F.: *Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts*, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.

## 1.2. Boundaries

The definition of surprise as an unexpected or unanticipated *event* distinguishes surprise from other terms – especially from crisis<sup>265</sup>. A crisis concerns *a time*, has a beginning and an end. If between states, it may, but must not begin with a declaration of hostile intent and is usually characterised by increasing tensions, or even. While surprise events may occur during a crisis or may mark the beginning or the end of a crisis, a surprise is a specific, unique event.

The second concept surprise needs to be distinguished from is co-incidence – which, as the term implies, is an unrelated event<sup>266</sup>. Surprise, on the other hand, occurs in relation to something often to a crisis, but not exclusively.

The third term that requires to be considered in the context of surprise are so called ‘Black Swan’ events. The term, coined by Greek satirist Juvenal who called his faithful wife a *rara avis in terris, nigroque simillima cygno*<sup>267</sup>, as white swans were unknown at the time in Europe. Following their discovery in Australia in 1697, it became a metaphor for freak events – highly improbable events that nonetheless occur<sup>268</sup>. The financial crisis of 2008 led to a renaissance of the term. In its wake, “Black Swans – The Impact of Highly Improbable Events” by the stock-market guru Nassim K. Taleb became a best-seller<sup>269</sup>. In it, Taleb dissects why there are events that are wholly unexpected but with grave consequences. The sophisticated presentation of his arguments notwithstanding, Taleb essentially repeats the pessimistic notion offered by earlier scholars – surprise is inevitable, unless one is blessed with serendipity<sup>270</sup>. Like the

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<sup>265</sup> For a distinction from other, similar concepts see also: Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic Surprise’, Academy of Management Meeting Proceedings, 2014 No.1, Philadelphia, 2014, pp. 4-6.

<sup>266</sup> Buchstein, Hubertus: ‚Zufallsentscheidungen historisch betrachtet. Eine (kleine) Geschichte des Einsatzes von Losverfahren für Regierungshandeln.‘ In: *Zeitschrift für Führung und Organisation*, Jg. 88, Heft 3/2019, 162-168. In his short history of the use of lottery for government action Buchstein points out that in democratic Athens, most public offices were allocated by the use of lottery – or fate and co-incidence – amongst the citizens of Athens. These offices included senior positions, for example tax-collection. Mostly a measure against corruption, it also created a sense of citizen responsibility by the theoretical chance that any citizen could be chosen by fate to assume public office. However, some offices were exempt from lottery, as it was held they should not be left to luck and chance, and they were elected. One of these offices was that of the “strategos”, the leader in war.

<sup>267</sup> Juvenalis, Decimus Junius: Die Satiren Des Decimus Junius Juvenalis in einer erklärenden Übersetzung, Decker Verlag, Berlin, Leipzig, p. 182; online available at: <https://digital.slub-dresden.de/werkansicht/df/69231/192/0/>

<sup>268</sup> Interestingly, two eminent figures in the history of the humanities and social sciences, John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper considered Black Swan events as example of deductive reasoning.

<sup>269</sup> Taleb, Nassim K: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, 2007.

<sup>270</sup> Terje Arven argues that the difference between a Black Swan event and a strategic surprise is somewhat semantical in relation to the effect. See Arven, Terje: Risk, Surprises and Black Swans: Fundamental ideas and

distinction between a ‘normal’ surprise and a strategic surprise event, the difference between a ‘black swan’ event and strategic surprise is somewhat blurry. However, unlike ‘strategic surprise’, ‘Black Swan Events’ may also encapsulate co-incidence: That the Black Swan was discovered had nothing to do with the Black Swan, but with the Black Swan and the Dutch explorer Willem de Flamingh happened to be at the same place at the same time.

### 1.3. Effect

The effect of surprise is that one “[s]uddenly and deeply feel[s] that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system”<sup>271</sup>. In other words, it is a cognitive sensation, a psychological effect.

Most works on the phenomenon of surprise to governments consider its effect in war and strategy. James Wirtz, for example, observes the effect of a military surprise attack as follows, “[s]urprise temporarily suspends the dialectical nature of warfare (or any other strategic contest) by eliminating an active opponent from the battlefield”<sup>272</sup>.

Kass and London point to the three common effects of surprise to governments:

*“First, they are traumatic to the victim. Second, they accord a significant, albeit temporary, advantage to the initiator. Third, they generate a seemingly endless stream of assessments and analysis seeking to determine what happened and why, who was at fault, and how to reorganize the system in order to avoid similar failure in the future.”*<sup>273</sup>

The key term in the descriptions of the effect of surprise in war and strategy is *temporary*. Whether or not surprise can be decisive, thus have direct effect on the outcome is contested among strategists and scholars on surprise alike.

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concepts in risk assessment and risk management, pp. 115 – 124, Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014. However, there is a difference in cause – strategic surprise involves an malevolent actor aiming to surprise its adversary.

<sup>271</sup> Weick, Karl E.: ‘The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann-Gulch disaster’, in: *Administrative Quarterly Science*, cf.: Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic Surprise’, in: Chicago Academy of Management (eds.): *Proceedings*, Vol. 2014, No.1, August 2014, p. 5.

<sup>272</sup> Wirtz, James: A Theory of Surprise, part 1, slide 3, July 2008. Online presentation available at the Homeland Security Digital Library: <https://www.chds.us/ed/items/1636>, last accessed: 30.03.2021.

<sup>273</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, in: *Orbis*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2013, p. 69.

## 2. The elusive concept of strategic surprise

Although there is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes a strategic surprise, literature offers some definitions of the term.

For example, Paul Miller of the Atlantic Council Strategy Consortium offers the following definition: “strategic surprise is an unanticipated development that erodes if not ends our prevailing strategic assumptions, undermines one or more policy lines, and demands a policy response”<sup>274</sup>

Another definition of strategic surprise is offered by Milo Jones and Phillippe Silberzahn: “We define strategic surprise as the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an erroneous assessment which results in a failure to anticipate an event that has significant impact on vital interests”.<sup>275</sup>

The difference between a “normal” surprise and a strategic surprise event experienced by a government remains blurry. A distinction can be drawn looking at the severity of the adverse impact of the unanticipated event: The difference between a foreign minister unexpectedly not being able to board a government-jet because of a mechanical failure and an unexpected attack by two hi-jacked civilian aircraft steered by Muslim fundamentalists on the World Trade Centre is the severity of their relative impact. Simply put, a strategic surprise event is an unexpected event with especially grave consequences for its victim, and one that for this reason is particularly well remembered. Up until today the Horse of Troy is remembered to have caused surprise with strategic effect. Thus, whether a surprise was strategic can only be judged with the knowledge of hindsight – it requires the surprise event to occur<sup>276</sup>. This notwithstanding, surprise has featured prominently in considerations about strategy. The following will outline the debate about the relationship between strategy and surprise from classical strategy to contemporary considerations on the phenomenon.

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<sup>274</sup> Miller, Paul: Responding to Strategic Surprise, in: Atlantic Council (eds.): *Strategy Consortium*, 12.05.2017, Washington, 2017.

<sup>275</sup> Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic Surprise’, in: Chicago Academy of Management (eds.): *Proceedings*, Vol. 2014, No.1, August 2014, p. 3.

<sup>276</sup> Leni and Kass offer the assumption that the impact of a surprise event depends on how strong the perceptions that are falsified by the surprise event are held and how much is at stake, see: Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, 2013, p. 73.

## **2.1. Strategy and Surprise in the pre-nuclear age: surprise as a decisive factor for winning wars?**

As the military origin of the term surprise suggests, surprise is as old as war itself<sup>277</sup>. And as Colin S. Gray notes: “Surprise is not merely possible, or even probable, it is certain”<sup>278</sup>. But it certainly is not new.

And so is the reflection about the role of surprise in the art and science of winning wars, strategy. In the search of how to best win wars, the question whether surprise can be decisive – that is, strategic, - is contested.

Two schools of thought can be distinguished concerning the relationship of surprise and strategy in the classics of strategy: the direct and the indirect approach<sup>279</sup>.

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<sup>277</sup> Classic examples are the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, or the Allied D-Day surprise landing on the coast of Normandy. Considering the United States as a victim of surprise, in their contemporary contribution ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, Lani Kass and J. Phillip J. London list additional unexpected events: “[...]the February 1979 invasion of Vietnam; the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the September 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran; the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and the August 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Likewise, Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and Odyssey Down (Libya) all involved successful surprise and deception by the belligerents.” Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, p. 69 <sup>277</sup> However, not only the United States was caught off guard. For example, Israel was surprised by the coordinated Syrian-Egyptian attack in 1973. So was the Soviet Union when in 1971 U.S. president Richard Nixon visited communist China to re-establish the relationship between the two Pacific-nations. Furthermore, the history of surprise does not end with the 20<sup>th</sup> century, nor are unexpected events limited to military operations and diplomatic coups. The Asian financial crisis of 1998 came as a surprise, as did the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001; In 2004, Southeast Asia was hit by a Tsunami; in 2008, the global financial markets collapsed leading to the global financial crisis; in 2012, the Arab Spring unexpectedly changed much of the long-standing political realities in the countries affected; in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and a terror group so far not considered, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria swiftly took control of much of the territories of the two countries; in 2016, the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union, and Donald Trump was elected as the 45<sup>th</sup> president of the United States.

<sup>278</sup> Gray, Colin S.: *Another Bloody Century: The Future of War*, p. 25, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005.

<sup>279</sup> An excellent review outlining the distinction between the two western schools of strategic thought can be offered by Henry L. Roberts, see Roberts, Henry L: ‘Strategy: The indirect approach’, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1955

Disciples of the direct approach follow the notion that strategy is “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war”<sup>280</sup>. Disciples of the indirect approach on the other hand argue that the direct engagement in a battle of annihilation has rarely been decisive and should be avoided. To them, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”<sup>281</sup>. In the following, the role of surprise in the strategic theory of Carl von Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart, the two eminent *Western* representatives of the two approaches will be discussed<sup>282</sup>.

### 2.1.1. *The direct approach: The limited value of surprise and deception*

In his quintessential work ‘On War’, the eminent Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz considers surprise in his third book of his Treatise, ‘On Strategy in General’, specifically in the second chapter, which considers the elements of strategy. Albeit viewing surprise as an element of strategy in general, the von Clausewitz is cautious to its strategic utility:

*“[...] while the wish to achieve is common, and, indeed, indispensable, and while it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of success in war. The principle is highly attractive in theory, but in practice it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine.”*<sup>283</sup>

This leads to the question what Clausewitz would consider “outstandingly successful”, or the “key element to success in war”. To the Prussian war theorist, success in war is the annihilation of the enemy on the battlefield, brought about in a single, decisive battle - the battle of

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<sup>280</sup> On Clausewitz argument on the intractability of surprise: Watts, Bryan D.: ‘Clausewitzian Friction and the Future of War’, McNair Paper 52, Oct. 1996, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington D.C.

<sup>281</sup> Tzu, Sun: *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 79.

<sup>282</sup> It appears important to stress the same cultural origin of the authors assessed, as often the distinction between the direct and the indirect approach is wrongly related to different cultures, with the direct approach representing the Western school of strategic thought, and the indirect school of strategic thought representing the Eastern or Asian school of thought. The distinction between the two approaches in strategy however was introduced by Basil Liddell Hart, a Western scholar applying positivist methods to test the assumptions offered by Carl von Clausewitz after the experience of the battles of attrition in the First World War. While Liddell-Hart was chiefly concerned with land warfare, a similar notion was developed for sea-based warfare and strategy by Sir Julien Corbett, see: Corbett, Julian S.: *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Naval Institute Press, 1988.

<sup>283</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, edited and translated by Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984, p. 198.

annihilation. This decisive engagement serves as the axiom of Clausewitz' strategy framework. His remarks on the value of surprise to strategy have thus to be seen in relation to this axiom. Clausewitz does not deny the attractiveness of surprise to military considerations – however, not in strategy:

*“Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics, time and space are limited in scale. Therefore, in strategy surprise becomes more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the more it approaches the higher levels of policy”<sup>284</sup>*

In light of the attractiveness of taking the enemy by surprise, Clausewitz emphasises the importance of correct planning – because if the enemy is surprised based on flawed assumptions and with faulty measures, he will have little issue in overcoming the initial shock, as the surprise is not total and decisive. Once the surprise occurred, much is given away to the enemy about intentions and capabilities – and weaknesses, which the enemy can exploit after the initial shock following the surprise attack has faded.

The main reason for Clausewitz' critique of the strategic relevance of surprise is the fact that it is impossible to conceal the preparations for a surprise with strategic effect: “Preparations for war usually take months and these preparations rarely escape the adversary's vigilance”<sup>285</sup>. Surprising the enemy strategically, Clausewitz holds, is a rare occurrence that “depend[s] on more than energy, forcefulness and resolution of the commander: it must be favoured by other circumstances”<sup>286</sup>.

His fundamental criticism about the likelihood of a decisive, or strategic, surprise notwithstanding, Clausewitz is somewhat ambiguous about it. On the one hand he dismisses its value to strategy. On the other hand, though, he acknowledges that the psychological effect of surprise may be so great, that, if circumstances are right and the planning correct, the victim of

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<sup>284</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 198.

<sup>285</sup> This argument, slightly adapted, is repeated by those that believe that technological advances in surveillance and intelligence technology render surprise impossible, see especially: Bracken, P.; Bremmer, I.; Gordon, D. (eds.): Managing Strategic Surprise, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008

<sup>286</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 200.

surprise will lose and never regain the bonds of inner-cohesion. This goes to show that despite all criticism, Clausewitz gives surprise a chance.

Viewing Clausewitz' chapter on surprise in isolation however only gives a limited impression on why the Prussian is sceptical about the strategic utility of surprise. It becomes clearer in his analysis the role of stratagem or cunning (*Kriegslist*) as the means to create the right circumstances for surprise<sup>287</sup>.

*“The term “cunning” implies secret purpose. It contrasts with the straight-forward, simple direct approach as much as wit contrasts with direct proof”*<sup>288</sup>

To the Prussian war intellectual all surprise “is rooted in at least some degree of cunning”<sup>289</sup>. The objective of cunning is to surprise the enemy:

*“The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined, in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before his very eyes”*<sup>290</sup>.

Noting that strategy and stratagem share the Greek prefix strat-, Clausewitz acknowledges that, superficially, it seems plausible that strategy is derived from stratagem. To the grand Prussian strategist's mind, this appears particularly true if one distinguishes between the execution of force (tactics) and the skilful exploitation of force for a larger purpose (strategy).

From this perspective “no human characteristic appears more suitable to the task of directing and inspiring strategy than the gift of cunning”<sup>291</sup>. However, to Clausewitz

*“[s]trategy is exclusively concerned with engagements and with the directions relating to them. Unlike other areas of life, it is not concerned with actions that consist only of*

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<sup>287</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 200ff.

<sup>288</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202.

<sup>289</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202.

<sup>290</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202.

<sup>291</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202.



*words, such as statements, declarations and so forth. But words, being cheap, are the most common means of creating false impressions*<sup>292</sup>.

Words, or “analogous things in war”<sup>293</sup> issued for appearance and confusion to Clausewitz have so little strategic value, that they should not be “considered as a significant independent field of action at the disposal of the Commander”. Clausewitz warns that

*“[i]t is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time to merely create an illusion; there is always that risk that nothing will be gained and the troops deployed will not be available when they are really needed”*<sup>294</sup>.

According to Clausewitz, able generals are aware of this risk, and in war “stern necessity usually permeates direct action to such an extent that no room is left for such a game [of cunning]”.<sup>295</sup>

In sum, the Prussian military intellectual could be no clearer in his judgement on the strategic (in)validity of cunning, deception and, and their objective, surprise. To his mind, only “in a state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgment, and ability no longer suffice, cunning may well appear the only hope”.<sup>296</sup>

### *2.1.2. The indirect approach: A premium on surprise*

Regarding the outlook of surprise being decisive for the outcome of war, the direct approach and the indirect approach assume diametrical stances. The following will discuss the considerations of the relationship between surprise and strategy offered by Basil H. Liddell Hart in his opus magnum, *Strategy*<sup>297</sup>.

Contrary to Clausewitz hypothesis that the direct military engagement is the decisive factor in war, Liddell-Hart finds that historical evidence shows that only rarely has there been *the* decisive battle: “The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without

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<sup>292</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, p. 202.

<sup>293</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, p. 202.

<sup>294</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, p. 203.

<sup>295</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, p. 203.

<sup>296</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, p. 203.

<sup>297</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: *Strategy*, Praeger, New York, 1967.

any serious fighting”<sup>298</sup> Rather than seeking the decisive battle to annihilate the enemy, success in war to Liddell-Hart is achieved by “diminish[ing] the possibility of resistance”, until the enemy is dislocated. He finds that the sequel of dislocation “may be either the enemy’s dissolution or his easier disruption in battle. Dissolution may involve some partial measure of fighting, but this does not have the character of a battle”<sup>299</sup>. This, according to the British strategist, is best achieved by exploiting “the elements of movement and surprise”<sup>300</sup>.

According to Liddell-Hart, manoeuvre belongs to the physical realm and surprise to the psychological realm. However, Liddell-Hart emphasises their interrelation:

*“Although strategy may aim more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely, the two elements react on each other. For a movement which is accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise, even though it be unconcealed; while surprise smoothes the path of movement by hindering the enemy’s counter-measures and counter-movements.”*<sup>301</sup>

To Liddell Hart, “dislocation is the result of the impression on the commander’s mind”<sup>302</sup>. A sudden realization of being at a disadvantage will increase the sense of psychological dislocation. In other words, while the physical sphere seeks to find the line of least resistance, the psychological sphere seeks to find the line of least expectation.

From the perspective of the British thinker on strategy, the adversary’s mindset and psychological sphere is ultimately decisive. To his mind, surprise, is at the core of dislocating the adversary’s commander’s mind. Dislocation is rarely achieved in a single move, but rather requires preceding moves which Liddell-Hart calls “distractions”. These are aimed at depriving the enemy of his freedom of action. In the physical sphere, distraction should divert the adversary’s troops to unprofitable ends, while in the psychological distractions may be achieved by “playing upon the fears of, and by deceiving, the opposing command”<sup>303</sup>.

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<sup>298</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, p. 338.

<sup>299</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, p. 339.

<sup>300</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, p. 339

<sup>301</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, p. 338.

<sup>302</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, 340

<sup>303</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, 341

Psychological distractions are also the method to threaten the opponent with what Liddell-Hart calls alternative objectives. The efforts required by the opponent to guard against more than one objective serve as a distraction of mind and dispersion of forces. To “put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma”<sup>304</sup> requires the concealment of the true intention, or deception and cunning.

### *2.1.3. Surprise as essentially contested concept in war and strategy*

The two interpretations of strategy, and the role of surprise within it offered by Liddell-Hart and Clausewitz could not be any more different. Strategy is concerned with the study of how to win war. In this regard, surprise, can be considered as an essentially contested concept in the theory of how to win wars, or strategy. Despite this, there are areas of agreement:

- (1) Surprise is a temporary, psychological effect.
- (2) Surprise is a powerful force multiplier.
- (3) The means to surprise is cunning and deception.

It is on the question of the relative value of surprise to strategy, and hence to the question of how to win wars, where the two authors differ: For Clausewitz, surprise, is, at best, located in the world of tactics. A strategic surprise, one of decisive effect to the outcome of war, to Clausewitz seems unlikely: Longevity of preparation and the frictions inherent to large organisations stand in the way, preventing to fully conceal the plans from the adversary. Furthermore, Clausewitz makes a normative comment, stating that surprise, cunning and deception may serve as a last beacon of hope to the militarily inferior side. To Liddell-Hart, on the other hand, surprise is the effect that is ultimately decisive to impose one’s will on the adversary.

While Clausewitz, in strict consequence to his dogma of the battle of annihilation to win wars considers surprise from its effect on the decisive battlefield engagement, and thus intractable, Liddell-Hart considers surprise to be of strategic effect, thus ultimately decisive to dislocate the adversary. While Clausewitz considers the effect of a singular surprise (attack), to the British thinker, it is not a question of “one” surprise, but of a series of surprise events, in which the ultimate surprise is then considered to be a “strategic surprise”. Finally, the two schools fundamentally differ in relation to the element of planning. While for the Prussian war theorist,

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<sup>304</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: *Strategy*, 341

strategy and planning are almost synonymous<sup>305</sup>, the British theorist influenced by the experience of trench-warfare that characterised the 1<sup>st</sup> world war is more hesitant on the role of planning, and puts a premium on manoeuvrability, flexibility and adaptability. His is more a muddle-through the best you can but don't waste time on writing a plan – or, as Clausewitz disciple Count Moltke the Elder argued – a system of expedients as no plan lasts longer than until the first contact with the enemy<sup>306</sup>. Table 2 summarizes the findings of the role of surprise to winning wars for the two approaches to strategy:

Direct approach	Indirect approach
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategy is concerned with how to win wars.</li> <li>- Success in war is brought about by the annihilation of the adversary on the battlefield.</li> <li>- Psychological effect on adversary not always decisive.</li> <li>- Surprise only applicable at tactical level of war.</li> <li>- Achieved by deception = Effort to manipulate adversary's mindset, with the aim to surprise.</li> <li>- If successful, force multiplier, but strategic effect unlikely due to internal friction (leaks) and risk of discovery (difficulty of concealing large military operations). Strategy is planning.</li> <li>- Weapon of the weak.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategy is concerned with how to win wars.</li> <li>- Success in war is when the enemy is dislocated.</li> <li>- Dislocating the enemy is achieved by movement and surprise and prevent battlefield engagements.</li> <li>- Surprise is achieved by efforts to manipulate the adversary's mindset.</li> <li>- Psychological realm decisive.</li> <li>- Rather than seeking military engagement, seek to prevent it; winning without fighting is the ultimate art of strategy.</li> <li>- Strategy is adaptation to the circumstances.</li> </ul>

<sup>305</sup> Interestingly, his student who later turned into Prussia's foremost war practitioner, Count Helmuth von Moltke (the elder) considered strategy to be a system of expedients, and that plans only last until the first contact with the adversary. This is a fundamental difference between the two eminent scholars of Prussian military thinking, see: Hughes, Daniel J. (ed): *Moltke and the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Random House Publishing, New York, 2009.

<sup>306</sup> The difference between the two Prussians could in fact not be more startling. A comparative analysis of Clausewitz and Moltke and their principles of strategy, how and why they differed might be a worthwhile endeavour.

## 2.2. Nuclear Age pessimism and Post-Cold War Optimism: The victim's perspective

The preceding chapter has shown that amongst the classical thinkers of strategy, the question whether surprise can be strategic – that is, decisive in war – is essentially contested.

The continued relevance of these two approaches to strategy notwithstanding, the military-technological developments catalysed by the Second World War led to a paradigm change for the thinking about strategy. It also changed the focus of thinking about strategic surprise – facing the threat of an unexpected, decisive, nuclear attack, another question gained prevalence in relation to surprise: Can it be prevented.

The advent of the nuclear weapon made a wholly new approach to strategy seem necessary, as the nuclear weapon was considered a technology rendering all previous thinking on how to win wars outdated. A weapon of such effect that a single strike had the potential to annihilate the adversary. A truly “strategic” weapon, to remain in the terms of Clausewitz; a weapon that made attempts to “dislocate” the adversary in a complex series of a cost-intensive and risky undertaking.

The “absolute weapon” had been uncovered<sup>307</sup>. There was a requirement to “think the unthinkable”, as Hermann Kahn, one of the godfathers of civilian strategic thinking in the nuclear age eloquently put it<sup>308</sup>.

The feasibility of strategic surprise was not only a consequence of the devastating effect of the atomic bomb, but also the technological advances in delivering them. This argument was first put forward by Albert Wohlstetter in a contribution to *Foreign Affairs* magazine titled “The delicate balance of power”<sup>309</sup>, where he points to the fact that the preparation and delivery time for a single, decisive blow was drastically shortened with the developments in air power and

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<sup>307</sup> Brodie, Bernard: *The Absolute Weapon, Atomic Power and World Order*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.

<sup>308</sup> Kahn, Hermann F.: *Thinking the Unthinkable*, Horizon Press, New York, 1962.

<sup>309</sup> Wohlstetter, Albert: “The Delicate Balance of Terror”, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 211 – 234, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, 1959.

propulsion technologies, which also increased the chance of being caught unaware by an attack with nuclear – strategic - weapons.<sup>310</sup>

The possibility of falling victim to a nuclear surprise attack led to systematically consider why governments are surprised. In 1962, Roberta Wohlstetter, Albert Wohlstetter's wife, offered a seminal study on how governments fall victim to surprise. In "Warning and Decision", she examined why the U.S. government was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first publication with this specific question in mind, and it served as a blueprint for many studies to come in the remainder of the Cold War era and beyond<sup>311</sup>.

In 2018, Mark F. Cancian published a report for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in which he considers surprise in the context of great power competition, in which a most useful summary of the key findings of the plentiful research into surprise since Roberta Wohlstetter's Warning and Decision is provided<sup>312</sup>.

Two schools of thought have developed over time, one being the orthodox-pessimist school of thought, the other being the revisionist school of thought. Their key tenets are summarized in table 3:

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<sup>310</sup> This point is also made by Michael Handel, who notes that "although surprise has always been possible on the tactical level, its feasibility on the strategic level is a relatively new historical phenomenon of the twentieth century". Handel, Michael: 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1981, p.231.

<sup>311</sup> Wohlstetter, Roberta: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962.

<sup>312</sup> Cancian, Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.

Orthodox-Pessimist	Revisionist Optimist
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Surprise is inevitable</li> <li>- Surprise occurs despite the availability of warning.</li> <li>- While steps can be taken to lower susceptibility to surprise, factors inherent to surprise prevent the victim of surprise from accurately predicting and hedging against surprise:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ uncertainty inherent in future.</li> <li>→ unavoidable limitation in the warning and response mechanism of government.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Two subgroups within orthodox school:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ the majority considers surprise occurs because policy-makers fail to respond to available warning.</li> <li>→ the minority considers the intelligence community, or those agencies with the responsibility to warn the political leadership of impending danger, to be the culprits.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Surprise can be avoided</li> <li>- Occurs despite the availability of warning.</li> <li>- Factors contributing to limitations in the warning and response mechanism of a government can be overcome.</li> <li>- Two ‘model-suggestions’:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ establish a strategic warning or foresight system for policy-makers.</li> <li>→ Restructure and reorganize the warning and response mechanism.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Table 3: The orthodox and the pessimist school on strategic surprise

Generally, Cancian observes three general patterns in relation to the literature on surprise:

- Publications come in short spikes after surprise events.
- The majority of available works are single case-studies of a surprise event.
- Most literature follows the orthodox-pessimist conclusion that surprise is inevitable.

The key difference in the two perspectives is thus their outlook on the question whether surprise can be prevented. Furthermore, when considering the date of publication, a turn in notion can be observed: Throughout the Cold War, the orthodox-school was dominant. From the end of the bipolar ideological confrontation until the financial crisis in 2008, the more optimistic revisionist school was having the upper hand. However, under the impression of a more and more dynamic world, the orthodox-pessimist school experienced a renaissance – greatly helped

by Nassim Taleb's bestseller "Black Swans". He joins the grim outlook – surprise is inevitable unless one is blessed with serendipity. However, the continued prevalence of surprise events has also given rise to increased efforts in strategic forecasting and thinking about surprise.

The differences between the two surprise-camps notwithstanding, they agree as to the underlying factors that contribute to surprise. These will be outlined in the following section.

### *2.2.1. Why governments are surprised*

As noted above, identifying the factors causing governments to fall victim to surprise have received most attention by research on strategic surprise during the Cold War years. In this time, widespread agreement on the factors causing governments falling victim to surprise was reached. At the centre of these factors is the assumption that "warning is the antithesis of surprise."<sup>313</sup> However, warning alone does not suffice to prevent surprise, as it requires to act to warning, too. Thus, governments are surprised because either there was no warning, or because policymakers failed to respond.

At the core of this failure is "the manner in which humans, as well as machines built and used by humans, process data"<sup>314</sup>, a factor affecting both warning and decision. The "human factor" contributing to the susceptibility to surprise thus blurs the lines of distinction between warning and surprise, as humans account for both "intelligence failures" and "policy fiascos". The question where the brunt of the responsibility for being surprised lies is contested – while some argue that surprise is caused by failure in warning<sup>315</sup>, others consider the failure of decision-makers to act on warning to be ultimately decisive for falling victim to surprise<sup>316</sup>. They argue that "Warning means nothing if decision makers fail to act."<sup>317</sup> However, pointing out whether surprise occurred due to a failure of warning or due to a failure to act is only possible in hindsight. While this may provide relief – or grief – to those that were caught off guard, as it allows finger pointing, no general tendency can be identified. Surprise events are unique cases, and the failures that ultimately lead to surprise are specific in each case.

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<sup>313</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: 'Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives', p. 70.

<sup>314</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: 'Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives', p. 70.

<sup>315</sup> A key proponent of this notion is Michael I. Handel

<sup>316</sup> Marrin, Steve: 'Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy', in: *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 32, No. 6, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 725 – 742.

<sup>317</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: 'Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives', p. 69.



### 2.2.1.1. Human Factor

The human factor, or “human weakness” as Mark Cancian describes it, equally applies to those responsible for warning as for those responsible to act upon warning. A key contribution to better understanding the effect of human weakness were Robert Jervis findings on the role of perceptions and misperceptions on decision-making in international politics<sup>318</sup>, in which he points to the impact of cognitive biases to international politics. More recent authors include Daniel Kahnemann or Phillip Tetlock, whose works highlight the human tendency for mental shortcuts, and how this distorts the assessment of incoming information and data<sup>319</sup>. The human being:

- Focuses on the information that is already available, while not considering which additional information might be important.
- Tends to search for information that confirms pre-existing assumptions.
- Misjudge its ability to control events and rule out the impact of randomness.
- Is inclined to focus on what is considered normal, creating path-dependencies that disregard the possibility of alternatives or disruptions (that is, surprise).

Thus, all information and data are processed through a number of filters – “a perceptual prism comprised of [...] culture, assumptions, biases and experiences”<sup>320</sup>. Figure 1 developed by Kass and London describes the process how the human being deals with incoming information and highlights the steps in the process information is commonly lost.

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<sup>318</sup> Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976.

<sup>319</sup> Gilovich, Thomas; Griffin, Dale; Kahnemann, Daniel (eds.): Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2002; Tetlock, Philip E.: Expert Political Judgement: How good is it? How can we know?, new edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 2017.

<sup>320</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’ p. 70.




Figure 1: Model for Processing and Ordering Information<sup>321</sup>

#### 2.2.1.2. Organisational Filters

However, these filters are not only limited to the individual, but, as the study of complex organisations finds, are reinforced by the mechanics of bureaucracies<sup>322</sup>. Research has identified several structural pathologies within large organisations which contribute to the vulnerability to surprise. Particularly hierarchy, specialization, centralization, and the regularized patterns of behaviour (like Standard Operating Procedures) „distort the acquisition, evaluation, dissemination and consumption of strategic warning“<sup>323</sup>.

Irving Janis finds that groups develop a tendency to seek to avoid conflict and reach consensus without sufficiently testing and evaluating their courses of action, a phenomenon known as ‘group think’. As Tetlock points out, the psychological pressures for conformity negatively impact the scope of thinking, introduce bias into analysis and punishes individual and

<sup>321</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’ p. 70.

<sup>322</sup> Allison, Graham T.: Essence of decision. Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971.

<sup>323</sup> Levite, Ariel: Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987, p. 24.

independent thought<sup>324</sup>. The consequences of groupthink are that it increases the likelihood of an inaccurate analysis of available information. Furthermore, the limited scope of self-reflection may lead to inappropriate or very risky courses of action.

In addition, cybernetic theory, and the related findings on the decision-making process in large and complex organizations has contributed to a better understanding to the organisational filters contributing to surprise. Filters are cybernetic

“[f]eatures that hinder accurate threat perception and adequate response are: (1) narrow input channels; (2) low and highly structured receptivity to incoming information; (3) limited repertoire of responses attempted sequentially; (4) slow learning process”<sup>325</sup>.

#### 2.2.1.3. Intelligence Specific Problem

In the field of intelligence studies, the issue of surprise played a special role – naturally, as the world’s leading intelligence organisation, the CIA, was founded to prevent the U.S. government from being surprised. In the search for vulnerabilities that lead to being surprised, all of the general pathologies identified by those works not explicitly situating themselves in the field of intelligence studies are equally at work in the production and consumption of intelligence: The cognitive-perceptual issues on the individual as well as the organisational level, as well as the structural filters that make it more difficult for non-congruent information to be taken into professional consideration and pass it on to the consumer. Concerning the consumption of intelligence, the cognitive filters specific to the realities of the policy-world apply. Very often the literacy of decision-makers in intelligence is comparatively low. The main reason is that only few policymakers reach their position because of expert knowledge on intelligence – and even if they were, the importance of the cognitive filter of the individual and his subordinates is of particular relevance<sup>326</sup>.

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<sup>324</sup> Tetlock, Philip E.: *Expert Political Judgement: How good is it? How can we know?*, 2017.

<sup>325</sup> Levite, Ariel: *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987, p. 27.

<sup>326</sup> The difficult relationship between policy, intelligence and strategy has been of particular interest to Michael I Handel and Richard K. Betts. In „Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy“, the continuous relevance of the underlying factors leading to governments being surprised despite available warning is re-emphasised, see: Marrin, Steve: ‘Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy’, 2017.

However, when it comes to a government's vulnerability to surprise, intelligence plays a major role, and requires specific attention. Therefore, the role of the intelligence analyst, and how her work is affected both by the relationship to policy as well as by the specific structural filters at work within the intelligence community led to the identification of intelligence specific issues that may contribute to a government's susceptibility to being surprised.

#### 2.2.1.3.1. Signal to Noise

The most prominent factor specific to the production and consumption of intelligence is what Roberta Wohlstetter calls the 'signal to noise' problem<sup>327</sup>. It may be regarded as the foundational problem of analysis: Accurate and relevant information, or signals, are embedded in inaccurate and or irrelevant information, or noise. The challenge for intelligence analysts is to distinguish the signals from the noise correctly. However, they are forced to do so against the uncertainty inherent to the future.

#### 2.2.1.3.2. Compartmentation

Compartmentation is another issue which is specific to intelligence but can be linked to findings in relation to the study of small groups. Because of the confidential nature of the work of intelligence, specific restrictions apply on the pooling and sharing of information, or the incorporation of external views. The effects are twofold – (1) available warning may not be utilized because it was not made available, or (2) lead to the issues related to group think, where non-congruent information is not being considered to a professionally satisfying extent.

#### 2.2.1.3.3. Intelligence paradox No.1: Inherent uncertainty of the future

The first intelligence paradox identified by Handel describes the challenge of the intelligence producer to provide certainty in face of inherent uncertainty.

In the process of „figuring out what an actual or potential opponent is up to “ the intelligence analyst is „always at the mercy of the attacker to change his plans“<sup>328</sup>. In other words, the accuracy of information is perpetually subject to the possibility of the adversary to change his course of action – making „accurate“ warning a very raw gem.

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<sup>327</sup> Wohlstetter, Roberta: 'Warning and Decision', 1962.

<sup>328</sup> Betts, Richard, K.: Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1980, p557.

In addition, the process of intelligence, and the requirement for it to provide relevant and accurate information, creates a time lag in determining likely intentions of the opponent. This time lag increases the vulnerability of surprise in two ways: (1) the time lag may prove decisive in a sudden transition from routine to threat, and (2) accurate intelligence may become outdated by new developments. Formerly accurate information then serves as a cognitive barrier which new information has to penetrate.

#### 2.2.1.3.4. Intelligence paradox No.2: Deception

Lastly, the information received may have been deliberately sent or manipulated by the adversary to achieve a certain end or invoke a certain impression, ie to cover or distract from a signal. As Michael I Handel put it:

*“The ever-present possibility of deception further complicates the already difficult task of the intelligence analyst. Deception can be defined as the deliberate and subtle dissemination of misleading information to an intelligence service by its adversaries.”<sup>329</sup>*

Handel also highlighted that being alert to the possibility of adversarial deception leads to an intelligence paradox: “The more alert one is to deception, the more likely one is to become its victim.”<sup>330</sup> In other words, Michael Handel warns against considering deception in too much depth, as it may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

#### 2.2.2. Preventing Surprise

Considerable efforts were undertaken to find pathways to rule out future surprise. Much of it was carried by and developed in sync with progress in digital technology, affecting information gathering, analyses and decision-making processes alike. For example, in strategic intelligence or foresight, Bayesian networks play a key role, as they allowed to consider large amounts of data and identify possible future development and attach probabilities as to their likelihood<sup>331</sup>. Not everything, however, was informed by the development of technology. Undertakings like

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<sup>329</sup> Handel, Michael I.: ‘Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise’, in: Betts, Richard K; Mahncken, Thomas G. (eds): *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I Handel*, Frank Cass, London, Portland OR, 2003, p. 9.

<sup>330</sup> Handel, Michael I.: “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise”, p. 9, in: Betts, Richard K; Mahncken, Thomas G. (eds): *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I Handel*, Frank Cass, London, Portland OR, 2003.

<sup>331</sup> The author is indebted to the many and fruitful exchanges with Dr. Adam Zagorecki about Bayesian networks, especially the opportunity to participate in one of his seminars introducing Bayesian networks to senior practitioners attending a bespoke curriculum on artificial intelligence at Cranfield University.

Red Teaming, Critical Thinking, simulation exercises, workshops on group-think and the power of mental images, or considering possible surprises – grey instead of black swans, are less technology-driven, and focus more on the human factor contributing to surprise, seeking to raise awareness of possible blind-spots rather than forecasting the probabilities of the next unexpected event. A mix of both the cognitive and the technological elements that may contribute to hedge against future surprise is offered by those that focus on the flow of information within government agencies and between them, between the political level and the bureaucracy or between academia and policy. This approach is possibly the most traditional, as it mirrors the facets held by the adherents of cybernetics. The chief aim is to minimise susceptibility to surprise by seeking to improve the flow of information and decision-making processes.<sup>332</sup>

However, despite the quantum leaps in technological developments the world experienced since Ariel Levite presented a more optimistic view on preventing future surprise, and the mushrooming of structured approaches aiming to raise awareness to the human factors contributing to surprise, surprise continues to occur.

Some argue that ultimately, the blame rests with the decision-makers, whose competing priorities and lack of interest in matters that might occur in the future bar them from reacting when there would still be time. The criticism of the policymaker, however, is nothing new, and a common theme especially in intelligence studies. One man's surprise is another man's analysis.

Others, like Leni and Kass, on the other hand, are cautious to point to a particular group of actors within government.

*“The readiness to open the mental, institutional and technological apertures and the ensuing ability to absorb and integrate new information in new ways are usually short-lived. Soon after the crisis that shocked the system and induced new behaviors passes, stability and “business as usual” become the natural default. The transformed behaviors become the new normal; newly created “memory boxes” become stale or irrelevant; complacency inevitably sets in. This allows*

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<sup>332</sup> See for example: Bracken, P.; Bremmer, I.; Gordon, D. (eds.): *Managing Strategic Surprise*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.

*determined adversaries to find new opportunities to exploit the target's comfort with and confidence in the "fixes" that have been introduced into the collection, analysis, and decision-making system. Absent constant vigilance and adaptation to ever-evolving threats, fixes become fixations, generating new vulnerabilities to be exploited both symmetrically and asymmetrically."*

More simply put – even though there is a period where perceptions are changed because of the recent experience of surprise, new path-dependencies and blind spots are created as time continues. The following figure by Leni and Kass captures this eternal spiral of surprise:




Figure 2: The eternal spiral of surprise<sup>333</sup>

To maintain constant vigilance, the only cure against surprise, Leni and Kass propose ten maxims that should guide decision-makers, diplomats, soldiers and intelligence analysts at all levels and all times:

- *"1. Always conduct a reality check from not only your own perspective but also that of the opponent. Reality always has rough edges, ambiguities, and shades of gray. If everything is crystal clear and consistent with your best-case scenario, and the*

<sup>333</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: 'Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives', p. 72.

*adversary behaves just like you would in similar circumstances, you are probably being deceived.*

- *2. State assumptions clearly and explicitly. Identify pivotal assumptions, those that if proven wrong would upend your entire approach. Develop a system to periodically revalidate these assumptions, making sure you don't confuse estimates with facts, or hopes with viable courses of action. Remember that any plan that relies on more than two consecutive miracles and violates more than one law of physics is not suitable—even as a deception or feint.*
- *3. Don't fall in love with any plan, policy, program, or assessment. Don't expect the opponent to cooperate. Have a branch and sequel to address the unexpected along the lines of "what if?" and "what next?" Pay attention to what both adversaries and allies are saying and doing—especially if there is a mismatch between words and deeds. Don't discount indicators just because they point to things you would never do. There are no universal standards of rationality or recklessness.*
- *4. Collaborate with all who might provide fresh insights and different perspectives. Keep this circle as diverse and wide as practicable. Help your colleagues by asking the "right" questions. Tell them explicitly what you need to know and why. But be realistic: no existing technology is capable of assessing intentions. Question the bona fides of any information—no matter how comforting, convincing, or highly classified.*
- *5. You don't know what you don't know, and what you don't know can spell disaster. Create an organizational climate that allows for alternative viewpoints to be given a fair hearing. Beware of group-think and remember that just because something never happened before does not preclude it from happening. Every precedent was created by someone's act of courage or folly.*
- *6. Trust your instincts and be ready to pay the price that might go with that. Warning is about being safe, not about being right. Beware of the "cry wolf" syndrome, but don't dismiss the bearers of bad news. Sometimes the wolves are really at the gate and "inflammatory rhetoric" indicates a real and present danger.*



- 7. *Timely, unambiguous warning is nice to have, but don't count on it. Don't assume or expect that appropriate decisions, authorities and actions would automatically follow. You have plenty of latitude within your own organization. Do what's right, even if you have to stake your career on it.*
- 8. *Don't be a victim! It's painful, even if you ultimately win. Never allow the initiator to exploit his initial success. Surprise only determines where and how the first battles will be fought, but it's up to you to revalidate this principle every single time.*
- 9. *Don't get complacent. Hubris kills.*<sup>334</sup>

While these practical maxims proposed by Leni and Kass are of little help to identify and prepare for the next surprise, they are helpful in the sense that they are simple to remember, and provide a structure of thinking mindful of the perils of the human being – and surprise to a government. It was therefore included here in full length.

2.2.3. *The researcher's dilemma: Developing a theory of surprise vs. enriching insight on a specific event at the expense of academic rigour?*

Another shortcoming in the efforts on strategic surprise was the academic rigour applied, which was especially noted by Ariel Levite in *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*<sup>335</sup>. Following its publication, a heated debate about the relative value of academic rigour for the study of surprise with one of the most outspoken scholars of strategic surprise, Richard K. Betts, broke out<sup>336</sup>.

Levite, arguing on the base of a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the phenomenon of surprise argues that they are no more than “educated guesses, lacking the academic rigour required for establishing a theory. The existing body of literature, he argues,

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<sup>334</sup> Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: 'Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives', pp. 66-67.

<sup>335</sup> Levite, Ariel: *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987.

<sup>336</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 329-343 is a biting critique of Ariel Levite's *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*. However, Ariel Levite's response which is published in the same issue of *International Studies Quarterly* is no less sharp, see: Levite, Ariel: 'Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy"', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, 345-349.

is “plagued by severe methodological and substantive shortcomings that cast doubt on the validity of their conclusions”<sup>337</sup>.

His criticism of what he called the orthodox pessimist school has several dimensions. The first concerns the quality of the data used to measure one of the variables of surprise identified by this school: warning. In the eyes of the proponents of the orthodox school, all information that could be known to the government prior to the surprise event can be considered as warning. Levite on the other hand argues that only information that has been processed by a government’s intelligence service can be considered warning. The second dimension concerns the methodology applied – he notes that most of the studies on the subject draw their conclusions on single, reconstructive case studies. Levite also notes a selection bias in these cases, as they predominantly focus on cases of military surprise attack, and do not represent what he considers the universe of surprise cases. Furthermore, they only consider successful surprise attacks, not unsuccessful ones. Lastly in the context of the second dimension of Levite’s fundamental criticism Levite argues that by focussing on single cases instead of comparing several cases, earlier studies do not fulfil the standards of comparison to distinguish between causation and correlation.

The third dimension Levite criticizes is the sources used for data collection by earlier attempts, as it is mainly secondary data, but rarely primary data. This is in line with Levite’s narrow notion of warning in the context of surprise. The fourth dimension Levite criticizes concerns the determination of necessary and sufficient causes of surprise. To establish a general theory, the identification of the necessary or sufficient causes of surprise, as well as the identification of the decisive cause is required. However, Levite dismisses the prevalent, multi-causal explanations of surprise, as they are ill-suited to identify which variables produce necessary causes as opposed to sufficient ones.

Levite’s criticism did not go unheeded and invoked a response by Richard K. Betts, a leading proponent of the notion that surprise is inevitable. His response is no less sharp than Levite’s criticism. In principle Betts agrees with the diagnosis of Levite but argues that “in practice it is

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<sup>337</sup> Levite, Ariel: Levite, Ariel: ‘Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts’ p. 345.

impossible to surmount barriers Betts rejects Levite's critique by pointing out the peculiarity of surprise.

*"Even more than usual in social science, surprise attack is not susceptible to replication [...]. While general similarities exist, specific differences between each case are so numerous that one could legitimately isolate parsimonious explanations with confidence."*<sup>338</sup>

In other words, each case of surprise is unique, making the distinction between necessary and sufficient causes impossible and thereby rendering attempts to develop a theory that stands the proof of rigid academic scrutiny as an exercise in futility. This also goes for the isolation of the decisive cause, a criticism that Richard Betts counters as depoliticized, as only "foolhardy analysts would believe that they know which factors are decisive when dealing with matters of perception, that the officials whose decisions are under scrutiny may not even understand themselves"<sup>339</sup>.

In relation to Levite's critique of the sources and data considered, Betts maintains a similar line – it is an apolitical assumption that government decision-makers only take information processed by the government's intelligence services into account for their decisions. Thus, while he acknowledges that Levite's narrow scope of sources and data qualified to measure the availability of warning, as it reduces the amount of data the researcher is required to consider, he rebukes the criticism as too academic to represent the messy reality of political decision making. Instead of offering an alternative, however, Richard Betts uses this argument to defend the predominant single-case studies, as each case requires the researcher to consider large amounts of data. To Betts, this is also the reason why Levite's demand to conduct large-n comparative studies is beyond reach for the individual researcher.

In relation to Levite's demand for data from primary source, Betts points to a practical issue the surprise-scholar faces: Surprise, when it happens to a government is embarrassing, as it exposes a government's failure to anticipate adversarial developments and hedge against them in due

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<sup>338</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises', p.338.

<sup>339</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises', p. 338.

time. Therefore, primary data is rarely made available for the scrutiny by academics, and if so, often only with a considerable time lag. This also explains why often, there is a considerable time lag between cases of surprise and research about them. A good case in point is Roberta Wohlstetter's seminal "Warning and Decision" – it was published 17 years after the end of World War 2, and 21 years after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Betts strongest challenge to Levite's criticism about earlier works, however, is that he points out that despite the rigorous methodology Ariel Levite develops, his conclusions are no different to those of earlier research. That he has a more optimistic outlook on preventing future surprise was less to do with his findings on the factors contributing to surprise, then in the technological advances.

Mindful of the academic desire to fulfil rigorous standards, and develop a theory, Betts concludes that:

*"In principle, much of his [Ariel Levite's] diagnosis is correct. In practice it is impossible to surmount the barriers to more scientific treatment. The question becomes whether data should be forced onto a procrustean bed to produce the rigorous theory Levite endorses (which would be pseudo-science), or whether the goals of inquiry should be reduced to permit maximal methodological rigor (Levite's solution), or whether scientific standards should be compromised to enrich insight."*<sup>340</sup>

Thus, the researcher interested in surprise faces three basic choices: (1) Force data on a procrustean bed to produce a rigorous theory; (2) reduce goals of enquiry to permit maximum methodological rigour ; (3) compromise scientific standards to enrich insight. None of these solutions is fully satisfying, each solution invites criticism. All options carry risks.

The exchange of views between Levite and Betts about the value of the academic standards and the desire to develop a theory for social phenomena is rather heated. Most importantly, for the researcher it cautions against aiming academically too high. Surprise is a humbling experience,

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<sup>340</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises', p. 338

both in theory and practice. And even though some<sup>341</sup> claim that the widespread agreement that can be observed amongst researchers as to what causes the phenomenon of surprise, a theory that complies with the criteria laid out by Ariel Levite yet to be established.

Therefore, instead of aiming to identify “conditional generalizations regarding the circumstances in which various causal patterns leading to surprise occur”, the researcher, as Richard Betts convincingly argues, should consider surprise as what it is: a specific event, for which certain causal phenomena can be identified for its occurrence. While Levite makes a compelling case for academic rigour, seeking to establish a specific explanation appears to be an equally legitimate aim for analysing cases of surprise.

For this research, the dilemma surprise poses to the researcher has already been resolved previously – it considers surprise in the annexation of a Crimea as a specific event, and it is interested in the questions which causal phenomena can be identified for its occurrence, and what role did surprise have for the overall outcome.

#### 2.2.4. *Summary - Nuclear Age Pessimism: The victim's perspective*

The focus of the debate in relation to surprise has shifted considerably compared to the lines of debate on the role of surprise between the direct and indirect approach to strategy. Instead of debating whether surprise can have strategic effect, and be planned for with that objective in mind, the essentially contested question became whether future surprise can be prevented. Secondly, unlike under the impression of the threat of a nuclear surprise attack, the issue has moved from being an essentially contested concept to a phenomenon about which widespread agreement was reached on many aspects of which one in particular demasks the overwhelming majority of the efforts to better understand the phenomenon of strategic surprise to have adopted the notion on the strategic relevance of surprise offered by Carl von Clausewitz and the disciples of the direct-approach: there is no need to consider how surprise is achieved. This notion is especially evident in the outright rejection on considering deception and cunning by Michael I. Handel. Although there is no shortage on citations of the eminent Prussian in the literature on strategic surprise, there is no reference or reflection of the indirect approach and its view on the

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<sup>341</sup> James J. Wirtz: ‘A Theory of Strategic Surprise’, in: Betts, Richard K; Mahncken, Thomas G. (eds): *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I Handel*, Frank Cass, London, Portland OR, 2003, pp. 101-116.

utility of cunning and surprise to win wars. Hence, the essentially contested question in the pre-nuclear debate on how to win wars, or strategy, was answered before it had been discussed and reflected. This explains why the efforts undertaken to better understand strategic surprise exclusively consider only the victim's perspective – but also makes evident that the debate between the direct and the indirect approach on surprise had been implicitly resolved in favour of the direct-approach.

Interestingly, this limited focus on the victim's perspective was addressed by most scholars, but countered with the arguments offered by Clausewitz – preparing surprise is a waste of time, and deception is a weapon of the weak. But since it is inevitably part of war, and a powerful force multiplier, it is better to seek ways to prevent it. Furthermore, despite the optimism that better technology, a better understanding of the internal drivers that increase the susceptibility to surprise, improved decision-making systems and a plethora of tools and methods could prevent future surprise, future surprise were not averted.

However, as the hypothesis about the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, and why it happened, identified in previous works and from the data collected and analysed for this research go to show, why surprise occurred in the context of Crimea cannot be fully answered if only the victim's perspective is considered. It requires to consider the means to surprise, deception, as well, which, as the previous section outlined, was not thoroughly considered by those concerned with strategic surprise during the Cold War.

### **3. The means to surprise: Deception.**

#### **3.1. Preliminary Remarks**

Despite the role deception, cunning or subterfuge, as a means to surprise played in the pre-nuclear debate about how to win wars, it was not considered in depth by those focussing on “strategic surprise” following the advent of the nuclear weapon, with one notable exception: Barton Whaley<sup>342</sup>. His doubts about the validity of the findings by Roberta Wohlstetter and her disciples of the orthodox school grew while studying another historical surprise event, Nazi-

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<sup>342</sup> For a most considerate and balanced recent article paying tribute to the works of Barton Whaley, see: Leni Kass and Phillip London, see: Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: *Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives*, p. 69, in: *Orbis*, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 59 – 82.

Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union. While he found indications of the internal factors idiosyncratic to Stalin and the Soviet Union that contributed to their surprise, it was German deception that created the conditions for Stalin's surprise. It did so by making Stalin very certain, and very wrong<sup>343</sup>. Whaley also was not convinced by the argument that deception should not be considered too deeply, as it carries the risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies – rather, Whaley argued, if deception is an adversarial, methodological activity aimed to create the conditions for surprise, then in seeking ways to prevent surprise, countering deception is the only active defence available against the sole external factor identified for causing surprise to governments<sup>344</sup>.

Whaley's opus magnum on the subject, however, is *Stratagem*, where he conducts a large-n study on the inexorable link between deception and surprise. His works and numerous efforts notwithstanding, Whaley and his notion was the odd one out, a singular representative of the indirect approach<sup>345</sup>. Neither the inexorable link between deception and surprise Whaley sought to capture, nor the 'theory of stratagem'<sup>346</sup> he developed, nor his efforts to develop counter-deception methods were seriously considered by mainstream strategic surprise experts of the Cold War period – or thereafter<sup>347</sup>. Instead, deception was considered in isolation, as an independent activity. The following section will consider and discuss the findings of these efforts.

Unlike the research on strategic surprise which experienced its heydeys in the early days of the Cold War, deception only gained prominence as an academic research subject in the last decade of the bipolar confrontation. One reason for this is the fact that Soviet deception capabilities were considered inferior, and at best of tactical nature<sup>348</sup>. Much of this assumption was based on Stalin's decision to remove surprise from a "principle of war" to the status of a "permanently operating factor" after the experience of Nazi Germany's surprise attack in 1941.

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<sup>343</sup> Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), p. 71.

<sup>344</sup> Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), pp. 75-78.

<sup>345</sup> Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), pp. 61-63.

<sup>346</sup> Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), pp 67- 73.

<sup>347</sup> Unlike other works on deception or strategic surprise, however, Whaley's core contribution, *Stratagem*, was reprinted in 2007.

<sup>348</sup> It led to a large Department of Defense funded enquiry into the matter, later published as: Daniel, Donald C; Herbig, Katherine L (eds): *Strategic Military Deception*, Pergamon Policy Studies on Security Affairs, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981.

However, in the early eighties, when NATO countries learned about the level of sophistication of Soviet military deception operations by the defector Wladimir Bogdanowitsch Resin, who prior to defecting was an officer of the Soviet Special Forces and the Soviet Military Intelligence Service GRU. Methods like “active measures”, or “reflexive control” indicated that Soviet deception capabilities had taken a surprising turn from what was until then perceived to be rather unsophisticated skills.

The interest in deception, however, was rather short-lived, as only a few years after Resin changed sides, the world order would fundamentally change. The ensuing peace-euphoria led to the perception that there would be no need to further consider those aspects of war the “Western” strategist Clausewitz had so eloquently described as weapons of the morally inferior. However, it must also be noted that the issue of deception has always been very much a specialist subject, and of particular interest to the military and intelligence communities, and less to the research community. The lack of academic interest notwithstanding, research into how to deceive successfully has produced rich insights into the process of deception.

### *3.1.1. Definition*

In a study on deception and urban warfare by Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn for the RAND Corporation, the authors point out that numerous definitions and concepts of deception have been offered by the foreign policy, intelligence and defence communities over time<sup>349</sup>.

For example, Abram Shulsky offers the following definition of deception “the effort to cause the adversary to believe something that is not true, to believe a “cover story” rather than the truth, with the goal of leading him to react in a way that serves one’s own interest, rather than his”<sup>350</sup>. A shorter but broader definition is offered by Katherine Herbig and Daniel C Donald, to whom deception “is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive

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<sup>349</sup> Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell: *The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations*, MR1132, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p.19.

<sup>350</sup> Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, in: Godson, Roy,; Wirtz, James J.(eds): *Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty First Century Challenge*, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 15 – 33, p. 15



advantage”<sup>351</sup>. To Gerwehr and Glenn, on the other hand, the precise wording of the definition of deception is irrelevant. To them, “if an operation, a technique, or measure has as its goal the deliberate purveyance of falsehood to another to aid friendly interests, we call it deception”<sup>352</sup>. This is done “to produce an inaccurate assessment, or misperception, in the mind of the target”.

### 3.1.2. Aim of deception

The aim of deception is to surprise the adversary. It is a process, a means, not an end, intended to create the conditions for the victim to be surprised.

### 3.1.3. Objectives of deception

Katherine Herbig and Daniel Donal distinguish three objectives of deception. The immediate objective of deception is to condition the target’s beliefs, the intermediate objective is to influence the target’s actions, and lastly, the ultimate aim is to benefit from the target’s actions<sup>353</sup>.

### 3.1.4. *Boundaries: Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Propaganda and Deception*

The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Doctrine on deception from 2006 considers military deception activities to be part of information warfare. It defines Information Warfare as “Information Operations conducted during times of crisis of conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries”<sup>354</sup>. Other Information Warfare activities include Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), and Operations Security (OPSEC). They are “actions taken to [...] influence others’ decision-making processes, information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems”. To place deception into the context of information warfare, it appears important to distinguish it from the other information operations activities.

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<sup>351</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: Propositions on Military Deception, in: Gooch, John; Perlmutter, Amos (eds): *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*, pp. 155-175, 1982, p. 155.

<sup>352</sup> Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell: ‘The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations’, p. 19.

<sup>353</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, in: Gooch, John; Perlmutter, Amos (eds): *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1982, pp. 155-175, p. 157.

<sup>354</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (eds): Joint Publication 3-13.4 (formerly JP 3-58): *Military Deception*, 2006, Chapter II.

OpSec has the purpose to deny the adversary knowledge about friendly forces capability and intent. Another term used to describe the same effect is thus denial. As Abram Shulsky and others point out, denial is always part of deception, as key to a successful deception operation is to deny the enemy knowledge of the deception and its elements<sup>355</sup>.

EW and CNO on the other hand seek to achieve a kinetic effect on the adversary's critical national infrastructure (CNI) by the use of modern information technology and have both an offensive as well as a defensive (or OPSEC) component.

Psychological Operations, however, aim at the cognitive elements in war. Both deception and propaganda target the mind of the adversary by the cunning use of words and can thus be considered as psychological operations or non-kinetic operations<sup>356</sup>.

However, they are distinct activities<sup>357</sup>. Propaganda related activities can be distinguished by their source. While "white" propaganda refers to propaganda activities where the source is known, i.e. Russia Today, "Black" Propaganda refers to activities where the source is unknown. The latter is often a routine activity of intelligence services. However, it is unspecific in relation to its aims. Propaganda operations also are not specific but seek to influence the target's belief in a more general fashion – for example to make the own side appear more legitimate in the eyes of the adversary's public. It targets the wider public rather than seeking to achieve a specific objective with specific people. Lastly, propaganda is not only aimed at adversarial audiences, but is also used to condition the domestic audience's mindsets, values and belief systems.

Unlike propaganda, deception is specific in terms of what it seeks to misrepresent, the target audience required to accept the misrepresentation, and the objective it seeks to achieve by deception and surprise. A useful metaphor may be to consider propaganda as the production of

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<sup>355</sup> Shulsky, Abram: 'Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception', pp 15-16.

<sup>356</sup> The NATO – definition for PSYOPS is established by Military Decision MC 402/1 – NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations. It defines PSYOPS as: "*planned activities using methods of communications and other means directed to approved audiences in order to influence their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives*", NATO: MC 402/1, p. 2, March 2003.

<sup>357</sup> Shulsky, Abram: 'Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception', pp 18-19.

planned noise, while deception is about the transmission or suppression of a specific signal to achieve a specific effect.

Although they are distinct activities, in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between propaganda and deception as they will appear intertwined – D-Day relied both on the deception campaign to mask the true location of attack, as it did on propaganda aimed at the German soldiers and populace at large. However, they are distinct activities that require distinct considerations how to go about them.

The distinction between propaganda and distinction offered by earlier attempts to better understand deception certainly casts doubt on the synonymous use of propaganda and misinformation with strategic deception found in earlier works<sup>358</sup>. Rather, the previous discussion has shown, they may appear intertwined, and use the same means, but have widely different target audiences and aims.

### **3.2. Factors influencing the likelihood of deception.**

Two groups of factors influence the likelihood for the use of deception. Contextual factors and the idiosyncrasies actors bring to a situation “by virtue of previous conditioning or personal predilection”<sup>359</sup>. The two groups should not be considered in isolation, as they likely interplay. It is thus difficult to assess which group is more important to the occurrence of deception, although the personal predispositions are ultimately of greater impact. The key question is thus why some actors resort to deception and others not. Table 4 summarizes contextual factors and actor idiosyncrasies that contribute to the likelihood of deception:<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine*, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016.

<sup>359</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 164.

<sup>360</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 164

Contextual factors	Actor idiosyncrasies
<p>High stake situations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- When outcomes are critical, actors will resort to make use if every available capability, advantage, to ensure victory or prevent defeat.</li> </ul> <p>Military weakness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deception as a compensation to offset imbalance, by subterfuge and ruse to induce the enemy to lower his guard, dilute strength, or concentrate forces on the wrong objective.</li> </ul> <p>Cost-Benefit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Use of deception to lower costs, for example wish to avoid being regarded as an aggressor.</li> </ul> <p>Uncertainty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Under conditions of uncertainty, actors often seek to mislead or confuse to keep their options open and to test the reaction to alternative politics.</li> </ul>	<p>Cultural Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deception styles may vary from culture to culture<sup>361</sup></li> </ul> <p>Type of governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deception may be more common in authoritarian states where political leaders take a strong, central role in military decision<sup>362</sup>.</li> </ul> <p>Bureaucracy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organisations trained for a particular task will seek to perform them.</li> <li>- States that maintain an apparatus to plan and organise deception, or if its military preserves passes on or at least debates a doctrine for deception are more likely to undertake deception<sup>363</sup>.</li> </ul> <p>Psychological</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People tend to think in terms of what is available or familiar to them</li> <li>- Unclear why some leaders resort to deception while others not, or what characterises them; however, “a commander that has appreciated and relied on deception in the past is likely to do so again”<sup>364</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>361</sup> On the cultural aspect of strategic military deception see: Daniel, Donald C; Herbig, Katherine L (eds): Strategic Military Deception, Pergamon Policy Studies on Security Affairs, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981, particularly part II. An excellent British analysis of Soviet military deception patterns can be found in C.J. Dick: Catching NATO unawares: Soviet surprise and deception techniques, in: Rothstein, Hy; Whaley, Barton (eds): The Art and Science of Military Deception, Artech House, Boston, London, 2013, pp. 181 – 192.

<sup>362</sup> “secrecy and total control available, and the reduced inhibitions that accompany such exercises of power, facilitate and provide incentives for the exercise of craft, cunning and deception” ,see: Goldhamer, Herbert: Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (June 1977), edited by Joan Goldhamer, RAND Corporation: R-2448-NA (February 1979), pp 107-108; cf: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’ . The point that authoritarian regimes can employ deception more easily than democratic governments is also raised by Patrick Morgan and Klaus Knorr in: Morgan, Patrick; Knorr, Klaus: Strategic Military Surprise: Incentive and Opportunity, Taylor and Francis, London, 1984.

<sup>363</sup> Consequently, states that have no such capabilities or traditions will have to overcome the inertia when deception is suddenly needed again.

<sup>364</sup> Goldhamer, Herbert: ‘Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (June 1977)’, Joan Goldhamer (ed);, RAND Corporation: R-2448-NA (February 1979), pp 107-108, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’ . Goldhamer suggests that politics either attracts individuals prone to deception, or conditions individuals to practice deception (political animal?). On the role of predispositions international relations, see: Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976

### 3.3. Types of deception

Deception makes use of words – and is thus a non-kinetic activity, which in the military context is considered as part of information operations aiming at the “hearts and minds” of target. However, deception is not limited to the military realm, or to military actors. It may also be applied by intelligence services or diplomats. Research distinguishes between two types of deception:

- *Military Deception* refers to deception efforts in wartime. Deception may deal with the strategic level (having a decisive effect on the entire war, ie in the initiation of hostilities or in ending them. Examples: Trojan Horse; Operation Barbarossa; D-Day), operational level (having an effect on a theatre of war; Examples: Operation Mincemeat;), or tactical level (affecting a single battle or engagement, example: Battle of Khalkin Gol, 1939)<sup>365</sup>. Its target audience are usually those directly engaged in the conduct of the war at each respective level of war<sup>366</sup>.
- *Strategic Deception* refers to deception in both peace and wartime, “aimed at the highest levels of government or of the military chain of command”<sup>367</sup>. This has a bearing on the nature of deception, as its core must be something of such relevance, that individuals that hold such high positions of influence would deal with the matter personally.

Particularly challenging is the question about the objective or nature of strategic deception in peacetime. During war, deception is always expected to be part of the war efforts, and the delineation between strategic (entire war), operational (theatre), and tactical (single battle) clear. In peacetime, this is more ambiguous, and implies a bigger variety of actors and audiences. Strategic deception in peacetime “would deal with major national decisions concerning fundamental issues of foreign policy, major decisions concerning military procurement, and an assessment of threats a nation faces”<sup>368</sup>.

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<sup>365</sup> It should be noted that this single battle had a strategic effect, and so influenced the perception of the Japanese High Command, that they hesitated to open a second front against the Soviet Union as was the idea of Nazi-Germany, but attack the United States at Pearl Harbor instead.

<sup>366</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (eds): *Joint Publication 3-13.4 (formerly JP 3-58): Military Deception*, 2006, Executive Summary.

<sup>367</sup> Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, p.17.

<sup>368</sup> Shulsky, Abraham: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, p.19.

Table 5 summarizes the difference of strategic deception in war and peace<sup>369</sup>.

War	Peace
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Desire to attack enemy who is not prepared because he was deceived when, where, or how an attack would occur.</li> <li>- Deny knowledge of weapons development, deceive about how new weapons operate.</li> </ul>	<p>Deception may be practised in various ways; possible objectives include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deceive adversary to believe you are stronger than you are in order to gain concessions.</li> <li>- Convey false appearance of weakness or threat to dissuade an adversary from a military build-up or taking a more alert and suspicious course of action</li> <li>- Convince target that third party is the main threat and principal target of hostility, so that target relaxes its guard</li> <li>- Seek to appear strong and weak at the same time, by addressing different audiences with specific cognitive predispositions in adversarial government to increase internal disagreement.</li> </ul>

**3.4. Variants of Deception**

Ultimately, irrespective of whether the deception is military or strategic, the target is always the same: the mind of individuals. Thus, the principles guiding successful deception are detached from the question of type. The question is thus whether different types of categories can be distinguished that are regularly employed to achieve this aim.

One categorisation of the variants of deception is offered by Barton Whaley and John B Bell. They identify two overarching objectives of deception – dissimulation (hiding the real) and simulation (showing the false). Depending on which objective is sought, the deception will have specific characteristics, like masking, repackaging, and dazzling if the deception seeks to dissimulate, or mimicking, inventing or decoying if the deception seeks to simulate<sup>370</sup>.

<sup>369</sup> See: Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, pp 19 -26.

<sup>370</sup> Bell, Bowyer J.; Whaley, Barton: Cheating and Deception, Transaction Publishers, New York, 1992.

In their effort to establish a theory of deception, Daniel and Herbig distinguish between two variants of deception, A-type and M-type. The A-type, which according to Daniel and Herbig is “simpler” and “less elegant” but more common than the M-type, seeks to confuse the adversary in order that he is unsure what to believe. The M-type on the other hand is described as a more complex effort, seeking to decrease ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative. As Barton Whaley in his seminal study on Operation Barbarossa put it, German deception served to eliminate ambiguity, making Stalin quite certain, very decisive, and *wrong*<sup>371</sup>. Table 6 summarizes the two variants of deception identified by Daniel and Herbig<sup>372</sup>.

A-type deception / “ambiguity increasing” “Simple”	M-type deception / ambiguity decreasing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confuses target in order that he be unsure as to what to believe.</li> <li>- Seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting any state’s attempt to determine its adversary’s (wartime) intentions: Contradictory indicators; missing data; fast-moving events; time-lags between data-collection and analysis, chance – all inhibit accurate intelligence assessments.</li> <li>- Seeks to make use of intelligence analysis; premise: over course of time, true intentions will reveal themselves; → maintain level of ambiguity / options high as to protect the secret of the actual operation.</li> <li>- Require that the deceiver’s lies be <i>plausible</i> enough and <i>consequential</i> enough to the target’s wellbeing that he cannot ignore them.</li> <li>- Faced with uncertainty, target may delay decision to await more information, giving deceiver more freedom of movement / freedom to retain/ take initiative.</li> <li>- If deceiver achieves that situation remains ambiguous, then target may be forced to spread resources thinly to cover all important contingencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduction of ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative.</li> <li>- Causes a target to concentrate his operational resources on a single contingency, thereby maximizing the deceiver’s chances for prevailing all others.</li> </ul>

<sup>371</sup> Whaley, Barton: Codeword Barbarossa , p. 15.

<sup>372</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, pp 157 – 159.

As Daniel and Herbig point out, these types are not mutually exclusive. Deception will oscillate between the two variants of deception.

The distinction between the two variants of deception again allows to refine the understanding of the findings in research on the annexation of Crimea as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the identification of a further research gap. There is the unequivocal characterisation of Russia's deception, irrespective whether considered in the military, or propaganda context, as seeking to increase ambiguity for the adversary. However, lacking the detailing of what exactly the deception was, the distinction between the variants of deception suggests that the conclusion that all Russian deception rests on ambiguity may be premature. At the very least, if deception is suspected, research interested in confirming or disconfirming this assumption ought to consider both variants.

### **3.5. The process of deception**

Even more so than access to data allowing to assess why a government has fallen victim to surprise, access to data that would allow the factors that contribute to successful deception is rare. It is therefore not surprising that much of the findings on the process of deception are often derived from former practitioners accounts.

#### *3.5.1. Planning for deception*

Gerwehr and Glenn describe the planning process for deception as a “backwards planning” procedure, which starts with identifying the desired end-state, and from that derives the target(s) of the deception, the targets's desired response, the requisite misperception, and the “story” that needs to be told<sup>373</sup>.

Implementing the plan then moves in the reverse direction: Informational elements are being transmitted (or obscured), creating the story, in the mind of the target(s) to achieve the objective. Another approach to describe the process of deception is offered by Daniel and Herbig. They consider it necessary to

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<sup>373</sup> Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell: *The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations*, MR1132, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 28f.



*“[...]differentiate the categories of actors typically found on both sides of the interaction. On the deceiver’s side, it is necessary to keep in mind that wide-ranging deception plans do not begin without being cleared at the highest levels of government, irrelevant of how good the plan is or who is responsible for it.”<sup>374</sup>*

Taking the example of how deception plans, once agreed by the national leadership, were implemented by Allied troops in WWII, the authors point out the actors involved in implementing deception plans:

*“During WWII, such tasks were assigned to small cadres in intelligence gathering and covert action organisations as well as military staffs. These groups were often not a normal part of the civilian or military bureaucracy, but rather, like the famous London Controlling Section, were specially formed during the war and disbanded or severely cut back at its conclusion...National political leaders, high -level diplomats, civil servants, businessmen, and news reporters also often played a starring role in strategic deceptions.”<sup>375</sup>*

On the target side, the authors point to the initial target of deception, which usually are a state’s intelligence organisations. Such organisations monitor channels of communication for information about the adversary, and they tend to be the gatekeepers that screen the information to determine what is forwarded to authorities, which are the ultimate targets of the deception.

### 3.5.2. *Ways and Means*

Essentially, deception is about conveying (false) information to a target without the target noticing the falsehood. Therefore, when considering the means, or the how to of deception, the essential question is how the information gets to the target.

Enablers for conveying (distorted) information are referred to as channels of information. These channels are “the links between the deceivers and target which make deception possible” <sup>376</sup>. Literature points out to the fact that the variety of channels to convey information is virtually unlimited: They include newspapers, satellite reconnaissance, interception, diplomats, spies,

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<sup>374</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, p. 159.

<sup>375</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, p.159.

<sup>376</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 159.

double agents, actors of influence both formal and informal etc. The rapid developments in information technology has tremendously increased the opportunities to convey information in a targeted fashion on a massive scale tremendously<sup>377</sup>.

### 3.5.3. *Principles of Successful Deception*

Over time some agreement has been reached over the key factors contributing to success of deception. Due to the widespread agreement on their key role, they may also be regarded as maxims or principles of deception. They are

- Incentive and Opportunity
- Secrecy, Organisation, and Coordination
- Predispositions of the Target
- Plausibility and Confirmation
- Adaptability

#### 3.5.3.1. Incentive and Opportunity

Deception is not a risk-free business, and usually carefully considered by the highest level of government. As research into why governments fall victim to surprise indicates, the contextual factors that lead to the likelihood of deception are also those, that will make deception more likely successful. Before considering planning a deception, it is thus important to consider whether deception is an approach suitable for the context, and the own relative position<sup>378</sup>.

#### 3.5.3.2. Secrecy, organisation, and coordination

Deception requires detailed planning, that does not overlook the slightest triviality, as often the trivial holds a clue. This planning must be well organised and directed from a central point, usually at the headquarters or highest levels of government. However well planned and organized, “if strictest secrecy is not observed, all deception projects are condemned to failure from the start”. Denying the adversary knowledge that deception is

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<sup>377</sup> Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, pp 23-24.

<sup>378</sup> See Morgan, Patrick; Knorr, Klaus (eds): *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentive and Opportunity*, 1984..

being employed is of such paramount importance, that deceiving own and friendly forces is a “necessary by-product of deception”<sup>379</sup>.

#### 3.5.3.3. Predisposition of the target

The mental predisposition of the deception - target is a factor that gained importance with the insights of social psychology in the late 70s early 80s. Because deception targets the mindset of the adversary, and specific, high-ranking individuals in the target’s government, the target’s cognitive predisposition is an undeniably significant factor to successful deception. Deceptions that build on an already existing mental image in the mind of the target are more likely to succeed than those seeking to make the target do something against his mind.

Building the deception on already existing cognitive predispositions has the advantage that much of the work of deception will be done by the victim – the deceiver’s task “then becomes providing clues which reinforce these predispositions while minimizing or discrediting clues which contradict them”<sup>380</sup>.

#### 3.5.3.4. Plausibility and confirmation of deception

To the target, the core of the deception must appear at least as something which may plausibly happen. A deception is more credible if the lie is “woven in into a skein of truth to be confirmed by more than one source”<sup>381</sup>. These sources need to be credible and trusted – and often informal actors of influence appear to have greater credibility to high level members of government than formal actors. That the deception is ideally be confirmed by more than one source also implies for the deceiver that it is important to manipulate as many channels as possible to reinforce the deception<sup>382</sup>.

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<sup>379</sup> Von Greiffenberg [sic], Hans: ‘Deception and Cover Plans’, Project #29, Foreign Military Studies, MS #P-044a, US Army, Historical Division, MMR, NA, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 167.

<sup>380</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 161.

<sup>381</sup> Von Greiffenberg [sic], Hans: ‘Deception and Cover Plans’, Project #29, Foreign Military Studies, MS #P-044a, US Army, Historical Division, MMR, NA, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 168.

<sup>382</sup> Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, in: Godson, Roy,; Wirtz, James J.(eds): Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty First Century Challenge, pp 24 – 25.

#### 3.5.3.5. Adaptability

Another aspect of the relativity of truth is that it is subject to change. Truth is a dynamic, complex cognitive process.

Deception thus needs to be conceived as a dynamic process, that can adapt to such changes of target preferences over time. If it doesn't, then the deception becomes implausible.

The need to adapt to target preferences over time again emphasises the central role of channels for successful deception campaigns. On the one hand they serve to deliver the deception, and on the other they make possible to monitor possible changes in the target preferences, and they lastly the measure available to the deceiver to ascertain whether his deception is achieving the intended effect.

In sum, the factors contributing to success of deception, except for secrecy, organisation and coordination seek to exploit the factors inherent to the target government that cause surprise – above all, the known psychological predispositions of its political leadership. Besides the mental predisposition to exploit, the success of deception depends on the ability to purvey the deception to the target – the channels. Unfortunately for the researcher interested in deception in a historic case, the number of channels is almost unlimited – a point also raised by earlier research on the annexation of Crimea. Even in hindsight, considering all these channels as well as identifying the channel which was decisive for the success of deception appears an impossible task for the individual researcher. The same holds true when asking how Russia went about confirming if its deceptive plot is working or requires adaptation.

#### 3.5.4. *Measuring success*

The difficulty of “controlling” deception, that is measuring its impact, however, as research points out, it not limited to the researcher – it also holds true for the deceiver. Measuring success means “to sort out the impact of deception on the target from other influences affecting [it]”<sup>383</sup>. This may be measured in a variety of ways, but as research point out, none of them precise. One problem of measuring the impact of deception is that most deceptions build on something

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<sup>383</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 166.

that already exists. Thus, “would the target have continued undisturbed in his (false) expectations without the deceiver’s reinforcement? Would his existing ambiguity have been enough to cause delay and confusion without the deceiver adding more?”<sup>384</sup>. A second related problem with measuring deception’s impact is that they tend to build on mental predispositions of select individuals. Both in hindsight and in foresight however it is “usually impossible to precisely recover the weight deception had in tipping the scale of decision. As in most problems of historical evaluation, evidence on the priorities assigned in a decision is often lacking”<sup>385</sup>.

### **3.6. Summary: Deception as the means to surprise**

Unlike the phenomenon of strategic surprise, which has received widespread interest from several perspectives, deception, as the means to surprise has enjoyed a wallflower’s life. Even though dedicated research has been undertaken, which greatly contributed to a better and more systematic understanding of the process of deception, it was short lived, and its findings never made into mainstream discourse. Although some researchers undertook efforts to develop a theory of deception, just as in relation to surprise, so far these efforts have remained fruitless. This does not mean to imply that the subject did not receive heightened interest amongst practitioners in military or intelligence, as the U.S. Doctrine on Deception, or the NATO Military Committee’s resolution on military deception go to show.

Lastly, the findings on the process of deception – very much like those made on surprise from the victim’s perspective during the Cold War – were not considered in relation to their effect on the overall outcome of a war, conflict or crisis. However, this decoupling of deception from its strategic effect has the same consequence that was observed by Richard Betts in relation to surprise: it becomes trivialized.

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<sup>384</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 166.

<sup>385</sup> Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 166.

#### **4. Discussion of the findings about the relationship between surprise and deception in strategy and the findings on the annexation of Crimea**

How does the previously discussed discourse on the utility of surprise and deception to strategy, whether it can be prevented and how the conditions for it are created relate to the diametrical conclusions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea identified in this research?

Firstly, the competing hypotheses on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany identified in the previous chapters can be related to the two notions on the role of surprise for strategy offered by the direct (Clausewitz) and the indirect strategy approach (Liddell-Hart). It allows to conclude that the works scrutinizing the annexation of Crimea that have been reviewed for this undertaking unanimously assume the notion of the direct approach in strategy: that the strategic role of surprise is negligible or coincidental for the overall outcome. On the hand, the conclusions reached by this research following the analyses of ARD's reporting on Ukraine and Crimea echo the notion of the indirect approach in strategy, as it was found that surprise was decisive for the annexation of Crimea, and the conditions for it created by Russian deception, which specifically targeted the German political leadership directly involved in the situation.

Secondly, the previous discussion allows for a more nuanced understanding of the factors that contributed to surprise, including deception, that were observed by this and other works on the annexation of Crimea. It further qualifies the conclusions drawn from the analysis of ARD's reporting, as it would allow to postulate that to annex Crimea, Russia employed strategic deception of the more complex M-type and increased the attractiveness of the wrong of two alternatives by using the military and military manoeuvres to increase the perception that Russia would seek to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, and lure Ukraine into firing the first shot. It also provides an explanation as to why Russia – and Putin – may have resorted to adopt a strategy of deception: because it was available and known to him. And lastly, it would even allow to put the Russian president and his strategic ability squarely into the notion on surprise and strategy promoted by the indirect approach. Not only did he use physical manoeuvre and sought psychological dislocation by a series of unexpected developments and the use of distractions, but also did Putin secure his strategic objective – the annexation of Crimea – without firing a single shot.

Likewise, the previous theoretical exploration of the interrelationship between surprise, deception and strategy further qualifies the findings of those arguing that the role of surprise and deception for the annexation of Crimea is negligible or coincidental: it could be argued based on the findings in this chapter that Russia and Putin resorted to deception because it was their last resort, and they had no moral quarrels with using it. That it was not considered by Russia's victims may either be because of psychological-cognitive filters on the individual or organisational level. The question which filter was ultimately causal, is irrelevant (and insoluble) as especially the military aspect, the battlefield, was decisive with other, specific contextual factors like shared culture and history and the geographic location of the Crimea peninsula as additional contributing factors for success. For the overall outcome, surprise was a great force multiplier, but not decisive.

Unfortunately, although the previous chapter has provided many dimensions to reconsider assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea identified in this effort, the previous recourse to the relationship between surprise, deception and strategy has also brought to the fore that the question which role surprise had for the Russian annexation of Crimea is intractable and will remain so for the foreseeable future: Where you sit on surprise, depends on where you stand in strategy.

Academic rigour, however, would demand that where you could stand is identified before you take a stance. This, however, cannot be observed in any of the publications seeking to identify the decisive factor(s) that allowed Russia to annex Crimea the way it did reviewed for this research.

This leads to an additional, more general observation, as by not giving surprise a chance to be of serious consequence, the literature about the annexation of Crimea considered for this effort continues a trend that was already discernible in the works on strategic surprise on the nuclear age: The de-coupling from the debate the two grand schools of strategy.

Interestingly even despite this apparent de-coupling, the premises assumed on the utility of surprise and deception for winning wars by classical strategist can be as readily identified in the hypothesis on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, as they could be in the

research into why governments fall victim to surprise during the Cold War. However, while the latter still paid reference to Carl von Clausewitz and overwhelmingly adopted his notion on the strategic utility of surprise, those concerned with the annexation of Crimea appear blind to the discourse on strategy.

On the one hand, this may be considered strong argument for the continued relevance of strategy, and the added value of the principled reflection on the subject's classical thinkers. But on the other hand it may also be seen as what is best described by the term strategy blindness. This is not so much evidenced in the lack of references to classical strategists, but by the fact that despite unanimously observing surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea, it was never systematically scrutinized for its strategic value. De-coupling surprise from its strategic effect, however, as Richard K. Betts argued, trivializes the phenomenon of surprise. But disregarding the potential of surprise to have strategic effect, holding the phenomenon to be a co-incidence rather than the outcome of wilful adversarial act intended to surprise, as could be observed in the literature on the annexation of Crimea reviewed for this undertaking, trivializes strategy.



## ***V. Summary and Concluding Remarks***

This research set out to assess the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. It showed that dealing with surprise is a humbling experience both in theory and in practice. In practice, because it temporarily suspends order and replaces it with chaos. A sensation that was mirrored by the German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier when he appeared for an interview after he learned about the referendum on the decision of the Crimean regional parliament to join the Russian Federation on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March and found a new division in Europe. The ground thought solid suddenly turns shaky, and it requires extra-efforts to recover balance and stability. Similarly, in theory, it temporarily suspends the validity of prevailing theoretical assumptions and academic wisdom, because what had happened was considered implausible before. That a Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula was considered implausible before it happened became apparent throughout this research.

The review a selection of previously published works on Crimea and Germany's role in the context of Crimea done at the onset of this research revealed that although surprise as a phenomenon was unanimously observed, no systematic examination of the phenomenon and its relationship to the overall outcome was undertaken. This notwithstanding, the review led to the identification of hypotheses on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, as well as specifically for Germany in the context of Crimea. Despite the hypothesis differing in their specific explanations on why and how surprise occurred, the majority view considers surprise to be a co-incident of the annexation of Crimea, an intervening variable for the overall outcome. None considered the strategic effect of surprise. This decoupling of surprise from its strategic effect can also be observed in the works of those that argue that Russia contributed to surprise by using deception. Furthermore, it was found that these works fail to provide the link between Russian deception and surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea.

Following the literature review, this research re-examines the annexation of Crimea with a data set collected specifically for this undertaking interested in the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. This data set was identified based on the observation that neither had the question of data received much consideration by previous research, nor were data and sources consulted in previous efforts suitable for this research's interest. To find out which role surprise had for the annexation, it is tantamount to first consider what had been

expected before the unexpected occurred. Only then it is possible to draw conclusions what may have contributed to surprise, and its effects. However, the data and sources that had been considered by the works selected for this review all adopted a hindsight perspective, explaining the outcome that was previously unexpected, thereby neglecting the character of this outcome. Thus, the specific challenge for this research was to identify a data set that would allow identify what had been expected before this outcome was known. Facing an overwhelming amount of data that could be considered, after careful reflection, this researcher decided to focus on a single source that is fully accessible and available to the researcher and promises the highest likelihood of finding out what had been expected before the surprise outcome was known: The reporting that was made available by one of Germany's public broadcasting station, whose evening news have the highest reach among TV news in Germany. Rather than tracing developments from the view of what is known, thus, this research analysed the daily reporting of ARD on Ukraine and Crimea between the 29<sup>th</sup> of October 2013 and the 18<sup>th</sup> of April 2014, for what was expected by the German government to happen before the unknown event occurred.

The conclusions drawn from this analysis on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, are diametrical to the those identified in the literature review. Whereas previous research that the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea cannot be traced, the analysis undertaken for this research suggests that a specific surprise event, the announcement of the Crimean regional government to hold a referendum on the decision of the regional parliament to join the Russian Federation on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, was decisive for the overall outcome. Furthermore, it finds that Russia used strategic deception to create the false expectations, and identifies the deceptive pattern Russia employed to create the conditions for the decisive – or strategic – surprise: The Russian military and its manoeuvres were Russia's chief stratagem was to evoke the expectation that Russia would seek to repeat what it did in 2008 in Georgia – lure the Ukrainian government into firing the first shot to be given a 'legal' excuse to claim the right of self-defence. In addition to the military's manoeuvres, Putin was Russia's chief 'stratagematist', and Germany's political top-leadership his intended target. He used his phone-interactions with the German chancellor to create and confirm the wrong expectation. As the analyses of ARD suggests, due to Germany's role as 'the West's' chief interlocutor with Moscow and the new Ukrainian government, the surprise event that was decisive and caught Germany unaware was not only a strategic surprise for Germany, but also

for the liberal-democratic countries: for the first time since the end of the Cold War, an alternative political solution to that favoured by ‘the West’ was brought about. After almost 25 years, it was the first and most direct challenge of the liberal-democratic model of political crisis management. Thus, the analyses of ARD’s reporting leads to the conclusion that the *political* rather than the military character of the surprise event that shaped the outcome, as well as the simple fact that the event that shaped the outcome was a surprise, make the surprise event on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March a strategic surprise.

The diametrical relationship of the conclusions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, drawn by previous efforts and this undertaking led to a recourse to the theoretical discourse on the relationship between surprise and strategy, to assess which of the assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea – inscrutable or co-incidental vs. decisive – has more theoretical credit.

It showed that surprise is all but a new problem for governments, and that the discussion about the relationship between surprise and strategy is as old as the thinking about war. In fact, it was found to be an essentially contested problem in the thinking about strategy, with two juxtaposing positions. One argues that a strategic effect of surprise is co-incidental, and deception both a waste of effort and a last resort, whereas the other holds surprise to be ultimately decisive to dislocate the adversary, and deception a smart and required means to achieve it. Whereas the first notion holds the battlefield engagement to be what is decisive in war, the second argues that it is wiser to evade the battlefield engagement. The two views on the role of surprise are mutually exclusive, rendering it either-or qualities and leaving open the question which role for surprise in strategy. Where you stand on surprise depends on where you stand in strategy.

This is not a very satisfying outcome for this research’s aim, which was to assess the role of surprise for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. Instead of contributing to more certainty about the role of surprise or helping to resolve the diametrical nature of the two assumptions on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, by confirming or disconfirming one of the assumptions on surprise’s role for the annexation, the recourse to the theoretical argument about surprise’s strategic effect showed that there can be no clear-cut solution.

However, while the theoretical recourse was not helpful to conclude on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, it has shown that over time, a de-coupling from the discourse on strategy can be observed. The review of the discourse on the relationship between surprise and strategy brought to the fore a strategy-blindness, above all because despite the universal observation of the phenomenon, no effort prior to this systematically considered the relationship between the phenomenon of surprise and the overall outcome, the annexation of Crimea by Russia. This de-coupling of surprise from its possible strategic effect that could be observed in the literature following the annexation of Crimea trivializes the phenomenon of surprise, as well as strategy and the discourse about strategy overall.

Furthermore, this research has shown that surprise is not a new phenomenon or merely a temporary characteristic of a forever dynamic context. Especially when it happens to a government should not be mistaken with co-incidence, and merits reflection, as it may be the consequence of directed adversarial efforts. Or, as Thomas J. Schelling points out in his introduction to Roberta Wohlstetter's seminal analyses of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor:

*“Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise*

*may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.*"<sup>386</sup>

While the selection of literature and its origins suggest that disregard of surprises possible strategic effects should raise concern in all 'Western' countries, Germany especially seems to have some catching up to do, as the case of Crimea suggests that there may be a relationship between assuming 'international responsibility' and experiencing surprise. If Germany wants to assume more responsibility, as it claims since 2012, then it must also be prepared to be surprised more often. It furthermore became apparent that while the phenomenon of surprise did receive heightened attention in the wider discourse on strategy, there is no German contribution to this debate. Neither has Germany featured as a 'victim' of surprise, nor are there German language contributions systematically assessing why Germany fell victim to surprise. It would merit further research to uncover why this is the case, as it seems unlikely that Germany was not exposed to surprise in the past 80 years. Of particular interest would be the question whether systematic barriers to analysing adverse surprise events for the German government can be identified. Another aspect that seems worthwhile to further explore against the backdrop of this research would be to analyse how the German government dealt with such unexpected events in the aftermath. Was there an unbiased assessment of what went wrong, or are there efforts to translate lessons learned into government practice? These questions are well suited for academic reflection.

For senior policymakers and those engaged in day-to-day foreign and security policy, these undertakings are too abstract. Ideally, they require a tool or method ruling out future surprise. This research has demonstrated that the hopes in such a silver-bullet may be ill-founded. Surprise is a fact of international politics, and that it may render strategic effects is, too. Rather than seeking a silver-bullet to prevent future surprise, this research suggested the maxims on strategic surprise developed by Leni and Kass provide a better guideline<sup>387</sup>. On the one hand, they provide a guideline helpful to minimise the likelihood of falling victim to surprise. And on the other it cautions those having to deal with the inherent uncertainty of the future to be mindful

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<sup>386</sup> Schelling, Thomas: 'Foreword', in: Wohlstetter, Roberta: *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA., 1962, p I.

<sup>387</sup> Pp. 156 / 157 in this research.

of the factors making us vulnerable to surprise that are inherent to the human being, including oneself.

However, the precondition to develop such a notion within governmental organisations and policy, which derives much of its legitimacy from creating certainties where uncertainty prevails, is the preparedness to accept that surprise, and failure to anticipate surprise are normal. Unpleasant, but normal.

Such an understanding could be developed by a comprehensive review and reflection on the strategic shocks Germany has experienced since 2011 – Fukushima, Crimea, ISIS, the migration crisis, BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump, and the COVID-pandemic to better understand where Germany got it wrong, and why. Such a review of Germany's performance in times of unexpected events and developments may well add to a body-politic much more self-aware, and create the *Fingerspitzengefühl*, a sensitivity on the fingertips of policy-makers and analysts alike about the perils of their own premises and assumptions. It may furthermore be a strong contribution to increasing Germany's resilience to exogenous shocks. Above all, it may lead to the observation that in international relations, especially during crisis, surprise is always around the corner, and rarely is a solution without alternative. Such a process also requires a broad public debate and public parliamentary scrutiny.

However, while such an approach will consider the phenomenon of surprise, it is unlikely that the exercise will help much to improve Germany's 'strategy blindness' that was also observed in this research. Of course, much of this 'blindness' can be explained with Germany's history: When it did consider strategy in the past, it was for the purpose of attacking other nations. It was a tool for Germany's aggressive behaviour. Following the Second World War, the objective was to prevent Germany from repeating its pattern of aggressive behaviour again – and while the divided countries' parts were integrated into the duelling ideological blocs, turning Germany into one of the Cold War's front states, neither the Federal Republic nor the Democratic Republic were fully sovereign countries – and matters of strategy not to concern the Germans.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended and Germany re-united. Soon after re-unification, Germany also regained its full sovereignty. At that time – and possibly nowhere else – this sentiment was more strongly shared than in the peacefully re-united Germany –

however, strategy was considered obsolete, as hopes ran high that the end of history also made thinking about war and how to win them redundant. Even though the impression of the end of organized violence was short-lived, the disregard of strategy as a field of study and research continued, either under the pretence of being anachronistic, or because it was morally judged as an effort to prepare for Germany's next war. Consequently, 30 years after the end of the Cold War, and 76 years after the Second World War, Germany has no academic chair in strategy or strategic studies, and the subject plays no discernible role in the curriculum of diplomatic or military professionals.

Hence, this work closes with a modest suggestion: The establishment of knowledge centre on strategy, for example through the creation of a chair of strategy or strategic studies in a German university. It is unlikely that the establishment of such a knowledge centre on strategy as it relates to governments will be outstandingly successful in preventing the next surprise – just like all other suggestion directed at that aim. But it may be a better and more concrete contribution to a more strategic debate about the future course of Germany's foreign and security policy than the repeated pledge by policymakers and analysts alike that Germany needs to be a more strategic actor, requires a strategy or strategic capability. While all these demands may hold merit – without providing a clear understanding of what exactly is strategic, and a discourse about the meaning of strategy in the contemporary context, a strategy becomes a panacea, and strategic a hollow buzzword employed to catch attention. Not only does this not look good for a country that objectively is fully capable of acting strategically, but it also prevents a public discourse that would allow to consider whether dealing with strategy is a question exclusively concerned with waging and winning wars between states, and should be left to generals, or whether strategy holds lessons for governmental behaviour that transcends the state of war between states. This research has shown that while the principles of strategy remain, the face of war and conflict has changed. Having set out to fathom the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, the findings of this research may also be viewed as a testimony that circumnavigating a thorny issue based on assumptions no matter how well intentioned, carries the risk of being stuck in the past, and is the seedbed for future surprise. In a world characterized by surprise, doubting your own assessments and expectations about the future becomes a strategic imperative despite futures inherent uncertainty. Instead of ruling out or covering up inconsistencies, they should be embraced and exploited for a better, more resilient foreign and security policy.



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## VI. ANNEX: ARD reporting from the Ukraine crisis in late 2013 until Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
29.10.2012	Yanukovych wins elections. <sup>388</sup>	Yanukovych wins presidential elections despite massive domestic and international protests. Despite irregularities and protests, opposition achieves an estimate, part. Opposition Leader Klitschko achieves good results; Expert argues that EU strategy has failed to achieve desired end, as majority of population has voted for Yanukovych's course of action despite/against EU.
06.09.2013	G20 Summit in St. Petersburg. <sup>389</sup>	Syria Conflict main item on agenda; no agreement between Putin and Obama, key point of dispute: future of Assad Regime and Intervention; China and Russia agree on position of non-intervention.
19. - 21.09.2013	Yalta Annual Meeting: "Changing Ukraine in a changing world: Factors of Success", held in partnership with Victor Pinchuk Foundation. <sup>390</sup>	High brow meeting sponsored by Victor Pinchuk, oligarch who is hit amongst the hardest by Russian sanctions; gathers very high level supporters for the 'UE accession treaty. Participants are Bill and Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, G. Schröder, Mario Monti, Petro Poroshenko (hit by chocolate sanctions), Dominique Strauss Kahn, Stefan Füle; numerous ranking MEP, incl. Elmar Brok, spokesman external relations committee EU Parliament; Large number of high level media representatives, think tanks; civil society mainly represented by Timoshenko's political party; Sitting Ukrainian government represented in its entirety; only Russian participant is Sergei Glazyev, advisor of Putin on Regional Economic Integration. In the meeting, he threatens that if deal is signed, then Ukraine will go bankrupt, and face chaos.

<sup>388</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-wahl100.html>

<sup>389</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts44088.html>; Interview Stefan Meister: <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-wahl100.html>

<sup>390</sup> List of participants: <https://yes-ukraine.org/en/Yalta-annual-meeting/2013/spisok-uchasnikiv> ; Program: <https://yes-ukraine.org/en/Yalta-annual-meeting/2013/programa-zustrichi> ; backgrounder: <https://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/09/other-yalta-conference>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
18.11.2013	EU Foreign Ministers meet on Eastern Partnership <sup>391</sup>	Increasing doubts that Y will sign off the accession deal. Merkel: "We have been made aware that certain decision could fall very shortly before the [Eastern Partnership] summit [in Vilnius]"; EU increases pressure, EU official:"Deadline to fulfil requirements by 19.11.2013" . Key obstacle: allowing imprisoned T. to leave country for medical treatment [EU backed down from demanding the release of T, only freedom to travel for ailment in Germany]. Guido Westerwelle repeats German position, demands resolution prior to signing a deal. Rada to meet and discuss passing of law allowing to lift the travel ban on Timoshenko on 19.11.2013.
18.11.2013	EU Foreign Ministers meet on Eastern Partnership /Association Agreement; background Interview with Sylvia Stoeber. <sup>392</sup>	Q: On negotiations and context of Ukraine: EU step towards Ukraine by not demanding the release of T.; at the same time, Ukraine in a dire economic situation (Standard and Poor rated the likelihood of state bankruptcy at 44%); rather than implementing reforms, Y established a clan-like, authoritarian regime, fighting back all opposition. Q: Is Russia trying to undermine the EU Ukraine Deal? A: Russia opposed to deal because of own vision for economic integration; increased pressure on Ukraine, mostly through unfavourable gas deals, but also by sanctioning certain Ukrainian exports like chocolate or pipelines. Y tries tu balance through the dilemma of bowing to much to either Russia or EU; Q: Is a unilateral Ukrainian withdrawal from the EU deal, and turn to Russia likely? A: Y seeks to prevent both,too much proximity to Russia ("He is not a fan of the Eurasian Customs Union"), and too much influence of the EU - Y wants to win the elections in 2015, and "they can not be held too democratically, because otherwise the likelihood that he will win the elections would be too small". Q.: What do you expect from the summit today? A: No decision likely, as Rada only to decide on T question 19.11.2013; even if agreed, implementing it may well take until the very last minute before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013; also, "not set in stone that the agreement is signed, as domestic Ukrainian voices already demand moving the signing of the agreement for another year." [ see demands made by Putin in 09.11. meeting; which domestic voices...]
21.11.2013, 14:06 Uhr	Parliament does not pass Timoshenko Law. <sup>393</sup>	Timoshenko Law is rejected, after the decision on it had been postponed over and over again. According to Wolf Dieter Krause, "Wladimir Putin has threatened economic sanctions if Ukraine signs the treaty. Ukrainian industry representatives warned of the consequences, and demanded to delay the signing of the accord by a year"; EU inceasingly upset, Elmar Brok, Head of External Relations Committee, EU PArliament: "increasingly of the impression that Mr Y. is not interested in signing the deal", and sees "Russian pressure" as main reason. EU Commission announces that it remains comitted to deal; Commissioner of Enlargement, Füle, to travel to Kyiv.

<sup>391</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu100.html>

<sup>392</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu100.html>

<sup>393</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine414.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
21.11.2013, 15:14 Uhr	Ukraine announces ist withdrawal from accession agreement. <sup>394</sup>	Published shortly after the Timoshenko Law is rejected; freezes accord, and suggests a trilateral commission on trade issues made up of EU, UKR, and Russia. Names three reasons for withdrawal: 1. National Security must be ensured; 2. Ukrainian economic relations with Russia must be renewed; 3. Domestic UKR market requires further preparation to be prepared to enter relations with EU-market "on eye-level". Putin threatened earlier that Ukraine would lose all preferential trade agreements with Russia if the accord is signed, and offers at short notice to hold trilateral talks with EU and UKR; have to take place before signing any accord.
24.11.2013	Ongoing Mass Manifestations on Maidan. <sup>395</sup>	"We belong to Europe"
26.11.2013	Yanukovich to visit EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. <sup>396</sup>	Emphasises the difficult position of J, who seeks to find a position between Russia and EU; faces dilemma: Russian sanctions, hitting particularly the east of Ukraine, and difficult conditions from both EU (politically (Timoshenko), and financially (the short term loan offer is too small). "Not a friend of Russia"

<sup>394</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine418.html>

<sup>395</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine434.html>

<sup>396</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-gipfel-osteuropa100.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
26.11.2013	Yanukovich to visit EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. <sup>397</sup>	Yanukovich: "Ukraine wants to continue on the European path".
27.11.2013	Merkel signs new coalition treaty <sup>398</sup> .	
28.11.2013	EU Council Summit on Eastern Partnership /Association Agreement; Yanukovich to meet van Rompuy and Barroso.	EU heads of state meet to discuss EU Association Agreement and Ukraine's unexpected turning away from the offer of the EU. Merkel: Noit optimisic about Ukraine re-joining; "We will demonstrate clearly that the EU will keep an open door for Ukraine to sign the association agreement"; first critical voices, Martin Schulz: "I think as the European Union we need to ask ourseloves what we must do, economically, and financially [...]to support the Ukrainian state and people. Experts also critical about quick agreement,Tilman Brück, Director SIPRI: "maybe with next UKR Preident in 5 years" EU in a dilemma: If they offer more money to Ukraine, then it will look as if they would buy Ukraines. So far no one presented an idea for a solution"

<sup>397</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45566.html>

<sup>398</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45598.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.11.2013	Interview on likelihood of UKR turn-around from turn-around; EU Policy towards UKR with ARD correspondent Christian Feld. <sup>399</sup>	Q. Desirable/Likely to convince UKR to sign agreement despite ist surprise-turn on 22.11.? A, Christian Feld: Unlikely, no signals for that; J. clearly stated that for econmic reasons Ukr. Can not survive without Russia as a trading partner, and that the EU has not offered enough. Problem for the EU: if it were to put more money on the table, it would give in to blackmailing.
29.11.2013	EU-Open Door Policy for Kiev. <sup>400</sup>	Strong lobbying of UKR opposition in Vilnius for EU support, msg " We want to siogn [the agrrement], but our president doesnt want to"; Timoshenko announces that she is wilking to accept to remain under house arrest to stand in the way of Yanukovych signing the agreement; Elmar Brok, MEP, spokesman of foreign relation committe EUPARL, warns Ukraine about orientation towards Russia: "The standard of living for the people in Russia is catastophical, and if Ukraine clings itself to Russia, then it will get that [Russian] standard of living. "
29.11.2013	Meeting between Yanukovych and Merkel. <sup>401</sup>	J. emphasises close economic ties with Russia; Merkel underscores open door, offers gas deliveries, but also emphasises that there are limits to aid: "Within the EU we have conditions that apply to all member states - we can not just turn around and say: This does not apply to Ukraine, now". Francoise Hollande states that it is not only a question of money, but also about the will to implement democratic reforms, and that "an agreement will not be signed with governments [...] whose relationship with the people is not founded on the principles of democracy".
29.11.2013	Press conference Yanukovych after meeting EU heads and Angela Merkel. <sup>402</sup>	J demanded package deal with substantial financial and economic support; if his demands are met, he will sign very quickly; Two problems, a)the amount, and b) conditions; J. demands unconditional financial support; Merkel emphasises that even within EU, countries can not lend money without conditionalities. Christian Feld: "Handing out several billion Euros with no guarantees difficult to communicate a year before the EU elections" [GREECE!!!]

<sup>399</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1355346.html>

<sup>400</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-gipfel-osteuropa106.html>

<sup>401</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1355472.html>

<sup>402</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1355470.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
29.11.2013	Expert Interview on Economic consequences of Association Agreement, and UKR turning away from it; with Torsten Hähn, Chief Economist and CEE Expert at WZG Bank. <sup>403</sup>	The economic relationship between (economically huge) EU and (tiny) markets of the 6 countries of the EP is asymmetrical; taken together, 6 countries have a GDP equivalent to that of Poland; within the group, Ukraine is the most important market (size of population), but currently in an economic downward spiral; dropping credit ratings, facing bankruptcy; Not signing the EP accord will have long-term negative consequences for Ukraine. The deal with Russia may be a short term compensation for the most burning economic problems, but not solve the structural problems. For the EU, on the other hand, the economic loss of UKR not signing the accord is "negligible".
29.11.2013	EU warns Russia about interference. <sup>404</sup>	EU warns Russia about its interference in the negotiations with UKR about an associated membership status of Ukraine to the EU. At the final press conference of the summit originally intended for the signing of the accord, EU President v. Rompuy: "We will not bow before Russia's pressure"; The way Russia deals with the former Soviet republics "incompatible" with the norms how things should develop in Europe. President of Commission, Barroso: "We can not accept a veto-right of third parties"; time of limited sovereignty in Europe is over. EU wants to discuss differences with Putin at EU-RUS summit end of January 2014; towards UKR, EU continues to pursue open door policy. van Rompuy encourages UKR government to "withstand external pressure", now it is time for courage and decision; Lit. President Dalia Grybauskaitė (Lithuania EU Presidency 2013) openly criticizes Yanukovich: Leadership in Kiev decided to "end progress in its country".
29.11.2013	Police violence on Maidan escalates. <sup>405</sup>	Shown in evening news of 30.11.2013; Police uses violence to fight back pro European protesters; opposition leader Wladimir Klitschko emphasises that Ukraine is at a crossroads, and encourages protesters to continue: Now is the time to decide whether you want to live in a police state, or in freedom.

<sup>403</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1355468.html>

<sup>404</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-gipfel-osteuropa108.html>

<sup>405</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45626.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.12.2013	Ongoing protests; increasing use of violence by protesters; first signs of fragmentation amongst protesters. <sup>406</sup>	After some protesters use violence against police to gain access to government buildings, opposition leader Klitschko goes out to speak to them; Klitschko: "You do not belong to us". Q. to Ina Ruck on the unity of the opposition movement, whose traditional weakness has been fragmentation. A: There are three parties in the opposition: Timoshenko, the new party of Klitschko, and the extreme nationalist Swoboda ("scanting "death to the enemies of Ukraine"). They have nothing in common, "which does not suggest a strong and unified coalition against Yanukovych".
01.12.2013	Background Expert Interview on Protest Movement and Situation in Ukraine with Kyril Savin, Head of Office, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Kiev. <sup>407</sup>	Q: Is the opposition united? A: No, disunited, can be shown when looking at support in wider population and how it differs geographically - in Kiev and Western Ukraine, entire population supports protests and deeper EU integration; about half the population in the east and southeast of Ukraine - however, in the East, there are no signs of protests, and attempts of Yanukovych to mobilize counter protest in his region have been "artificial and unsuccessful". Q.: Demands for J to step down: A.: Currently ignore protests, but won't be able to do so in the long run; Q: What can he offer the opposition [which demands deeper ties with the EU] after putting everything on the Russia card? A.: J still between the chairs: there is no real deal with Russia, as neither gas nor credit negotiations with Russia have been successful so far; Difficult to judge J's intent, as he has remained silent on the protests and not commented on them so far. Q: After the 2010 elections, J. mobilized coal workers from Donezk to occupy central squares in Kiev to prevent protests against him. Will he mobilize a violent counter protest? A.: Can not be excluded. Already, attempts over the weekend to bring young and violent supporters to the capital. However, these were very few, and it was very unsuccessful. Q.: What or who is the face of the opposition? A.: Three movements with very different outlooks: 1) Klitschko's UDAR, 2) Arseniy Yatseniuk of Timoshenko's Baktiwschtschina (Fatherland) party, and 3) the ultra national/fascist Swoboda party. Key difference is the use of the nationalist card, the least nationalist is UDAR. Together, they have no coherent strategy, with many people asking what would be the next steps, and whether to trust the people leading the opposition parties; fear that a change of regime wont change much; know that J. is not the problem, but the UKR system is: "The political system is so lopsided and corrupt, that only a re-start with new structured, new faces, and new parties [will bring the necessary change]"; opposition parties seem to have no interest in that, but want J out to take over lucrative gov. positions. "The population wants a democratic, transparent, and fair political system". "Agreement with EU would increase chances of the deep modernisation UKR requires for its people to live freely and democratically.

<sup>406</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5126.html>

<sup>407</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-proteste102.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
02.12.2013	Opposition hands in motion of censure against J.; J. communicates willingness to continue negotiations with EU; Opposition adds Timoshenko back on list. <sup>408</sup>	Ongoing protests, Government buildings now under control of opposition.; During the night, protesters used violence against police and security forces. "Most prominent" opposition leader Klitschko criticises J. on-going silence on protests on Maidan. Opposition establishes "joint headquarters" in occupied labour union building. Opposition now not only demands J to step down, but also freeing Timoshenko.
02.12.2012	First statement of Yanukovich on Maidan protests. <sup>409</sup>	Ukr evening news screen interview with J., in which he heavily criticises the protest movement; offers to discuss demands; announces he will pursue his planned trip to China, presumably for economic reasons.
03.12.2013	Motion of censure unsuccessful. <sup>410</sup>	Blow to opposition, loses vote of confidence in Rada. Prime Minister Azarow states the governments regret about the use of violence by police and security forces. "I will guarantee to hold those responsible accountable for their actions." Opposition leader Yatseniuk calls government a "government of thieves". Problem of Ukraine not only an economy, but a government that doesnt want to listen to the will of the people. Opposition leaders encourage protesters to keep on pressure; loosing the moption of confidence requires them to come up with a new strategy".
04.12.2013	NATO Russia Council Summit. <sup>411</sup>	At summit, Lawrow criticises statement by NATO condemning the use of violence against peaceful Maidan protesters as interference in domestic affairs; German FM travels to Kyiv to speak with government and opposition, meets with Yatseniuk and Klitschko, PM Azarow cancels meeting at last minute; PM Azarow announces that government will toughen its reactions to protests, and threatens to withhold wages for workers from Western Ukraine; UKR Foreign Minister Koschara announces that although his country is dependent on economic ties with Russia, it desires to continue talks with the EU about possible accession; emphasises that UKR does not come as a "beggar", but has to offer a large market. Opposition now also in control of parliament.

<sup>408</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1356218.html>

<sup>409</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1356238.html>

<sup>410</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1356556.html>

<sup>411</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1356866.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
04.12.2013	Ongoing demonstrations in Kiev as reaction to the withdrawal; German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, visits Maidan; meets opposition leader Yatseniuk, and with Wladimir Klitschko. <sup>412</sup>	
05.12.2013	OSCE Summit in Kyiv; Russian EU tensions rising; ultimatum to protesters. <sup>413</sup>	First reports on counter protests in Kyiv, signs that not entire population supports pro EU course of opposition. OSCE Summit, UKR holds presidency of summit; Guido Westerwelle criticizes Russia's behaviour with unusually harsh words, calling Russian threats to Ukr "inacceptable behaviour". Russian FM Lawrow "We are a little surprised by some of the speeches we heard today. They did not match the agenda. It is unacceptable for the OSCE to finger-point at others", re-iterating a statement by Putin a few days earlier, when Putin stated his believe that the Maidan protests are orchestrated from abroad. The UKR constitutional court sets protesters on Maidan ultimatum to clear square by Dec. 10.
07.12.2013	Speculations on signing agreement between UKR and RUS on Eurasian Customs Union; Opposition announces massive protest march for next day. <sup>414</sup>	J visited Putin 06.12.2013 for trade negotiations; PM Asarow confirmed 06.12.2013 "bilateral consultations of considerable importance to the strategic relationship between Ukraine and Russia"; talks about a roadmap to overcome obstacles for further integration; characterizes negotiations as difficult. On 07.12., J. denies that any agreement has been reached or signed; Opposition announces "March of the Millions" through Kyiv on 08.12.2013

<sup>412</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45706.html>

<sup>413</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5136.html>

<sup>414</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5136.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
08.12.2012	March of Millions in Kyiv; protests move beyond question of EU integration, turn to domestic power struggle. <sup>415</sup>	largest protests in Kyiv so far; protesters demand J to step down and re-elections; Ukrainian State Security Services announce investigations against opposition leaders for acts of subversion. J. remains in private residence outside Kyiv.
08.12.2013	March of Millions in Kyiv; protests move beyond question of EU integration, turn to domestic power struggle. <sup>416</sup>	Still no statement by J. on demands of opposition. Correspondent Ina Ruck: "Maybe the government hopes that the Cold Temperatures will eventually drive home the protesters. However, they occupy heated buildings, so this seems unlikely. To drive them out of the buildings would require violence, if not some form of mediation takes place." Announces visit of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in Kyiv in the following week, but doubtful if she can offer any help to resolve this "deeply Ukrainian domestic crisis".
09.12.2013	Berkut forces arrive in Kyiv, start taking down barricades, no violence so far. Ashton expected 10.12. in an attempt to mediate between the conflicting parties; Police evict HQ of Timoshenko's Fatherland party,	Increased police presence all day, in the evening police starts taking down barricades; no violence so far; Klitschko speaks directly with police forces, appeals them to renunciate violence; announces that the regime will be changed, and they will be prosecuted under the new regime if they were to use violence. Police evict Timoshenko's Fatherland party's headquarters, take away computers, later announced as "investigation for business crime". J announces dialog, but not directly with opposition leaders, who are "investigated for subversion") but with his three predecessors, who "have been critical of him lately".

<sup>415</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1357770.html>

<sup>416</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45774.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	take away Computers. <sup>417</sup>	

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<sup>417</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1358014.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
09.12.2013	"The role of images in the Ukraine crisis": Background feature on Russian reporting on Ukraine crisis, Stephan Stuchlik. <sup>418</sup>	Not only images in Internet, but also in television; in UKR itself so far, media coverage has been fairly realistic and open. In Russia, state controlled media sends completely different images to the ones seen in elsewhere - "almost impossible to recognize that the pictures are related to the same event [as reported elsewhere]; Russian state television airs "propaganda in the best Soviet tradition, from a time when the wall still stood in Berlin"; random example evening news 09.12.2013 show no pictures of the eviction of Timoshenko's party's (Fatherland) headquarters; instead images of blocked roads and heavy traffic in Kyiv, "as if the future of Ukraine was a traffic problem". "Opposition in UKR offers much space for critical reporting, for example their diverging interests or their ties to the private sector and the oligarchs. Instead, Russian TV aims at emotions"; shows helmet of Berkut trooper that has apparently been crushed by angry protesters. Another program shows a feature on the protesters on Maidan, showing only the red and black flags of the ultra-nationalist and radical Swoboda (Freedom) party "instead of hundreds of yellow-and-blue flags" , painting them as "the face of those in favour of Europe"; Shows interview with leader of Russian Communist party, who sees historic parallels with the era of fascism in Europe: "The situation in UKR does not develop towards [democratization like during the 90s], but more in the early 30s when fascism took over power in Europe". Anchorman on news program accuses Guido Westerwelle of favouring the Klitschko brothers "because he has been impressed by the hot bodies of the Klitschko brothers" , playing on Guido Westerwelle's sexual orientation. TV shows statement of Putin on 09.12.2013, stating that he is "willing to accept whichever decision Ukraine takes".

<sup>418</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5146.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.12.2013	Police starts removal of barricades; Ashton visits Kyiv, meets J.; J. announces that a delegation to negotiate specific points will travel to BXL on 11.12.; J. hold broadcast "round table" with fmr. Presidents. <sup>419</sup>	In Round talk with fmr. Presidents, which now support opposition, J. announces willingness to consider amnesty for imprisoned opposition leaders; emphasises that re-establishing economic ties with Russia "without alternative; In meeting with Ashton no concrete results, but in press conference J. announces that a delegation will travel to BXL for further talks on "specific" points. Background Interview with ARD correspondent Ina Ruck on J. Q: What are the implications of J signalling willingness to re-enter negotiations with EU? A.: "Deja vu, a repetition of what he said 3 weeks ago, 2 weeks ago, 1 week ago: "Of course Ukraine continues on the European path, but it needs more money for it, and that it needs the economic relations with Russia and thus needs to revive them." EU delegation thus more of a "back to start" move; appears as if J still gambles on cutting the best deal for him and his country, but faces harsh realities: UKR almost bankrupt, and economically dependent on Russia - "and will remain so if it doesn't undergo deep reforms. Reforms, however, are not only painful for the population, but also for industry, who is largely supportive of J. Q.: Implications of high-ranking visits by Western politicians [V. Nuland, Catherine Ashton] on outlook for opposition? A.: Unified in resolve, staying in the streets despite extreme cold and threats of police storming the camps; international negotiators need to consider not only the demands of the opposition, but three options for J in their efforts to facilitate national dialogue. J. options: 1) Resigning - difficult to demand from a negotiator, would be considered as an interference in domestic affairs; 2) continue to deny opposition - J would lose further support from people; 3) Negotiate with opposition - "only solution, and solution international mediators should aim for".
11.12.2013	J. offers national dialog; riot police attempts storming Maidan. J. meets C. Ashton and Victoria Nuland; Opposition rejects offer. <sup>420</sup>	Riot police attempts to storm Maidan and occupied buildings, retreat after 10hrs of operations, largely peaceful. Most barricades removed, but Maidan and buildings still held by opposition. After meeting with C. Ashton (10.12.2013) and V. Nuland (11.12.2013), J. announces "national dialog" with "opposition, church leaders and all other social groups"; calls on opposition to end resistance. Opposition leader Klitschko: "[The riots] Last night leaves no room for compromise"; insists on J to step down, calls for re-elections.

<sup>419</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5148.html>

<sup>420</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45822.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.12.2013	News of the day on situation in UKR after police raids on protester camps during night 10/11.12.2013; Nuland meets J; J announces willingness for talks with opposition. <sup>421</sup>	"Resolve of protesters drives back police". "Camouflage, trickery, deception" and to then strike unexpectedly, or at least attempt it appears to be the tactic of Yanukovych. First offers negotiations [after meeting Nuland], then sends out police at night "to restore public order in the streets of Kyiv". The "pro-European" people on the streets held out nonetheless; clashes remain non-violent, unlike two weeks earlier; Berkut Forces have been mobilized from Crimea and eastern UKR; Kyiv-orthodox priests demand Berkut forces to renunciate violence; Swoboda occupies Kyiv town hall, willing to use violence; police retreats after nine hours, meeting unified resistance [at town hall?]; take down barricades on streets to Maidan; Maidan and buildings still held by opposition. Victoria Nuland visits Kyiv, meets J., hands out food packs to people on Maidan:" I made it absolutely clear [to J.] that what happened last night is impermissible in a European and democratic state. I have no doubts that after our meeting [Mr. J] knows what he needs to do."; After meeting, J. offers talks with opposition, a "national dialogue", on national television; Opposition leaders reject offer, unless central demands are met: resignation and re-elections. [no Europe...].
11.12.2013	Background Feature on Yanukovych. <sup>422</sup>	Two factors move J.: a) pressure from Russia, and) the opposition's demand for closer association with Europe. Ad b) J remembers the Orange Revolution of 2006, where protests against forged elections cost him his office despite backing from Russia. Grip to power in UKR however not only a question of what the masses want, but also on the support of the oligarchs. J. for long enjoyed their support, e.g. Achmetov, owner of Schachtjor Donetsk, also Dmitri Firtasz. Oligarchs often own TV station's, and so far their private channels have reported very openly about the protest movement. This can be seen as an indication that J looses his grip on media controlled by oligarchs. Reason may be that Ukraininan oligarchs like Achmetov, Firtasz [Poroshenko, Pinchuk] want to do business with Europe. Trying to seek their support and win them over may explain J. tactics of "two steps ahead, one back" towards Europe. J, "the Russia friend", remembers that Russian support only could not keep him in power in 2006.m He was swept out of office, and at this point would have needed more help from Russia.

<sup>421</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5150.html>

<sup>422</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5150.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.12.2013	Interview with Guido Westerwelle on the question whether the EU underestimated the complexity of UKR. <sup>423</sup>	<p>Q.: Has the UKR president J. been muscling around with the EU all along? A.: Hesitant to comment on recent manoeuvres [by UKR government to step away from signing agreement]. Our main interest is that the situation in Kyiv remains peaceful. "I call on all parties to renunciate violence. I expect the UKR government to protect the peaceful protester, and guarantee the freedom of assembly. I have seen the protesters personally, and they have one clear objective, which is Europe [the associated membership status with EU], and that must be possible."; Q.: Has the EU underestimated the role of Russia? Don't you think that the Russian president will try EVERYTHING [emphasis by speaker Th. Roth] to prevent Ukraine from drifting to close to Europe??" A.: "That is why the EU has offered an associated partnership status from the beginning". UKR requires profound deep reforms, and these reforms are possible only if UKR chooses the European path"; look at neighbouring countries shows that these countries are much better off than UKR. Therefore, the offer from the EU to UKR is very advantageous. Q.: Let me repeat my question: Has the EU misjudged Russia's resolve to prevent the associate member status of UKR in the EU?"; A.: "Since summer 2013, I have been to Kyiv three times. Before the summit in Vilnius [29.11.2013] everyone had to assume that UKR will sign [the association agreement with the EU].This [J. turnaround] has surprised some, but most of all the UKR people, as it clearly has been a fundamental change of direction. That is the reason for the Maidan movement, they demonstrate for Europe. I visited Maidan, I spoke with the people, not only with the politicians: The people are peaceful, they represent European values, and, of course, as Europeans we stand with Europeans. Q.: "UKR is short of bankruptcy, EU has offered around 1 bn in financial assistance; UKR government today stated that it requires 20bn. If EU wants to move closer to UKR or wants UKR to move closer to the EU, would the EU not have to offer substantially more to offer something that is attractive to the UKR government? A.: " We are ready to do a lot. The [association] agreement really is of great advantage to UKR. There are additional and ongoing talks with UKR, for example with the European Investment Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But please understand that I cannot lead negotiations on the television screen. Rest assured that the material questions have been discussed and are being discussed. But I cannot accept that playing off the EU and Russia to reach a better deal. This is not in our interest, but it is especially not in the interest of the UKR people, because they want Europe."</p>

<sup>423</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5150.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.12.2013	Commentary Wolf Dieter Krause, ARD Correspondent BXL, "Has the EU misjudged Ukraine from the beginning?" <sup>424</sup>	Tough power struggle about future of Ukraine; OF COURSE the EU underestimated RUS resolve to maintain UKR in its sphere of influence by almost all means; "signals from Russia remained calm". Argues that EU, specifically NATO contributed greatly to the fact that it could get to this point: "Today, NATO troops are stationed much further to the east than once guaranteed [Paris Agreement; see Adomeit's uncovering of a myth]" to Russia. recently, under the pretence of protecting civilians, NATO massively took sides in the Libyan civil war. Now Russia is writing the bill, in Syria, and in Ukraine. Russia does feel respected. In Russia's eyes, NATO and the EU are the two sides of one coin." Recommends that Europe should acknowledge the Russian desire for respect. In relation to UKR, Krause suggests that the EU can trust that has the better offer for Ukraine. Putin seeks to blackmail Ukraine into enslavement. Europe offers partnership and long-term opportunities, and that explains why Ukrainian took to the streets, and why unlike in earlier domestic crises in Ukraine [Orange Revolution], the oligarchs are on the side of the opposition. Yanukovich feels the pressure of the people, but his wish to remain in power, and his fears about losing the personal wealth he has amassed in recent years; feels that only if siding with Russia this can be protected. Will not give in voluntarily. Outlook to 2015 elections in UKR: European Council, to which both RUS and UKR are members could observe if the elections are held democratic, free, and fair. EU and RUS have all reasons to clarify their relationship.
13.12.2013	First meeting between opposition and Yanukovich. <sup>425</sup>	Before meeting, J. announces possible amnesty for political prisoners; No results, Klitschko: "Government hasn't moved a millimetre"; J. refuses to resign, or dismiss government; J. aggress top moratorium against the use of violence form both sides; Before meeting, opposition leaders appear on Maidan to receiver mandate for talks; Klitschko announces running for president in 2015; most important demand from opposition: "dismiss the current government to end the political crisis"; Swobodo leader Oleg Tiagnibok warns of new police action during night: "Despite their promises [to remain peaceful], they don't only use targeted provocations, but also the complete scenario of a violent storming of Maidan". Supporters of J announce counter-demonstration for next day.

<sup>424</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5150.html>

<sup>425</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1359078.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
14.12.2013	Counter demonstrations by supporters of J. <sup>426</sup>	Mobilized from east and south of Ukraine; favfour closer ties wirth Russia over closer ties with EU. Rumours are that they are paid by government; anonymous source: "They are paid 2,50 Hrywnja per hour. The protests are organized by the local authorities"; suggests that many protesters do it for the money, not for the cause. Dismissal of mayor of Kyiv and unnamed hingh ranking security official for violent suppression of peaceful protests in November
15.12.2013	Gauck announces to stay away from Winter Olympics in Sochi; McCain, Members of EU Parliament (Elmar Brok, Rebecca Harms) appear on Maidan, speak to protesters; support W. Klitschko. <sup>427</sup>	According to Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Federal Chancellery was not informed about Gauck's step. If they had known, they would have advised against the move. Stefan Fule announces that EU may put talks with Ukraine about Association agreement "on ice". John MacCain visits Maidan, tells protesters about their inspirational protests, "to the world and to your country. America stands side-by-side with the Ukrainians". After McCain, Elmar Brok, conservative Member of the European Parliament, and Head of its Foreign Relations Committee, and Rebecca Harms, of the European Greens, speak to demonstrators; Brok: "The door to Europe remains open for Ukraine". Appearances of high-level politicians on Maidan are criticised by Russia as Western interference in domestic affairs. Announcement of trip by J. to Russia next week.
15.12.2013	Fears rise that UKR question may cause international crisis between Russia and EU. <sup>428</sup>	Additional reporting on visit of Elmar Brok; Brok to protesters on Maidan: "We, the European Parliament will help you to fulfil the conditions [to become an associate member of the European Union]. For this your don't need to go to Moscow to sell your country. The countries of freedom will help this country." Russia annoyed by appearances, accuses EU of interference; simultaneous protests of J. supporters without Russian speakers.

<sup>426</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1359258.html>

<sup>427</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45880.html>

<sup>428</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5160.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.12.2013	Meeting between S. Lawrow and EU Foreign Ministers; no results, EU continues "open door policy" towards Ukraine; In Ukraine, first voices in government party demand dismissal of current government under PM Asarow. <sup>429</sup>	Before meeting, Westerwelle, W. Hague announce that EU is keeping the door open for UKR to still sign the agreement "if it is willing to meet the conditions"; Stefan Fule, EU Commissioner for Enlargement announces on Twitter that the EU will only continue to negotiate if there is an obligation for Ukraine to sign the agreement. Russia offers credit to Ukraine, as, according to Andrej Belorussow, economic advisor to Putin, "without a credit from either side Ukraine cannot guarantee its economic stability".
16.12.2013	Correspondent R.D.Krause on meeting between EU Foreign Ministers and Sergei Lawrow. <sup>430</sup>	Q.: What will the EU ministers tell Lawrow? A.: The ministers will try to take away the Russian fear that the EU wants to drag Ukraine into the Western camp, and position Ukraine against Russia.; they will emphasise that they want a balanced relationship, and try to convince Russia that the EP Association Agreement with Ukraine would be beneficial to all three, especially Ukraine; that Russia would profit from an economically stronger UKR economy. Two-pronged approach, 1. take away Russian fears, 2. refuse Russian pressure on Ukraine. Q.: What are the expectations in Brussels? Does anyone expect a U-turn of Yanukovych, so that he will after all sign the association agreement? A.: "I believe that the ministers are uncertain [about the prospect of J. signing after all]". Expectation not mentioned by FM, they say that it is up to the Ukrainian, not external actors to decide, and that it should occur in the absence of fear. C. Ashton stated that she expects that the short-term problems of J., the economic situation of Ukraine and Russian pressure, can be overcome.
16.12.2013	EU FM Summit meeting with Lawrow. <sup>431</sup>	Carl Bildt on Russian pressure on Ukraine and the impact on relations with Russia: "It [the Russian behaviour] has an impact on our relations. Russia has initiated a massive propaganda initiative with misinformation, and sometimes outright lies against the association agreement".

<sup>429</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu104.html>

<sup>430</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1359620.html>

<sup>431</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu104.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.12.2013	EU FM Summit meeting with Lawrow. <sup>432</sup>	No results, G. Westerwelle: "Especially in times of differences of opinion it is important to talk more, not less. And before anything, there is the diplomacy of conversation, paying close attention, and of exchange". Appears unlikely that UKR is going to sign agreement with EU, Westerwelle: "We continue to want Ukraine [as associate member of the EU]. We still want to sign the agreement. No one can say that there was a lack of will on behalf of the European Union". Meanwhile, J on trip to Moscow, Westerwelle demands that lines of communication with Russia are not cut: "There is no peace and security in Europe against Russia, only with Russia."
16.12.2013	Lawrow, Ashton after meeting ministers; accusations of "Western" interference by Russia. <sup>433</sup>	Russia calls appearances of Western politicians "shameless"; Lawrow after meeting EU FM: "It was our common agreement that everyone respects the sovereignty of every country, including Ukraine, and should allow all people to decide freely for themselves how they want to develop their country, their state." In eyes of EU, association agreement would be advantageous for Russia also, Ashton: "Our association and trade agreements are in full accordance with existing trade relations [between RUS and UKR] and fully respect the traditional economic ties between UKR, RUS and its neighbours. We are of the opinion that UKR can have good relations with all neighbours". Analysis by W.D. Krause, ARD correspondent BXL: Doubts among EU diplomats about value of Lawrow's statement, "Russia wants influence, and wants to keep Europe off its borders"; this also explains that there were no results to the meeting.
17.12.2013	Yanukovich signs far reaching agreements with Russia to overcome UKR economic crisis; lowers gas prices by 1/3 immediately. <sup>434</sup>	Putin in joint press conference: "With the aim of supporting the Ukrainian state budget, the government of the Russian Federation has decided to grant Ukraine a credit of 15 bn US \$ in loans."; No agreement on UKR joining the customs union; difficult for UKR position, because opposition in Kyiv prefers stronger links with EU; Klitschko: Why does he [J.] get large credits, why does he get much cheaper gas prices? We don't know, we hope he won't sell Ukrainian interests"; opposition leaders continue to demand re-elections. Commentary tagesschau (Bock): "Smart move by Russia". Signals to EU: We hold on to our promises to our UKR partner.
17.12.2013	Putin announces amnesty for Russian prisoners. <sup>435</sup>	Including Pussy Riot band members; majority of prisoners released served their sentence for "thuggery". Rumours that list of those released may include Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

<sup>432</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu106.html>

<sup>433</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-eu106.html>

<sup>434</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1359986.html> ; <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5164.html>

<sup>435</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45928.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
19.12.2013	Backgrounder on why Ukraine shelved deal with EU. <sup>436</sup>	Tells a story of Y first pushing his cadres towards EU, but then suddenly turning to Putin; main explanator: grip to power, and emotional dealing with Timoshenko; second order, economic offers made by EU / conditions imposed by IMF perceived as humiliation. EU source states that more was in the pipeline for Ukraine, but this was to be withheld from negotiations.
20.12.2013	In the league with the conservatives: Klitschko's international relations; backgrounder on fmr. Boxing heavy weight champion, as opposition leader and darling of western conservative support; includes insights into work of German political foundations. <sup>437</sup>	Almost daily visits of high ranking western politicians and leaders to Klitschko.; Elmar Brok, MEP, leading member of the European conservative party, and spokesperson of the EU Parliament's Foreign Affairs committee describes K. as "an extraordinarily smart and increasingly experienced politician", who is "clearly in favour of Western values" since he speaks of democracy and the rule of law as preconditions for economic success"; Brok visited K. twice already, also at Vilnius Summit (29.11.), Klitschko profits from having established contacts with western political foundations early on. In 2006, when he was leading the "Pora" political movement he established relations with the conservative German Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF). When founding his current party, Udar, "Vitali Klitschko approached us. He asked for informal contacts to CDU [German conservative party; Merkel's party] and the European Conservative Party, as well as support through workshops and seminars" says Gabriele Baumann, then Head of KAF in Kyiv. Klitschko visited CDU party summits in 2011 and 2012, meets Chancellor Merkel; established good relationship with BILD Zeitung, in which he publishes regularly since the beginning of the protests in Kyiv. [In response to Russian criticism of Western interference, pat. financing of opposition movements] Baumann emphasises the limits of the work of political foundations: "We don't finance parties, and give no logistical or material support, not even computers or other hardware. We don't support election campaigns, neither financially, nor otherwise". Success for Klitschko UDAr party in 2013: With support of KAF granted observatory status in European conservative party (European People's Party?), made possible as part of the Eastern Partnership Initiative; observatory status gives access to high-ranking European politicians; at Vilnius summit Klitschko meets with Barros and van Rompuy and other EU heads of state; "according to Elmar Brok, he left a good impression". Commentary adds that his competitor, J. made negative headlines among the participants in Vilnius by renting the most expensive apartment available, according to a Western diplomat; Klitschko also receives support from conservative US politicians, like John McCain.

<sup>436</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-deal-special-report/special-report-why-ukraine-spurned-the-eu-and-embraced-russia-idUSBRE9BI0DZ20131219>

<sup>437</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45928.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.12.2013	Background Interview on EU summit on Ukraine with Christian Feld, ARD Correspondent, BXL. <sup>438</sup>	Q.: Deoes the EU have a concept how to deal with UKR? A.: Not really apparent. It send out two message: 1) the door remains open for UKR, if it fulfills the conditions of the agreement; 2) We are not carpet dealers, we can not buy countries with a checkbook; all this shows that the opportunities [for the EU] are currently very limited. Q.: UKR appears very important for the EU; why? A.: It's not only about Ukraine, but also the other countries of the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership is also not only about economic issues, but also the export of EU values: democracy, freedom of opinion. The EU repeatedly stressed that signing the Agreement is not an either or decision between Russia and the EU, but a decision of not only but also. However, currently [signing of loan agreement between RUS and UKR on 17.12.2013] UKR has turned to RUS.
22.12.2013	First press conference of M. Khodorkovsky after being released from custody; in Berlin. <sup>439</sup>	Khodorkovsky gives first press conference 36hrs after being released from custody; in Berlin; Thanks Angela Merkel and Hans-Dietrich Genscher for their efforts; calls on J. to release Timoshenko, supports Maidan protests.
29.12.2013	Renewed mass protests after violence against journalist. <sup>440</sup>	Mass protests continue, 50.000 people on Maidan; sparked by brutal beating of critical journalist Tatjana Jornovil; opposition organized march on J. residence, where he is suspected, as he still refuses to enter talks with opposition
29.12.2013	Terror attack on rail station in Volgograd, leaving 16 dead, 29 wounded. <sup>441</sup>	Unknown perpetrators; suspicions that attackers related to Muslim rebel groups from the North-Caucasus (Dagestan), as they had announced attacks prior and during the Winter Olympics in Sochi; so far, no claims for responsibility.

<sup>438</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45928.html>

<sup>439</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5174.html>

<sup>440</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46104.html>

<sup>441</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46104.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
29.12.2013	Volgograd Incident. <sup>442</sup>	Fears that North Caucasus based Muslim rebel groups made their announcement about attacking prior and during the upcoming winter Olympics true; "Sochi is close to the Northern Caucasus Region, and Volgograd only 700km away from Sochi" [Th. Roth; how far is Dagestan away from Volgograd]; Russian TV shows pictures of rebels in the northern Caucasus region, where the self-proclaimed mujahedeen prepare themselves for attacks on secret training grounds. Commentary I Roth: "Muslim terror groups have long before announced their intent to attack prior and during the Sochi Winter Olympics; today's attack seems to a symbol that they also have the capability"
01.01.2014	Putin visits Volgograd; ongoing protests in Kyiv. <sup>443</sup>	"Putin made mark by visiting Volgograd [on Russian Christmas Day] two days after the attack"; P. denounces attacks, "nothing legitimizes this brutal act". P. re-emphasises his resolve to "annihilate" the terrorists; in his new year's speech, screened just before he arrived in Volgograd, he already announced a "firm approach against terrorism, we will fight them until their total annihilation". Commentary I. Ruck, ARD Correspondent Moscow: "Putin, as before, today announced his intention to "destroy" terrorism; however, the problem goes much deeper: the radical groups have announced their intentions to attack a long time ago - and now [despite Putin's repeat announcements of taking a tough stance] have shown their ability to do so."

<sup>442</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5182.html>; <http://tass.com/russia/713488> ; <http://en.sledcom.ru/news/item/886689/?pdf=1>

<sup>443</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46144.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
12.01.2014	First large demonstrations in 2014; Renewed mass protests on Maidan after brutal beating of fmr. Minister of Interior; UKR gov. Announces 6 bn US\$ loan from Russia for	Following the brutal beating of former minister of the interior Lutsenko, renewed mass protests in Kyiv. Police starts using violence against protesters; Klitschko announces change of course, "protests must continue, but with new means. We will organise a country-wide strike"; Yatseniuk, of T. Fatherland party, demands Western governments to sanction individual members of UKR government; Commentary on introduction: ""Original trigger for the mass protests in Ukraine was the refusal [of the UKR president J] to sign a long planned agreement [about an associate partnership status] with the EU".



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	its nuclear power plants. <sup>444</sup>	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.01.2014	Increasing violence on Maidan after tightening laws of assembly; 200 reported injured. <sup>445</sup>	Violent clashes following the surprise move of J. to tighten the laws governing the right to assembly on 16.01.2014, including the permission to use live ammo against violent protesters that occupy government buildings. Clashes despite earlier announcement by J of mediation talks with opposition, but at the same time emphasising his willingness to use all legal means available to re-establish public order. Klitschko: currently, the government mobilizes special forces [Berkut] from all across the country. [to Ukrainians] Sit in your cars and buses, you are needed here for the victory of UKR".

<sup>444</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46302.html>

<sup>445</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1366992.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.01.2014	Yanukovych offering talks with opposition; violence on Maidan; Interview with U. Lilischkies, by Thomas Roth; first mentioning of radical elements among Maidan	<p>Q: J. offers talks with the opposition - is this yet again a ruse to appease the opposition and play on time and the bitter cold, or is it an honest offer this time around? Is there, after all, only a violent way out? A.: Appears as if the hopes in a peaceful solution that were kindled by J.s announcement to make concessions (including by me) are ill-fated. After the talks with J., Klitschko said that "one cannot trust this man", and today, many indicators point that way: 1. Since one hour, Berkut forces have started to arrest people, take out barricades and storm occupied buildings; 2., further Berkut forces are being mobilized from all across the country to move to Kyiv; 3. J announced in the morning that he will revise the controversial law on the right to assembly, and in the evening it becomes apparent that he has enacted it nonetheless, and it will be published tomorrow. Q.: Surprisingly, the President yesterday announced his willingness to talk to the opposition directly - but this now appears more like a diversion tactic by J? A.: That is correct; but important to understand that the position of the two sides are very far apart. On the one hand, the protesters, who have been holding out on Maidan since November, have far reaching demands: They want J to step down, dismiss the government, and hold re-elections. To Yanukovych, this would be very large concessions to makes. There is also another problem: The people that protest on Maidan today are [different to those initially] but young man with a high propensity to resort to violence; they want to see results now; "a revolutionary fire has been ignited that will be hard to control now". Q.: From here [Hamburg] the images portray a united opposition; but is not one of the key problems of the opposition that they are disunited in central questions? A.: Yes, absolutely; there are for example large debates who legitimately speaks for the opposition - 1 person, several people, if yes, then who...there are very different wings, from ultra right and high propensity for use of violence, to nationalist-conservative like Fatherland and Udar. The disunity amongst the opposition have been a traditional UKR problem.</p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	protesters; "rogue protesters". <sup>446</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.01.2014	First fatalities on Maidan; protests escalates; crisis summit between J and opposition leaders; opposition sets ultimatum. <sup>447</sup>	First fatalities, opp. Claims five, government two killed. Video footage of the first victim taken just a few hours before show a young man who is willing to die for the cause. Violence takes over when Berkut forces start raiding the opposition barricades and occupied buildings; violent protesters ("thugs and hooligans") using Molotov-Cocktails enriched with chemicals; rumours that police uses live ammo, denied by police; Asarow denounces violent protesters as "criminal", doesn't rule out further use of police force against them; subsequent crisis meeting, the first face to face meeting between J and all three opposition leaders since beginning of protests, does not bring any ease of tensions on Maidan. Klitschko, sets ultimatum: "If tomorrow the President does not meet with us, then we assemble even more people tomorrow, and then we will attack", adds that he will do his best to prevent further bloodshed. Live-Commentary from Kyiv by Udo Lilischkies: other opposition leaders joined up with Klitschko on ultimatum; Yatseniuk announces that J. promised that he will consider to dismiss the government, which would be a partial victory for the opposition; self-confident opposition, large scale support, many women and old people on Maidan as well; very difficult to storm and clear the square for the amount of people.
22.01.2014	Brennpunkt: Crisis in Ukraine. <sup>448</sup>	10min on background of crisis and surge of violence; contributions exclusively from ARD, Ina Ruck (Studio expert fmr head of ARD Moscow) and Udo Lilischkies, in Kyiv. Lilischkies emphasises pre-revolutionary atmosphere, speaks of united opposition with high morale, and from well-organized manoeuvres ("fighters"; hospital and first aid); stresses that there are many conflicting rumours, ie. tanks have been seen moving, but MoD stated that this is part of a regular rotation. Ina Ruck on likelihood of violence? Always expected, apparently now ignited by agents provocateurs paid by J; J now has to go all the way with RUS, as he needs their support not only for the short term economic crisis, but also for his re-election in 2015 which he will only secure if Russia helps him to manipulate the outcome.

<sup>446</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5224.html>

<sup>447</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1367528.html>

<sup>448</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1367562.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.01.2014	tagesthemen on Maidan escalation; Interview Th. Roth	Q.: Rumours that the protests turned violent because of agents provocateurs among the protesters? A.: Yes, this can be confirmed, they do exist, and they have been arrested by the opposition, and chased away from Maidan. But they are a smaller group, the large majority of those willing to fight against the police are young men, football supporters; and of course, they throw Molotov-cocktails, and for three days now have not shied away from throwing them at the Berkut Forces around Maidan. The hatred between the groups is on an upward spiral, chances for a negotiated agreement very small, and if, need to happen very fast. But whether J. is really finally considering living up to what he announced [taking back controversial assembly law; dismiss government] remains to be seen, many believe he plays on time [as he did before].

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	with Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv. <sup>449</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.01.2014	tagesthemen, commentary on Ukraine Crisis, Ina Ruck. <sup>450</sup>	Starts off by reminiscing about the powerful images ("soup kitchen and winter camp romance") of the first days of the protests following J unexpected turning away from signing the association agreement in Nov. 2013. Now, instead of those peaceful pro-European protesters, "radical bomb-throwers, shooting police men, ugly images, violence" rule Maidan; helpless Klitschko accepts that "the opposition does not control Maidan anymore". This development could have been expected, considering the question how long people an hold out in the cold if the other side doesn't move a millimetre, and instead of engaging in search for a solution adds salt to injury? This is what J did by tightening laws and going ahead with his Russia friendly course, and by letting every dialog with the opposition run into nowhere. In such a [polarized] context, provocateurs play an easy game. "Now, there are armoured personnel carriers in town, there are fatalities, and people wounded; images that do not belong to Europe. But this is where the Ukrainians want, and apparently, this also goes for the President". At least this last deception of J. should not be believed, "the deeply corrupt J. has made his choice: Moscow instead of Brussels."; choice not only because of economic crisis of UKR and financial aid by RUS, but also because he hopes that Moscow will support his re-election in 2015. "In the Kremlin, people know how to manipulate elections"; Certainly, J. also sought Moscow's backing for the recent escalation on Maidan. "This also means for everyone who wants J to give in, will have to talk to Putin also".

<sup>449</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5228.html>

<sup>450</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5228.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
23.01.2013	background article on protest-movement, ist link with nationalism and the Maidan escalation; argues that the Maidan movement does not per se have a propensity for violence and extremism; radical right wingers loosely organized, using the Russian facebook Vkontakte; Sylvia Stöber. <sup>451</sup>	Increasingly, hooded thugs on Maidan, some belonging to nationalist right wing groups; atmosphere on Maidan suddenly changed when it became apparent that J. would not accept any deal; rushes through law tightening right to assembly, denounces protests as illegal, limits freedom of media and NGOs; parliamentarians belonging to opposition can lose immediately lose their immunity. Robbed of alternative peaceful means to achieve their objectives, Klitschko and other opposition leaders have little arguments to counter those calling for violence; the violent excesses discredit the opposition movement, allow J and UKR government to speak of "extremists" risking the stability of the country. Indeed, violence originates from groups like "Right Sector", an informal right wing association, that came together since the first days of the protests; organize themselves via Vkontakte (Russian facebook equivalent; check role of Vkontakte in Russian Foreign Policy); use vKontakte to "ask for donations in kind to prepare for the fighting"; have no fixed meeting point on Maidan like other movements; amongst them also Russian speaking hooligans "and others from different regions of UKR" ready to use violence; they are united in their hostility towards Russia; no interest in dialog with government, want removal of J and establish a new nation state; do not want to join the EU. Swoboda, the most radical nationalist party of the three main opposition parties also known for its right-wing extremist stance, and well connected amongst European nationalists, favours closer ties of UKR with EU; Nationalism widespread in UKR, T party also "quite nationalistic. Anyway, nationalism in UKR is often seen as an expression of pride and the willingness to defend sovereignty against Russia"; mentions differences between eastern and western Ukraine in this respect. Rumours, fanned by discovery of tortured, dead journalists in forest nearby Kyiv, of thugs recruited by J government to threaten journalists and members/supporters of the opposition movement.

<sup>451</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-nationalisten100.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
23.01.2013	Crisis meeting between J and opposition after night of violence; easing of tensions on Maidan after announcement; pre-revolutionary atmosphere continues. <sup>452</sup>	J. meets with heads of Maidan-opposition; announces special parliamentary session to discuss opposition demands; K. demands truce until decision is taken to prevent further escalation of violence. Live commentary by Udo Lilischkies: people on Maidan increasingly impatient, as their leaders announced that today was "the day of decision" : either there concessions of J or attack (ultimatum set 22.01.2014); after J announcement, the protesters are confronted with the offer to hold on 5 more days [until plenary session in parliament] at temp. of -22 degrees; video footage of protester tortured by police adds to impatience; currently, orthodox priests are standing between the lines of violent protesters and Berkut forces, try to mediate.

<sup>452</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1367796.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
24.01.2014	Stefan Füle meets J to mediate; J. announces concessions after meeting Füle; protests and occupation of government buildings not limited to Kyiv anymore; tagesschau. <sup>453</sup>	J. offers to dismiss government and take back controversial laws after meeting with S. Füle; however reiterates his intent to use all legal means to resolve situation; Protesters not satisfied, new demonstrations, occupation of government buildings outside Kyiv (Western Ukraine, especially Lwiw); Klitschko to protesters: a few weeks ago, dismissing the government would have been OK - but now only stepping down of J. can resolve the crisis; without alternative for opposition, outlook for peaceful resolution on new low.
24.01.2014	Ambiguous, high-tension situation on Maidan continues, conflict parties agree on truce. <sup>454</sup>	Despite "truce" between sides, and efforts by Klitschko to de-escalate mistrust in J. leads protesters to fortify barricades further; occupy another government building, as rumours spreading that Berkut will storm Maidan during night. S. Füle meets with J, after meeting J. offers amnesty for political prisoner "that are not accused of criminal or violent acts". Peaceful resolution unlikely, as now only alternatives "step down" or "attack".
24.01.2014	Feature on protests outside Kyiv. <sup>455</sup>	Feature on riots outside Kyiv, here: Lwiw; shows that protests have "since long" not been limited to Kyiv, but esp. Also in entire Western Ukraine.

<sup>453</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368070.html>

<sup>454</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5232.html>

<sup>455</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5232.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
25.01.2014	J. dismisses government; offers Yatseniuk and Klitschko positions in new government. <sup>456</sup>	After meeting, J. announces that the Asarow government will be dismissed; Yatseniuk to take over as Prime Minister, and Klitschko as his deputy; J furthermore announces amnesty for political prisoners, strengthening of the legislative vis a vis the president; restructure central election committee of UKR. Prior to meeting, Yatseniuk's party sends out rumours that J will proclaim state of emergency; MOI publishes statement that it will treat all protesters occupying government buildings as extremists, and if necessary, employ force against them; apparently, sides agreed on how to retreat from Maidan, but unclear if protesters will follow the leadership decision; amnesty on prisoners will only be enacted when occupied government buildings are vacated; same condition for revision of controversial laws on right of assembly; all depends on whether deal can be sold to radical groups among opposition that want nothing but J to resign. Commentary: "Everything still very ambiguous, and challenging, but the recent steps by J. may have helped to resolve this crisis at the very last minute."

<sup>456</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46516.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
26.01.2014	opposition protests continue, situation calms. Opposition continues to demand stepping down of J and re-elections. Protests (and riots) spread across the entire country; Minister of Defence refuses involvement in Ukrainian crisis. <sup>457</sup>	Relative calm in Kiev after violence of earlier days; protesters mourn protester killed earlier; coffin wrapped in colours of ultra-nationalists; police denies responsibility. Y interprets offers made by J as "a sign of weakness: the ruling elite shies away from being responsible for their country"; opposition refuses offer, remains relentless in their demands and objective; [on stage with Klitschko and Yatseniuk not Tiagnibok of Swoboda anymore, but Petro Poroshenko].; later during day hooligans and thugs storm congress centre in Kyiv, "with fire crackers and Molotov cocktails"; Klitschko mediated between protesters and police to prevent bloodshed, before police vacated building; Reports of riots in the meantime spreading across entire country, including east and south of Ukraine; e.g. Zaparaje in south-eastern Ukraine, thousands of people unsuccessfully attempt to storm municipality, which was used to organize support for J. ; Commentary Golineh Atai: "It is getting close for president J. The minister of defence just announced that under no circumstance will he order the Ukrainian military to fire at Ukrainian people - without the militaries support, however, it will be difficult to implement a state of emergency."
26.01.2014	Tagesthemen: Riots spread across country; breaking news: protesters storm and occupy buildings of Ministry of Justice. <sup>458</sup>	Reports that riots have now reached as far as Eastern UKR, which so far has been spared from protests; Opposition shows map spread of protests: only regions without protests are Donetsk and Crimea. back in Kyiv, a field hospital of the opposition is shown, which is all run by volunteers; interview with a doctor " I am a private doctor, and I am here to support the change of this government this government of thieves and thugs not caring about the people".

<sup>457</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368370.html>

<sup>458</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5236.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.01.2014	Protesters vacate Ministry of Justice after ultimatum; opposition still wanting to find a negotiated solution; disunity between opposition becomes more apparent; rumours of state of emergency. <sup>459</sup>	Ongoing crisis summit between opposition leaders and J.; Tiagnibok, leader of Swoboda, states that plans for a state of emergency are on the table of the President, and that the military would be part of it. L. Koschura, UKR FM denies plans to proclaim state of emergency, "difficult to enact", however, after occupation of Ministry of Justice, the Minister sets ultimatum to protesters, otherwise, in her capacity as MoJ she will turn to the President and assess whether the conditions for a state of emergency are fulfilled; Klitschko intervenes, protesters leave building; Reports of riots in Dnepotrepowsk, clashes between opposition supporters, thugs, football hooligans and police. G. Atai, live: Ongoing war of nerves, as talks are still on going; maybe special plenary session in UKR parliament 28.01.2014 can bring solution; unlikely if dismissing the government only can satisfy the opposition. Events like today's occupation and freeing of the government building shows disunity among opposition, and that it is not always under the control of the leadership of the Maidan-Movement; Reports of a credible UKR newspaper of government plans to increase Berkut presence in Kyiv, equipped with "far ranging legal authorities".

<sup>459</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46550.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.01.2014	tagesthemen, interview Th. Roth, tagesthemen anchor, with Elmar Brok on situation in Kyiv. <sup>460</sup>	<p>Q.: Ongoing talks between J and opposition. You are in close contact with Mr. Klitschko, - are there signals of a peaceful solution to the crisis in Ukraine? A.: I believe that the negotiation position of the opposition is realistic. If good willed, if willing to prevent further violence and chaos, J. should show a real interest in their position. The longevity of the talks [talking place at the time of interview] gives me some hope, but the outcome is all but certain. Q.: Why should J accept demands of the opposition now? So far, he showed little willingness to compromise, but played on time instead - why should this be different now? A.: Firstly, I believe he now understands that the deal with the Russians isn't that good after all, and that the Russians are blackmailing him. Secondly, because the protests have now spread across the entire country, showing him that his policies have no future. Of course, he can now use stalinistic methods, brutal force, and clobber everything and everyone, but if he does that he will soon thereafter go to prison - because you can not deal with your population like this anymore. That's why he needs to find a way out, so that he has a future for himself. I hope that this understanding has reached J in recent days. Q.: From the UE, there have been repeated talks about sanctions, to support J in his thinking process - but nothing happened. Why not? A.: Because that would be too early. We are currently here to lead talks with both sides. Commissioner Füle arrived tonight, C. Ashot is about to arrive; tomorrow evening a delegation of 12 MEP will arrive for an official visit: We are still trying to convince the two sides of a peaceful solution; only if that doesn't work, then we will move to punish all those prosecutors and judges, bureaucrats and ministers that send people to prison and have helped to sign off the laws of 16.01. It would mean travel bans to Europe; oligarch's accounts to be frozen. If we employ sanctions, then to hurt and punish those individuals, not the people of Ukraine. Q.: Mr. Brok, let us summarize briefly: what is the position of the opposition, what is their model that will be discussed in parliament tomorrow? A.: First thing to be discussed is the stepping down; the annulment of the laws from 16.01; Amnesty for those imprisoned as consequence of law; and then, very importantly, the re-introduction of the constitution from 2004, which would strengthen the parliament vis a vis the President, and make Ukraine a parliamentary democracy. This second part would also entail re-elections for October 2014. Q.: Mr. Brok, let me ask you again: so far J's tactics was to deceive and play on time. Do you honestly believe that the opposition stance a chance to change this with what they demand from J.? A.: People here say that the chance is there, they even speak of 50/50. I am not so optimistic. But it is a real window of opportunity now, but also a real threat if J doesn't accept, and things don't work out in the Rada tomorrow, the situation may deteriorate dramatically. It is not acceptable to leave the people in such a situation of insecurity for two months. People feel insecure, they have seen snipers on the rooftops above them, have seen incredible kidnappings and torture, and many of them are by now filled with hatred. If J doesn't accept now, then the situation is likely to explode, and would be of truly revolutionary character. I believe that J is conscious of this situation, and that should lead him to be willing to compromise, truly compromise this time, not only promise and then do nothing like he did before. Q.: Tomorrow, the EU-Commission is to meet Mr. Putin, who is also a player in Ukraine somehow. What do you have to offer him that he would be willing to drop J.? A.: I think Putin must understand that he can not incorporate UKR like before: the people here have developed a much stronger sense for freedom. It will be very expensive for him; Ukraine is an expensive country. We expect the cost for Russia's plans with UKR to be around 30bn US \$ in the coming years. But that will not keep Ukraine under control. He must therefore ask himself whether this operation is worth it, or whether he has not already suffered a defeat. And we must make clear that no country has the right to interfere in another country's trade negotiations by blackmailing the victim by increasing commodity prices. It must be made clear to Putin that every country has the right to choose for itself, the decision does not take place in Moscow, nor in Brussels. The UKR population must be given the right to decide for itself.</p>
27.01.2014	tagesthemen: breakthrough for opposition in UKR; "night of decision";	<p>Opposition leaders (Yatseniuk, Klitschko, Tiagnibok) meet with J for talks again; crisis summit in preparation of special parliamentary session 28.01.; session could decide whether the severe crisis of the UKR state can be resolved, "if J doesn't play on time"; report shows companion of recently killed journalist (corpse found nearby in Kyiv forest) accusing UKR government of targeting individuals, and beating them up; systematically spread fear and distrust among opposition; perpetrators accuse later victim of "questioning the unity of the slavs", hinting at the Russian or Eastern Ukrainian descent of the torturers; new allegations of torture and killing leads to increased hatred and resolve amongst protesters, expects President to step down and snap elections. Protester: "The crossroads have been reached".</p>

<sup>460</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368668.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	situation remaining dicey. <sup>461</sup>	
27.01.2013	Commentary on situation in UKR, Michael Stempel, WDR: "Klitschko's hardest battle"; on disunity of opposition. <sup>462</sup>	only common denominator of opposition is to demand J to step down; very different nature of opposition parties, ultra-nation Swoboda, Timoshenko and Yanteseniuk's ambiguous Fatherland party (which had joined in an election-coalition with the ultra right in previous elections); Udar, lacking the punch to lead the opposition uncontested. "Klitschko's allies are no coalition for the future of the country". J could capitalize on the differences and play on time until now, but he overestimated the patience of the people; the country is now on the brink of a revolution; only snap-elections can possibly prevent a further worsening of the situation; "If J supports the way to snap elections himself - the better. If not, Europe's top-policy makers should emphatically engage with J on this point. The EU is far more attractive to the UKR population that it is to many people of EU member states. The EU should not completely disappoint this hope of the UKR people". EU must unambiguously prompt Putin not to torpedo democratic snap elections. UKR may not be allowed to turn into the front state of a renewed East-West conflict. "The country only has one future: if it reconciles its Russian and Western roots - and maybe a former boxing world champion is one day soon the right answer to join the disunited Ukraine again."

<sup>461</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5238.html>

<sup>462</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5238.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.01.2014	tagesschau.de: Interview with Gabriele Baumann, head of Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation Kyiv since 2012; collaborates with Klitschko's UDAR party and Timoshenko's Fatherland party. <sup>463</sup>	"ease of people to take and hold government buildings in 10 other Ukrainian cities could confirm the rumour that security forces are being concentrated in and around Kyiv. It is also a sign that J. has lost the monopoly of violence"; J.'s step to offer the prime minister post to opposition (surprised everyone"; but opposition declines unambiguously, and makes acceptance of offer dependent of further concessions; the offer is also deceptive, as in the UKR constitution, only president suggests and dismisses PM.
28.01.2014	tagesschau: Asarow resigns; laws of 16.01. taken back. <sup>464</sup>	PM Asarow resigns; parliament takes back law of 16.01. Asarow will continue to act as PM, until a new compromise candidate is found; decision is up to president; Report introduces Pedro Poroshenko as potential candidate; Klitschko on resignation: "This resignation should have happened months ago. We have lost time, and the situation has become explosive." Refuses to be part of new government, "can't even imagine".

<sup>463</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraineinterview100.html>

<sup>464</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368936.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.01.2014	tagesschau, EU Commission-Russia summit. <sup>465</sup>	Crisis in UKR overshadows summit; News Anchor: "Putin to discuss contentious issues like the Eastern Partnership Agreement between EU and UKR; "The protests in UKR were caused by a decision to freeze long-lasting talks between UKR and EU about closer ties in favour of Russia [by J.]". News report: Open and honest discourse announced; EU commission sees RUS responsibility for situation in UKR. Putin on association agreement and Russian behaviour: "Our worry with this association agreement is not the sovereign decision of UKR, but the economic consequences [of signing an Association Agreement]." Report states that "Putin fears economic disadvantages". van Rompuy: "we have emphasised that the agreement is economically advantageous for all sides, including Russia"; Summit agrees to joint expert commission to further analyse the economic effects. Putin on question whether he would take back bilateral agreement signed with J. on if government changes in Kyiv: "No, we will not do such a thing". Commentary W.D. Krause, ARD correspondent BXL: Summit supposed to clarify how Europe and Russia wish to live up "to their so-called strategic partnership". This has not been achieved, but it became apparent during the summit that both sides have an interest in trying to prevent a further deterioration of their relations.
28.01.2014	tagesthemem: pyrrhic victory for opposition? NOT day of decision in UKR; Protests ongoing; report from Charkiv, stronghold for J.; Interview with Golineh Atai, ARD Kyiv. <sup>466</sup>	Caren Miosga, intro: Resignation of Asarow and taking back of laws just a pyrrhic victory for opposition? Asarow continues to act as PM, until a new compromise candidate is found; introduction of Poroshenko as potential candidate; Interview on situation in Kyiv: Q. Is J playing on time again? A.: Some observers speculate that J could only be moved to change his course of (non)-action because some oligarchs now threatened to stop supporting him. It should also be kept in mind that despite Asarow resignation, J announced that 1. the change of the constitution back to the 2004 constitution is a very long and complex, therefore neither snap elections nor re-elections will happen soon. 2., on the amnesty for political prisoners, this will only be granted if the protesters leave all occupied government buildings and leave the streets and Maidan. The opposition will not accept this. Q.: Which options are left for the opposition after their united refusal to take the PM post as offered by J. to them over the weekend? A.: Klitschko said earlier "step by step negotiations" - if they had joined the government of J, they would have lost all credibility and sympathy of the streets. Therefore, [in addition to talks], the only option now is to keep the pressure of the street on the president"

<sup>465</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368936.html>

<sup>466</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5240.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.01.2014	tagesthemen: EU Commission - Russia Summit; Femen activists protest outside EU Commission: "Putin uses propaganda against peaceful protesters". <sup>467</sup>	Putin meets with heads of EU, van Rompuy and Barroso; meeting on EU-Russia strategic partnership set to last two days, changed to 3hrs; joint press conference on UKR after meeting; Caren Miosga: "Vladimir Putin is responsible for the situation in Kyiv. By urging J. to step away from the association agreement, he set the stone in motion that led to mass protests". Report: Joint Press conference shows little agreement between EU and RUS, Barroso complains about fundamental disagreements in the areas of trade and energy. Putin signals "room for compromise" [citation report], states that it is not important who rules UKR, and that in case of change of government stay true to the aid agreement signed with Yanukovich, "we always had a good dialogue with UKR government, and we will continue to have that"; MEP (Lambsdorff) sees "Ice Age" in EU Russia relations, and demands that the EU needs to find a way out of the deadlock, as the economic interrelations are too close"; Next summit announced after Sochi Olympics.
28.01.2014	tagesthemen: Commentary Udo Lilischkies, WDR: "Putin doesn't take the EU serious". <sup>468</sup>	EU regarded differences with Russia as case of "Sonderpädagogik" (special education): patiently educate the behaviourally difficult Russia into a strategic partnership: "a visa-carrot here, a Bundestag debate stick there: This recipe failed miserably. Putin simply does not take the EU seriously"; in addition, doesn't fear confrontation, in fact on the look-out, seemingly needs it: "Backing Assad, offering exile to Snowden, breaking free trade-rules - the self confident discourse with the west attaches greater value to the country, and greater value to him. EU has no effective means to exude pressure on Russia; depends on RUS gas, and EU billions for Russian gas are received by Gazprom "even if we don't smile on handover". Conclusion: "A rather impotent EU meets a rather mighty Putin". EU seems doomed to wait until the "Putin System" "disassembles itself" in an unagitated way - despite oil and gas income, Russia has serious domestic problems, which threatens Putin's power base. Therefore, only new realities can change Putin's behaviour, not reminders from BXL. The pressure on UKR government for siding with RUS has now led to a possible change of government, Putin stated this won't change anything as he supports the country, not government. "A great learning success, without any special education efforts.

<sup>467</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5240.html>

<sup>468</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5240.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.01.2014	tagesschau.de; Sylvia Stöber: Tsar Attitude and KGB methods; Backgrounder in Putin before EU-RUS Summit. <sup>469</sup>	Dealing with Putin splits Germany in two camps a) Russia understanders (SPD: Steinmeier, Erler) and b) Russia critics (CDU; A. Schockenhoff): a) Understanders argue that Russian behaviour can be explained with R disappointment about how the West dealt with Russia in the past 20 years; point to common economic interests; plead to not pillory the Russian society. b) Critics argue that Putin is behaving increasingly authoritarian and shows neo-imperial behaviour towards the former Soviet Republics. Debate in Germany surged with return of FWS as FM and G.Erler as Federal Coordinator for the relations with Russia. Steinmeier, based on change through rapprochement (Brandt Ostpolitik slogan) , in his first term as FM initiated a Modernisation-Partnership with Russia, hoping that economic reforms would pave the way for political reforms in Russia. <b>A. Schockenhoff, initiated a Bundestag resolution, criticizing the Kremlin for its dealing with opposition (9.11.2012), leading to discord between Merkel and Putin in their subsequent meeting (Nov. 2012). Putin getting increasingly conservative: searches proximity of RUS orthodox church; Fjodor Ljukanow describes Putin as "most conservative politician in the world"; according to Fiona Hill, Putin secures his power with KGB methods.: collects incriminating material about oligarchs, to secure their loyalty; Putin claims fmr. Soviet Republics as privileged spheres of influence and extended security zone, but doesn't do anything to convince the people in these republics to cooperate; instead uses pressure and money, but gets mistrust and resistance in return. Steinmeier, in his inaugural speech for his second term ((December 2013) clear on Russia: "appalling" how Russia exploits the economic emergency of UKR to prevent the association agreement with EU; claims that he views the [ongoing!] modernisation partnership "sober and without any romanticism.", as the project requires investments from both sides, but currently Russia lacks "courage, creativity and willingness".</b>
29.01.2014	tagesschau: Rada discusses further steps to defuse power struggle; decision on amnesty expected. <sup>470</sup>	Protesters continue to stay on Maidan despite earlier government concessions (dismissal of PM, taking back laws from 16.01.); For an amnesty, government demands opposition to leave Maidan and occupied buildings; "inacceptable" (Yatseniuk) for opposition; seems also unlikely because majority of opposition has further demands, ie stepping down of J, snap elections;
29.01.2014	tagesschau: Putin shelves financial aid package from 17.12.2013. <sup>471</sup>	Russia shelves aid package due to "domestic instability of Ukraine". During a cabinet meeting, Putin declares that Russia "needs to know who is in the new government". Assures that RUS will stick to the financial aid package once the situation has become clearer.

<sup>469</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/russlandpolitik100.html>

<sup>470</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46592.html>

<sup>471</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46592.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
30.01.2014	tagesschau: Amnesty Law passed in Rada; ongoing protests; J.	Protests continue despite amnesty law passing Rada, due to conditions; increased rage on Maidan as protesters feel blackmailed; J appears in a surprise visit in parliament, rumours have it that he threatens to dissolve parliament; Klitschko to supporters on Maidan: "The recently passed law doesn't ease the tensions, but hardens the fronts further". Commentary G. Atai, Kyiv: First cracks on J. government party visible during Rada debate; J. announces that he is fallen ill (on sick leave); J declares in a written statement that he has fulfilled all demands by the opposition. "He just hasn't signed any of his concessions".

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	announces illness, sick leave. <sup>472</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
31.01.2014	tagesschau:President Gauck visits Munich Security Conference (MSC). <sup>473</sup>	First German president to visit MSC; Keynote speech: "Germany should act earlier, more substantially, and more decisively"; Ursula von der Leyen and Frank-Walter Steinmeier announce more active German role in international security; commentary: appears as if Germany is about to undergo a fundamental change of its foreign and security policy. (Also known as Munich Consensus)
31.01.2014	tagesschau: Kerry visits Berlin, meets Merkel, Steinmeier. <sup>474</sup>	Focus on NSA bugging affair; Kerry doesn't provide the hoped-for excuse, nor does he mention the German advance to sign a no-spy agreement. Kerry reassures Maidan opposition of full US support.

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<sup>472</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46612.html>

<sup>473</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46634.html>

<sup>474</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46634.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
31.01.2014	tagesschau: UKR military interferes; opposition claims systematic spreading of fear; UN demands investigation into	Military declares that storming of occupied buildings would be "inacceptable"; demands steps from government to "bring peace and harmony in Ukraine".



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	claims of human rights abuse. <sup>475</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
31.01.2014	tagesthemen: Historic speech by President Gauck at Munich Security Conference (MSC). <sup>476</sup>	Historic for two factors, a) first German president to visit conference, b) clear interference into domestic German policy [German president not supposed to interfere in policy]; key message: Germany should not shy away from taking on more international responsibility, if require and as last resort with military means. Minister of Defence von der Leyen added: "To sit and wait is not an option." Caren Miosga Interview with Sabine Rau, in Munich: Q.: How was the speech received? A.: Lead to widespread discussion amongst participants; NYT correspondent "Wow, we haven't heard something like this from a German politician in the past ten years". A signal that Germany's allies have long been waiting for, but also domestically this was long awaited, as Germany wanted to "leave the passivity of the era Westerwelle [Libya]. But what does "more responsibility" mean exactly? Q.: Appears as if Germany and EU want to interfere in a very acute conflict - tomorrow's conference topic is the situation in Ukraine. Which signal can be expected from MSC? A.: Conference sends out signal "the world is watching what the UKR government is doing to its people"; opposition leader Klitschko expected to arrive, fmr boxing world champion puts his country in the limelight; however, experts are very sceptical about MSC contributing anything substantial to the resolution of the current crisis in Ukraine. Everyone agrees that now a lot depends on Russia, and how Russia is going to behave towards Ukraine after the Winter Olympics.
31.01.2014	Situation in UKR remaining dicey; opposition leader re-appears with signs of torture. <sup>477</sup>	Situation in UKR remaining dicey; opposition leader re-appears with signs of torture.

<sup>475</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46634.html>

<sup>476</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5246.html>

<sup>477</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5246.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.02.2014	MSC discusses UKR. <sup>478</sup>	Lines of conflict become openly apparent; Klitschko accuses UKR government of "choosing path of violence and terror", systematic spreading of fear, torture, and disregard of human rights; demands sanctions against UKR government; shows pictures of tortured protesters; claims 300 imprisoned, 27 missing; demands amnesty and snap elections. UKR Foreign Minister Koschara defends course of the government, argues that government has fulfilled all opposition demands; "if the police is attacked with Molotov-cocktails, then the protests are not peaceful anymore.". Klitschkos meets many decision makers during conference, including Steinmeier. Steinmeier on Ukr. crisis: "If the fuse of the powder keg is already burning, you can't play with on time anymore. It doesn't cost any fantasy to imagine what is going to happen then." Kerry asks for Russia's cooperation in resolving the UKR crisis. Lawrow reacts with reservation, states on protests in Ukraine: " What does instigate mass riots or the occupation of government buildings have to do with democracy? Is that not prohibited also in your countries?". Commentary Sabine Rau: Russia stands firmly on the side of the J. regime; Experts at MSC expect Winter Olympics to be a reprieve for the opposition; after the games it remains to be seen whether Russia is willing to resort to more drastic means.
01.02.2014	Steinmeier announces: Bulatov allowed to travel for medical treatment; UKR police announces investigations into origin of protest. <sup>479</sup>	Steinmeier announces that UKR FM Koschara has guaranteed that opposition leader Bulatov, who recently re-appeared showing signs of torture, and is in need for medical treatment, can leave the country. According to Koschara, Bulatov is "in good shape". UKR Ministry of Interior declares that it is currently examining computers taken from a raid on the headquarters of Timoshenko's Fatherland party on 9.12.2013; secret service investigates several individuals for treason; Deputy chief investigator announces that "there are indicators that the mass protests that began on 21. November were not spontaneous, but planned well in advance".
03.02.2014	tagesschau.de: Ashton tells WSJ about EU-US financial aid plans for UKR. <sup>480</sup>	On side-lines of MSC; according to Ashton, EU and US are preparing a joint short term financial aid package for UKR; doesn't mention precise amount, but "amount won't be small"; unlike earlier aid packages, this package will not be tied to UKR fulfilling the IWF conditions set earlier; [note: Putin announced that he is going to hold back his offer]

<sup>478</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46644.html>

<sup>479</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46644.html>

<sup>480</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine846.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.02.2014	Interview Th. Roth with Frank Walter Steinmeier, German FM. <sup>481</sup>	Intro Reports show Ukraine as a divided country, west=pro-European, East= pro Russia and Yanukovych. Interview: Q: You spoke of a powder keg with a burning fuse earlier - how do you want to prevent the keg from exploding? A.: Yes, this still holds true today, the situation remains highly ambiguous, despite ongoing talks between government and opposition. Maybe there could even be slight progress today, since for the first time the amnesty question will be discussed. However, we are not yet at the most difficult piece laying ahead of the conflicting parties: The re-introduction of the 2004 constitution, which would limit the presidential powers. So, without being overly optimistic, there are small movements that give reason for a little hope. Q.: Putin "lured" UKR with 15 bn \$ to keep the, under Russian influence. Must the EU now put 20bn on the table? A.: I don't think it can work like that. I hope the in Russia the situation is assessed correctly as highly charged, that the situation may devolve again to the violence of recent days with fatalities and wounded. This has calmed down a little now; it has even been achieved that the, likely tortured, hospitalized opposition leader Bulatow was allowed to leave UKR for medical treatment. But it remains a powder keg, which is why I hope that none of the sides plays with the fuse, neither domestically, nor external actors that have an interest in maintaining a state of chaos and violence. We should not enter a competition of who pays most. Rather, we should develop a common understanding to let UKR slowly recover, and that the direct talks between J. and the opposition create something that gives the country a political future. Q.: You met Klitschko in person during MSC; he demands sanctions - in favour or against? A.: I find that we must present ourselves very decisively before the UKR government. We have done so as Germany, but also as the EU, via Catherine Ashton, who as High Representative represents the common foreign and security policy of the EU vis a vis the UKR government. We have to reassess whether sanctions are in place after the talks and meetings. I hope that the UKR understands that we are not going to torpedo an ongoing political process [like this, with sanctions].Q: Herr Steinmeier , you said that the time when Germany practised a foreign and security culture of restraint ("culture of restraint"), is over. Does this mean in relation to UKR that you will involve yourself directly? A.: The whole sentence went: "I find it good and right that we feel obliged by a culture of military restraint. But this must not be mistaken as a policy of staying out. Ukr. is such a case in which we must get actively involved, to help bring about what currently is so hard for the conflicting sides in Ukraine to reach, to help bring about a political solution, and prevent further violence and bloodshed. This is what we do, this is what I do, hopefully successful in the end."

<sup>481</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5252.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
09.02.2014	Ongoing protests in Ukraine. <sup>482</sup>	Ongoing Protests against President Yanukovich in Ukraine

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<sup>482</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46752.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
19.02.2014	Liveticker: Situation in Kyiv escalates. <sup>483</sup>	<p>situation escalates on night of 18.02., German Foreign Office publishes Twitter message that it is very worried about the situation in K.; C. Ashton: Events in Kyiv are "shocking"; in face of violence, during night, Pres. J. invites opposition for further talks on 20.02.; fatalities on both sides, number unclear at time of reporting, difficult to assess, as opposition treats victims in own field hospitals; Acting PM Asarow promises to Stefan Füle, EU enlargement commissioner, in a phone conversation, that police will not use live-rounds. Füle stated earlier at a meeting in BXL, that seeing Berkut Forces armed with AK 47 has "caused him to worry"; US condemns violence by both sides; FM Steinmeier announces that EU may consider sanctions, condemns both sides for violence, calls on Security Forces to contribute to de-escalation. Violence escalates in other UKR cities, particularly Lwiw. 2. Live Ticker: 18.02.2014: 22:17: Klitschko meets J, meeting was originally scheduled for 19.02.; shortly after meeting begins , signs that storming attempt has been aborted by Security Forces; 22:42: Gernot Erler demands OSCE observer mission to verify responsibilities; 23:30: Renewed effort to storm Maidan; rumours of police using live-ammo; 23:54: Confidante of Pres. J. announces state of the union address by J for next day on national television. 19.02.2014: (00:13) HQ of opposition on Maidan up in flames. (0016): US Vice President Joe Biden demands immediate retreat of Security Forces from Maidan. (0031): Carl Bildt, FM Sweden, demand J. to stop catastrophe via Twitter; (0114) Opposition leaders meet J. (0127)Crisis summit between J and opposition leaders ends without result [13minutes later!?!] (0138) Klitschko: J will continue storming efforts on Maidan. (0446) Pro-Eu opposition demands boycott of Winter Olympics; (0503): Yanukovich blames opposition leaders for violence, demands to "distance themselves from the radical forces".</p>

<sup>483</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-ultimatum100.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
19.02.2014	Brennpunkt 20:15 "Ukraine on the brink of civil war?" <sup>484</sup>	<p>1. Report on current situation: UKR orthodox church (St. Michael cloister) hosts field hospital for wounded embers of the opposition (Udo Lilischkies); G. Atai reports of functioning logistics f opposition on Maidan despite encirclement by security forces. 2. Backgrounder on EU policy towards UKR, "diplomatic egg dance": 17.02., Klitschko and Yatseniuk meet Merkel in Berlin; Martin Schulz: One thing is sure, if the Ukr. government does not tnd the violence, sanctions by the EU will be the next step. These sanctions should limit individual freedoms of those responsible for the violence in UKR"; Barroso: "We expect that targeted measures against those responsible for the violence will be agreed by our member states"; only few critics of sanctions remaining, Kurt Fleckenstein MEP SPD: "Sanctions should remain an option, but I don't think we are there yet. I think it is important now to - jointly with the Russian government - move the conflicting UKR sides to talk to each other"; concluding remarks journalist: "Either sanctions or negotiations jointly with Russia"; "Sanctions more likely". 3. Interview with Gernot Erler, Federal Coordinator for the Relations with Russia and the Eastern Partner Countries: Q.: Tomorrow FM Steinmeier will travel together with his colleagues from France and Poland to Kyiv, too mediate between the conflicting parties. Does that make sense, as from the perspective of the UKR government the EU is on the sides of the opposition? A.: IT sends a strong signal that the three FM of the so-called Weimar triangle travel to Kyiv to show that they are not blind to what is happening. We want to send out a signal that we are ready to support, but also - if desired - to mediate. The EU follows a double strategy, as at the same time sanctions against individuals will be imposed by the UE. That sends another important message: No one that bears responsibility for the unbelievable use of force in Kyiv [against the protesters on Maidan] should expect impunity. Q.: This appears more like a stick and carrot [GER original: sugar bread and whip] policy [Erler interruption: <u>double strategy</u>]. Fmr. Chancellor Schröder, a member of your party, the SPD, today announced that the EU cannot be a credible mediator, as it is party to the conflict. Is he wrong? A.: Well, I think in such a situation it is important to consider alternatives and options, that somehow may help. Against this backdrop I find the joint trip of the three FM the right signal about what can be done. Q.: You mentioned sanctions: which sanctions could actually develop leverage on Yanukovich? No one believes that sanctions like freezing accounts or not granting travel visa will have an immediate effect and change policies of the government in an instant. <u>But it shows nonetheless that the EU is united, that it acts jointly, and that it is capable of action.</u> Furthermore, it sends out the signal: no impunity for violence. All that may impact the overall developments, even if not immediately. 4. Interview with Golineh Atai, ARD correspondent Kyiv, on domestic disunity in UKR: Intro: Large rift between eastern and western UKR population; West pro-EU, East more pro-Russia: Q.: News today that <u>secret service is preparing a large-scale terror operation</u>. Is this a sign of J losing his grip on power within his own government? A.: In a statement this morning, J appeared pale, like from a Wax-cabinet. There are many other signs that he is slowly losing control. The situation however, is ambiguous. Behind the scenes, there is a festering, evidences for this is that J. <u>sacked the UKR militaries Chief of Staff, and that it was the Secret Service</u> [Atai: Staatssicherheit], that <i>informs [emphasis Atai]</i> about plans for an anti-terror operation. If that were to happen it would mean that the military, the Berkut forces may kidnap protesters from the street, and keep them without legal reason for 72hrs in captivity, confiscate their belongings without a court verdict.</p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
19.02.2014	tagesthemen, Chaos in UKR. <sup>485</sup>	<p>1. First report on support of German-Lutheran church also offering a field hospital for wounded members of opposition. 2. Interview Th. Roth with G. Atai, on situation on ground in K.: Q.: Do you have any news about the moratorium on violence announced by the president earlier? A.: I know that opposition leaders met, and that the meetings lasted for <i>four and a half hours [emphasis Atai]</i> until an offer for a moratorium was made; apparently the opposition downright begged the president to not implement the anti-terror measures set for tomorrow [which were announced by Secret Service, apparently a sign of J loosing grip on power, see above] Q.: Is there hope for a solution? A.: Very difficult to say, as there is no real progress ever since the protests began. 3. Interview Th. Roth with Udo Lilischikies, ARD correspondent Moscow, on role of Russia Q.: In a phone conversation [today, 19.02.2014], Merkel and the Russian president agreed that an escalation of further violence in UKR must be prevented. On the other hand, it seems safe to assume that J would not be in power anymore without Russian backing; thirdly, now apparently a truce has been agreed which most likely would also not have happened without Putin. Can you explain Putin's tactics? A.: Unfortunately, neither of us could listen into the conversation between Merkel and Putin. However, the more interesting phone call probably was the one between the RUS and the UKR president. J, most observers believe, is servile to Putin, who also safes him of the looming state bankruptcy. What we experienced yesterday was the attempt to solve the problem at a single blow, just like Putin managed it to do a year ago on Volotnaya Square [in Moscow]. But maybe the two presidents felt that the anxiety in the West was getting very high, and comparative terms like Tiananmen Square were revoked; that the EU is considering painful sanctions, and that the "Putin Games" in Sochi are under serious threat, so that both sides felt a need to defuse the situation. Today's events may be interpreted in such a way. I do not think this means that Putin will bid farewell to his attempt to keep Ukraine on a pro-Moscow course. UKR is too important for him and his dream of the [Eurasian] customs union is not complete without the UKR. But maybe in the meantime, Putin increasingly feels that with the much-hated J. still in power, Maidan will never calm down. Some believe that RUS already has a Plan B, to install a less hated, but nonetheless pro-Russian president. But under no circumstance will Putin let UKR freely to Europe. Lastly, many believe that the dynamics of the current crisis are very fragile, meaning that playing on time could be the way out for both, Putin and J, to prevent further images like yesterday and today.</p>

<sup>484</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1373826.html>

<sup>485</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5284.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
19.02.2014	tagesthemen, F, POL, GER FM to travel to Kyiv. <sup>486</sup>	Th. Roth: "the EU has every now and again commented on Ukraine, without any clear direction, less action to it. The UKR state crisis and its effects were simply underestimated by Brussels. Now, under the impression of the bloody violence in Kyiv last night, this seems to have change: Three foreign ministers, amongst them FWS, will travel to Kyiv tonight to mediate between the conflicting parties. The EU, after all, like the US is considering imposing sanctions against individuals amongst UKR circles of power.
19.02.2014	German-French Council of Ministers Meeting. <sup>487</sup>	Event used to find common position on UKR.. Merkel: Concerning the political dialogue in UKR, it is a question of establishing an interim government, hold free and fair elections. Wherever France and Germany can participate, and the EU can participate, we will do so."; Announces sanctions: "Must be sanctions that start with those that are responsible for the escalation of violence". Commentary: "With this "stick" the the FM will travel to Kyiv tomorrow.
20.02.2014	tagesschau: EU announces sanctions, Commentary R.D. Krause. <sup>488</sup>	"Known since yesterday that the EU would announce sanctions: travel bans and freezing of bank assets will hit all those that are immediately responsible for the recent escalation of violence - when the sanctions are being imposed. IT is obvious that the EU believes that their three colleagues (FRA, GER, POL FM) are able to reach something in Kyiv. That is why the sanctions are being prepared now, but not imposed, to not disturb the talks. According to a number f FM, the impact of the sanctions is likely to be limited. They argue that the future of UKR will be decided in UKR. The fact that ever larger parts of the population are brealing with J's government has much stronger impact."
20.02.2014	tagesthemen, Interview TH Roth mit W.D. Krause in BXL on EU-sanctions. <sup>489</sup>	Q.: Was it difficult to agree amongst the EU to impose sanctions? A.: Not at all. It was completely clear that if there was an escalation of violence, particularly of such a scale, the the EU would announce sanctions against those that are responsible for the violence. They are not enforced yet, to not affect the ongoing talks, but the EU is serious. <b><u>That [the situation in UKR] has been underestimated is a venial sin, but, until it got to the actual signing of the Association Agreement, no resistance was expected in Brussels neither from UKR nor form RUS That came about very surprising.</u></b> Q: How much effect are the sanctions believed to have? Q.: Sanctions can only have a limited impact. But it is possible to target people that would like to spend their money in the West, at the Cote D'Azur or elsewhere, that do not have this enjoyment anymore. - the wealth becomes worthless. However, that this will have an impact on the developments in UKR no one here seriously believes. Everyone is aware that the decision must fall in UKR. We are currently witnessing how J. loses control over parts of his government. now he will start to need to manoeuvre, seek leeway's, and maybe then he will agree to sit down with the opposition seriously. There is no other solution. Militarily this cannot be won by either side.

<sup>486</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5284.html>

<sup>487</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5284.html>

<sup>488</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine1002.html>

<sup>489</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5286.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.02.2014	tagesschau, Merkel speaks with Yanukovich on phone, <b>Russia gets involved officially diplomatically.</b> <sup>490</sup>	Merkel speaks with J on phone during morning. Advises the president "urgently" to build a new government and support a change of the constitution. Steffen Seibert, Merkel's speaker: "Mrs. Merkel made it clear in her conversation to Pres. J. that playing on time will only add fuel to the conflict and bears unforeseeable risks". On request of the UKR government, Russia Putin gets officially diplomatically involved in the crisis management. Putin sends mediator for upcoming talks, his parting human rights commissioner Wladimir Lukin.
20.02.2014	tagesschau, EU announces sanctions; Troika of three EU-FM presents roadmap for political resolution. <sup>491</sup>	EU decides on sanctions to hit individuals Joint declaration of EU FM after crisis summit in BXL: "The extent of the application of the sanctions depends on the further developments in UKR"; C. Ashton makes clear the EU sees main responsibility for violence with the UKR government, but that protester also hold some responsibility. "The prime task of a government is to ensure the security of its people. We need an independent investigation on the question who is responsible for the escalation of violence. But the government should take its responsibilities very serious"; extent of sanctions to be decided depending on outcome of talks between opposition, the UKR government, and the troika of the three EU FM (FRA, GER, POL). Troika presents roadmap for political resolution: a) establish interim government; b) initiate constitutional reform; c) old early presidential and parliamentary elections; neither government nor opposition concurs with roadmap; according to POL PM, D. Tusk, J agreed to early elections; according to Klitschko, no tangible results during talks so far, to be resumed during the night of 20.02.2014; French FM left Kyiv, GER, POL FM stay on for further negotiations.

<sup>490</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine1002.html>

<sup>491</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine1002.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.02.2014	tagesthemen, Commentary on Sanctions by Armin Stauth, compares violence on Maidan to Russian Anti Terror tactics used at Beslan. <sup>492</sup>	2I remained sceptical about sanctions since there has been a truce. However, I changed my mind when I saw the images of brutal violence. Maybe it was J who ordered this bloodbath, but maybe it was hardliners in the military or the secret service., for whom J is just a wimp. In any case, there are actors at play that stand in sinister Soviet tradition: to them, every protester is a terrorist that must be liquidated. Almost 20 years ago I was witness to Russian special forces opening fire at a school where hundreds of children were taken hostage [by Muslim extremists from Chechnya], and the kidnapers entrenched themselves. Also, then victims died. The Russian leadership took this into account [see Beslan incident, and how it changed Russian Anti-Terror Tactics and Doctrine!!!] Today on Maidan was exactly the same. I was there last week. It was obvious that the protesters were that well organized, that the government would not be able to win against them with sticks. Whoever ordered the storming of the Maidan knew this would only be possible with AK-47. He took the bloodbath into account or wanted it. That's why today was the correct time for sanctions. It was time to tell J: You are currently leaving the community of civilized states. The world has spun further since Soviet times, today political murderers stand trial at the ICC in The Hague. And who wants to move freely in Europe and enjoy his personal wealth cannot fire at his own people! Sanctions were required exactly today. At the same time, the EU was smart enough to keep the door open for further talks.
20.02.2014	tagesthemen: snipers kill protesters; almost 70 killed; Merkel speaks with Obama and Putin; EU sends Torika of FM. <sup>493</sup>	Situation report, G. Atai: Reports of Berkut Forces using live ammo; firing of AK 47 is audible several times during the morning; protesters also armed, many lying on the ground wounded. Armoured Personnel Vehicles carrying sniper repeatedly drive to Presidential residence. Protesters take back lost space on Maidan during the day, "showing high morale and discipline, they are busy fortifying the newly gained ground with barricades." Atmosphere amongst opposition defiant and sense of "no return". J meets with EU FM, Rada in session during the day, votes with more than 50% in favour to pass laws to revoke the anti-terror operations of the government.

<sup>492</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5286.html>

<sup>493</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5286.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
20.02.2014	tagesthemen, Interview Th Roth with G. Atai, on situation on ground in Kyiv. <sup>494</sup>	Q.: Has the situation on Maidan calmed down? A.: Yes, calmed down, cannot hear shots being fired or explosions. We just saw that the opposition used massive lights to search the rooftops for snipers. Q.: How did you experience the day? A.: It was not pleasant, we experienced war like scenes, how people fell down dead. The lobby of the hotel in which we stay has been turned into a field hospital and mortuary. Pure chaos broke out: in our rooms, the window frames have been shot at, and the bullets went through the frame. Even inside the hotel we are wearing security vests, and we decided to not leave the hotel after dark. Q.: Politically, there seem to be two processes: On the one hand, parliament is in session. also, POL MP D Tusk stated J is prepared to hold early elections. How do you analyse this? Q.: Indeed, parliament has passed a declaration to take back the anti-terror operation. The decision was passed with 36 votes from J. governing party. They achieved a joint declaration that the Special Forces shall return to their barracks and drop their arms. In addition, we have just heard that Steinmeier is about to meet with J again tonight. Regarding D. Tusk announcement on J being prepared to hold early elections, insiders here respond just with a smile. They point at first signs of dissolution of the government apparatus, as apparently just recently J's. speaker to parliament has just left UKR with his family.
20.02.2014	tagesthemen, scenes from Sochi. <sup>495</sup>	UKR situation overcasts Olympic games; Pussy Riots appear on scene, get clobbered by voluntary Cossack Forces.

<sup>494</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5286.html>

<sup>495</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5286.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
21.02.2014	tagesschau: agreement between opposition and government; opposition split; radical protesters announce ultimatum for J to step down. <sup>496</sup>	After three days of bloody riots, government and opposition agree on return to constitution of 2004; hold early elections. Agreement signed by Klitschko, Yatseniuk and Tiagnibok, but radical opposition remains unwilling to accept the agreement, and continue to demand J to step down with immediate effect. Report on situation: "Without the negotiating skills of the French, Polish, and German FM, there would not have been a signature. Steinmeier: "We have reached an agreement that of course does not meet all expectations But, it maybe was the last chance to find a way out of this looming spiral of violence." Klitschko: "Most important aim was to stop the bloodshed. All those responsible for the escalation o violence now must face the consequences. By no means may UKR be allowed to fall apart [puts pressure also on radical protesters, that may be responsible for some of the escalation]". Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop calls the dead martyrs. During the day, the atmosphere changed from relatively calm in the morning - great hopes after Parliament decides on amnesty for all protesters; stepping down of much hated Minister of Interior; passing of law that could set Timoshenko free; in the evening situation becomes increasingly explosive again: opposition leaders booed by Maidan protesters, did not want to listen to their announcements; instead, protesters carried coffins on the stage; Klitschko and Yatseniuk get interrupted by one of the Maidan Defenders [wearing Balaclava, and is armed and guarded], saying: We don't listen to you, you are playing on time. We demand Yanukovich to step down until 10am tomorrow morning, otherwise we will storm the parliament with armed force". Commentary reporter (G. Atai): "We almost expected this development, and do not expect the night to remain calm at all.
21.02.2014	tagesschau, International reactions on agreement. <sup>497</sup>	US: is relieved, and demands speedy implementation; Obama to call Putin on UKR; RUS: Lawrow, in a meeting with C. Ashton, repeats his opinion that radical protesters are responsible for the violence.EU: Ashton: "stop violence immediately. Implementation is important and that is going to be difficult. In all that we are doing now we must support the UKR people. It is an UKR agreement and must be implemented by them. We will support them in doing that"; announces possible financial aid, but leaves future of sanctions open; Elmar Brok did not expect the most recent developments, but "it will be a difficult path, the country is so dramatically divided, partly because of the events, the dead, the violence. To start a reconciliation process will be a difficult endeavour. I think that we must support the people in a way that this can become a sound political process"; D.Tusk warns about euphoria, as he sees no short term happy end in sight. Commentary: Too early to judge of the EU has achieved a negotiation success [did the EU negotiate?]; despite all happiness about progress, caution can be felt in BXL, as the agreement is still just a piece of paper, as a very senior EU diplomat said. Now it is up to J. to make evident that he is serious.

<sup>496</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46936.html>

<sup>497</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NA0fzZhSv8>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
21.02.2014	tagesschau.de audio feature on the role of social media in UKR crisis. <sup>498</sup>	Social media strongly influences images of events on Maidan, also because often being there is "too dangerous" for normal journalist; Ole Wintermann, CEO of Future Challenges, Think Tank funded by Bertelsmann Foundation offering bloggers from crisis regions a platform) identifies two types of media and news recipients in Germany: a) "older people using traditional media: They get an image with less violence, and send highly stereotyped images on [UKR ] government and opposition. They are the larger part of the population, and b) younger people that are informed by a more direct image from Kyiv and surrounding cities. Journalist use social media to get informed, but also to inform, ie G. Atai of ARD uses Twitter; however, role of journalists changing due to social media, as journalists are no longer the exclusive source of information. Social media also changed the addresses of activists communications: ' no longer is it directed at the cause, but at rallying people to support the cause. Social media challenges the work of classical journalists, particularly a quantitative one: "What in the face of the masses of information can actually be confirmed?". Wintermann offers solution: " transport the principles of social media to classical media, be open and transparent, accept that journalists do not have superior knowledge. Aim for engaging people on the ground much mire and try to get more citations from them rather than interpretations by the journalist." Another problem is speed: social media makes news available instantly, thus losing the exclusivity for journalists. The requirement for exclusivity again increases pressure on journalists to filter which information is true, and which one is not.
21.02.2014	tagesschau.de interview with Stefan Meuser, Head of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Kyiv on Agreement. <sup>499</sup>	Opposition on the streets not enthusiastic about the agreement: "Politically, these people can be located in the West of the country. Here you find a pro-Ukrainian - unfortunately also meaning Anti-Russian - Nationalism. Curiously this matches with the sense of belonging to the EU, because here Anti-Russian is identical with pro-Western. If there is a transition government, the it will be very difficult for the opposition leaders to take these people along in the political process. On support of Yanukovych: Beginning to crumble, however, majority of gov still behind J; still has around 20% support in the east of the country. East economically and emotionally pro-Russian, and often favour a strong hand which was the core message of J. last election campaign. On Putin and J.: "Personally believe that Putin detests Yanukovych because he hasn't ended the protests early on in a hard and brutal fashion to end the situation that was not helpful for Putin. „Putin requires UKR for his Eurasian Customs Union, but not J; could also deal with other politicians, ie Timoshenko, whom he once described as "the only man in UKR politics" and collaborated well with on a practical level. On EU sanctions effects: no effect, "but the EU has held the sanctions stick up for too long, so imposing them became a matter of safeguarding her own credibility.

<sup>498</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118578.html>

<sup>499</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/interviewukraine102.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
21.02.2014	tagesthemen: "Diplomatic success in Kyiv"; Snipers fire at Protesters during night 20.02. - 21.02.2014; Timoshenko free; Berkut forces leave parliament and presidential palace. <sup>500</sup>	1. Situation in Kyiv, G. Atai: During night 20/21.02.2014 snipers "aim at heart, head, lung of protesters"; during night agreement reached between opposition and J.: re-introduction of 2004 constitution and early presidential elections in 2014; Rada passes re-introduction of 2004 constitution, with many votes from J's party; members leave J's party, Rada Member Valery Khomotenik: "We are on the brink of civil war. We dont know if it hasn't started already. On Monday, we had a chance to prevent all this."; Rada also paves way for freeing of Timoshenko; Berkut forces leave parliament and presidential palace "after easing of tensions". in the evening, Klitschko and Yatseniuk appear on Maidan, booed by protesters; ultra-nationalists announce ultimatum for J. to step down by 10am of 22.02.2014;
21.02.2014	tagesthemen, Statement of Frank Walter Steinmeier on "Diplomatic success in Kyiv", in interview with Udo Lilischkies; during statement, Elmar Brok appears in background. <sup>501</sup>	Intro Roth: "A key role was played by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter-Steinmeier"; Udo Lilischkies spoke with him just before the minister returned to Berlin. FWS, (1) Of course I know that the opposition leaders speak not for the entire Maidan and have repeatedly said so during the negotiations. However, we should not underestimate today's agreement. The agreement meets four core demands of the opposition: (1) instalment of a government, (2) based on the constitution of 2004, (3) re-introduction of the 2004 constitution until September 2014, and (4) early presidential elections. These were the key demands, and we have agreed on them after 30hrs of continuous negotiations. I hope that in the next days and weeks all parties turn this agreement into policy. This is now the frame and it must be filled by UKR itself now. We will keep an eye on that". 2)I think the UKR leadership has understood that what we have experienced in recent days is moving towards a Ukrainian tragedy, with the ongoing fighting, with fatalities and wounded in the last days. The real risk of splitting the country has led to a rethinking of the Ukrainian leadership".

<sup>500</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5288.html>

<sup>501</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5288.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
21.02.2014	tagesthemen, Interview Thomas Roth with Udi Lilischkies on Agreement and reactions to it. <sup>502</sup>	<p>Q.: Is the agreement a positive development for Ukraine? A.: Yes, it is celebrated almost like a historical breakthrough. We see images of voluntary road-block searching for tituschki, paid agent provocateurs; the mostly western Ukrainian police-forces, fully backs opposition now".</p> <p>Q: What do you expect in the coming hours? A.: The situation is very ambiguous, and it is hard to judge - there is the ultimatum set by the ultra-nationalists for tomorrow, there are news that neither parliament nor the presidential palace are protected by the BERKUT [presidential guard], but instead surrounded by protesters; credible journalists report that J is on his way to Kharkov, his last stronghold, and set to continue to Moscow. If all this were true, then the opposition was successful. But it would also mean that we are at the beginning of a splitting of Ukraine".</p>
21.02.2014	tagesthemen, commentary on "diplomatic success in Kyiv", by Jörg Schönenborn. <sup>503</sup>	<p><b>"It was a smart strategy of the three European Foreign Ministers to lodge themselves in Ukraine without an invitation and</b> stay until something was put on the table. Respect. At least there was no bloodshed today. If the situation really has calmed down, or whether <b>only time was gained</b>, is impossible to predict. The problems have not disappeared, UKR is in a deep crisis. There are questions [about the agreement]: Can we ask the protesters to put up with a president that has dozens of them killed [to stay in power]? Can we trust J this time? And, if he really steps down, who should follow? Who has the power to keep the country together? None of the opposition leaders has the necessary backing. This, <b>however, does not change anything about today's diplomatic success. It shows that Europe has influence, if it wants to use it. To be fair, in this case it is not the EU, but 3 national ministers of foreign affairs in the cloak of the EU. Three men that got along with each other and had a plan.</b> Maybe [the agreement today] was the rescue at last-minute, maybe it was already too late. It is astonishing how little is understood about the dimension of the Ukrainian crisis. UKR is not a regional hotspot, it is like the former Yugoslavia a state-like construct that doesn't hold together anymore. With all conceivable consequences. <b>20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe still deals with the question about the demarcation of borders. In this, the EU is an important player that way too often remains on the side-lines. Maybe today Europe understood what it can achieve, if it wants to. Hopefully.</b></p>

<sup>502</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5288.html>

<sup>503</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5288.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.02.2014	tagesschau.de, Stöber, Sylvia: "Dangerous geopolitical power play", background article; hints at possibility of a repeat of Georgia (2008) in Crimea, large Russian population. Two types of power: Bad: RUS, US; Good: EU. <sup>504</sup>	<p>Warnings about the collapse of Ukraine are getting louder, as the crisis continues after or despite agreement. The struggle between Russia and the West will be decided in Ukraine, it is said [see: Mearsheimer, 1996]. There is disturbing news from Crimea, which belongs to Ukraine since 1954 only, and whose inhabitants are 60% Russian. [Recently] Russia accelerated the handing out of Russian passes, and the demands to protect the compatriots and return Crimea to Mother Russia are becoming increasingly popular. Russia acts according to geostrategic standards, also given the experience of NATO's eastward enlargement and the recognition of Kosovo by the West. Geostrategists and Hardliners in the West support this scenario. It is argued that it is about power, and its extension is desirable - at the cost of the other sides power. To them, it is a zero-sum game, in which only one side can win. The developments in UKR show parallels to the Georgia War in 2008, where a conflict about two secessionist regions almost led to a confrontation between Russia and the West. [Like in Ukraine, Georgia was] in the beginning a domestic conflict. Russia claims both UKR and Georgia as privileged spheres of influence and puts forward security interests. In both conflicts Russia did not play a constructive role. Before 2008, both Russia and Georgia contributed to the escalation, until it turned to open hostilities. Russia was als not constructive in UKR. It labelled the protesters as right-wing extremists and terrorists, and [the three Foreign Minister's] mediation efforts as one-sided intervention. Russia pressured J to bring an end to protests with force. [There was, however, also] the failure of International Organisations: The UN and the OSCE stood by and watched, as conflicting parties bypassed agreements, and as violence slowly escalated. UN, European Council or OSCE are powerful enough today to resolve a crisis. The US is no peacemaker either. Despite many US diplomats conjuring that they had warned Saakaschwili thn, there were voices amongst the hardliners in Washington that made Saakaschwili believe that the U.S. would support him if there was to be a war with Russia. <b>But the conflict then showed [to the world] that the U.S. was not prepared to step in and risk a direct confrontation with Russia. As for the Europeans and the EU, in both cases, they were the ones that successfully brokered peace: In 2008 it was French president Sarkozy. This time Steinmeier and his colleagues from Poland and France, with the backing of the EU, whose members then [2008] and today [UKR] only found a common position in the face of fatalities: Factors for success were assertiveness and authority with the conflicting parties. There is no trust in RUS ord the US anymore. The US lost trust after the Iraq intervention [2003] and their mild treatment of dictators provided it suits their security or economic interests. RUS lost trust because the leadership forgets to get the buy-in of the people for its imperial dreams. The numerous conflicts and problems on the doorstep of Europe require a solution and honest brokers: People are tired of being just figures on the political chessboard".</b></p>

<sup>504</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-analyse100.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.02.2014	tagesschau: <b>J. left Kyiv</b> , contests legality of decisions by Rada of previous day;	<p>J. left Kyiv, speaks on TV from Eastern UKR; contests legality of decisions by Rada; Timoshenko announces her running for President, says: "Best sons of our country have been lost to bullets. They have given their best. Now we only have one task: No more bloodshed"; New president of Rada, new Minister of Interior; Klitschko: "Our main task was to calm the heated atmosphere among the people. This is only possible if we meet their demands. The people want a functioning legal system, that corruption ends - all these deficiencies have turned them into protesters"; Yanukovych, "in probably his last TV appearance (G. Atai)", calls actions of Rada "coup d'état", declares all decisions taken by the Rada as "illegal"; J.: "I have not stepped down. "; reaction of protester to statement: " J appears estranged, as if he doesn't understand what is happening"; Summary of Report, G.: Atai: The changeover of power seems done and dusted". (2) G.Atai, Live from Kyiv: "The king is dead, long live the queen" commented many in Kyiv; Timoshenko announces her running for presidential elections, and is greeted with cheers by the Maidan crowd. J. apparently was kept from boarding a plane in Donetsk to fly to Russia; on Maidan, many people are proud to have participated in a historic moment, proud to "demonstrated after three months of continuous protests that they are not extremists, but able at all time to control those in power"; nonetheless sad atmosphere, burying of dead ongoing [orthodox priests singing heard in background, no other sounds but their singing].</p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	<b>Timoshenko released from prison.</b> <sup>505</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.02.2014	Brennpunkt: Changes in Ukraine: Beginning of a new old order of the beginning of things getting worse? 1., <b>Situation Report Udo Lilischkies, ARD correspondent Kyiv.</b> <sup>506</sup>	Special Forces patrolling the city have been replaced by civilian patrols, the "Maidan-Defenders" using stolen military vehicles; entire UKR government left Kyiv hastily - the seat of the government, parliament and presidential administration; J. leaves his residence 25km outside the city centre, not without taking his personal belongings. Police backs protesters nationwide; the chief state-prosecuter was captured at an airport prior to leaving for Russia: "no one here still fears Yanukovych".
22.02.2014	BrennpunktChanges in Ukraine: Beginning of a new old order of the beginning of things getting worse? 2., <b>Interview with Udo Lilischkies, ARD correspondent in Kyiv.</b> <sup>507</sup>	Intro, J. Schönenborn: "Revolution began exactly 3 months ago with student protests against Yanukovych's unilateral withdrawal from a closer EU-UKR partnership"; Q.: What can be expected tonight? A.: Very difficult to say, we have experienced so many surprises during the day, and ever more incredible news were confirmed eventually. Currently the possible arrival of Timoshenko captures the atmosphere, but no one knows what will happen after [T. appearance]. She is a good public speaker that can move the masses, and she is much more radical than other opposition candidates. This will likely add to the tensions already present on Maidan. It is therefore very open / uncertain if a return to a political process will eventually happen. Q.: Does J. still play a role? A.: His appearance on TV was pathetic and not convincing. This man has no base anymore; in the entire country police now sides with the population; the military also stated that it won't interfere, although J only recently had replaced the Chief of Staff with a personal friend of his [the fmr. CoS early on denied a role for the military]. J. has no power base left. Rumours, which cannot be confirmed have it that he is on his way to Russia. It is feared that J. could seek to build up a resistance movement in eastern UKR., but even there his backing is not as strong as we thought. This revolution has developed such a dynamic that I believe that J plays no role in this country anymore. Q.: Who is in power now? Military, police, opposition, no one? Q: I wish you had an easier question. It is the fighters of Maidan that forced this dramatic turn. - to get them to participate in the political process again will be the decisive question for the country - especially taking into consideration the dramatically fast approaching financial crisis of the country. I cannot answer the question.

<sup>505</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46950.html>

<sup>506</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html>

<sup>507</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.02.2014	Brennpunkt: Changes in Ukraine: Beginning of a new old order of the beginning of things getting worse? 3. <b>Timosshenko as new power in Kyiv</b> (during breaking news appearance of T on Maidan is shown; CNN factor: Watching a revolution...):	Compares Timoshenko to other candidates of opposition. Her recent comeback almost like Orange Revolution in 2006. Klitschko negligible factor, lost much credibility with protesters, but much support of Europeans; Tiagnibok is a right-wing populist that is not as extreme as the newly established right wing groups. <sup>508</sup>
22.02.2014	Brennpunkt: Changes in Ukraine: Beginning of a new old order of the beginning of things getting worse?, pt 4, <b>reactions in Eastern Ukraine.</b> <sup>509</sup>	Population remains doubtful of what happened, because unimaginable for them to disengage from Russia; In Kharkov, a stronghold of J (70% in last elections), they also favor close relationship with Russia; Governors of Eastern Ukraine assemble in an emergency meeting in Kharkov, and question the legality of the decisions taken by Rada. However, first pro-Maidan protests flare up in several Eastern UKR cities. Reactions in Russian TV, which is widely viewed as prime news source in Eastern Ukraine, express consternation in Russia: Headlines are "Ukraine before the end" or "Yanukovych before the end" because Russia TV argues, the EU convinced him of not acting, and therefore also has blood on her hands. Shows Putin, who demands that the "situation must be stabilised". Report ends with: "People here felt closer to Russia than to Europe. But ever more young people also desire a better life".

<sup>508</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html>

<sup>509</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
22.02.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: Changes in Ukraine: Beginning of a new old order of the beginning of things getting worse?</p> <p><b>Interview with Alexander Rahr,</b> Director German Russian Forum.<sup>510</sup></p>	<p>Q.: How does Russia view the developments in Ukraine? A.: Russia wishes to end the Winter Olympics in Sochi and does not desire any problems with the West before the Olympic Games end. However, Russia will protect ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine against any harm, and step in if any harm is caused. Otherwise Russia hands out financial credits to Ukraine, while the West has not promised UKR any money in the negotiations preceding the Vilnius Summit [29.11.2013]. Furthermore, Russia lowered the gas price. Thus, Russia plays a big role on the UKR field and now will have to seriously engage the new UKR government about this. Q.: Timoshenko announced on her way to the airport that UKR should join the EU soon. Do you have any idea what she wants? does she maybe aim for splitting the country? A.: T. is able to speak with Russia. She has negotiated the gas deal five years ago. But first she needs to become UKR president. I will believe she will take over from Klitschko and others now and will become the strong political leader in the country. However, it remains to be seen if she is able to put the ultra-nationalists into their place, because it is them who today control Maidan and large parts of Western Ukraine. and they are, furthermore, armed! Of course, if T plays it diplomatically, a resolution is possible. Otherwise I fear a splitting off the country is likely because the east will never be subject to a government made up from people exclusively from the West of the country. Q.: Yesterday we witnessed a strong appearance of 3 EU foreign ministers. What do you expect in this situation from Berlin, what from the EU? What can and should they do? A.: From my point of view the Eastern Partnership Program ought to be reformed, to not lead to the interpretation that they do not want to revoke the countries [of the Eastern Partnership] from the Russian sphere of influence. The EU must, from my point of view, work closely with Russia. Russia is a larger financier of UKR. Eastern UKR is economically dependant from Russia, and that is a fact. German diplomacy has contributed greatly to bring the Russian government back in, but I think this should be the case anyway. I wish that Mrs. Merkel or Frank Walter Steinmeier take the opportunity to travel to the Olympics closing ceremony and in this permissive, friendly atmosphere seek direct talks with President Putin about a solution for UKR. Q.: Was today a good day in hindsight, or a critical one? A.: It remains to be seen if it was a peaceful protest that brought about the coup d'état, or other forces that may be much better organised than the Maidan opposition, and will take over power in the coming two or three days. If that happens, then it was not a good day for Ukraine.</p>

<sup>510</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
23.02.2014	Tagesthemen (youtube), Mod.: Thomas Roth, I. <b>People's victory - Ukraine after Yanukovich;</b> II. Russian reactions to UKR; III. End of Olympics/Putin and UKR. <sup>511</sup>	<p>I. Ukr. The day after: a) Intro Th Roth: Ukr. Wants to return to pro-European course, Interim President Turtschinow announced on evening of 22.02.; "In Ukraine, the dramatic, historic upheaval developed during the last 48hrs with enormous speed"; Merkel spoke with Timoshenko (free since 22.02.) and Putin on phone, indicates the fears about developments [in Ukr]; Looming UKR state bankruptcy one of the key threats. GER FM FWS and EU High Rep C. Ashton held out the prospect of financial aid, "which would be needed very fast". b) Report by Udo Lilischkies on day in UKR: Atmosphere on Maidan quiet, but still full of anger and feelings of revenge; Lenin statues torn down in many Western-UKR cities, as a symbol of protest against Russia/pro-Moscow course of J government; Simultaneously, on the <b>Crimean peninsula violent clashes between supporters and opposers</b> of the Maidan movement; extreme tension throughout country, in Eastern UKR cities J loyalists protested, some of them armed; J. left country, as recently released cctv video shows, from his presidential residence with two helicopters; Klitschko: "Nobody knows his whereabouts. We are trying to find him since yesterday. He simply disappeared".; In Rada, many parliamentarians demand to hold those responsible for outbreak of violence on Maidan accountable; [on 22.02.2014] Rada elects Alexander Turtschinow, confidant of Timoshenko, as interim president; T. demands a that Russia must accept a pro-European course of UKR; Further rumours that J is hiding on Crimea, and that he had been arrested there. c) live-Interview with U. Lilischkies on situation on the ground: Q.: Is it known for sure that J is on Crimea, and that he has been arrested? No, these rumours that have been circulated by the entourage of Klitschko, cannot be confirmed. The parliamentarian who claims this to be the case himself said that this is 80% the case - so we don't know for sure, but of course this would be a sensation. However, it does fit into the [wider] image we receive: we now know more about the escape if the fmr state-attorney general in Donetsk: border guards tried to keep him from leaving , and when this got noted, his bodyguards appeared armed and got him out of the airport like this. Also, the fmr Minister of Interior tried to escape to Russia and was hindered to do so yesterday: [the image, is that] the fmr clique around J, is trying to flee unsuccessfully, while the fmr. President himself is in hiding successfully, <b>speaks for the fact that he had to expect something like this.</b> Q.: Many people are on the run, it appears. Let's turn to Timoshenko, who now is an important figure again. Has it become clearer now which role she is going to play? A.: Well, this also is UKR. There are many confusing turns, and they often coincide to occur just before our live-talks... Timoshenko does not want to be head of government, but does she want to become president, as a press agency put on the wire today, and as was picked up by some? Now we hear that apparently, she never said this, but she still has neither denied saying it herself. Some irritation as a factor for excitement therefore remains. Fact is that it would be a problematic decision to take just now. The tensions, as we have just seen in the report are increasing. <b>Further, we just heard from a demonstration in Sevastopol [Crimea] with 20000 protesters with not a single UKR flag, but countless RUS flags. The new regional governor, which has just been put in place, a very pro-Russian candidate, today announced that he will stop transferring tax money from the region to Kyiv.</b> You realize, the tensions are rising, and it needs a government that is capable to somehow re-unite these two increasingly polarized camps at all cost. If T. id the right person for that is doubted by many observers.</p>

<sup>511</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	Tagesthemen Mod.: Thomas Roth, I. <b>People's victory - Ukraine after Yanukovych;</b> II. <b>Russian reactions to UKR;</b> III. End of Olympics/Putin and UKR. <sup>512</sup>	a) Intro, Roth: Re the situation in Crimea, one scenario that many fear is that <b>Crimea will simply separates itself from Ukraine, and then regards itself Russian.</b> While in the West, some reactions about the end of the protests and the new government, the reactions in Russia differed sharply: Russian FM <i>Lawrow</i> today stat that the opposition had seized power violently, and continues to use violence. The Russian ambassador to Kyiv has been ordered home "for consultations" - all this sounds anything but conciliatory. In Russian state-controlled media, the sentiments are expressed more drastically - and it is only that [one] image, that is being communicated to the population. Report, Birgit Virnich: In Russian state TV, consternation looms large tonight: "Blood and Chaos in UKR", "President J. on the run", "Parliament in the hand of opposition, passes one law after the other", says Russian Moderator [no precise source given: "Russian TV", no channel information - Fox or CNN?...]; [During] the entire ween, Russian medias denounced the protesters as terrorists, and held them responsible for the violence on Maidan. <b>"However, in Moscow, many people view this differently, put down flowers in front of UKR embassy. Amongst them well known opposition leader Mikhail Kasianov: "Russian media is spreading evil propaganda about UKR - their account is completely one-sided, worse than the official statements from the Ministry of the Interior. If I see that, I feel sick". Many Russian support UKR, applaud on social media, and admire their bravery.</b> Maybe this is the biggest worry of Russia today - that one day the revolutionary spark of the slavic brother nation may spill over."
23.02.2014	Tagesthemen Mod.: Thomas Roth, I. <b>People's victory - Ukraine after Yanukovych;</b> II. <b>Russian reactions to UKR;</b> III. End of Olympics/Putin and UKR. <sup>513</sup>	a)Report: Stupendously expensive closing ceremony of Sochi Olympics, but many question marks remain. Putin thanked for personally by German President of IOC Bach for his support of games. b) Interview with Ina Ruck, Sochi: Q.: How would you rate the political outcome of the games -could the developments in UKR be felt strongly [during the games]? A.: Had not an individual UKR athlete withdrawn her participation, nothing would have been felt in Sochi about the developments in UKR. They did not play a role, at least not a visible one. But - I assume - those extremely rapid developments in UKR will spoil Putin's victorious mood: Just imagine, two weeks ago, for the opening ceremony, a UKR President called Yanukovych was on stage here, wishing his team good luck. Now he has disappeared, a new [interim] president is already in place. That's how fast it can go. <b><u>A few weeks earlier, it appeared as if Vladimir Putin had won the tug-of-war [with the EU] about UKR. That now also looks very differently. Furthermore, Putin's geostrategic dreams about the Eurasian Customs Union are wothless without UKR. Thus, now things are really looking differently, and no wonder hence that Moscow still keeps silent: It appears as if they are in a state of emotional stupor.</u></b>

<sup>512</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html>

<sup>513</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
23.02.2014	Tagesthemen Mod.: Thomas Roth, I. People's victory - Ukraine after Yanukovich; II. <b>Russian reactions to                      UKR; III.</b> End of Olympics/Putin and UKR ; Other News. <sup>514</sup>	La Garde, during G20 Finance Minister Summit in Sydney announces that if consulting or financial aid is required, the IMF would stand ready. Prerequisite for this are economic reforms and legitimized dialogue partners.

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<sup>514</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
24.02.2014	tagesschau: After Overthrow, UKR faces bankruptcy. <sup>515</sup>	<p>a)Intro: Search for J [in UKR] continues; been issued with a arrest warrant for mass murder; <u>Timoshenko to travel to Germany for medical treatment</u>; According to new UKR gov, country on brink of bankruptcy, in urgent need of external assistance. B) Report, Demian von Osten: according to new gov, UKR needs a grand total of 25,5bn Euro; Ashton to visit Kyiv to assess if and how the EU can be of help; there are positive signals from the EU; EU Parliament President Schulz: "It is now important that the EU and the international community stands by the Ukrainians, to prevent the looming economic collapse of the country"; In addition to EU, IMF also considered as a potential donor: Klitschko: "[The] IMF said long ago that it is prepared to give us money, but only to support reforms. Just handing out money without a clearly determined use is without direction". <b>Whether RUS continues to support UKR is an open question, although people in Sevastopol desire just that</b> [images show pro-Russian protests of 23.02.2014 (see Interview Lilischkies)]. <b>Russia not pleased by the coup d'état in Ukraine. Medwedew: There is no government, and we have strong doubts about the legitimacy of the current leadership</b>". J, now issued with arrest warrant, remains on the run. <b>Travels from Kyiv by Helicopter to Kharkov, continues to Donetsk; from there to Balaklava, a town on the Crimean Peninsula, where his trails are lost</b>; people on Maidan want to see J. captured and put to trial. c) tagesschau anchor, on economic situation in Kyiv: <b>"Already late last year UKR was on the brink of economic collapse. Russia offered financial aid , but in the meantime has put payments on hold.</b> Furthermore, the two countries are economically closely linked through the gas-industry: particularly the heavy industry in Eastern Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy imports. d) report, on economic situation: Economically UKR still suffers from heavy recession in 2009, when the GDP dropped by 15%. Slow growth of 4-5% since, but this year (2014) has been almost entirely an economic shutdown of the country. At the same time, the government debt has increased dramatically; key problems: lack of businesses in growth areas, most important sectors still <b>heavy industries, predominantly in the east / agriculture in the west</b>. In addition, country grapples with endemic corruption, ranks very low on Transparency Corruption Index. d) Reactions on change of government in eastern UKR, Birgit Virnich, live from Kharkov: "While Maidan this morning appeared like a tranquil site of pilgrimage, in Kharkov the fronts are clashing. Kharkov, 500km east of Kyiv, is a stronghold of Russia supporters, and favours a strong relationship with Russia. <b>But since the last couple of days, [even here] a Maidan-movement crystalizes.</b> More and more people assemble on the Kharkov-Maidan and demand the stepping down of the governor and the mayor. Since of tonight, these protesters threaten to take down the Lenin statue [on the Kharkov Maidan]. Faced with this threat, J. supporters appear on the scene, to hold vigil at the statue. This shows how divided the country is.</p>

<sup>515</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46984.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
24.02.2014	tagesthemen: After coup d'etat, Russia reacts; report on situation on Crimea. <sup>516</sup>	<p>a) Intro, Carmen Miosga: News on J have it that he has hand signed the dismissals of his Bodyguards at a private residence on Crimea, whereupon he drops all communications EQUIPMENT AND DISAPPEARS: Since then no trace of his whereabouts./ b) On Russia: Miosga: All eyes are on Russia now, particularly on how Putin will react to the changes [in Ukraine]. Now, Ukraine has already been a divided country: The West, for centuries, has been oriented towards Europa. But the Russian speaking regions in Eastern UKR forever oriented themselves towards Russia. <b>Crimea, which always has been Russian, may have once been gifted to Ukraine by Chruschtschow, but the current Russian government seems prepared to do everything to not entirely loos grip on this former present.</b> c) Report on situation in Crimea by Golineh Atai: Intro images show Putin and J during joint UKR RUS military exercise on Crimea [in July 2013J], "celebrating Slavic brotherhood and blood-ties. Crimea serves as base for Russian Black Sea Fleet, and is home to over 1 million ethnic Russians. [During the joint exercise in July 2013] J extended the bilateral lease-agreement about the Russian base in Sevastopol as a sign of brotherhood. Crimea a few days ago: Ethnic Russians attack Maidan sympathizers, moved by fear to lose their power status, or be chased away by the new leadership in Kyiv, or to be "ukrainized!. [Pro Russian protester says]: "A UKR nationality doesn't exist. It is an invention by Russia's enemies. We are all Russians". <b>Russian TV shows how Berkut forces returning to Crimea are being welcomed like heroes, mourning for the fallen Berkut. Juri Abisov, fmr Berkut officer: They are our brothers. They are the best fighters"; [statement by pro Russian protester in Sevastopol]: "Currently Russia is waiting, but we hope Russia won't remain passive if war breaks out [here]". [Atai, ctd]: "Would Russia consider using military force to support the protests? Only in an extreme situation, says Kremlin expert Fjodor Ljukanow."; Ljukanow: "A military intervention would only be conceivable if ultra-radical nationalists would take over power in Kyiv. Not Timoshenko, but people that want to "Ukrainize" Crimea"; [Atai ctd]: "Little by little, Russia lost her former spheres of influence to NATO after 1989. Which geopolitical implications do the changes in UKR have?" Lukjanow: "Russia will monitor very closely that Ukraine continues to remain outside NATO. Last time UKR desired this, out relationship deteriorated rapidly"; [Atai ctd.]: Russia doesn't accept the new government [in Kyiv]; Medwedew:"Cooperation [with the new government in UKR] will be very difficult for us, if men in balaclavas and AK-47s constitute the government [of Ukraine]. Closing Comment Atai: "Russia is waiting - still. But it is watching nervously.</b></p>

<sup>516</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5298.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
25.02.2014	tagesschau: High Rep Ashton visits Kyiv to assess EU support in economic crisis; sets conditions, calls for cuts of subsidies to farmers and heavy industry. <sup>517</sup>	Report by Udo Lilischkies: Ukraine is still without government, Rada announces 27.02.2014 for presentation of interim government. Rada pushes for trialling J. at the ICC in The Hague; C. <b>Ashton, is expected to offer financial assistance, however with conditions attached, as she demands a lowering of subsidies to farmers and energy [Farmers=West; Energy: East!.</b> Ashton in a statement after the meetings in Kyiv: "I would argue that in the areas of agriculture and heavy industries there is much to do for the government". Financial assistance furthermore depends on the instalment of a transitional government. Ashton's demands are in harmony with those of other international organisations. Udo Lilischkies, closing commentary: "Pressure of radical protesters prevents what the international community requests from the opposition leaders: reconciliatory gestures to the losers of this revolution. Ukraine remains far away from the preconditions for financial assistance mentioned by Ashton today: Rule of law, stability and order."

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<sup>517</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47004.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
26.02.2014	tagesschau: Putin orders snap exercise in Rostow/Don; increasing tensions between Russia and West; interim government announced; dissolution of Berkut. <sup>518</sup>	a) overview: <b>Putin orders military snap exercise "to test the combat readiness of Russia's troops at the border"</b> . US warns of interfering in UKR sovereign affairs; in Kyiv, interim president Alexander Turtschinow takes over supreme command over military. In Kyiv, Interim-president Turtschinow takes over supreme command of Ukr. forces. b) Report, U. Lilischkies: Interim government presented to Maidan-protesters, first public appearance of commander of "Maidan-Defenders" [ultra-nationalist movement believed to be responsible for the outbreak of violence/split/rift within opposition] <i>Andrej Porubij</i> : "It is our square, it is our space to show the world that we are capable of forming a government, and take over responsibility for Ukraine"; extremist drive APV in front of Rada in the morning, to put on pressure to announce interim government; weld of fences around Rada, to make it an "accessible" parliament. Extremists among protesters don't trust Maidan opposition leaders; statement by [female] extremist: "Many of the opposition were in the old government. But we want a complete change of power"; <b>In Crimea violent clashes between Tatars, who actively supported the Maidan-movement, and pro-Russian protesters break out</b> before the regional parliament building; on Maidan, the official investigation begins on who fired the shots on protesters. Interim Minister of Interior, Arsen Awakow signs <b>dissolution of Berkut</b> . c) Udo Lilischkies, live from Kyiv on reception of Interim government: "Roughly 50% of the members of the interim government presented today, belong to the established parties, like the new prime minister A. Yatseniuk; the other 50% are individuals that represent the Maidan protests, like the abducted and tortured activist Dimitrii Bulatov, new minister for Sport, or Andrej Porubij, leader of the "Maidan-Defender", to become Secretary of Ukraine's National Security Council. In this fashion, the suggested interim government mirrors more or less the balance of power in Kyiv. [The crowd received the new government] reluctantly but did not boo either. Therefore, the way is free to also formally install the interim government by a Rada decision. This is urgent, as today the Hrivna [UKR currency] dropped to a historic low. Forming the new government formally would fulfil at least on precondition UKR has to fulfil before receiving the first billions of assistance this country on the brink of bankruptcy needs so badly".

<sup>518</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47024.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagesschau (1): <b>Yatseniuk takes over government amidst heavy crisis; situation on Crimea continues to deteriorate;</b> (2) J. announces press conference in Russia; (3) Russia continues military	a) Intro: New prime minister for Ukraine, Yatseniuk, confidant of Timoshenko sworn in today, takes over government in "most difficult crisis in decades"; ongoing, massive tensions in south-eastern Ukraine, particularly the Crimean Peninsula; peninsula has long been contested between RUS&UKR. b) Report, Olaf Bock: <b>[On Crimea] Members of the regional parliament decide on a referendum of the future status of Crimea, dismisses the regional government and installs a new regional prime minister. [What happened] Looking back [at the developments on Crimea]: "It was a surprise action: during the early morning [27.02.2014] armed, masked men entered the regional government seat, the regional parliament, and hoisted the Russian flag. It is said that they are to protect the rights of the ethnic-Russian majority on the Crimean Peninsula";</b> Eyewitness: " Around thirty armed men stormed the building, they took them and kicked out the police. Then buses followed, and further 30 men came out, they were <b>heavily armed and carried weapons like anti-tank guns and sniper rifles</b> "; Olaf Bock: "The dramatic aggravation of the situation [on Crimea] overshadows the developments in Kyiv. [There], A. Yatseniuk was elected as prime minister. The finance-expert must now not only resolve an economic crisis, but also a political conflict with Russia; Yatseniuk on Russia in Rada: "We hope that Russia keeps the situation in UKR stable, and does not support separatists or members of the former government"; [Bock]: "Ukraine looks back on a difficult recent past. <b>It must now solve the problems of the future, and that is not possible without Russia</b> ".

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	manoeuvres/ <sup>519</sup> NATO meets on situation in Crimea.	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagesschau (1): Yatseniuk takes over government amidst heavy crisis; situation on Crimea continues to deteriorate; (2) J. <b>announces press conference in Russia;</b> (3) Russia continues military manouvres/NATO meets on situation in Crimea. <sup>520</sup>	Fmr. President Yanukovich appears in Russia, and in a televised written statement announces a press statement in Rostow/Don. Requests protection from Russian government, which according to Russian media reports has been granted.

<sup>519</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47046.html>

<sup>520</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47046.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagesschau (1): Yatseniuk takes over government amidst heavy crisis; situation on Crimea continues to deteriorate; (2) J. announces press conference in Russia; <b>(3) Russia continues military manouvres/NATO meets on situation in Crimea.</b> <sup>521</sup>	In addition to the Army, today Putin also put the Russian air force on high alert in the border region. Report by Ina Ruck: "The snap exercises are large scale military exercise - now, of all things. The exercises are conducted on the orders of President Putin, it is being said, to test the combat readiness of its troops in western Russia; more than a 150.000 troops participate; RUS Deputy Defence minister Anatoli Anatow states that "this [the exercise] has nothing to do with Ukraine. We are not required to announce such exercises to our international partners, but have chosen to do so nonetheless, as a sign of our transparency. This surprise inspection of our troops is routine, it is <b>not directed against any other state</b> "; meanwhile, first hints of whereabouts of toppled J, apparently in or close to Moscow. During evening news on Russian TV it was announced that J will stand before press in Southern Russia, Rostow/Don. Before he asked the Russian government for protection; Russian TV screens a letter of J to Russian government, stating that he still regards himself as legitimate president of Ukraine. Russia apparently has indicated its willingness to protect J. [Closing Commentary Ruck]: " <u><b>Moscow's sabre-rattling, and exactly like this the military manoeuvres must be understood</b></u> , is related to the fact that here in Moscow, UKR is still regarded as backyard. And if NATO now assures UKR of its support in democratisation efforts, then this annoys the Russian's. They want to play a role in the future of the country, and they know full well that without Russia, Kyiv will not be able to resolve the economic problems
27.02.2014	tagesschau (1): Yatseniuk takes over government amidst heavy crisis; situation on Crimea continues to deteriorate; (2) J. announces press conference in Russia; Russia continues military manouvres; <b>(3) NATO meets on situation in Crimea.</b> <sup>522</sup>	Situation on Crimea topic at NATO Defense Minister summit ion BXL; Nato SG Rasmussen demands Russia to do nothing that would lead to a further deterioration of the situation, or lead to a misunderstanding. <u><b>According to Rasmussen, Nato has no indicators that Russia wants to interfere militarily.</b></u> A similar statement was made by US Deputy Defense Secretary Hayden: "The US is watching the Russian military exercise very closely."

<sup>521</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47046.html>

<sup>522</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47046.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagessthemen: <b>Anchorwoman:</b> <b>Caren Miosga:</b> <b>(1)UKR crisis affects major indices; (2) situation in Crimea;</b>	Anja Kohl, reporting from Frankfurt Stock Exchange: [There are reasons for the drops of the major indices on the global stock markets today]: " One factor are fears about a war on the borders of Europa; the other the disastrous economic situation of Ukraine. The state is in danger of bankruptcy because it is not able to service its debt anymore. Russian banks demonstratively cut off all money supplies to UKR: They have put on hold all loans to UKR industry and banks. Already, Ukrainian savers plundered their accounts, fearing a collapse of the banking system. The Ukrainian Central Bank, in a reaction today, has imposed limits on cash withdrawals. European Banks, like Commerzbank or Austrian Erste Bank have withdrawn their activities form Ukraine months ago. Only few banking institutes are still active in UKR, like Deutsche Bank or the Dutch ING bank, both however with limited engagements. Both shares dropped slightly (-0.2%) today. Italian UniCredit and the Austrian Raiffeisen are far more engaged in UKR [shares drop by 1.7%]. furthermore, the UKR currency is free-falling, the foreign exchange reserves depleted. The federal budget is not big enough to service the current credits. Because Russia is so closely linked, today the Russian Rubel lost strongly, and the Russian stock exchanges major index dropped by 3%.

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	(3) Interview U. Lilischkies. <sup>523</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagesthemen: Anchorwoman: Caren Miosga: (1)UKR crisis affects major indices; <b>(2) situation in Crimea;</b> (3) Interview U. Lilischkies. <sup>524</sup>	Ina Ruck reports on development on Crimean Peninsula: Regional parliament occupied last night: pro-Russian armed men stormed the building, that do not want to bow their heads to the new government in Kyiv; regional parliament paves way for referendum on future of sovereignty of Crimea, Ruck': "Most people on Crimea are ethnic Russians"; Protester: " Of course, Crimea was and is Russian, and it will remain so!"; Protester: "[The] majority doesn't want to live under this new government. They are people that just recently stood with sticks on barricades, people that have only bad words for Russians." [remainder repeats tagesschau report on situation on Crimea from 27.02.2014]

<sup>523</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5304.html>

<sup>524</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5304.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
27.02.2014	tagesthemen: Anchorwoman: Caren Miosga: (1)UKR crisis affects major indices; (2) situation in Crimea; (3) <b>Interview U. Lilischkies.</b> <sup>525</sup>	<p>Q: [on Yanukovich, and the announcement of a press statement in Rostov/Don]: J today announced he will give a press statement from Russia, and that he still regards himself as the legitimate president: What does this mean for the relationship between Moscow and Kyiv? A.: Well, that it currently not very harmonic. What I find particularly interesting is that apparently the <b>Kremlin has not finally decided how far it is willing to go.</b> Concerning the legitimacy of the new government in Kyiv, in the periphery of the Russian government much warlike language can be overheard. For example, that the new government is a government of fascists and extremists that have purged themselves to power with violence, that they are not legitimate. However, so far, <b>we have not heard this being said from either Putin or Medwedew themselves.</b> The same goes for the case, or mystery, of Yanukovich. Here in Kyiv, he is being searched for mass murder, while he asks Russia for protection - which Russia is likely to grant, it is being said. But so far, we haven't seen him [J in Russia], and we have only heard that Russia will grant his wish for protection by security circles. <b>But it has not been confirmed by Putin or Medwedew.</b> I think that only if Yanukovich would really appear tomorrow in Rostov/Don, <b>then it will become clear how the Kremlin has positioned itself</b> - and that it is willing to accept this dramatic new low point of relations with the West. Q.: What Putin says is not irrelevant to the new government in Kyiv, because they must resolve the most pressing issue, and that is: they need money. A.: How much money do you think is currently in the UKR household, according to the new Prime Minister? An absurd 316.00 Euros. That is what Yatseniuk said today in the UKR parliament. He also said that during the last three years, 50 bn US \$ have been moved out of UKR to offshore accounts. Most interestingly, more than 50 % (25bn \$) of this money stemmed from aid organisations from outside the country. We now understand much better why Yatseniuk yesterday stated that his post is a forlorn hope: <b>Today he announced the hardest and most drastic austerity measures in the history of the country, and that his country requires 15bn US\$ in immediate financial aid. Measured against this demand, the prospect of 1bn, the sum with which the EU could possibly help out held out German FM Steinmeier on the side-lines of his first official visit to Washington appear rather little. The US could also chip in about the same. The best news [for the new government] of today are from Berne, where the Swiss government today announced that it will lock the accounts of J. and his clique in Switzerland. We can only hope that there are some billions there, as this could really help the UKR government."</b></p>

<sup>525</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5304.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	Tagesschau, 10:00, situation in UKR before press statement by Yanukovych	Report Demian von Osten, a) On Yanukovych: Still regards himself as legitimate President of UKR; exact whereabouts despite TV announcement still unknown, rumours that he is in Moscow, but announces press conference in Rostow/Don. B) On Crimea: Ongoing tensions on peninsula, where the majority of the population is Russian speaking. Armed groups have stormed the regional parliament in Simferopol. <b>Behind barricaded doors the regional parliament decided to let the population of Crimea vote on the autonomy of the peninsula in May, on the same day set for the early presidential elections in Ukraine.</b> c) In Kyiv, the main topic in Rada was how to resolve the country's economic crisis.
28.02.2014	Tagesschau, 16:00, Interview with Ina Ruck after Yanukovych statement. <sup>526</sup>	a) Intro: First public appearance of J since he fled from Kyiv; announces that he will continue to fight for the future of Ukraine. Blames the West for the chaos in UKR; (b) Interview with Ina Ruck: What impression did you get of him, how did he appear? A.: "I just watched it on TV myself, and my impression is that there is someone living in a parallel world. J says he is still the legitimate President of UK, that - additionally - there are pro-fascists in power in Kyiv now, and that he feels fooled by the European negotiators of the EU [the three FM] . They negotiated and signed a compromise, in which it was decided that an interim government of national unity was to be put in place. This now, however, is a government of the victors [here the Maidan opposition], and a government that is made up exclusively by extremists. Interesting is what he says about money, prompted by a question a Russian journalist dared to ask. His response was that he had always paid pensions and welfare - if there is chaos now, then it is the responsibility of the new government. Q.: Can we assume that he will stay in Russia? A-: A very interesting question - yes, he says he is currently staying with a friend. <b>He also said something to think about, that is, that he is quite surprised by the fact that Vladimir Putin, whom he knows personally, has kept his silence, and is yet to speak out on the situation in UKR.</b> We can assume that J will stay in Russia for now, but eventually everything will depend on Putin, if he is willing to grant J protection - or not.

<sup>526</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47046.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, (a) <b>Steinmeier visits Washington;</b> (b) Yanukovych makes press statement, Report by Ina Ruck c) situation on Crimea, live commentary by Golineh Atai. <sup>527</sup>	a) Steinmeier in Washington, Intro Jan Hofer: Crisis in Ukraine overshadowing the meeting of FWS on his first official visit as FM in Washington. Amongst other items, financial aid to Ukraine was discussed. Report: Frantic search for solution to the economic problem of UKR; Steinmeier also meets with LaGarde, <i>LaGarde</i> : "We will be sending a team to Kyiv early next week to assess the financial requirements of UKR. It is much too early to throw numbers into the room already. <b>At the moment we see nothing that is worthy panicking about.</b> "; <i>John Kerry</i> welcomes Steinmeier cordially, publicly praises Germany for the newly revived foreign policy efforts - however, <b>does not offer the spy-agreement</b> [that had been suggested by the German government as a reaction to the NSA listening scandal]. Steinmeier therefore now urges a dialogue on privacy in the internet, which he does not regard as capitulation. Steinmeier announces that he will make sure that the US adheres to and respects German law in Germany: "We will have to continue the dialogue about the limits of spying on your neighbours and allies".
28.02.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, (a) Steinmeier visits Washington; (b) <b>Yanukovych makes press statement, Report by Ina Ruck</b> c) situation on Crimea, live commentary Golineh Atai. <sup>528</sup>	a) Intro, Jan Hofer, tagesschau anchor: First public appearance of J since he fled Kyiv; takes place in Rostow/Don, Southern Russia; still regards himself as legitimate president, denounces members of interim government as fascists and criminals; meanwhile, Swiss authorities have announced that they are investigating against J. and his son for money laundering, and froze their assets in Switzerland. b) Report, Ina Ruck: Statement happens in Rostow/Don, close to the UKR border; apparently Russia grants J. protection; J. appears before UKR flags, but speaks Russian during conference; emphasizes that he is still the legitimate head of state, and only left the country for fear of his life. "As you know, in Kyiv, fascists and thugs have taken control - but they are the absolute minority [in UKR]; regarding empty state household, and claims that he and his clique had managed to get the money out of the country: "we always paid wages, state pensions, everybody knows that. This year we even wanted to increase the social spending. The chaos that is now happening is the responsibility of this that started the crisis, and that are now in power". In Kyiv, new PM Yatseniuk announces that Central Bank of UKR will sharply control financial flows leaving the country, states: "Key task for our government is to fulfil all conditions set by the IMF. I am optimistic that we will pass the necessary hard laws, so that the credits held out to Ukraine can be granted"; the difficult economic situation is, however, just one of the problems the UKR government faces; another is Crimea. <b>This morning, uniformed, armed men appeared on the airports of the Ukrainian peninsula. They did not wear any national symbols on their uniforms. It is unclear who they are.</b> The UKR government accuses Russia for having sent troops, Russia denies accusations. On Crimea, majority of population are ethnic Russians that do not accept the interim government in Kyiv.

<sup>527</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47066.html>

<sup>528</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47066.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, (a) Steinmeier visits Washington; (b) Yanukovich makes press statement, Report by Ina Ruck c) <b>situation on Crimea, live commentary by Golineh Atai.</b> <sup>529</sup>	Live commentary by Golineh Atai from Simferopol, Crimea: "Swiftly facts are being established on Crimea. Unknown para-military units have occupied two airports and a TV-channel, as well as the regional parliamentary building [27.02.2014]. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses here report Russian troop movements, unusually large Russian troop movements on and around the peninsula. There are talks of a Russian guided missile cruiser patrolling the bays off southern Crimea, of considerably more helicopters, and of many APVs that are currently on the road. The access roads from the mainland to the peninsula are controlled by para-military units. We have just now witnessed how pro-Russian protesters chased a very famous local opposition politician [later Pres. Poroshenko], that had arrived from Kyiv by plane today, through the streets. <b><u>The UKR Minister of Interior has called the events "an invasion and occupation of Crimea staged by Russia".</u></b>

<sup>529</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47066.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	<p>Tagesthemen; C. Miosga: Increasing tensions on Crimea: <b>(a) Summary of Events, Udo Lilischkies; UKR gov. Confirms Russian troop presence</b> (b) Interview with G. Atai, Simferopol; ( c) Interview with I. Ruck, Moscow; (d) UN Security Council meets on Crimea.<sup>530</sup></p>	<p>a) Intro C. Miosga: "At first it was just a war of words and threats, but if it continues the way it goes currently on Crimea, then the country stands before a real, that is, military, conflict. First the Russian-speaking majority if the [Crimean] population protested against the pro-European course of the new government in Kyiv. Then armed, masked men in uniform occupied first the [regional] parliament, then during the night both airports on Crimea. And now, apparently a minimum of 2000 troops landed on Crimea. b) Summary of Events by U. Lilischkies: "Earlier this evening, Interim President Turtshinow confirms the numerous witness reports, says: "Today, Russia moved troops to the autonomous region of Crimea. They have not only seized the regional parliament, but also the seat of the [region] government on Crimea. Furthermore, they tried to bring the communications infrastructure under their control, and tried to block the military installations of the UKR forces. Everything follows the scenario which Russia used when it occupied Abkhazia". [report continues] "In the early morning, there were already signs of increasing tensions. APVs under Russian flag were parked around the military airport close to Sevastopol. Roughly 400 troops, observers say, have blocked the runway during the [yesterday] evening. The airport in Simferopol is also under the control of armed men. They wear uniforms without insignia, one states: "We are only Crimean, we are the people's brigades. We want to prevent that fascists and radicals from other parts of Ukraine come to our Crimea. We do not want any provocation here"; Witnesses however claim that they [the armed men] are Russian troops, increasing reports coming in, first without confirmation: Russian troop carriers landed, APVs on the way to Simferopol, the headquarters of the Coast guard and other UKR military installations blocked. [Now they have been confirmed by Turtshinow]. Closing remarks Lilischkies: "In Rostow/Don today we saw what appears to be the confirmation that the Kremlin has opted for an open confrontation: [fmr. UKR Pres.] Yanukovich holds a press conference, states: "No one has dismissed me from office. Me and my family had to flee for fear for our lives", and still considers himself as the legitimate president and asks people to leave Maidan. He also says something very interesting: "<b>I personally know President Putin, and I wonder why he is still so hesitant, or why he keeps his silence.</b>"</p>

<sup>530</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	<p>Tagesthemen; C. Miosga: Increasing tensions on Crimea: (a) Summary of Events, Udo Lilischkies; UKR gov. Confirms Russian troop presence (b) <b>Interview with G. Atai, Simferopol;</b> (c) Interview with I. Ruck, Moscow; (d) UN Security Council meets on Crimea.<sup>531</sup></p>	<p>Q.: Very unsettling news from [Crimea]. What have you seen, what have you experienced today? A.: I can definitely say that things develop very, very rapidly and with a noteworthy well executed choreography, it seems to me: Unknown paramilitary units today have occupied - I shall call them strategic - installations on this peninsula. Inhabitants tell us that on and around the peninsula there have been Russian troop movements - <b><u>I can, at this point, however, say nothing more than this... [Atai looks down, pauses for split second, as if considering whether she should say more instead].</u></b> Furthermore, we have met Russian parliamentarians here today, that have been rallying the local sentiments, and claim that they want to initiate a decision in the Duma to the effect that the ethnic Russians here get Russian passports. Just before we witnessed how a very well-known opposition politician, Piotr Poroshenko [later UKR President], who owns a private TV station in Kyiv, was literally chased through the streets. And just now we have heard that the airspace over Crimea has been blocked - in a nutshell it really looks as if someone from the outside wants to isolate the peninsula from the mainland. Q: In light of this situation, is it possible at to say who is currently controlling Crimea politically? A.: Well, clearly not Kyiv - even though I stand here on UKR territory. All these troop movements here were preceded by a decision on the local parliament to hold a referendum about the future status of Crimea. The date was set for the same day as the presidential elections in UKR. I can say that my observation is that at the moment, the <b>Russian ethnic majority of Crimea has nothing against belonging to Russia. This clearly is also related to the somehow strange image that the Russians have about what happened in Kyiv. An image that has been decisively orchestrated and directed by the Kremlin controlled media. During the last three days, Russian media has notably focussed on the developments here in Crimea. And we just heard from UKR Turtschinow that Russia want to provoke a UKR military reaction, to then annex Crimea - but that UKR will not let itself be provoked.</b></p>

<sup>531</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	<p>Tagesthemen; C. Miosga: Increasing tensions on Crimea: (a) Summary of Events, Udo Lilischkies; UKR gov. Confirms Russian troop presence (b) Interview with G. Atai, Simferopol; ( c) <b>Interview with I. Ruck, Moscow;</b> (d) UN Security Council meets on Crimea.<sup>532</sup></p>	<p>Q: Can it really be that the Russians are seeking an open confrontation, that the aim of the Russians can be to interfere in this conflict militarily?  A.: Everything we are hearing is very worrying and currently hints in this direction. 2000 additional Russian troops have landed, it is claimed by UKR. <b>Russia does not confirm any numbers, however state that they have increased the protection of their Black Sea Fleet. The Russians have always claimed the opposite so far. Today, Putin spoke on the phone with Angela Merkel and urged de-escalation of the situation and repeated that Russia fully accepts the sovereignty of UKR. What we are experiencing at the moment, however, is the exact opposite.</b> The news are really not comforting at the moment. Q.: This suspiciously reminds us of known patterns from other Russian conflicts. A: Indeed, many people here are reminded of the "Abkhazian Scenario", that goes like this: handing out of passports - here, on Crimea, the first Russian passports handed out were apparently given to Berkut members - which requires a process so that the inhabitants of Crimea can quickly receive Russian passports. Once the passports are distributed more widely, then you have citizens you need to protect. This was similar before the Russian invasion to Abkhazia, similar also in South-Ossetia. Of course, one is reminded of this scenario. <b><u>This notwithstanding, one asks what the Russians are willing to risk, if they are willing to go all the way this time. I ask myself that question because the price Russia would have to pay would be very high - further international isolation. I really ask myself whether Russia is prepared to take such a risk.</u></b></p>

<sup>532</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
28.02.2014	Tagesthemen; C. Miosga: Increasing tensions on Crimea: (a) Summary of Events, Udo Lilischkies; UKR gov. Confirms Russian troop presence (b) Interview with G. Atai, Simferopol; (c) Interview with I. Ruck, Moscow; (d) <b>UN Security Council meets on Crimea.</b> <sup>533</sup>	Joint statement by Foreign Ministers of GER, Fra, POL calling on all parties to refrain from all activities that risk the unity of the Ukrainian sovereign territory; UN Security Council meets on situation on Crimea.

<sup>533</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	tagesschau: (a) <b>Russia threatens military intervention; Duma empowers Putin to use troops;</b> (b) live from Simerfopol, G. Atai (c) International reactions. <sup>534</sup>	a) Intro: Russia threatens military intervention at height of crisis on Crimea; Duma ratified presidential empowerment to use troops in neighbouring country [Ukr.]; <b>Putin LET declare</b> that whether he gives the movement order will depend on further developments. Autonomous Region Crimea belongs to UKR since given to UKR by Kruschtschow; majority of population are ethnic Russians; besides capital Simferopol, the harbour city of Sevastopol has strategic relevance [to Russia] as a Russian naval base. b) Report, U. Lilischkies: "Russian APVs on the streets of Crimea - tonight the situation escalated dramatically: In Sevastopol units of the Russian black sea fleet surrounded the base of the Ukrainian Border Guards; other Russian troops took the military airport Belbek, and set an ultimatum to the present UKR forces to surrender or switch side; other armed groups apparently tried to disarm further UKR army and navy units stationed on Crimea. In Simferopol, where yesterday [28.02.2014] a <b>pro-Russian government was elected, the new prime minister today received the supreme command over military, police and intelligence [forces on Crimea], states [after his election: "I ask the Russian president Putin to come to our aide to re-establish security on Crimea." [Lilischkies continues]: "A plea, many believe, Moscow had long waited for.</b> Today, Putin asked the parliament for permission to use the military in the neighbouring country, which voted with great majority in favour of his request. Valentina Matwijkenko [NOT PUTIN], Head of the Council of the Russian Federation: "We hear that young hooligans commit all sorts of crimes in UKR"; [Lilischkies continues] "But it was more these [images show men in Balaklava, wearing uniforms with no insignia] pro-Russian hooded men that stormed a press centre in Simferopol today, that spread fear and insecurity. Or in Kharkov, [eastern UKR] where pro-Russian protesters re-conquered the town hall held by the European Maidan protesters - shots were fired, 97 reported wounded; in the moment of triumph, the Russian flag was hoisted"; after emergency meeting of UKR cabinet , PM <i>Yatseniuk</i> states that <b>"all Russian attempts to provoke a UKR reaction have failed. We understand very well the plan was to create a new South-Ossetia on the territory of UKR, with victims, blood, and civil war"</b> ; [Lilischkies continues]in Kyiv, National Security Council meets; Klitschko demands general mobilization of the UKR forces.

<sup>534</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47078.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	tagesschau: (a) Russia threatens military intervention; Duma empowers Putin to use troops; (b) <b>live from Simferopol, G. Atai</b> (c) International reactions. <sup>535</sup>	"Despite the threatening images and sounds, the situation in Simferopol has remained calm. We have not seen Russian tanks on the streets. We have also not heard any shots being fired. Despite the harsh rhetoric of the Kremlin, so far, we cannot bear witness that ethnic Russians are under threat here in any way. Even in front of UKR military barracks we have seen armed men without insignia, we talked to them, they told us that they are Russian navy troops, of the Black Sea fleet, and threat they have an amicable and relaxed relationship with the UKR troops inside the barracks. It appears therefore that Russian troops have long [before] arrived on Crimea, and that they cooperate very closely with the pro-Russian militia, and that they occupy strategic positions step-by-step, so far in a peaceful manner- or in their own word, to "protect" [ethnic Russians against threats to their security].
01.03.2014	tagesschau: (a) Russia threatens military intervention; Duma empowers Putin to use troops; (b) live from Simerfopol, G. Atai (c) <b>International reactions.</b> <sup>536</sup>	a) Intro: UNSC holds second emergency meeting within 24hrs, to no avail due to Russian position; FM of EU schedule an extraordinary summit for Monday, 03.03.2014; several EU politicians strongly warned of a splitting of UKR; b) Natalie Bachmayer, Report: Barroso in Berlin, meets with Merkel; <b>Merkel: "Of course everything must be done in these days - and I do that with many others in many phone calls, including the Russian president, with those responsible in UKR, that the territorial integrity of UKR remains untouched. What we are experiencing on Crimea is worrying us.";</b> <b>Few hours later Merkel learns that Duma paved way to send Russian troops to Crimea - calls Yatseniuk again in the afternoon, again the word "worry" is being used.</b> <i>Obama</i> already reached more drastic words, states unambiguously on 28.02.2014: "The US is in full agreement with the International Community: Every intervention has a price"; [Bachmayer continues]: " <b>The rhetoric is getting harsher, while the Europeans are facing the ruins of their diplomatic efforts. It is just a week ago that the Foreign Ministers of FRA, GER, POL [on behalf and in the name of the EU; no invitation from UKR gov.] negotiated a compromise - and now that. R. Sikorski</b> , Polish Foreign minister: "An armed intervention is an egregious violation of international norms and principles. We are in constant contact with our allies and partners, with Germany, with France, with the EU, and with NATO"; [closing commentary, Bachmayer]: "Federal Foreign Minister FWS cancelled his scheduled trip to Georgia and Moldowa, as for Monday EU Special Representative Catherine Ashton has invited to a special EU FM summit in Brussels - crisis management in UKR has the way of right on FWS agenda.

<sup>535</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47078.html>

<sup>536</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47078.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	Audio, WDR Studio Moscow, Sabine Stöhr: 2000 Russian troops landed on Crimea". <sup>537</sup>	<b>2000 troops landed close to Simferopol</b> , according to member of UKR gov; UKR ambassador to UN: We regard this as an act of aggression. <b>11 helicopters and military aircraft</b> have landed on UKR territory"; Interim President Turtschinow speaks of <b>military intervention under the pretence of an exercise</b> ; calls on Russia to end provocation, and refrain from any act that may endanger the territorial integrity of UKR; Russian Ambassador to Ukraine claims that the military manoeuvres are all covered under the covenants of a Russian-UKR military agreement; Russia is worried about the security of its black sea fleet base in Simferopol. <b>Airspace above Simferopol closed</b> during evening (28.02.2014); UKR telecommunications company announces on its webpage that there are hardly any landline, cell phone, or Internet service available between Crimea and other parts of the country; unknown men apparently have occupied several telecommunication centres. Yesterday, 28.02. during evening local time, fmr. UKR president J. appears before press [at Rostow/Don]: "...The UKR Rad has no legitimacy...I still think that the agreement that had been negotiated between the opposition and myself, if it would be implemented as planned, the it could defuse the crisis of Ukraine."; on Crimea: " of course the inhabitants of Crimea will not bow before the nationalists from Kyiv.", warns of bloodshed. After phone conversations, amongst other with A. Merkel, Putin let declare that he does not wish any further escalation in UKR, and that to prevent this has utmost importance to him. [unclear whether statement from Putin personally, or press release; as no citation given, indication for the latter].
01.03.2014	tagesschau.de: background, "Russian Military Doctrine eases foreign military assignment". <sup>538</sup>	Since changes to its military doctrine in 2010, Russia can deploy its troops abroad more easily. Earlier Russian military doctrine stringently required a case of self-defence, anti-terror operations, or the fulfilment of international agreements for the use of the military, the case either through a declaration of war, or a decision by the Russian National Security Council. Changes as consequences of the RUS experience in Georgia in 2008, when Russia sought to legitimize its military offensive by claiming to protect Russian nationals in South-Ossetia. [When published in 2010] the doctrine raised fears that Russia could use this argument now in other similar cases, too. Then-president Medwedew however declared, that the doctrine facilitates Russian participation on the fight against Piracy. "Many Russian citizens live on Crimea. Thanks to a leasing agreement between Moscow and Kyiv, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is allowed to stay on the autonomous republic [of Crimea] until 2042.

<sup>537</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118872.html>

<sup>538</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/russland846.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: "Psycho War about Crimea", Jörg Schönborn [now ARD editor in chief] : <b>(a) Situation Report from Crimea</b>, G. Atai; (b) Live from Simferopol on Situation in Crimea, G. Atai; c) Historic background on Crimea as a contested territory; (d) Media Echo on Russian Duma decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, Ina Ruck; (e) Interview on Russian intentions with Ina Ruck, Moscow; (f) Expert-Interview with Hans-Henning Schröder, German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP), on Russian intentions</p>	<p>a) Intro, Schönborn: "During the past hours, the situation deteriorated dramatically on the still Ukrainian peninsula. <b>Putin's psycho-war against UKR today entered a new phase: The parliament in Moscow officially decided to invade the neighbouring country. What so far has been a covert activity, is now official Kremlin-policy.</b> This reminds us in fatal fashion of the times when the Soviet Union let itself be called for help against external aggression from its soviet brother peoples". b) Report, G. Atai: "Snipers in front of Crimean regional parliament; heavily armed men without insignia are here, have occupied the building; local protesters cheer masked men, old lady: "I am UKR myself, but I see the country is torn into the wrong direction, and that's why I want Crimea to be Russia". [Another protester]: "You see today there are not many people here. A few days earlier, far more people were here, and they were all in favour of the changes - and now that we have armed men here, it is even dangerous for me to come here with a [UKR] flag"; [Atai continues]: "Soon the representative of the minority gets abused [by the other people present at the square] and chased away"; next images show people shouting "Berkut" to "honour the recently disbanded Special Police forces as heroes, and to blame the West"; [young woman]: "We don't need America. We prefer to have a Black Sea Fleet and no NATO troops. We are closer to Russia."; [old woman]: "You journalists are not objective. I was in Kyiv myself; I saw what happened. - and what they showed on TV was a total lie. Our Berkut boys were unarmed and were burnt and killed!"; [Atai continues]: "The small Muslim minority of the <i>Crimean Tatars</i> are on alarm since days"; Tatars still recall terror of displacement under Stalin, and [Atai:] "can only imagine UKR as their homeland"; [Young men, Crimean Tatar]: "We have lived side by side, and we remember the hard times we had in the beginning. We don't want to have to go through this again!"; [another young men, Crimean Tatar]: "They show horrible things on Russian TV [about us], for example that the UKR Tatars here kill people, just to provoke the Russians. They do it so they can bring in their troops.". [Atai continues]: "Pro Russian self defence forces assemble before the Ministry of Interior, and even set camp in front of the former base of the Berkut forces. [Fmr. Berkut officer, wearing uniform, insignia show Berkut badge, and an unidentifiable badge, showing the Berkut eagle against a blue white red colour code]: "Of course Russia understand very well that soon there will be no more army [military?] commanders, or monuments that were devoted to the Russian empire, or Russian churches - all this would be destroyed if nationalism spread here from Western Ukraine. Not Nationalism anymore, but real fascism."; [Atai closing remarks]: "Kyiv and Crimea - never were they so far apart".</p>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	and possible Western reactions. <sup>539</sup>	

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<sup>539</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376242.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	<p>Brennpunkt: "Psycho War about Crimea", Jörg Schönborn [now ARD editor in chief] :</p> <p>(a) Situation Report from Crimea, G. Atai; <b>(b) Live from Simferopol on Situation in Crimea, G. Atai;</b> c) Historic background on Crimea as a contested territory; (d) Media Echo on Russian Duma decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, Ina Ruck; (e) Interview on Russian intentions with Ina Ruck, Moscow; (f) Expert-Interview with Hans-Henning Schröder, German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP), on Russian intentions</p>	<p>a) Intro Schönborn: "Officially, the Russian parliament paved the way for Russian military operations on Crimea today - but G. Atai reported earlier today that since long Russian troops were present [on the peninsula] and on the move". B) Interview with G Atai, live, Simferopol: Q: Has Russia not taken control on Crimea since long? Does it really need new soldiers? A: Actually, no, it doesn't need any more troops. We have the impression that all strategic objectives have been achieved by these paramilitaries / unknown soldier4s without insignia. <b>Yesterday I did not want to confirm that Russia is here, but today I have seen it with my own eyes, of all places, in front of Ukr. military barracks.</b> There we talked to the soldiers, who told us that they are navy infantry, that they belong to the Black Sea Fleet, from the base in Sevastopol, and originate from Central Russia. [they said that] Within the barracks they have a relaxed relationship [with the UKR soldiers] and do many things together. UKR observers estimate an additional 6-8000 [Russian] troops to be present here in Crimea. <b>The Kremlin's tactics for now appears to be to send soldiers without insignia, then go through the entire political process via the Duma, so that on <u>paper everything appears perfect.</u></b>" Q: Is Crimea the only trouble-spot or are you aware of other regions in which the Russians might also let themselves be called for help? A: Well, we heard of demonstrations in the south-east of country, in Donetsk, from pro-Russian protest in Kharkov. It could well be that this turns into conflagration [Merkel statement at G20 summit Australia] and that other pro-Russian parts of the country take the developments in Crimea as an example. <b>However, at the moment something completely different is causing me concern: That is the reaction of Crimean Tatars, who, from the outset, wanted to remain UKR nationals. They have very bad memories of the RUS past, and the trauma of deportation under Stalin. They only live in peace, more or less, with the Russian majority here since the last 20, 25 years. If they call on the help of the Turks, or possibly Muslim terrorists appear on the scene to support their Muslim brothers, then this conflict could take a completely different, more dramatic turn."</b></p>

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The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: "Psycho War about Crimea", Jörg Schönborn [now ARD editor in chief] :</p> <p>(a) Situation Report from Crimea, G. Atai;</p> <p>(b) Live from Simferopol on Situation in Crimea, G. Atai;</p> <p><b>c) Historic background on Crimea as a contested territory, Marion Kerstholt;</b></p> <p>(d) Media Echo on Russian Duma decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, Ina Ruck;</p> <p>(e) Interview on Russian intentions with Ina Ruck, Moscow;</p> <p>(f) Expert-Interview with Hans-Henning Schröder, German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP), on Russian intentions</p>	<p>a) Intro, Schönborn: "Maybe you [G. Atai] are mentioning what in the end will be the larger problem - not the military invasion of Crimea, that appears almost like a child-'s play - it is the historic roots that have led to the fact that this region has been a place of conflict between its neighbouring countries throughout history".</p> <p>b) Historic background, Crimea - a contested piece of earth, Kerstholt, Marion: " Crimea, a Tatar word means something like rock or fort - a fort that was owned by different powers in history: the Venetians, the Osman Empire, or the Russians"; peninsula has a desirable [geo] strategic location, roughly 2 million inhabitants and is slightly larger than Mecklenburg-Vorpommern [larger German federal stat]; current ethnic diversity today, 58,5 ethnic Russians, 24,4% Ukrainians, 12,1 % Tatars, 5 % others; belonged to Russia since 1783, when Katherine the Great turned it into Russian territory [by military victory; see also: battle of the light charges, Brudenell], settles Russians there and displaces Crimean Tatars to the Russian hinterland. In 1954, Chruschtschow allocates Crimea to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, therefore [today] Crimea belongs to UKR. However, since 1992 the peninsula has the status of an autonomous republic, with its own regional parliament in the capital Simferopol, a gesture to the Russian majority on Crimea by the UKR government [back then]; Harbour in Sevastopol still is, as it was during Soviet times, home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet; lease agreement between UKR and RUS until 2042 (renewed between Putin and Yanukovych in July 2012).</p>

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	and possible Western reactions. <sup>541</sup>	

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<sup>541</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376242.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: "Psycho War about Crimea", Jörg Schönborn [now ARD editor in chief] :</p> <p>(a) Situation Report from Crimea, G. Atai;</p> <p>(b) Live from Simferopol on Situation in Crimea, G. Atai; c) Historic background on Crimea as a contested territory; <b>(d) Media Echo on Russian Duma decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, Ina Ruck;</b></p> <p>(e)Interview on Russian intentions with Ina Ruck, Moscow; (f) Expert-Interview with Hans-Henning Schröder, German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP), on Russian intentions</p>	<p>a) Intro Schönborn: " <b>The collapse of the government in Kyiv last week, the escape of the then president Yanukovich was an ignominy for Russian president Putin</b> - of all things during the last days of the Winter Olympics. Obviously, he has <b>done his utmost to compensate for the loss, to demonstrate his power.</b> He achieved this in only a few days. And today he even secured the support for his ambitions of the [RUS] parliament, which he only takes serious if it is serving his purpose." b) Report on Media Echo in RUS on DUMA decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, In Ruck, Moscow: "Troops to Ukraine" - "Russia's main evening news right away offered an explanation: [Russian TV news anchor; exact TV-station unknown] " "The countries leadership today has taken an important decision - they shall protect our Russian co-nationals. The upper house of parliament has agreed to the presidential request to allow the sending of troops to Ukrain"; [Ruck cts]: "Images of Russian TV then show decision in parliament, followed immediately by further stirring of emotions: [anonymous member of Duma, credentials only in Cyrillic, no source given] " President Obama has said that Russia will have to pay dearly for her policy in Ukraine. That is an affront. We all know the West trained the fighters on Maidan. Obama crossed the red line, not Russia!"; [Ruck cts] "Another station shows a documentary from UKR, with images of Russian flags everywhere - in Luhansk, in Kharkov, and Donetsk, the same message everywhere: "Russia, come and help Crimea"; [Pro Russian protester, young woman] "The Russian forces are our absolute protection. To know that they exist, that they protect us, is our hope. They are our only chance for security!"; [closing remarks Ruck]: "Russia's TV viewers are keyed in for an invasion. <b>Their president apparently has not decided yet. The marching order has not been given yet, it is being said. Putin still hopes that the situation stabilizes.</b>"</p>

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01.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: "Psycho War about Crimea", Jörg Schönborn [now ARD editor in chief] :</p> <p>(a) Situation Report from Crimea, G. Atai; (b) Live from Simferopol on Situation in Crimea, G. Atai; c) Historic background on Crimea as a contested territory; (d) Media Echo on Russian Duma decision to allow sending of troops to Ukraine, Ina Ruck; (e) Interview on Russian intentions with Ina Ruck, Moscow; <b>(f) Expert-Interview with Hans-Henning Schröder</b>, German Institute for International Affairs and Security (SWP), on Russian intentions</p>	<p>a) Intro, Schönborn: As a matter of fact, the Cold War is over for decades. The Europeans, Russia, the Americans wanted to cooperate - but now we can watch how the Kremlin obviously unilaterally tries to shift the borders [in Europe]. Tonight, we want to understand what does this mean? Where does this lead? Could there be war in the region? Who may be able to find answer to these questions is Hans-Henning Schröder, one of the best Russia experts amongst Germany's historians." b) Interview with Hans Henning Schröder: q: Mr. Schröder, is there a threat of war in the region? A.: This cannot be excluded, but it is certainly nothing Putin would desire directly. He aspires to destabilize Ukraine, for example by occupying Crimea. For him it is to prevent Ukraine from slipping into the sphere of influence of the EU, but it is not about initiating a bloody war. Q: " What can, what should the West do - besides idle standing by and watching? We read news like: "President Hollande warns of violence" - this doesn't exactly sound harsh. A: " <b>In the short term, the West can do very little. A military operation is off the list of things to be done; I think this must be said clearly on the onset. Economic sanctions should be considered, but this also depends how the situation develops in the coming days. So far we see that Putin is behaving legalistically, that means that he stuck to the rules set by the [Russian] constitution: he sought parliamentary consent for the foreign military assignment, which covers, as Mrs. Ruck rightly pointed out, the entire territory of Ukraine. [Furthermore], he advances very cautiously in Crimea, so far avoiding bloodshed. If this flips over, for example the Ukrainian side starts to defend themselves, then we have a completely different situation. But, as I said, in the short term, I do not see that the West can step in there in any meaningful way.</b> Q.: Is it conceivable for you tonight that UKR maintains its current territory, with Crimea, with the exact same borders today, or is the split already a fait accompli? A.: Well, if <i>I hear what Putin and his politicians are saying</i> [which statement of Putin, when; Putin has not commented personally on UKR or Crimea until 01.03.], <b><u>this is not about splitting up Ukraine, but that Crimea should be secured temporarily, for the short-term.</u></b> What Putin currently does, and he declared this publicly in 2011, is a large scale geo-political project, namely to round off his sphere of influence through projects like the Eurasian Customs Union and others, in order to establish a stronger overall position for himself. Without Ukraine, this will never be possible. He almost got UKR into his sphere of influence - you remember the Vilnius Summit -, but this was thwarted by the Ukrainian population. Now he is trying to destabilize." c) Outro, J. Schönborn: "For a brief moment last weekend, we had a feeling of hope, a feeling that now things can quiet down in this crisis region. Because the situation is so dramatic, the colleagues of tagesthemen are on duty all evening, and will provide you with updates. In case of breaking news, the following show "One side will win [Einer wird gewinnen] will be interrupted."</p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
01.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) <b>Strong sabre-rattling: Is Crimea on the brink of war?, Report by Ina Ruck;</b> b) Interview with Golineh Atai, Simferopol; c) Interview with Ina Ruck, Moscow; c) Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington, on US reactions.<sup>545</sup></p>	<p>Intro C. Miosga: "Important and ever more discomfoting news from Ukraine. Strong sabre-rattling - is Crimea facing war now? Yesterday there was talks of 2000 troops that landed on Crimea - by now there appears to be 8.000. But such threatening gestures seem not enough for the Russian president Putin: Today, he let parliament <b>empower him to send troops into the neighbouring country, and the whole territory of UKR at that.</b> Since then, many heads of state speak on the phone with President Putin, President Obama as much as the chancellor; the UNSC held another meeting on the crisis today - <b><u>because so far no one can really judge of Putin is just bluffing, or if he is indeed just before issuing the marching order.</u></b> b) REPORT, Ina Ruck, Moscow: "New Russian passports for the notorious Berkut police. In their old homeland [UKR] they are generally hated by now, some of them report that they have received death threats. In their new homeland [RUS] they are welcome: [unnamed official, unsourced TV channel]: "I believe these boys deserve the highest orders - the time will come when UKR will also be proud of them. Today they are the pride of Russia". [Ruck ctd.] "From the UKR perspective, this is a provocation, and by no means the only one: <b>Days ago already, men in uniform appeared - without insignia, but armed with machine guns - and ever more army vehicles, some of them clearly belonging to the Russian military. While UKR protested, spoke of a covert invasion, Russia kept silent, until today it decided openly to enable the invasion.</b> Unanimously the upper house of the Russian parliament (Duma) waived a request from Putin, and gave green light to issuing a marching order. However, so far this has not been issued yet, the Kremlin let the public know during the evening. They [Kremlin] were <i>still waiting and hoping for an improvement of the situation on Crimea.</i> The Russian TV-audience has long been attuned to the possible invasion. Evening after evening the new UKR government was described as bandits or fascists - also today. [TV presenter from unsourced RUS TV station]: "In the entire UKR, pro Russian protests under the Motto of "no to fascism" took place". [Ruck ctd.]. In Kharkov, thousands protested against the new regional administration that had taken over since the change of government in Kyiv. The town hall has been occupied by the protesters; sympathizers with the new government were beaten up by pro-Russian protesters. Sergei Shagan, the novelist also known in Germany, was also hurt. At the end of the day, on top of the Kharkov regional administration building, the Russian flag was hoisted. In a hurriedly ordered meeting of the Cabinet, the new head of government <i>Yatseniuk</i> said that <i>Ukraine will not let itself be provoked by Russia. However, a military operation would not be tolerated, and mean the beginning of a war. But on Crimea, it appears as if the Russian military operation is long a reality.</i> Even though the soldiers wear no insignia on their uniforms; even though so far there has been no official marching order issued by the Kremlin.</p>

<sup>544</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376242.html>

<sup>545</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html>

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01.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Strong sabre-rattling: Is Crimea on the brink of war? Report by Ina Ruck; b) Interview with Golineh Atai, Simferopol; c) <b>Interview with Ina Ruck, Moscow;</b> c) Interview with Tina</p>	<p>Q: Is it indeed the case that Putin only wants to exert pressure? He has received free passage from the Russian parliament to invade not only Crimea, but into the entire territory of UKR. Which objective does he really pursue? A: I believe this is really about <b>re-establishing [the fmr.] influence in UKR</b>. Clearly, Putin <b>thinks geopolitically, he wants to establish a counterweight to the European Union</b>, his Eurasian Union, made up of former Soviet Republics. For this he very urgently needs Ukraine, for this objective he is using this much pressure. <b>That is very clear from my perspective</b>. Therefore, also the wrestling with the EU that we witnessed last November. It did look like a defeat for Putin at the beginning [see Ruck, Interview with Th. Roth at the closing ceremony of Sochi], but I think it is not yet too late for him to win back UKR - no matter the cost and repercussions. By the way, he is even willingly risking a split of the country - <b>a weak UKR is easier to rule for him. Therefore, destabilisation</b> clearly is one of the aims. Also, in this he is completely oblivious about his international perception, we have witnessed this in earlier actions of his. For him, it is important to rebuild a strong Russia that has a lot of influence in the world. What he doesn't care about whether this is as friend or foe.</p>

<sup>546</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html>

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	Hassel, Washington, on US reactions. <sup>547</sup>	

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<sup>547</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html>

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01.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Strong sabre-rattling: Is Crimea on the brink of war?, Report by Ina Ruck; b) Interview with Golineh Atai, Simferopol; c) Interview with Ina Ruck, Moscow; c) <b>Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington, on US reactions.</b> <sup>548</sup>	Intro, C Miosga: "During a phone conversation, Mdm Chancellor appealed to President Putin to observe the territorial integrity of UKR. Also, French president Hollande admonished that everything should be done to prevent an intervention. President Obama spoke with Putin on the phone, and in the White House there is a National Security Council meeting. Q: Obama stated before that a foreign invasion will come at a cost, and that he is considering withdrawing from the planned G8 summit. Tina Hassel in Washington - is this really everything the US can threaten now? A.: Well, there is not really much political leverage here, which is part of the problem. The [National Security Council] meeting that took place today has dissolved, and apparently the situation was very tense. Different options were discussed, including for example freezing negotiations about important trade agreements with Russia, possibly economic sanctions or punishments. But <b>no one here thought about a military option, the transfer of US troops to the Polish UKR border or the deployment of the navy</b> [in adjacent water]. Q. This will not be enough for the new UKR government, as it already called NATO for help. Tomorrow, NATO will hold an extraordinary meeting - what exactly can they decide with a currently reluctant U.S. president, at least regarding military options? A.: Well, in principle, realistically, not much can be expected without the most important member of the alliance. Tomorrow is firstly about the alignment of planning - and one must be clear about the fact that no NATO member wants a military escalation, this is much too dangerous. <b><u>Essentially, everyone is clueless and impotent.</u></b> Obama may be weak and incapable of upholding his red lines. But one must remember that his predecessor, George W. Bush, in 2008 did not react any differently when it was about Georgia. He also, despite massive pressure, did not interfere in this conflict. <b>Russia is too much needed in solving all the other large conflicts of the world to risk such a move.</b>

<sup>548</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html>

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02.03.2014	Tagesschau, a) <b>Situation in UKR,</b> b) Live from Simferopol, G. Atai, c) International Reactions, Arnim Stauth. <sup>549</sup>	a) Intro: The conflict between UKR and Russia results in growing international tensions. <b>Western governments, lead by the USA, assess the Russian troop movements as an act of aggression.</b> As a response, economic sanctions are being discusses. UKR has ordered its military to full readiness for action. The Crimean Peninsula is largely inhabited by Russians. For Russia, particularly the black sea harbour Sevastopol has strategic relevance as a base for the Russian navy. b) Report, I. Ruck: Military [transport] vehicles on the streets of the Crimean Peninsula. On most, the number plates are taken off or posted over. On others, no one cared about this anymore: This is the Russian military on its way! Moscow send ever more troops and hardware to Crimea. One of their objectives: Privolnaya, a base of the UKR border guards. Here, according to agencies, hundreds of armed men appeared and blocked the base. The UKR border guards entrenched themselves behind the gates. All day there was rumours that Ukrainian personnel was defecting to join forces with the pro-Russian forces. In the evening news, the bombshell was announced: <b>The chief of the UKR navy who just recently had been appointed by the new government in Kyiv swore an oath to the pro-Russian regional government of the [autonomous] Crimea</b> before running cameras. Disorientation within the armed forces. It <b>remains unclear whether they [armed forces] would really adhere to the command from Kyiv, warned Yatseniuk,</b> the UKR head of government today: We are at the brink of a catastrophe. President Putin is on the best way to instigate war between two befriended nations."; announces that and <b>invasion would mean "the end of all relations"</b> . In Moscow, today several smaller protests against the Russian military operation occurred. "Dont drag our children into war against their brothers" was seen on signs. The protests were not approved, and police arrested dozens of the protesters. Soon later, a much larger protest, well organized AND [emph. I Ruck] approved by the authorities. In this case, they protested in favour of the invasion.
02.03.2014	Tagesschau, a) Situation in UKR, b) <b>Live from</b> <b>Simferopol, G. Atai,</b> c) International Reactions, Arnim Stauth. <sup>550</sup>	"The war of nerves before the UKR military barracks continues. Today, Russian troops, who mostly do not portray themselves as belonging to Russian forces, ostentatiously positioned themselves before UKR bases, and asked their UKR colleagues to drop their arms and put themselves under RUS protection. According to our knowledge, no UKR unit so far has given in to this demand. Most bases are put under heightened alert. We have just learned that Chancellor Merkel has spoken on the phone with President Putin, in which he told her that the means that he employed on Crimea are proportionate, and that it is about the interest of the ethnic Russians, that life and limb of the ethnic Russians on Crimea was under threat. So far, we could not see such a threat here on Crimea.

<sup>549</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47090.html>

<sup>550</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47090.html>

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02.03.2014	Tagesschau, a) Situation in UKR, b) Live from Simferopol, G. Atai, c) NATO crisis summit <b>/International Reactions, Arnim Stauth.<sup>551</sup></b>	a)Intro: Many Western politicians are outraged by the Russian behaviour. Consistently it is said that Moscow must not violate Ukraine's territorial integrity. The US, CAN, UK and FRA have stalled their preparations for the upcoming G8 summit in Sochi [June 2014]. Today, the NATO Council held a crisis meeting in BXL. b) Report, Arnim Stauth: "Military decorations and uniforms in the NATO-corridors - but no one seriously expects that the alliance is about to send tanks. NATO SG Rasmussen is now required as a diplomat, capable of finding clear words, but at the same time not spill oil into the UKR fire. Rasmussen: "What Russia is currently doing threatens peace and security in Europe. Russia must stop its military actions and threats." [Stauth ctd.] But also the UKR government needs to do its part towards de-escalation. Rasmussen: "We urge the UKR government to guarantee the democratic rights of all citizens, and also makes sure that minority rights are being protected." [Stauth ctd.] Thus, the world's most powerful military alliance strikes a low-keyed tune. However, from the other side of the Atlantic a rumbling foreign Secretary [John Kerry] could be heard, Kerry: "He is not going to have a G8 summit in Sochi, maybe Russia doesn't even stay in the G8". Frank Walter Steinmeier: "There is discussions about this [sanctions; excluding Russia from G8 summit] among the heads of state - the one group that says we now must send a strong signal and exclude Russia against the other group - and I am more inclined towards them - that argues that the G( Format is in fact the last format in which we from the West can talk with Russia directly. [this group asks] - should we really sacrifice this last remaining format?". [Stauth ctd.: Tomorrow, the EU FM will meet in BXL, and seek to find a common position between these two.

<sup>551</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47090.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	audio, Hessischer Rundfunk, Andreas Horchler: "Kerry to travel to Kyiv", 03:31am. <sup>552</sup>	<p>On Tuesday [04.03.] US Secretary of State Kerry is to travel to Kyiv, to assure the new government in Kyiv about US support. <b>Leading employees of the ministry (Department of State) argued at a conference late on Sunday [NSC meeting, 02.03.2014] that the Russian military took control of Crimea, and in doing so repeatedly violated international law. In a joint statement published by the White House, the G7 condemn the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia.</b> None of the states continues to participate in the preparations for the G8 summit that is planned for June in Sochi. It is the first price of which Obama warned Russia would have to pay in case of an intervention.: "There will be costs for any military intervention into Ukraine". The US Secretary of State, John Kerry attacked the Russian president sharply. [According to Kerry], he is acting with the methods of the 19th century, but he still has the opportunity to return to the negotiating table. If the conflict would escalate, Kerry said on ABC, 'Russia could not only loose the Sochi-Summit, but also its membership of the G8. He added that it is possible that Russian assets in the US could be frozen, a visa-ban imposed, and economic relations could be disrupted; there could be a withdrawal from US investments in Russia. <b>[Kerry]: "One simply doesn't invade into another country based on false assumptions."</b> [Kerry furthermore demanded that ] as soon as possible, an international observer mission should monitor the situation on Crimea and Eastern UKR. [Horchler ctd]: <i>A military response is not considered by the US, as the Department of Defence, and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, emphasised.</i> According to the Department of State, several meetings between Russian and US business delegations had been cancelled already. For Russia, the economic situation could soon become dicey, if further sanctions are to follow. The historian <i>Aron David Miller of the renowned think tank Woodrow-Wilson-Centre</i> told CNN: "Unfortunately this is a chess game. Putin is first host to the Winter Olympics, and not even a week later he invades a sovereign country." [Horchler ctd.] Miller is sure that at the end there will be a diplomatic solution. And Putin, the aggressor, will after joint efforts in the Iran Deal or the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal portray himself as a <b>peacemaker</b>. The path to such a diplomatic solution - if so taken - appears to be long and littered with many uncertainties.</p>

<sup>552</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118912.html>

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03.03.2014	audio, Radio Bremen, Robert Kiendl: Reactions from Berlin to the Ukraine crisis, 09:59 am. <sup>553</sup>	<p>Also, in this country many have the unpleasant feeling that one can literally watch how in the south east of Europe a new war is being instigated. Between two states that until 1990 belonged to one, the Soviet Union. Back then already, all power was held in Moscow. And today it also appears as if the shots are being called about war and peace in Ukraine by the Kremlin only. Russian president Putin received a free hand from his parliament to order a military operation on Crimea. It is not too late yet, German Foreign Minister FWS emphasised in ARD "Bericht aus Berlin": [Steinmeier] <b>"Putin has the authorisation to use troops, but he has not yet taken a decision to use this to the effect to, at least in larger numbers, send troops in the direction of Crimea.</b> That is a very dangerous state of affairs that we are having there. <b>But I also say: Reversal is still possible; we can still prevent further escalation.</b> " [Kiendl ctd.] For this, [Steinmeier added], it is required at a minimum that RUS and UKR start direct talks, or in the case of this failing, with the help of the United Nations or the OSCE. At least, according to Steinmeier, the new <i>UKR prime minister Yatseniuk and his Russian counterpart Medwedew spoke on the phone</i> for the first time over the weekend. <b>At the same time the Foreign Minister warns to singularly exert pressure on Russia.</b> Much rather, unambiguous messages should be send to both sides, [Steinmeier:] "On the one hand to Russia, to observe the territorial integrity of UKR, on the other hand to Ukraine, to portray itself as the government of ALL Ukrainians." [Kiendl ctd.] Not least, Russia is worried about the security of the ethnic Russian Ukrainians, since the pro-Russian president Yanukovich has been overthrown in Kyiv. Claudia Roth of the Green Party, and vice-president of the Bundestag clearly favours a hard stance towards Russia: [Roth] "<i>Putin's intervention is a violation of international law.</i> By doing this, he positions himself outside the UN, outside the European Council, outside the OSCE. Therefore one must <i>consider for example sanctions, a visa-ban or the freezing of Russian assets, but also the energy business, and the energy business relations.</i>" [Kiendl ctd]: The US Foreign Secretary [Kerry] even threatens that Russia could be kicked out of the G8. His German counterpart, at least so far, is not convinced: [Steinmeier]"One group favours sending a strong message to Russia now, while the other - and I am more inclined towards them - argues that the G8 format is in fact the only format in which we from the West can still speak with the Russian directly - and should we really sacrifice this only format?" [Kiendl ctd] In Brussels [on the EU Foreign Minister crisis summit on Ukraine], Steinmeier will now seek a way forward with his EU counterparts. To this end, he even moved a planned trip to Georgia, which also once belonged to the Soviet Union, and against which Russia lead a war six years ago - and eventually won."</p>

<sup>553</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio118920.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 1200 noon, Ina Ruck. <sup>554</sup>	"On Russian media, the top news was about the phone conversation between Merkel and Putin. [TV presenter on Russia 24] <b>"Putin has told the chancellor the Russian reactions were fully proportionate, [as] the rights of Russians and Russian people are threatened by [Ukrainian] ultra-nationalists"</b> . [Ruck ctd.] Pictures shown in the news today also show images of several Ukrainian bureaucrats swearing an oath to the constitution of the autonomous Republic of Crimea. Russian TV claims they are high ranking officials from the UKR intelligence, the UKR ministry of interior, and UKR Border Guards. However, so far this has not yet been confirmed by Kyiv. Confirmed is the defection of the chief of the Ukrainian Navy, who yesterday placed himself under the command of the Crimean regional government. The [new] Ukrainian government fired him immediately. The <i>British Foreign Minister William Hague</i> travelled to Ukraine, and visited the Maidan square first thing in the morning. He called upon Russia to order back its troops, and on <b>Ukraine to not let itself be provoked</b> . The US Foreign Secretary is also expected in Kyiv.

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<sup>554</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376460.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	audio MDR BXL, Martin Bohne: EU Foreign Minister Crisis meeting on Ukraine. <sup>555</sup>	<p>"Rarely have the EU Foreign Ministers gathered in such a dramatic situation. [German] Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier chooses a vigorous admonition to describe the seriousness of the situation. [Steinmeier]: "Europe, without any doubt, is experiencing its most serious crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall. <b>Twenty-five years after the end of the bloc confrontation, the risk of a renewed splitting of Europe is real</b>". [Bohne, ctd.]: The French Foreign Minister, <i>Laurent Fabuse</i>, demands that <i>Europe must speak with a unified voice</i> in such a dramatic situation. That [Fabuse added] is of fundamental importance. For the <i>Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt</i>, this begins with an <i>unambiguous language</i>. He himself is not shy of clear words: [Bildt] "It is of <i>decisive importance that we condemn the Russian behaviour in Ukraine very sharply</i>". [Bohne, ctd.] The <i>Hungarian Foreign Minister, Martouj</i>, is fully on that line. [According to him] <i>The EU should stand fully behind the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine</i>. He drew a parallel to the intervention into his country in 1956. He even <i>wants to consider sanctions</i> against Russia: "What I can say no is that we will discuss these questions at depth in the next hours, and after that we will have an answer for you."; US Foreign Secretary Kerry already threatened to kick Russia out of the G8 group of states, and all other members have stopped their efforts for the upcoming G8 summit in Sochi. However, this is <b>not to the taste of all EU member states</b>. The <i>Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn</i>, explains why:[Asselborn] "<b>We are also fully aware of the fact that 25% of all our energy originates from Russia, and that we also know that the economic relations between Russia and the EU are to be rated extremely important.</b>" [Bohne ctd.] The German Foreign Minister also doesn't use the term sanctions. Frank Walter Steinmeier chooses diplomacy over strong words: [Steinmeier] "<b>We will not be able to comment our way out of this, but we also have to keep ourselves able to do policy beyond this date. Therefore, I say that it is indeed also the hour of diplomacy. Crisis diplomacy is not weakness but will now be more important than ever</b>" [Bohne, ctd.]: to prevent an outbreak of war. For Steinmeier, this means <b>searching for formats in which the Russian and the Ukrainian side can re-start a dialogue</b>. He highlights the <b>positive experience with international contact groups</b>. Furthermore, he spoke in <b>favour of an OSCE observer mission</b> to assess the situation on the ground on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.</p>

<sup>555</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118938.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 1700, a) <b>Crisis on Crimea, Report by Michael Heussen</b> ; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; c) Interview with W.D. Krause, BXL, on EU Foreign Minister crisis summit; d) Interview Stefan Wolff, Frankfurt, on market response to Ukraine crisis. <sup>556</sup>	"Flowers for the fallen of Maidan - the British Foreign Minister [William] Hague on the battlefield of the past weeks. Everything is still covered in soot [here], but the next conflict with much more serious consequences is impending. William Hague calls it the <b>largest crisis in Europe in this century</b> . The Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk hopes for political and economic support [to his country]: [Yatseniuk] "Every attempt by Russia to annex Crimea will not be successful - just give us some time". [Heussen ctd.] Former PResident Yuliya Timoshenko portrays herself more bellicose: [ <i>Timoshenko</i> , on INTV] " <b>Vladimir Putin should understand that if he attacks on us, he declares war on all those that guarantee our security, the United States and Great Britain</b> . I am convinced that he will not cross this threshold, if nonetheless he does, he will definitely loose." [Heussen ctd] At a Human Rights Council of the United Nations meeting in Geneva, Russian Foreign Minister <i>Sergei Lawrow</i> <b>defended Russian behaviour on Crimea, and sharply criticizes the West: [Lawrow]: "Those that speak of an [act of] aggression, and threaten sanctions and bankruptcies, are the same that have prevented dialogue. They have thereby supported the splitting of the country"</b> . [Heussen ctd]: Dialogue in Russian - on Crimea this means Russian soldiers encircle Ukrainian military installations and continue to arrest Ukrainian soldiers. <b>Moscow has de facto taken over control.</b> "

<sup>556</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376526.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 1700, a) Crisis on Crimea, Report by Michael Heussen; b) <b>Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol;</b> c) Interview with W.D. Krause, BXL, on EU Foreign Minister crisis summit; d) Interview Stefan Wolff, Frankfurt, on market response to Ukraine crisis. <sup>557</sup>	Q.: How do you experience the situation? A: Well, <b>after such massive movements that we have seen on TV, one would imagine to be tanks or heavy equipment rolling here - but this isn't the case.</b> There is nothing here, the streets are open, only a few roadblocks here and there. <b>No, the entire re-enforcement of the Russians is organized by air</b> - if one looks up, one can see military aircraft flying, we have seen two or three today. With them the Russians reinforced their troops and encircled the Ukrainian bases. IT is an afterwit of history that throughout the history of Crimea, there were always two types of bases here - Russian and Ukrainian. Therefore, if you allow the cynical remark, the way was not so far.... Q. How are the people of Crimea dealing with this situation? A.: Well we have heard a lot about the composition of the Crimean population - more than 60% are either ethnic Russians or speak Russian - and they actually believe that the <i>Russian troops are truly establishing a line of defence, coherent with the [official Russian] motto "to defend Crimea against the annexation of [Ukrainian] nationalists.</i> But we spoke today with the <b>Crimean Tatars</b> who represent one fifth (1/5; 20%) of the population, and are thus a minority. <b>Only if one looks into their eyes, one truly sees their fear, only then one is able to grasp the size of the operation and what it means for the people who don't necessarily belong to the Russian speaking majority"</b>

<sup>557</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376528.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 1700, a) Crisis on Crimea, Report by Michael Heussen; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; c) <b>Interview with W.D. Krause, BXL, on EU Foreign Minister crisis summit;</b> d) Interview Stefan Wolff, Frankfurt, on market response to Ukraine crisis. <sup>558</sup>	Q: How much is the EU struggling with this crisis? A.: Europe is struggling - but this is also a consequence of the situation. On the one hand, the U.S: and Europe maintain close economic ties with Russia. More than a fourth [25%] of our energy supplies are from Russia. Russia is also an important export market. This creates a mutual linkage and creates dependencies and takes away some freedom to let the heavy words be followed by substantial action. <b>From the perspective on many Europeans, it is also not too late yet to still try something with diplomacy,</b> directed at both sides of the conflict. One foreign minister told me that the situation there was not black and white, that there is no simple evil on one, and the good on the other side, but <b>one must influence both sides to moderate their behaviour in order to prevent a larger conflict here.</b> Q: Now Ukraine is factually bankrupt - will the EU help quickly and whole-heartedly with financial aid? A.: The EU is not in a position to do this. Ukraine needs money, and the correct institution for this is the IMF. IT is not possible to buy Ukraine, as Putin tried earlier [November 2013]. It is <b>only possible to help Ukraine by for example temporarily taking over their debt,</b> but there will be strings attached that won't be easy for the country either.

<sup>558</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376530.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 1700, a) Crisis on Crimea, Report by Michael Heussen; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; c) Interview with W.D. Krause, BXL, on EU Foreign Minister crisis summit; d) <b>Interview Stefan Wolff, Frankfurt, on market response to Ukraine crisis.</b> <sup>559</sup>	Q: The German stock market reacted concerend, but did not show any signs of panic. How is this on the other markets, in the United States, in Russia? A.: Well, the reaction of the financial markets indeed makes clear that this is a crisis in the heart of Europe, and that it is also a crisis for the trade relations, which of course are very strong with Russia. The Wall Street reacted cautiously, drops 1%, while European Indices averaged a drop by 2,7%, and the Russian market, already closed now, suffered a mega-loss of 12%. Particularly those businesses that held close ties with the Russian marketlost: , for example the retail group METRO, who intends to list his Russian business on the stockmarket this year, down 5.5%; pharmaceuticals Stada, who is very active on the Russian market, down 5.2%; and ADIDAS, who regards Russia as a future market, down 2.1%. <b>All this led to the fact that the DAX lost considerably, and closes down 3.2% - in a nutshell, the markets are very worried.</b>

<sup>559</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376532.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 2015, a) <b>Report Michael Heussen</b> , b) live from Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) live from Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) Reactions in Brussels, Report Bettina Scharkus f) Lawrow defends Russian actions, Daniel Hechler, Geneva. <sup>560</sup>	a)Intro, Linda Zervakis: "Russia increases ist pressure despite international crisis diplomacy. Apparently further troops were sent to the Crimean Peninsula. Furthermore, the Russian Black Sea fleet appears to be blocking UKR vessels. However, according to the speaker of the Russian parliament, Sergei Narishkin, Russia currently sees no reason for a military intervention. There would still be the possibility of a political solution [Naryshkin said]. b) Report, Michael Heussen: [Images show Russian military official saluting President Putin on the occasion of a <b>military exercise near St. Petersburg</b> ] "Commander in Chief, the troops stand ready at your orders". [Heussen ctd]: Today, <b>Russian President Putin convinced himself of the effectiveness of troops in a military exercise near St. Petersburg, where counter-terrorist operations were shown, it was being said</b> [images show a large-scale military exercise, including 8 battle helicopter]. Close combat on the other hand [could be seen] in the Ukrainian town of Donetsk, where hundreds of protesters occupied buildings of the local administrations. Ukraine is threatened as much from the inside as from the outside. [...statement Steinmeier of his favouring keeping the G8 format as last remaining negotiation format]. "The currencies of both UKR and Russia have lost already. [Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk] "This is a normal reaction of everyone who has money in the bank. If you see Russian troops and tanks mustering, businesspeople withdraw their money from the bank and change it into safe foreign currencies."[Heussen ctd.] In the meantime, the propaganda-war continues on Crimea: Hundreds of naval officers today publicly swore an oath of allegiance to the [autonomous] Republic of Crimea; their Commander swapped his allegiance already yesterday and put himself under Moscow's command."

<sup>560</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47098.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 2015, a) Report Michael Heussen, b) <b>live from Moscow, Ina Ruck</b> ; c) live from Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) Reactions in Brussels, Report Bettina Scharkus; f) Lawrow defends Russian actions, Daniel Hechler, Geneva <sup>561</sup>	a) Intro, Linda Zervakis: "Additional irritations about the conflict were caused by <b>reports of an alleged Russian ultimatum</b> to the Ukrainian military - from Moscow, Ina Ruck. B) Ina Ruck, live from Moscow: "Indeed, a lot of fuss was made about this alleged Russian ultimatum: During the afternoon, the <i>Ukrainian Ministry of Defence</i> had <b>said Russia had issued a deadline</b> to the Ukrainian border guards on Crimea, to leave their barracks by 4am, otherwise the buildings will be stormed. Only <b>during the evening Russia issued a denial</b> , that said something that what the Ukrainians are <b>claiming is complete nonsense</b> . <i>In times like these, it is very difficult to differentiate rumours from propaganda, and both from the truth</i> . The nerves are showing, particularly on Crimea. However, at the moment, the Russians clearly appear to have the better nerves. They control large parts of Crimea; its troops control several bases of the Ukrainian border guards. If the Russians show nerves anywhere, then economically - the Rouble dropped to a record low this afternoon."
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 2015, a) Report Michael Heussen, b) live from Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) <b>live from Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol</b> ; d) Reactions in Brussels, Report Bettina Scharkus; f) Lawrow defends Russian actions, Daniel Hechler, Geneva <sup>562</sup>	<b>"The whole day Russia reinforced its troops here. However, not a single tank, not a single piece of heavy equipment was moved. The reinforcement was done exclusively by air.</b> For good reasons the Russian air force has maintained bases here. In front of some Ukrainian bases, there still are Russian troops - they are standing eye to eye with their Ukrainian counterparts: a dangerous situation [that has been ongoing] for days. <b>However, according to the information so far, there have been no provocations or incidents so far.</b> On the political side, the new pro-Russian administration of Crimea has begun a discussion on the rights of minorities. This is of course particularly interesting, as this is of course directed at the Crimean Tatars, the only minority on Crimea that is in its entirety in favour of remaining with Ukraine.

<sup>561</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47098.html>

<sup>562</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47098.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 2015, a) Report Michael Heussen, b) live from Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) live from Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) <b>Reactions in Brussels, Report Bettina Scharkus</b> f) Lawrow defends Russian actions, Daniel Hechler, Geneva. <sup>563</sup>	a) Introduction, Linda Zervakis: "On the international scene, intense efforts are underway to defuse the situation. On request of Russia, the United Nations Security Council will convene tonight for another discussion on the situation on Crimea. Following an extraordinary meeting in Brussels, the EU foreign ministers demanded Russia to remain prudent. They will still focus on diplomacy, but also threatened sanctions. b) Report, Bettina Scharkus: "The cables are burning in the building of the EU Council, where the breaking news about the crisis in Ukraine are being received. [Today] the EU Foreign Ministers feverishly tried to find ways to defuse the conflict. However, in his press conference, the <b>German foreign minister remained vague: [Steinmeier] "Today we also agreed to a decision which says that if there are no fast and credible contributions to a de-escalation by Russia, then we will have to take decisions that will touch upon the bilateral EU-Russia relationship"</b> . [Scharkus ctd.] Decisions yes, but the EU foreign ministers can not agree on sanctions. During the crisis summit, apparently it was particularly the Scandinavian and Eastern European member states that demanded to get tough on Russia - to no avail. [Radoslaw Sikorksi, Polish foreign minister] " We have the most serious crisis in Europe since the wars in Yugoslavia. How credible the International Community, and particularly the European Union is will have to be proven in this challenge." [Scharkus ctd]: Although the European Union does not want to exclude sanctions entirely, for now it limits its actions to appeals. [High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton] "We need to see a return [ot the Russian] troops to their barracks, to the places where they are stationed according to the bilateral agreement on the stationing of Russian troops in Ukraine. We are very concerned about the fact that Russian troops are being mobilized". [Scharkus ctd.] Another crisis summit is being prepared for Thursday, this time the heads of state and government will meet. However, a grand solution is not to be expected from them either. <i>The consequence the EU top-diplomats are threatening are for example a temporary visa-ban or the freezing of assets - that such threats impress the leadership in Moscow is believed by hardly anyone here in Brussels.</i>

<sup>563</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47098.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	tagesschau, 2015, a) Report Michael Heussen, b) live from Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) live from Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) Reactions in Brussels, Report Bettina Scharkus; f) <b>Lawrow defends Russian actions, Daniel Hechler, Geneva.</b> <sup>564</sup>	a) Intro, Linda Zervakis: " Lawrow defended the Russian behaviour in Ukraine during a meeting today of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. He accused the new government in Kyiv to neglect the fundamental rights of the Russian minority on Crimea, and that it had furthermore prepared provocations against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, [and that to counter this], <b>the legitimate authorities on Crimea had [officially] pledged Russia for help.</b> " b) Report Daniel Hechler: For long, Sergei Lawrow, the Russian Foreign Minister had kept his silence. Today, of all places, he chose a meeting of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, to defend the use of troops on Crimea. With some astonishment diplomats from all over the world heard that Russia steps in particularly because of the human rights situation [on Crimea]. [Lawrow] "It is about defending the human rights of our fellow people, especially the right to life. Those that describe this as an act of aggression, and threaten sanctions, are the same partners that refused any dialog about this, and that are responsible for the splitting of Ukraine." [Hechler ctd.] At least Russia indicates readiness for dialog. During the afternoon Sergei Lawrow met with UN Secretary General [Ban Ki Moon] - with no concrete results. However, after the meeting, Ban Ki Moon strongly warned of further provocations: [ Moon] " I urge Russia to undertake nothing that could further escalate the situation, and to begin negotiations with Ukraine." [Hechler ctd.]: In these minutes, [German] foreign minister Steinmeier is meeting Lawrow for dinner. He doesn't want to cut the dialog with Russia. [To Steinmeier's mind] Russia should not be allowed to slip into complete diplomatic isolation, despite all verbal attacks. While on Crimea the sabre-rattling continues, in Geneva diplomacy is slowly taken up pace. No one, however, should expect a quick return to normalcy".

<sup>564</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47098.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, 23:45, Thomas Roth; a) <b>Situation on Crimea / in Kyiv</b>, Michael Heussen, b) Interview Michael Heussen, Kyiv, c) Interview Stuchlik, Simferopol, on Russian troop movements; d) Role of Crimean Tatars, Report Stefan Stuchlik; e) Interview Stefan Stuchlik, Will the Tatars take up arms?; f) What does Putin want, Report Ina Ruck; g) EU&amp;US reaction, report by Hechler [see also report tagesschau, 03.03.2014, 20:15; h) Reactions in Washington, Interview with Stefan Niemann; i) UN Security Council meeting on Crimea, Interview with Markus Schmidt, New York; j)Commentary, Wolf-Dieter Krause [see also comment W.D. Krause after EU-summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013].<sup>565</sup></p>	<p>a) Intro, Th. Roth: "This is the worst crisis in Europe in the 21st century", British Foreign Minister [William] Hague said today about the crisis on Crimea. "It is the worst crisis since the fall of the wall", German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said today. Both are right.[...] [Roth ctd.] <b>A few weeks ago, no one could have imagined that a de-facto occupation of Crimea by Russia or troops collaborating with them, could happen. Today, we must assume that this is the case.</b> Almost by the hour, this scenario is unravelling, seemingly following a well-prepared Russian script, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict, if not to say the <b>threat of war</b>. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv itself has no means at its disposal to stop the development. In the meantime, they [Kyiv government] are counting 16.000 additional [Russian] troops on Crimea. b) Report, M. Heussen: "The news are the most viewed program in Kyiv. What is happening in the South, on Crimea? How does the West react? [the people are asking]. Many want to remain on Maidan, until the crisis is over. But no one can imagine how long this might be. British foreign minister Hague put down flowers to commemorate the victims of the protest in Kyiv, just like thousands of others did before. The streets here [on Maidan] are still covered in soot, the smell of fire is still lingering in the air. <b>Is this the day before the outbreak of a war?</b> The war of words is surely fully being waged: [Yatseniuk, UKR PM]: Any attempt by Russia to annex Crimea will not succeed" [Heussen ctd] Even football star Timoschchuk speaks out: "We play for different supporters, and there are many differences between our cities - but let us stop the violence, let us be united in what we love, Ukraine!" [Heussen ctd]: But in many cities Timoschchuk mentions, the violence is not stopping. It is unclear whether the protesters who have successfully stormed the local administrations headquarters are Russian Ukrainian or actually Russians. At least one partial success for the Kyiv government today: Naval officers publicly swore an oath of allegiance to Ukraine [check news during day, were reported as defectors first]. Yesterday, their commandant publicly changed sides, and put himself under the command of Moscow. Most soldiers stationed on Crimea have completely different worries. Their barracks are encircled by troops that adhere to the command of Russia.</p>

<sup>565</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, 23:45, Thomas Roth; a) Situation on Crimea / in Kyiv, Michael Heussen, b) <b>Interview on Russian war ultimatum Michael Heussen, Kyiv</b>, c) Interview Stuchlik, Simferopol, on Russian troop movements; d) Role of Crimean Tatars, Report Stefan Stuchlik; e) Interview Stefan Stuchlik, Will the Tatars take up arms?; f) What does Putin want, Report Ina Ruck; g) EU&amp;US reaction, report by Hechler [see also report tagesschau, 03.03.2014, 20:15; h) Reactions in Washington, Interview with Stefan Niemann; i) UN Security Council meeting on Crimea, Interview with Markus Schmidt, New York; j)Commentary, Wolf-Dieter Krause [see also comment W.D. Krause after EU-summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013].<sup>566</sup></p>	<p>Q: During the day there was news about a Russian ultimatum issued to the Ukrainian troops, that if they do not surrender their barracks, the barracks will be taken by force- What is that all about? A: We have of course all asked ourselves that question. This ultimatum really ruled our agenda here today, but up until this point we cannot confirm whether such an ultimatum really had been issued. <b>The Russians [in the evening] vehemently denied it, and issued a statement saying that such an ultimatum doesnt exist.</b> On the other hand, <b>one must ask the question what could such an ultimatum really achieve? Because de facto the Russians already have taken control of Crimea.</b> Whether the soldiers stay in their barracks or not doesn't play a big role for the question of who is in control on Crimea anymore. q.: Asked very soberly - is there any means at the disposal of the Ukrainian government to prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea [first time calling it Russian annexation!]? A.: Certainly not the military. On the contrary, the Ukrainian military can be expected to be fatally inferior to their Russian counterpart. And it doesn't help either to be running out of money, or, to be more precise, on the brink of bankruptcy. The 1 million Euro immediate financial aid promised by the EU won't change this much. The only means Ukraine has at its disposal is the support of the West. <b>There is true shuttle diplomacy at work here</b> [referring to the frequent visits of more or less important politicians in Kyiv]. Today, British foreign minister Hague was here, tomorrow US foreign secretary Kerry is expected. And of course, Ukraine is betting on this card to receive as much support as possible, and by this somehow making Russia give in at the end - because no one here can really have an interest in war.</p>

<sup>566</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, 23:45, Thomas Roth; a) Situation on Crimea / in Kyiv, Michael Heussen, b) Interview Michael Heussen, Kyiv, c) <b>Interview Stuchlik, Simferopol, on Russian troop movements;</b> d) Role of Crimean Tatars, Report Stefan Stuchlik; e) Interview Stefan Stuchlik, Will the Tatars take up arms?; f) What does Putin want, Report Ina Ruck; g) EU&amp;US reaction, report by Hechler [see also report tagesschau, 03.03.2014, 20:15; h) Reactions in Washington, Interview with Stefan Niemann; i) UN Security Council meeting on Crimea, Interview with Markus Schmidt, New York; j)Commentary, Wolf-Dieter Krause [see also comment W.D. Krause after EU-summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013].<sup>567</sup></p>	<p>a) Intro Roth: "News today about Russian troops crossing from the Russian mainland by ferry to the Crimean town of Kerch. The crossing is only 4 kilometres. What do you know about this? A.: We cannot conform this from here, but it would make sense, as thereby three neuralgic points on Crimea would be occupied. Kerch to the north [EAST???] of the island, with ferry access to the mainland, and in the south, as we already know, Belbek Airbase. The occupying forces here have been reinforced by several hundred additional troops today. And in the Centre of Crimea, Alpetre, where there is a node for radio reconnaissance. So, if one would conceive of an annexation of Crimea, strategically the occupation in the north [Kerch] wold make a lot of sense.</p>

<sup>567</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
03.03.2014	Tagesthemen, 23:45, Thomas Roth; a) Situation on Crimea / in Kyiv, Michael Heussen, b) Interview Michael Heussen, Kyiv, c) Interview Stuchlik, Simferopol, on Russian troop movements; d) <b>Role of Crimean Tatars, Report Stefan Stuchlik;</b> e) Interview Stefan Stuchlik, Will the Tatars take up arms?; f) What does Putin want, Report Ina Ruck; g) EU&US reaction, report by Hechler [see also report tagesschau, 03.03.2014, 20:15; h) Reactions in Washington, Interview with Stefan Niemann; i) UN Security Council meeting on Crimea, Interview with Markus Schmidt, New York; j)Commentary, Wolf-Dieter Krause [see also comment W.D. Krause after EU-	a) Intro, Roth: There is another potential conflict that we want to look at - because on Crimea, since centuries lives the Muslim Crimean Tatars, a Turkic people. <b>Under the pretence of their collaboration with the Wehrmacht</b> deported hundreds of thousands of them, and many of them died. It is the historical trauma of the Tatars. Only at the end of the 80s, under Gorbatschow, they were allowed to return to Crimea. This led to new conflicts with the Russian inhabitants of Crimea [that Stalin had placed there instead]. The Tatars already backed the Orange Revolution in 2004. And also, now, they feel well under the current central government in Kyiv. They oppose an occupation of Crimea by Russia. b) Report S. Stuchlik: "It is difficult to describe the sensation one gets when driving through Simferopol. "Everything is as usual", the new [regional] government of Crimea claims. One must look very closely to see that there are still ongoing protests - with Russian flags. But if one then turns at Karl-Marx-Street, it quickly becomes apparent that this pseudo-reality only lasts as long as the evidently Russian soldiers allow for it [images show heavily armed, masked men in uniform without insignia]. An hour outside of Simferopol the world is completely out of joint. Scatters small houses, a village of the Crimean Tatars. It is the first time we see the Ukrainian national flag on our entire trip. The muezzin calls for the prayer when we arrive. [unnamed male Crimean Tatar, mid aged]: "We are now fortifying our houses, mosques and graveyards, we protect our culture. We do not want the Russians to rob us. [Question Stuchlik] "What are you doing during the night, how do I have to imagine this? [Tatar ctd]: We make a fire here, and then we are 40 people - we all want that it stays peaceful". [Stucklik, ctd]: " The fear here can be sensed with bare hands. No one is on the streets, particularly the women are not leaving their houses anymore. The Muslim Tatars represent a sixth [16%; check with earlier figures, where 20% was commonly claimed] of Crimea's population. A people that were deported during the Soviet Union. Ukraine allowed them back in 1990. They are the only ones here that really fear Russia. [old female Crimean Tatar]: Who has allowed them to do this, how can you just invade another country? And now what? What about us, we are completely without protection. I am furious." [Young female Crimean Tatar]: "We want that all cultures on Crimea co-exist peacefully. Now dictatorship is beginning again, we have already been through this during the Soviet Union. Do you know how long it took us, here, on our soil, to get our rights back, peacefully, and before the eyes of the people of Crimea?". [Stuchlik ctd]: When driving back through the village hours later, we get an impression how quickly fear can turn into violence. Unarmed, the male Crimean Tatars stand at the village entry. The question is how long they will remain unarmed. [Old Men, Crimean Tatar]: We are ready to defend ourselves, even with our bare hands, if necessary. We don't have any other chance. The Russians say we are a minority here - which minority? We are the indigenous people of Crimea"" [Stuchlik ctd]: <b><u>300 000 Tatars live on Crimea. 300 000 people that under no circumstances want to belong to a Russian empire. Currently they are protecting their villages unarmed. Whether this remains the case, is one of the big questions.</u></b>

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	summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013). <sup>568</sup>	

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<sup>568</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

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<sup>572</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

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<sup>573</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

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<sup>574</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5312.html>

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04.03.2014	tagesschau.de, Background article: Appeals and threats of sanctions: Overview of international response to crisis on Crimea. <sup>575</sup>	a) Steinmeier: " The risk that we already can see now is that someone [in this conflict] simply loses the head - not even because of a political decision - and that things then start developing by themselves. This must be prevented with the means that are at our disposal". b) Summary of international response to crisis in UKR: 1) <b>Contact Group</b> [Steinmeier's idea], made up of several international organisations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe) and governments, with the objective to get the two conflicting parties, Ukraine and Russia, talking to each other again. German government emphasises the role of the Council of Europe. 2) <b>OSCE fact finding mission</b> to establish the facts on the situation on Crimea and prevent a further escalation. However, the mission requires unanimous consent of the OSCE members. So far, Russia vetoed such an initiative. However, in an extraordinary meeting yesterday, the OSCE decided to send a pre-deployed team promptly.
04.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15 Jan Hofer; a) <b>Signs of de-escalation: Putin's first statement on Crimea, Report B. Virnich</b> b) Situation in Crimea/ Kerry in Kyiv, c) Live from Kyiv, Michael Heussen; d) Diplomatic efforts / Steinmeier's efforts, Report N.N.; e) Reactions in the US, Report Tina Hassel. <sup>576</sup>	a) Intro, Hofer: " <b>Russia keeps steady on its course, but indicates that it is open for discussions. With such signals the Russian President Putin spoke out [on the situation on Crimea] today. Before [hand-picked] journalists he made clear that he currently sees no reason for a military action in Ukraine. He also denied the accusation that Russian soldiers had occupied the Crimean Peninsula. Putin called the change of power [in Kyiv on 26.02.2016] an unconstitutional coup d'état.</b> b) Report, B Virnich: Finally, the long waited for statement by Vladimir Putin was announced. Russian journalists waited for hours. Foreign journalists were explicitly not invited. As if the president was unwilling to face their questions. Something like [no foreign journalists] has not happened during Putin's rule before. He used the press-conference as a stage to portray his view on [Crimea]. [Putin] " The overthrow of the Ukrainian government [on 26.02.] was an armed coup d'état. And therefore unconstitutional. There is nothing to interpret about that.". [Virnich ctd] " <b>For Putin, the agreement that the three foreign ministers of the EU from France, Poland and Germany negotiated with Yanukovych is binding.</b> The current government is considered illegal by Putin. [Putin]: Yanukovych had already stepped down. He had no chance to be re-elected, I told him that personally already then. And everyone agreed to that. Why was there a need to override this, and act unconstitutionally?" [Virnich ctd]: In many places in Russia, Putin's words were seen as a sign for de-escalation. But at a demonstration before the ministry of defence, critical voices could be heard. Here, Putin's assertions are not believed. [Images show police arresting demonstrators]. [anonymous male protester] "I am against this madness Russian officers and soldiers are staging in Ukraine. That is violence against another country, a country that we should better support." [Female protester] "We are for peace! There are no reason at all for a military intervention. The army is in Ukraine for long already." [Virnich ctd] But words like these don't go unpunished in Russia, and later many of the protesters were being arrested.

<sup>575</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/russland-krim132.html>

<sup>576</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47112.html>

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<sup>577</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47112.html>

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<sup>578</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47112.html>



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<sup>579</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47112.html>

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04.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15 Jan Hofer; a) Signs of de-escalation: Putin's first statement on Crimea, Report B. Virnich b) Situation in Crimea/ Kerry in Kyiv, c) Live from Kyiv, Michael Heussen; d) Diplomatic efforts / Steinmeier's efforts, Report N.N.; e) <b>Reactions in the US, Report Tina Hassel.</b> <sup>580</sup>	<p>a) Intro, Jan Hofer: The US is drawing consequences from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. All contacts to the Russian military, like joint exercises, were put on hold with immediate effect. Tonight, President Obama said that President Putin could not lead anyone astray with his assertions. Russia isolates itself [Obama added]. In the meantime, Washington is preparing to bring sanctions against Moscow underway.</p> <p>b) Report Tina Hassel: Many in the White House ask themselves these days: Is it an ice-age again, does Russia really fall back into the politics of the Cold War? Or is a diplomatic solution still possible? [Obama]"We are calling for a de-escalation. There is widespread agreement that Russia has violated international law, although President Putin and his advisors have reached different conclusions." [Hassel ctd] " For two hours, Obama met with his National Security Council. Feverishly, sanctions that are to come into effect this week are being prepared. Russian assets shall be frozen, visa restrictions applied, and a trade agreement between the two countries put on ice. <b><u>But for further reaching sanction, the closing of ranks with Berlin is required.</u></b> "Germany exerts the largest influence on Russia" [CNN interview with Mrs. Amanapour], it is said openly here on TV. <b><u>There is a widespread believe that the chancellor can achieve more than the US president.</u></b> The opposition here holds Obama responsible for the crisis. [Lindsey Graham, Senator, R] "Obama's weakness and his inability to decide have made this crisis possible." [Hassel ctd]: "Domestically, the pressure is mounting on Obama. But for a power-play with Russia, he currently has few viable leverages. For a strong response, a common strategy with the partners is required. And this is precisely where the problem lies. <b><u>Washington wants to isolate Russia, Berlin still emphasises dialogue.</u></b> For example, kicking Russia out of the G8 could only be implemented jointly. In this, it <b>doesnt help much that the relationship between Merkel and Obama is still suffering from the NSA listening scandal"</b>.</p>

<sup>580</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47112.html>

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04.03.2014	Brennpunkt: New Cold War on Crimea, Markus Strempel; a) <b>Situation in Eastern Ukraine, Report by B. Virnich</b> , b) Situation on Crimea, Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, c) , Interview (1) with Jean Asselborn, FM LUX on Russia-West; EU Russia; possible reactions to Crimea; d) Putin's Press Conference, Report Jens Eberl	Intro, Michael Strempel: The events on Crimea have led to a new ice-age between the West und Russia. Today, again there were no signs of an easing of tensions. President <b>Putin, in his first Press conference since the beginning of the crisis on Crimea [when exactly is the beginning?], sent re-assuring and unsettling signals alike.</b> b) Situation in Eastern Ukraine, Report by Birgit Virnich: (a) Intro Strempel: "Not only on Crimea, but also in the Russian speaking towns of Eastern Ukraine the pro-Russian forces are more and more clearly gaining the upper hand. (b) Report, Virnich: "Still the Lenin-statue stands tall in Kharkov and reminds of the time when the city was the capital of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. It is also the apple of discord between Maidan-supporters and those Ukrainians that favour a close relationship with Russia. The two sides stand face to face irreconcilable [here]. The 19-year-old Yuliya has been here for the last two weeks to protect the memorial. Because the Maidan-supporters want to tear it down. [Yuliya] "Lenin is part of our history, our inheritance. He meant a lot to my parents and grandparents - how dare I deny that?" [Virnich ctd] " They follow the political development in distant Kyiv with mistrust, and bitterly discuss the future of Ukraine. Splitting the country, no, but many could imagine a federation. [Young man]: But this wouldn't solve our problems. It cannot be that the parliament in Kyiv makes laws that forbid us to speak Russian". [Old men]:" Since Putin reassured us about his protection, we feel more secure, with Russia on our side. There is a power behind us to protect the Slavic peoples from interferences of the West and the USA. Because they are also responsible for this chaos." [Virnich ctd] And precisely in the close relationship with Russia, the Maidan-supporters in Kharkov, see the problem. At the beginning, Ukrainian novelist Sardan saw an opportunity in the manifold political discussions. The beginning of a civil society. He joined sides with the local Maidan -supporters that favour a closer relationship with Europe. But a few days ago, he was beaten up for that. [Sardan] "At times things get a little out of control here. The crisis has politicized the people. The power of the President must be curtailed, otherwise we will end up with a new dictatorship under the new president" [Virnich ctd] Here in Kharkov, the opinions are clashing more and more openly. The conflict showed how hard the people of Ukraine wrestle about their political future.

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<sup>581</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376826.html>

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During the times of the Cold War, Russia clearly was the hegemon in Eastern Europe. Not only the Soviet republics stood under Moscow's control, but also the members of the Warsaw Pact. <b>In 1990 the Soviet Union dissolved itself, and the European Union's became the cynosure for many countries formerly belonging to the Eastern Bloc. By now, nine of them are full members of the European Union. And the convergence is set to continue: Not only Ukraine currently fights for a closer association with the EU. The sphere of influence of Russia seems to shrink.</b> Q: Has the West, have you may be underestimated how strongly Russia was hurt by losing it's influence over the past 20 years? A.: I think there are two components at play. The first is, of course, what you alluded to, that the communist system disintegrated, and in parallel the territorial power of the Soviet. I was, together with Jean Claude Juncker on Crimea for a day in 2005, excuse me, I mean the Kremlin. We have interviewed President Putin all day in our capacity as EU presidency. <b>It was already evident then that his aim is to correct what from his view appears like a punishment by history.</b> The second component of course also is, and maybe I can say this a little easier than a someone from Germany, but one must say that in relation to NATO, the appetite came during the meal. We have, I think as <b>NATO, moved closer and more intensely towards Russia, in a way it was not agreed to, let's say directly after the wall came down.</b> [see Adomeit, the non-expansion agreement]. That hurt the Russian soul, and I think the NATO-Russia council is a corrective, but of course it doesn't relax the Russians. Q: But there is deep, widespread mistrust. Today Putin said during his press conference that he <b>feels side-lined</b>, because even the mediator team of the EU, the three [France, Germany, Poland] <b>foreign ministers have agreed to something else what happened.</b> The agreement was to manage a peaceful and orderly transition. That didn't work out. Putin claims that this is a breach of words. Is he completely wrong with his argument? A.: I believe that this claim is, to my mind, exaggerated by the Russian side. You see, <b>the paper that Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Sikorski, and also Fabuse helped negotiating wasn't even signed, but only initiated by the Russian side. And in all of a sudden this is supposed to be the entire reference.</b> In this paper, the first, important point was to stop the violence - on this day, the 21st of February more than eighty people died in Ukraine - and that was stopped. That was a major aim, and it was achieved. <b>Back then, it was talked about a transition, a debate about a new constitution, early presidential elections, and then, [lastly], to help Ukraine back on its feet economically. But that was during a revolution [violent uprising] and no one can entirely foresee or follow a revolution step by step.</b> Therefore, to my mind, this is an argument [by Putin] that is a little far-fetched. I also want to say that the other side of the Russian argument, that in relation to foreign policy they always hold up the principle of non-interference like a flag, that the Russians are currently doing exactly the opposite. And the argument for doing so is to protect the Russian speaking people in Ukraine. However, it is not the case that all Russian speaking people in Ukraine are currently under having to fear for their life. In light of this, I believe that we must achieve this in dialog with Russia. Q: <b>Mr Asselborn, at the moment it is not the time for dialog, but the time of crisis.</b> The Russian intervention, as one is almost forced to say, on Crimea, has also raised call for sanctions. Before we talk about this, lets briefly look at an <i>overview over the sanctions currently being discussed by EU</i>: 1) <u>Gas Boycott</u>: The gas and oil export represents more than 50% of the Russian household. A boycott would hurt Russia badly. But who could renounce Russian gas? In Germany, almost 40% of the entire oil and gas imports are from Russia. Other states, for example in South Eastern Europe, are up to 100% dependant on Russian oil and gas imports. Therefore, an oil and gas boycott would also badly hit the European economies. 2) <u>Travel restrictions</u>: Russia and the EU have long been negotiating the lifting of the visa-requirements. These talks could be under threat now. However - the negotiations have been making slow progress for years. As sanctions, they would have little if any impact. 3) <u>freezing of assets and accounts</u>: This could increase the pressure on Russia, as <b>apparently Russian oligarchs have bunkered billions</b> on European accounts. As a retaliation however, Putin could also punish European companies in Russia. [Interview Asselborn ctd.]: Q: If Russia cannot be moved to return to the negotiating table, which sanctions do you favour? A: I think sanctions are a very pejorative measure, to remain in the diplomatic tongue. There will be consequences, and we have already hinted at possible consequences, for example in relation to Sochi, or the freezing of negotiations about a new partnership agreement - if one uses the word sanctions, and then takes the mental journey and asks which individuals have been sanctioned by the EU recently: Lukchenko, Bashar Assad, then Yanukovych, who really was a man that had a lot to do with corruption - one would put Putin on the same level with them. That is really something where the impact could backfire. <b>A debate about sanctions may not be allowed.</b> That, the Russian side must also know. But also, it is very clear that <b>if tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow sees Russian military in Ukraine that seeks to draw the monopoly of violence</b>, then a debate will come up that I</p>

<sup>582</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376826.html>

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		<p>believe can go in all directions. Then also the question comes, how should NATO expand into countries that are currently not members of NATO. But all this will come and will maybe destroy the relations between the EU and Russia for an entire decade. That must be stopped. In addition, Mr. Stempel, I believe that we maybe talk too much about Russia. We should talk more about Ukraine. Here the people wait for a ray of hope that the International Community, together with Russia, manages to bring this country back on another track".</p>

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<sup>584</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5314.html>



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<sup>585</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5314.html>

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<sup>586</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5314.html>

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<sup>587</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5314.html>

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The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

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04.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) Report on Putin's Press Conference, B.Virnich; b) Report on John Kerry's visit in Kyiv, Michael Heussen; c) Interview with Michael Heussen, Kyiv; d) Report on situation on Crimea, S. Stuchlik; e) Interview with Prof. Gerhard Simon, Expert Eastern Europe and Ukraine, University of Cologne; g) <b>Commentary, Sonia Mikich,<sup>589</sup></b>	a) Intro Roth: A last question - must Russia's behaviour be seen as simply outrageous, or, to an extent, understandable? B) Commentary Mikich: "Putin establishes facts. The troop movements on Crimea. The rhetoric. Is there someone turning back time? Like during the Cold War, Russia only seems to know vassal or foe at its borders. Black - and - White-thinking, to which of course the West contributed. <b><u>We just wanted to view the utterly fearless heroes of democracy from Maidan</u></b> . Not the ultra-nationalist. Accepted with lightning speed a dubious transitional coalition government, in which the Swoboda party is part. This party not only welcomes foreigners, but anti-Semites, and at time the German NPD [German right wing party, now banned]. <b>We did not listen up when Putin said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.</b> That is not only an autocrat's ghost pain. It <i>traumatizes millions of Russians</i> . They relate respect, security and homeland with the Soviet Union; spending their summer holiday on Crimea; naturally not requiring a visa for the trip as much as it was not required for a trip to Tbilisi, or the Baltic states; <b>In 1991, at one stroke, 25 million Russians in the Baltics, Central Asia, there Caucasus were made foreigners</b> - sometimes even to stateless people, who were being discriminated against. <b>The West, particularly the ahistorical United States, have never understood this loss of influence. Also, not how Moscow received the EU expansion further east, the wholehearted talks with Georgia and Moldova.</b> To understand doesn't mean to accept. To accept does not mean to embrace - but a differentiated approach could be of help when the diplomats meet again tomorrow. Wondering how Putin marches forward into the 20th century won't help. His actions were not smart. <b>But where is the smart Russia strategy of the West?</b>

<sup>589</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5314.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
05.03.2014	tagesschau.de, Interview with Jasper Finke, International Law Expert in legality of Putin's actions and statements. <sup>590</sup>	<p>I. <u>On the legality of the change of government in Kyiv</u>: Q.: Putin speaks of an illegal coup d'état in Kyiv, and therefore considers the treaties signed with Ukraine annulled. How is this to be seen from an international law perspective? A.: His arguments are far-fetched. Treaties are signed between countries, and binding beyond the duration of a particular government. If there is a change of government in one of the signatories, this has no consequence for the bilateral treaty. <b>I therefore believe that Putin uses this argument of the illegal coup d'état to reinstall Yanukovich as the still legitimate president, and justify the military intervention.</b> [see Putin and Yanukovich, tagesschau.de Sylvia Stoeber, Feb.2014; also, Putin on Yanukovich, press statement 04.03.2014: "told him that he cannot be re-elected as president"] Q. Is Yanukovich still the legitimate president of Ukraine, as Putin claims? A.: It is completely irrelevant if Yanukovich is the Ukrainian president according to the Ukrainian constitution. Because this is a case of the principle of effectiveness - meaning that under international law, what counts is whether the new government effectively exercises state power. This means, even if the coup was unconstitutional, then we are now at a point where the government represents the country externally. Yanukovich is certainly not doing that, as he is outside the country. Therefore, a toppled president can never invite a friendly nation to occupy the country to re-install him as legitimate sovereign. Q.: Then the letter that Putin allegedly received from Yanukovich asking for a Russian military intervention has no relevance? A: <b>This letter, strategically speaking, is almost the act of a genius. In international legal terms, we call this intervention upon invitation.</b> And of course, Russia invokes this and obviously claims that he still is the legitimate President. But we know little facts about this letter: When has it been sent? Because if Yanukovich wrote it while outside the country, it is irrelevant. And even if he wrote it while still in power, as at the very latest when he was toppled, Russia should have simply accepted the fact that there is a new government. <u>II. On the legality of the intervention</u>: Q.: Putin justifies the sending of troops to Crimea with the protection of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, whose lives are put at risk by "radical nationalists [emphasis in original]. Is this action actually legal? A.: <b>The use of force is clearly a breach of international law.</b> If there would indeed be massive human rights violations on Crimea, one could consider whether Russia may intervene short-term. For example, GSG9 [German Federal Special Police Force] commandos to free hostages from planes were often agreed to by the states [in which the plane was located]. But you cannot compare this, because these are time-restricted missions, where troops very shortly enter into a country and then fly out again. Ukraine is a case of a long-term intervention. Additionally, currently there no risk to ethnic Russians can be identified. <u>III. Relevance of agreement about stationing of troops</u>: Q.: The agreement about the stationing of Russian troops on Crimea from 1997 allows for Russian troops to be based in Ukraine. What does this mean for Russia? A.: The government of Ukraine has agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on its territory in the "Neighbourhood and Friendship Treaty" of 1997, with a running time of 20 years [extended July 2013 for another 30 years, see tagesschau.de]. Such an agreement brings about the partial waiver of sovereignty. But it does not repeal it! If Russia uses its troops outside the narrow confines of the agreement, then this means a clear violation of sovereignty. That would be as if U.S. troops based in Ramstein would swarm out, occupy public roads and encircle the government buildings of Rhineland-Palatinate [Federal State in Germany]: None of this is covered in the agreement which underlies the treaty about the stationing of troops. The Crimean Peninsula clearly is a part of Ukraine, and only Kyiv can govern its external relations. <u>IV. On the binding character of the agreement negotiated between Yanukovich and the three EU Foreign Ministers</u>: Q.: How legally binding is the EU-agreement, which was negotiated by Steinmeier, Fabius and Sikorski with Yanukovich? A.: This is an agreement between the conflicting parties in Ukraine, and therefore only of <b>limited relevance to international law. For the question what Russia may or may not do this is irrelevant. Russia must stick to the principles of international law.</b> In addition to the general prohibition to the use of force, the UN charter also prohibits the threat to use force. And Putin is definitely threatening the use of violence at the moment.</p>

<sup>590</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/voelkerrecht-ukraine100.html>

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05.03.2014	audio, Hörfunkstudio Washington, Sina. <sup>591</sup> ARD Ralph	<p>With utter relaxation the news about the Russian test of an intercontinental ballistic missile were received [CNN]"Despite growing tensions, today Russia executed the planned test of an intercontinental ballistic missile today". To not add to the tensions between Moscow and Washington, the speaker of the White House, <b>Kathlyn Hayden, immediately emphasised that the test was routine, and that Moscow had informed Washington about this test already before the crisis on Crimea began</b>. This is in accordance with the so-called New Start Treaty between Russia and the U.S. The crisis on Crimea occupied the President until late at night. Again, he had a phone conversation with Angela Merkel. While <b>Obama favours sanctions on Russia and want to isolate Putin, the German chancellor emphasises dialog with the Russian president. [CNN] "Merkel is almost acting like an intermediary between Obama and Putin"</b>, [Sina ctd.] CNN reports, citing an anonymous high-ranking member of the Obama administration. [CNN]: "The German chancellor spoke with President Obama about her efforts to pave a way out of the crisis on Crimea". [Sina ctd] According to CNN information, Obama and Merkel discussed the possibilities of an international fact-finding mission that should establish whether human right of the Russian minority in Ukraine are guaranteed. Putin claims that the government in Kyiv suppresses the Russian population. With this argument the Russian president seeks to legitimize his intervention. Furthermore, he retains the right to invade anywhere into Ukrainian territory. <b>Merkel wants to weaken this argument of Putin by sending international observers, and thereby enable the Russian president to withdraw his troops from Crimea without losing face</b> [not appear weak before Russian public]. What the US president thinks about the prospect of a way out in which no one loses face? The White House remains silent on that question. The <b>U.S. president will not, however, participate in the G8 summit with Putin in Sochi</b>, a member of the White House told U.S. media. At least not if until then there still are Russian soldiers on Ukrainian soil. The Canadian Prime Minister suggested to Obama on the phone to demonstratively host a G7-summit, a meeting among the most powerful economies of the world, excluding Russia. [Obama]: "I actually don't think about Putin's behaviour on Crimea is a sign of strength. No, it rather stirs fears among Russia's neighbours, and pushes many countries further away from Russia. [Sina ctd] In principle, the Obama administration is positive about an international observer mission. U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry explicitly demands from Russia to not only tolerate the OSCE observer-team set to land on Crimea today, but to support it in its freedom of movement. Because currently it is unclear whether the 30 unarmed military observers will actually gain access to Crimea. Since Russia is a member of the OSCE, and the observer-mission has been requested by Ukraine, also a member of the OSCE, the US sees Putin under a compulsion to move [dt: Zugzwang]. The Russian president must allow the unarmed international military observes, amongst them two U.S. citizens, access to Crimea, Washington demands. John Kerry will voice this at the meeting with the Russian president in Paris [tomorrow].</p>

<sup>591</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118988.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
05.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 noon; a) a) Interview Bettina Scharkus on meeting of NATO Russia Council; b) Interview Ellis Fröder, EU-Foreign Minister Summit in Paris. <sup>592</sup>	Q.: Today, the NATO-Russia Council is meeting. Beforehand, the NATO Ambassadors consulted with security-policy experts. What does this mean? A.: The committee that convened today was the <i>political security committee</i> , which meets only very rarely. THE NATO - Ambassadors [also] will meet with foreign and security policy experts of the European Union. That - to my knowledge - certainly has not happened in the last two years. The last such meeting was triggered by problems on the Balkans. I think this is a <i>strong symbolic act done jointly by NATO and EU</i> . They want to demonstrate that they will not be divided, we w talk to each other, and in the end, the West will speak with one voice. Q.: If NATO is consulted in these talks, does this mean that in the Ukraine-crisis, there remains - despite today's statements by the French President - a military option? A.: NATO is of course also a military and security alliance. That is correct. The NATO ambassadors are meeting almost daily currently. But - and this has also been made clear by NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen after a meeting yesterday: a military response is not really considered. There is talks about the problem, there are warnings to Russia to not continue to violate the sovereignty of Ukraine, according to Rasmussen. It can be expected that he will use today's meeting to clearly convey this message to the Russian ambassador Gruschkow. However, I don't think that NATO sees a military option.
05.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 noon; a) a) Interview Bettina Scharkus on meeting of NATO Russia Council; b) Interview Ellis Fröder, EU-Foreign Minister Summit in Paris. <sup>593</sup>	Q. Do you have any knowledge about what is happening just now at the EU Foreign Minister Summit in Paris? A.: At the moment it can be said that diplomacy is running on high revs. Until a few moments ago, President Hollande and the foreign minister of Russia, France, the United States and the UK sat together in Elysee palace. They have by now changed locations, and are currently at the Quai D'Orsay, the French foreign ministry, to continue negotiations. <b>The key question here will be whether there will be an international contact group, which would mean that one could continue to bet on diplomacy.</b> By the way, the U.S. foreign secretary and the Russian foreign minister talked to each other in a one to one meeting. At the moment, however, everyone is at Quai D' Orsay. Q.: The <b>Western Foreign Ministers would like to have their Ukrainian colleague at the meeting.</b> Will that happen? A. This is a big question. The United Kingdom and the U.S. want this no matter what, but for Russia of course this is difficult, as this may lead to the interpretation that Russia is de facto acknowledging the Ukrainian interim government - despite that accepting the Ukrainian presence would not represent such an acknowledgment. That would be hard to swallow [German transl: A hard frog to swallow] for Russia. I therefore personally don't think that this will happen. We know at the moment that the EU Foreign Ministers are meeting, whether that is with or without their Ukrainian colleague we don't know. Steinmeier will hold a press conference in 30minutes. But <b>we hear from diplomatic circles that the negotiations are very difficult.</b>

<sup>592</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376950.html>

<sup>593</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376950.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
05.03.2014	tagesschau, 17:00 Interview with Stefan Stuchlik of Russian troops taking Belbek airbase. <sup>594</sup>	<p>Q. How important is this alleged incident? A.: Well, at first sight this all seems highly dramatic. According to our information, however, this was all quite unspectacular. One needs to understand that all the missile bases are from Soviet times. They were split artificially during the nineties, one side going to the Russians, the other side to the Ukrainians. <b>Today the Russians simply stated in writing that the entire base is under their control.</b> 20 soldiers were placed outside. We were told everything was peaceful. The second thing talked about on Crimea today is that the first representatives of the OSCE arrived. Before the hotel in which the observers are lodged, a crowd assembled shouting Russia, Russia. [Old woman] "The OSCE has nothing to look for here. They should better end the chaos in Kyiv.". [Stuchlik ctd.] Protesters suspect military observers amongst the OSCE team, despite only Dunja Mijatovic, the OSCE representative for the freedom of the press speaks out. "No one here thinks about prohibiting Ukrainian or Russian newspapers. Let's just stay calm and see how this situation will develop. Putin, Putin the protesters outside shout. If one day there would really be military observers, then the response should be expected to be even stronger. Q.: Why do you expect that? Because the Autonomous Government here, this Russian friendly government, has nothing to fear from letting the OSCE Spokesperson for the Freedom of the Press in. However, if military observers were to arrive, all barracks would have to open their doors. Then one could see how many Russian troops are really here, are they really Special Forces, and what type of equipment do they use? Of course, for understandable reasons, there is vehement resistance from both the Russian and the Crimean authorities. It will therefore still take a while until the first military observers arrive here."</p>

<sup>594</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377044.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
05.03.2014	tageschau, 20:15, Linda Zervakis; a) <b>Report from EU Foreign Minister Summit in Paris, Ellis Fröder;</b> b) on expectations on upcoming EU Council Summit, A. Stauth live from Brussels; c) Developments on Crimea, Stephan Stuchlik; <sup>595</sup>	Intro Zervakis: Western countries, on the highest diplomatic levels, today tried to defuse the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In Paris, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom tried to bring their colleagues from Russia and the U.S. for talks around the table. The EU and the U.S. are threatening to withdraw from the G8 summit and to impose sanctions. b) Report, Ellis Fröder: "Ukrainian flags wave outside the French foreign ministry, as if the protesters wanted to say "we [the people from Maidan] are real, and also here!" Inside, negotiations were ongoing all day, diplomacy on the highest levels. U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry, Germany, France, the United Kingdom - all are in search for a solution in the gravest crisis in Europe since the Cold War. And they are seeking dialogue with Sergei Lawrow, the Russian foreign minister. [Laurent Fabius, FRA foreign minister]: We want to be clear about and relentless vis a vis Putin, but also set the dialog in motion again. The solution in Ukraine must be political, not military." [Fröder ctd.] The Western foreign ministers want to establish an international contact group. In this way, the West could jointly with Russia discuss the future of Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. and the UK are undertaking efforts to sit Lawrow and the new Ukrainian foreign minister around the same table. [William Hague, UK foreign minister]: "This is the opportunity to engage Russia and Ukraine in direct talks and negotiations with each other". [Fröder ctd] "So far, to no avail. Russia is not prepared to enter into direct talks with Ukraine. Hour-long discussions amongst the foreign ministers, then one-on-one talks continued. <b>U.S. foreign secretary Kerry and Russian foreign minister Lawrow talked for so long, that at the end the negotiations had to be adjourned. This was judged here in Paris as a positive signal. As long as one stays engaged in talks, as long as the U.S. and Russia continue to talk to each other, there is reason for hope.</b> Whether the talks will continue tonight is open, the foreign ministers will remain in Paris in any case. Meanwhile, the EU <b>has promised billions to Ukraine today. [President of the Commission, Juan Manuel Barros]: "The package we have put together has a combined minimal value of 11 billion Euros."</b> [Fröder ctd] Should there be no result in Paris tonight, the EU wants to impose economic sanctions on Russia.

<sup>595</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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05.03.2014	tageschau, 20:15, Linda Zervakis; a) Report from EU Foreign Minister Summit in Paris, Ellis Fröder; b) <b>on expectations on upcoming EU Council Summit, A. Stauth live from Brussels;</b> c) Developments on Crimea, Stephan Stuchlik. <sup>596</sup>	<p><b>"The heads of states and governments of the EU [that will be meeting tomorrow in Brussels] will highly likely confirm what has been said by the President of the Commission, Barroso, today already: That is the 11 billion Euros in financial aid for Ukraine. And with the same kind of likelihood they are going to condemn the Russian military operation on Crimea as a breach of international law. Not quite clear is the question of sanctions. Here, different opinions are to be expected.</b> The suggestions to ban high-ranking Russian officials and members of the government from travelling into and inside the European Union or to freeze bank accounts have been tabled. In addition, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said today that NATO will fundamentally reassess its relationship with Russia. However, if there are to be sanctions, no hard sanctions against Russia are expected. It is more likely, that the EU will start another high-level diplomatic initiative.</p>

<sup>596</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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05.03.2014	tageschau, 20:15, Linda Zervakis; a) Report from EU Foreign Minister Summit in Paris, Ellis Fröder; b) on expectations on upcoming EU Council Summit, A. Stauth live from Brussels; c) <b>Developments on</b>	a) Intro Zervakis: The Ukrainian interim prime minister Yatseniuk will participate in the extraordinary EU Council meeting tomorrow. Before leaving for Brussels, he held a press conference on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. He showed concern that Russia could occupy further territory in Ukraine in addition to Crimea. b) Report Stuchlik: It is like a game of chess. Today the Russian navy blocked the entry to Sevastopol harbour for the Ukrainian fleet. A little further back of the harbour, here the Russian navy, there the Ukrainian navy, facing each other on the harbour's sides. Since yesterday as enemies. In Kyiv, interim prime minister showed concern about the further escalation: "[Yatseniuk] "What happened today in the autonomous Republic of Crimea not only threatens the security of Ukraine, but the entire world. The responsibility for this lies singularly with Russia." [Stuchlik ctd]. <b>Western experts by now believe that some of the armed men without insignia, are indeed Russian special forces. Moscow denies this.</b> In order to establish facts on this and other questions the West wants to send military observers. But already at the word OSCE, the public should get to a boil here on Crimea [old lady protesting]: "The OSCE has nothing to look for here, they should better end the chaos in Kyiv." The hatred is directed at the first OSCE representative on Crimean territory [note: news before: observer team] - who is only responsible for the freedom of the press. [Dunja Mijatovic] "There are worrying signs on Crimea, but I think we still have some time. Let us therefore remain calm and see how the situation will develop. "Putin, Putin" the masses shout - to them it is clear who took control on Crimea.

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	Crimea, <b>Stephan Stuchlik</b> ; <sup>597</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
05.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) <b>Interview Stephan Stuchlik, on situation on Crimea</b> ; b) Report on "men in uniform", Stephan Stuchlik; c) Paris-Summit and Diplomatic Efforts, Report Ellis Fröder; d) Interview Bettina Scharkus, on NATO decision to re-asses entire collaboration with Russia. <sup>598</sup>	Q.: The crisis on Crimea continues to simmer dangerously. The Special Envoy to Ukraine of the United Nations was allegedly threatened and chased away by a group of armed men. What is this about? A. This episode shows how nervousness increases day by day here on Crimea - by the way also the nervousness of the newsmakers, who reported earlier today that the men was kidnapped and taken to an unknown location. Fact is, Mr. Sarri [phonetically] has returned to his hotel. We know nothing of an armed attack, what could have happened? We witnessed three times before that the at the entry to the hotel there is an angry mob, whose anger appears to have been organized, that block the access to the main road for any black limousine. Because they suspect an emissary of the UN, OSCE, or EU inside a black limousine. Thus, on Crimea times are becoming rough for Western diplomats.

<sup>597</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

<sup>598</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

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05.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) Interview Stephan Stuchlik, on situation on Crimea; <b>b) Report on "men in uniform", Stephan Stuchlik;</b> c) Paris-Summit and Diplomatic Efforts, Report Ellis Fröder; d) Interview Bettina Scharkus, on NATO decision to re-asses entire collaboration with Russia. <sup>599</sup>	a) Intro Roth: President Putin claims that the armed men without insignia are local self-defence forces, and not Russian soldiers. And because this is the case, he not possibly orders them to withdraw. b) Report Stuchlik: This is a short story about two brother nations that suddenly are supposed to be enemies, and don't really know why. We are driving to <i>Belbek airbase</i> , an Ukrainian airbase. <i>Out of the blue, Russian soldiers appear. At least this is what they look like.</i> [Stuchlik approaching masked men, who turn their back to the camera, and continue walking, asks:] "Hello, we are from German TV, can we have a word with you? Who is the boss here?" The soldiers turn around, no one want to answer our question. Before his occupied base, a surprisingly relaxed [ <i>the same officer that yesterday was "completely overrun", see tagesschau 17:00, 04.03.2014.</i> [Andreij Kulatow]: " When these guys arrived <b>yesterday the head of the Russian soldiers, they are fine chaps, you know, asked me to hand over the base. I said no and that was it then. We understood each other. No, they are standing here peacefully, and for the other thing [demand], I don't blame them, it is just a standard operating procedure</b> ". Says it and walks over to his occupiers. They had to camp outside under their trucks last night, he said, and that should not be requested from anyone. Maybe he can find a solution.

<sup>599</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html>



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05.03.2014	<p>Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) Interview Stephan Stuchlik, on situation on Crimea; b) Report on "men in uniform", Stephan Stuchlik; c) <b>Paris-Summit and Diplomatic Efforts, Report Ellis Fröder;</b> d) Interview Bettina Scharkus, on NATO decision to re-asses entire collaboration with Russia.<sup>600</sup></p>	<p>a) Intro Roth: Amongst others, Chancellor Merkel is undertaking efforts to solve the pwoer struggle in Ukraine. She spoke with Putin on the phone again. And also in Paris, a number of EU Foreign ministers are negotiating. Among them is Foreign Minister Steinmeier. b) Report Ellis Fröder: "All talks were to no avail. <b>There is no agreement with Russia on the diplomatic level. All day the European foreign minister negotiated with their Russian counterpart. Diplomacy on its highest levels. They wanted to establish and International Contact Group, to enter into a continuous dialog with Russia. And they wanted that representatives of Russia and Ukraine sit together here in Paris. All that was denied by Russia.</b> [Lawrow, on Russia 24]: "It is very difficult to reach an agreement in an atmosphere of threats and conditions." [Fröbe ctd] There were still hopes for a solution during the afternoon. Foreign Secretary Kerry and his Russian colleague Sergei Lawrow had several long one-to-one meetings. But in the evening Sergei Lawrow left the talks. [<b>Steinmeier, appearing very tired</b>]: "I am not happy about the overall result. I am at best content with the fact that all those we spoke to signalled that they will not contribute to a further escalation of the situation. But difficult days remain ahead of us." [Kerry]: "All participants agree that is is important to solve these problems through dialog. The United States and its partners are working intensively on a remedy." [Fröbe ctd] Now talks will continue in the French foreign ministry. Without Lawrow, but with the Ukrainian [interim] foreign minister.</p>

<sup>600</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html>

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05.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) Interview Stephan Stuchlik, on situation on Crimea; b) Report on "men in uniform", Stephan Stuchlik; c) Paris-Summit and Diplomatic Efforts, Report Ellis Fröder; d) <b>Interview Bettina Scharkus, on NATO decision to re-asses entire collaboration with Russia.</b> <sup>601</sup>	Q.: NATO decided today that it will <b>re-assess its entire cooperation with Russia</b> . Is this an alarm signal, that NATO takes such a radical measure? A.: I could just speak with someone from NATO Headquarters, and was told that the <b>Russian NATO ambassador [Gruschkow] did not bring anything to the negotiation table that was aimed in any way at de-escalating the situation. Therefore, NATO had to react. Immediately, a joint naval operation was stalled, and further cooperative efforts will be re-assessed.</b> Also, this has been decided by all 28 member states unanimously [principle of NATO]. Hence, the rows are closing here. Apparently, towards the end of the meeting [of NATO-Russia Council] said that these [what was being said in the meeting] were stereotypes against Russia like during the Cold War. Diplomatic efforts will continue in Brussels tomorrow with an extraordinary summit of the EU heads of state and government. Here, the key issue will be whether sanctions against Russia should be imposed or not.

<sup>601</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	audio, Michael Bohne, ARD Hörfunkstudio Brussels, 00:53am. <sup>602</sup>	<p>The European have tightened their lips, now they must whistle. [Jan Techau, Head of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Brussels] "Considering that all this has been played at the highest possible level, expectations have been created - something must follow now", [Bohne ctd.] describes Techau the difficult starting position of the EU before its meeting today. The Europeans have little to offer [Techau]: <b>"The tools the EU has to exert pressure on Russia are very, very few, and very, very weak."</b> [Bohnen ctd]: The strongest option is already of the table. [Techau]: <b>"There is no military option for the West, not even for the Americans. IT is very clear that no one will go to war over Crimea. And that is equally clear to Putin, who was aware of this long before"</b>. [Bohne ctd.] As far as punitive actions the EU foreign ministers mentioned so far only mentioned, two specifically, the freezing of negotiations on easing visa regulations, and about a partnership agreement. That this will hardly impress Moscow must also be clear to European politicians. Furthermore, so called targeted actions were hinted at. This usually refers top travel bans or freezing of accounts of important representatives and businesses of the country in question. The larger part of the Russian oil and gas wealth is assumed to be on European bank accounts. To cut the financial stream of the oligarchs could be more effective. Of course, a boycott of Russian gas would hit Russia badly. [Techau]: "This means that in theory, there is leverage. But if one would use it, it would possibly hurt ine's own banks and economic interests badly." [Bohne ctd.] Against this backdrop, politicians obviously weigh whether this is the best measure. <i>All EU states have self-interests, says Techau. Involuntarily, the British government currently seems to confirm this thesis. In a leaked document, it demands a strong response to Russia.</i> [Techau]: <i>"But only as long as it doesn't threaten their financial market. This is a typical position, that you will find in almost all EU member states. The Italians have energy interests, the Germans emphasize that dialog must continue - the positions in Europe vary widely"</i>. [Bohne] Therefore, today's summit is about finding the minimal consensus. Much more important is the symbolic effect. [Techau] " This is more about unity, more about keeping the family together." [Bohne ctd]: <i>In light of these apparent limitations [Schwaechen] in their short-term crisis management, the Europeans should try to bring back the conflict to channels on which they are able to play their strengths.</i> [Techau]: What can be done now is to support the new government in Kyiv, so that the country doesn't go bankrupt, that it doesn't become a failed state, where police, firemen and doctors are not being paid.". [Bohne ctd] Beyond that, the country requires a long-term perspective. And here, the summit can send a signal and adopt the financial aid package with a volume of 11 billion Euros presented by the Commission yesterday.</p>

<sup>602</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-sanktionen100.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 noon; a)Interview Arnim Stauth on EU Council summit; b) Interview Michael Heussen on situation on Ukraine. <sup>603</sup>	Q.: How likely are sanctions against Russia by the EU? A: I believe it is unlikely that today specific sanctions will be announced. I believe the <b>EU is pursuing a two-track approach. One track is that they are trying with all available means to reach a diplomatic breakthrough and establish a mediation process.</b> The other track is - and this is taken from a draft version of the final communique we received earlier - there is talks about serious consequences if Russia is not willing to step back from its hard line. However, until sanctions are decided, specified and imposed will still take a while. Q: <b>Now the EU is prospecting a financial aid package for the Ukrainian government worth 11 billion Euros - however, only if the IMF also support Ukraine.</b> What does this junktim mean? A.: The IWF has longstanding experience in the payment and the conditionalities for the payment of such loans. It also demands <b>reforms - for example in Ukraine, heating for housing is heavily subsidized which leads to a massive waste of energy. That is a Soviet tradition. In this regard, the IWF and the EU expect that subsidies are being cut,</b> so that the money isn't just literally blown out of the window.
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 noon; a)Interview Arnim Stauth on EU Council summit; b) Interview Michael Heussen on situation in Ukraine. <sup>604</sup>	Q.: What is the situation in Ukraine at the moment? A.: Last night things remained calm. The <b>two arrest warrants that had been issued last night, one against the head of the regional government, the other one against the Russian commander of the Black Sea fleet</b> turn out to be blunt weapons. The Ukrainian government does not have the power or means to impose these arrest warrants on Crimea. Therefore, while the diplomatic tug of war continues, the situation here seems to remain calm. Q: In Brussels there currently are ongoing negotiations about sanctions against Russia. What are the Ukrainians saying about this? A: The Ukrainians are happy to see that pressure is building up, political, economic, and diplomatic pressure, which is of course an important signal to Ukraine. The hope here is that eventually Russia will give in. On the other hand, more concrete financial aid packages are being hoped for. An important Ukrainian newspaper today titled: "West, please help us to prevent collapse!" This shows how precarious the economic situation here really is. <b>Ukraine needs help against Russia, but above all, financial aid.</b> Q; Yanukovych's accounts in Europe have been frozen today. How hard will this hurt him? A. Badly, but surely he has taken precaution against such a step long before. Of course, this is now a very clear signal that the West is breaking with old leadership of Ukraine, that the old government had't done what it was supposed to, and instead of being there then need to protect, it terrorized its own population. Therefore is is a good sign vis-a-vis- the old leadership, but also Russia, as Russia is still on the side of Yanukovych.

<sup>603</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377193.html>

<sup>604</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377194.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	audio, Martin Bohne, WDR Brussels, EU Heads of State Summit. <sup>605</sup>	<p>Among the members of the European Union sanctions are being disputed. The US already decided for punitive actions, and imposed travel bans. At the beginning of the conference, the participating Ukrainian prime minister reminded of the graveness of the seriousness of the situation. [Yatseniuk] "This is not a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this is a European conflict, and we must urgently find a way to solve it." [Bohne ctd] There was no need to remind the EU heads of state, that have rushed together to show the flag and demonstrate unity. Particularly the eastern European member states are pushing. They feel threatened by Russia. [Dalia Grybauskaite, president of Lithuania] "First of all we must send a signal to ourselves: we are standing together and speak with one voice. Because the risk is obvious. Russia want to re-draw the post-war borders [of Europe]. We must understand this and find an appropriate response." [Bohne ctd] Such harsh and concise words cannot be heard from the member states from further West. <i>David Cameron</i> summarizes the aims of the summit: [David Cameron, prime minister United Kingdom] "First, Russia and Ukraine need to talk to each other again. Then we must show to the Ukrainian people that we are helping them in their hour of despair. And thirdly, we must tell the Russian leadership clearly that what they did is unacceptable." [Bohne ctd] Chancellor Merkel is of the same view. She supports current efforts for an international contact group. But as long as Russia continues to refuse diplomatic talks, then it is not possible to return to business as usual. [Merkel] <b>"This means we will also look at sanctions of different kinds. Whether these must be imposed now, or not, will be decided by us depending on the progress of our diplomatic efforts."</b> [Bohne ctd] <b>To impress Russia and push it to a political solution is one thing, said Merkel. At the same time, Ukraine needs support: „ We want that the people that have fought for freedom and democracy can now take a good development. I therefore wholeheartedly welcome the aid package that was presented by the Commission yesterday. Germany will support this intensively."</b></p>

<sup>605</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-sanktionen100.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 14:00, German Defence Minister visits Poland, Report by Ulrich Adrian. <sup>606</sup>	The visit was long planned. Federal Minister for Defence, Ursula von der Leyen (UvdL) was received with military honours by her Polish colleague Tomas Siemonjak. Under the impression of the crisis in Ukraine, however, the routine visit got a completely different meaning. <b>The talks lasted much longer than initially planned, probably the breaking news that the parliament of Crimea wants to join the Russian Federation were leant about during the meeting.</b> The Polish primordial fears about Russia played a visible role during the press conference. The Polish defence minister feels that there is a risk of conflagration in Europe, caused by the Ukraine crisis: <b>[Tomas Siemonjak] "We have already asked the Americans for the air force, and larger manoeuvres in March. The U.S. has reacted quickly, this is very important to us in Poland."</b> [UvdL] <b>"We know that we are working together reliably in the background, in the alliance, and send clear signals of that. But the main thing, and what is decisive, is diplomacy, it the dialog that we must keep on-going.</b> [Adrian ctd] <i>UvdL emphasized on the side-lines that the <u>International Contact Group</u> is the most important objective for now.</i> And that Poland, which is sharing a border with Ukraine may not be left alone with its concerns.
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 16:00; a) <b>Report on diplomatic efforts, Bettina Scharkus;</b> b) Interview with Arnim Stauth, Brussels. <sup>607</sup>	President Putin seems unwilling to give in. Also, not in a conversation with the [German] chancellor, they spoke on the phone just yesterday. On today's summit, Europe's top politicians want to increase the pressure. [see report Scharkus earlier that day] After the meeting with EU heads of state, Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk rejects the announced referendum on the future association of Crimea as illegal. His appeal to the Kremlin was highly emotional. [Yatseniuk]"Mr. Putin, tear down this wall. Tear down this wall of threats, this wall of the military. Let us build a new relationship between Ukraine and Russia. We are willing to cooperate but are unwilling to surrender." [Scharkus ctd] The EU heads of state will vote in favour of an 11 billion Euro strong aid package for Ukraine. How hard they will sanction Russia, is currently being discussed.

<sup>606</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377258.html>

<sup>607</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377300.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 16:00; a) Report on diplomatic efforts, Bettina Scharkus; b) <b>Interview with Arnim Stauth, Brussels;</b> <sup>608</sup>	Q: Crimea wants to declare itself independent and associate itself with Russia via a referendum. How were this news received by the participants of the summit today? A.: This is seen in the same way as Ukraine sees it: as a breach of the Ukrainian constitution, a violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and its sovereignty. <b>It is very clear that Russia is blamed for this - no one believes that this only been thought of in Crimea, this earlier referendum, but that this has been arranged by Moscow.</b> In this regard, the EU leaders are clearly on the side of the Ukrainian government. Q.: <b>The Ukrainian government wants to sign the association agreement with the EU.</b> Will the EU go along with this? I can not say anything about this yet, as <i>everything here is being delayed</i> . Thus, I have no results on this yet. So far the position of the EU was that specific short-term aspects [of the Association Agreement], particularly those that can help the Ukrainian economy quickly, may be moved ahead. But this <b>highly symbolic act of signing the association agreement will be moved to a later date, ideally of the 25th of May when a new, freely elected government is in place.</b>
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 17:00 a) <b>Meeting of Russian NSC; Putin considers admission of Crimea into Russian Federation, Report Birgit Virnich;</b> b) Interview Stefan Stuchlik. <sup>609</sup>	Report Virnich: "Sanctions and possible responses to sanctions were the topic of the day in Russia also. President Putin called the National Security Council. Laws are being prepared now in Moscow that will enable the confiscation of foreign assets. An answer therefore for possible targeted sanctions by the EU. Russian politicians themselves threaten drastic counter-measures if Europe decides to impose sanctions. Earlier today, Federal Minister for the Economy, <i>Sigmar Gabriel</i> , <b>in a long scheduled meeting with the Russian president</b> , warned about the consequences of a sanctions-spiral, and the real risk of further escalations. [Gabriel]: <b>"The first thing is for Russia to understand and accept just how big its responsibilities are. I truly believe that we are in the middle of the worst crisis of the past decades and are just short of throwing Europe back to the times of the Cold War. For the people this would be a massive step back. I believe it is hard to imagine the possible consequences."</b> [Virnich ctd]: <b>In addition, further laws are now being prepared by [Russian prime minister] Medwedew. One is intended to make it easier for absorbing foreign territory into the Russian Federation, the other one concerns the handing out of Russian passports to foreigner.</b> [Medwedew]: This is about individuals or their relatives that lived in Russia before the revolution, or in the Soviet Union." [Virnich ctd]:. That the West will regard these initiatives as a provocation seem clear to everyone. Certainly, a day that did not make a rapprochement more likely.

<sup>608</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377300.html>

<sup>609</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377322.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 17:00 a) Meeting of Russian NSC; Putin considers admission of Crimea into Russian Federation, Report Birgit Virnich; b) <b>Interview Stefan Stuchlik.</b> <sup>610</sup>	Q: Will the referendum find a majority in favour of the association with Russia? A.: I am fully convinced it will! However, please allow me to state this again, <b>this referendum is farcical, it will be a pseudo-democratic seeking of approval of a decision that has been taken already at the highest level.</b> At the moment, the situation is that the political pressure is that high, that the small part of the Crimean population that wishes to remain part of Ukraine, which is estimates to be around 20-30% according to <b>surveys conducted over the past years</b> - will have neither image nor voice in the referendum on 16th of March. Q.: OSCE observers were obstructed today. How has such a step to be taken? A.: I think this is reason for grave concern. It always follows the same pattern: if you ask [Crimean] officials here, then they say 'yes, of course the OSCE is welcome, the UNJ can send observers, we have nothing to hide'. And eyerytime - yesterday the UN special envoy, today the OSCE observers, the following pattern develops.: An angry mobobstructs the entry to what the observers actually would like to see. When When charged with this, officials just raise their hands and say thart they have no influence on this. Whether this is truely the case, I dare to doubt.

<sup>610</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377330.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15, Susanne Daubner; a) Report on Decision of <b>Crimean Parliament to join Russian Federation</b> , Referendum by Stephan Stuchlik; b) live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) European Union imposes sanctions, Report by Bettina Scharkus; d) US heads the way in imposing sanctions, Report Tina Hassel; e) Russian reactions to sanctions, B. Virnich; <sup>611</sup>	a) Intro Daubner: Despite all diplomatic efforts the fronts are hardening. On Crimea, the focal point of the crisis, facts were created today. The regional parliament paved the way for an accession to the Russian Federation. Already within ten days, the mostly ethnic-Russian inhabitants of Crimea are to cast their vote in a referendum. The government declared the referendum a charade, and that it will dissolve the regional parliament in Simferopol. b) Report Stefan Stuchlik: [Protesters showing] solidarity before the Crimean Parliament. The pro-Russian government here has installed itself a few days ago, and took a far-reaching decision [Rustem Temirgalijew, deputy prime minister of the autonomous Republic of Crimea]: <b>"Firstly, we announce our will that Crimea is to become a part of the Russian Federation. Secondly, in order to establish whether there is a majority in favour of this decision, we announce a referendum to be held at 16.03.2014."</b> [Stuchlik asking during presse conference]: "You just decided already that you will join [the Russian Federation] - is the referendum then not just a charade? [Response Temirgalijew]: "The Crimean High Council has taken a historic decision, and the decision to join the Russian Federation will not be renounced." [Stuchlik ctd. ] Translates into: The direction is clear: <b><u>Crimea is to be broken away from Ukrainian territory. If that was the case, then in all of a sudden the Ukrainian military would become an occupying force, with unforeseeable consequences.</u></b> The spokesman for the Crimean Tatars, only minutes [ after the press conference with Temirgalijew] later, in an almost desperate statement to the press, <b><u>declared the peaceful co-existence as ended:</u></b> [Rifat Tschubarow, President of the National Assembly of the Crimean Tatars]: "You have seen for yourself the so called tactics employed by the Crimean government. I see the Russification with great concern - because now, the mob, or the so called Russian self defence forces, has a blanko cheque to go after our Tatar people unpunished." [Stuchlik, ctd] And as if on request, self declared "Defenders of Russia" are marching on the streets. <b><u>Russian looking military vehicles are on patrol - unsettling signals from Simferopol.</u></b>

<sup>611</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15, Susanne Daubner; a) Report on Decision of Crimean Parliament to join Russian Federation, Referendum by Stephan Stuchlik; b) <b>live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik</b> ; c) European Union imposes sanctions, Report by Bettina Scharkus; d) US heads the way in imposing sanctions, Report Tina Hassel; e) Russian reactions to sanctions, B. Virnich; <small>612</small>	"Today's announcement of joining the Russian Federation tremendously adds to the tensions on Crimea. The nervousness between the different groups of the population here, the Ukrainians, the Russians, the Tatars, have clearly increased. Secondly, today's decision is a punch in the face of Western diplomacy. This is an escalation, not de-escalation. In the same vein fall the news that today OSCE-staff was denied access to Crimea. Allegedly, this was done by a group of people that spontaneously had come together for this purpose only. Thirdly, it shows the impuissance of the government in Kyiv. Interim PResident Turtschinow has announced to let the Crimean regional parliament be dissolved. How he wants top go about this in face of this stark Russian supremacy on Crimea, remains his secret. "

<sup>612</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15, Susanne Daubner; a) Report on Decision of Crimean Parliament to join Russian Federation, Referendum by Stephan Stuchlik; b) live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) <b>European Union imposes sanctions</b> , Report by Bettina Scharkus; d) US heads the way in imposing sanctions, Report Tina Hassel; e) Russian reactions to sanctions, B. Virnich; <sup>613</sup>	a) Intro Daubner: The European Union is imposing first sanctions against Russia, chancellor Merkel announced after a meeting with the EU heads of state in Brussels. As a first step, talks about easing visa regulations between the EU and Russia will be put on hold, later, further, possible punishing measures will be discussed. b) Report Scharkus: A difficult agreement to reach. The end of the EU-Summit was pushed aback several times. In the end, Europe imposes moderate sanctions against Russia. [H. van Rompuy, President EU Council]: " We will put our talks with Russia about the easing of visa regulations and about a partnership agreement on hold. We support the decision of the Europeans, to, until further notice, not participate in the preparations of a G8 summit". [Scharkus ctd] <b>Angela Merkel long favoured a dialogue-course</b> , now she also increases the pressure. She deems the referendum, which was announced today, illegal: [Angela Merkel] " <b>If such a referendum is requested on a base that doesn't even exist, to assume that it is possible to bring about an opinion-building process within ten days, then this to my mind has not the least to do with any sound preparation of elections or referenda</b> ". The eastern European countries showed deep concern. The Lithuanian president spoke of brutal aggression. [She thinks] that Russia wants to re-draw the borders in the region. These fears were not shared by the Western Europeans. <i>At the end, Europe did not speak with a single voice. The agreement reached is the smallest common denominator.</i>

<sup>613</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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06.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15, Susanne Daubner; a) Report on Decision of Crimean Parliament to join Russian Federation, Referendum by Stephan Stuchlik; b) live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) European Union imposes sanctions, Report by Bettina Scharkus; d) <b>US heads the way in imposing sanctions</b> , Report Tina Hassel; e) Russian reactions to sanctions, B. Virnich; <sup>614</sup>	a) Intro Dauber: Already earlier, the U.S. administration-imposed sanctions, and banned individuals responsible for the situation on Crimea and in Ukraine. Additionally, their assets in the U.S. will be frozen. B) Report Hassel. The US head the way. President Obama imposed sanctions. Which individuals are on the sanction list remains secret. Allegedly, Putin is not affected, but members of the [former] Ukrainian and [current] Russian government that are held responsible for the escalation. With immediate effect the individuals of the target group are being banned from travelling to the U.S., and their assets here will be frozen. <b>Completely unexpected, half an hour ago President Obama himself stood before the press, and showed his disappointment</b> that Russia continued its uncooperative stance. [Obama] <i>"If this violation of international law continues, us and our partners will remain firm. This afternoon the EU has adopted similar measures against Russia. I am confident we will continue to act together to resolve this crisis"</i> . [Presidential press statement indicates important developments/only disappointed about Putin, or also about EU decision?] [Hassel ctd] Congress is pushing for even tougher sanctions. Today it wants to pass a resolution demanding further reaching steps. Washington is increasing the pressure. In a few hours, <b>six F15 fighter jets will make their way to the Baltics. The USS-Trexton, a state-of-the art warship with high-end cruise missiles was sent to the Black Sea - allegedly for a long-planned manoeuvre</b> , emphasises the Pentagon. However, <b>what if diplomacy fails? So far, the President and his administration have successfully evaded this.</b>

<sup>614</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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<sup>615</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	Brennpunkt: Ukraine before separation?, Michael Stempel; a) <b>Introduction</b> , Michael Stempel with reporting from Stefan Stuchlik; b) Report on reaction of Crimean Tatars, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik on parliamentary decision to join Russian Federation; d) Military-Balance Ukraine-Russia, Report by Norbert Hahn; e) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (I) on war threat, German Institute for International Affairs and Security, SWP; f) EU crisis summit: self interest vs common interest, Reports from several EU capitals; g) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (II) on unity of	During the morning, there was some hope that the day could be ruled more by diplomacy than by escalations. Around 11 am CET, the times of hope were suddenly ended. At that time, the news of the day was received from the Crimean Regional Parliament. [Ruslem Temirgalijew]: "First, we announce our decision for Crimea to join the Russian Federation; Second, in order to establish whether there is a majority in favour of this decision, we announce a referendum to be held on the 16th of March." [Stempel ctd] <b>Shamefacedness especially among the European politicians loomed large after this shock that was triggered by the speaker of the Crimean regional parliament. You will be able to see this in a moment if you look at the facial expression of the German Foreign Minister - a deeply upset Foreign Minister stood before the cameras just before this show: [Steinmeier] "We must make it clear to us - a new division in Europe, a speechlessness between the West and Russia, would make it impossible to lead any of the larger conflicts, in Iran, in Syria, to a resolution.</b> Therefore, it is truly of historic proportions what is happening here."

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	the West and policy recommendations. <sup>616</sup>	

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<sup>616</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>



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06.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: Ukraine before separation?, Michael Strempel; a) Introduction, Michael Strempel with reporting from Stefan Stuchlik; b) <b>Report on reaction of Crimean Tatars</b>, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik on parliamentary decision to join Russian Federation; d) Military-Balance Ukraine-Russia, Report by Norbert Hahn; e) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (I) on war threat, German Institute for International Affairs and Security, SWP; f) EU crisis summit: self interest vs common interest, Reports from several EU capitals; g) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (II) on unity of</p>	<p>a) Intro Strempel: Already next week, a new chapter in this historic drama will be written. The Crimeans are to cast their votes on the decision of the regional government to join the Russian federation. Pro-Russian activists on Crimea are cheering, but those that want to continue to belong to Ukraine are in naked fear. b) Report Stuchlik: Stroganovka - the Tatar settlement emptied; the fear can be grasped with bare hands. A few hours ago, the government announced its decision to join the Russian Federation. No one want to talk to us, not even look at us. When we were here three days ago, people still approached us - today, even the security post at the entry of the village is emptied. A bad sign. Someone is walking over there - what do you say about what happened today, we ask. [...] Old man walking hurriedly to his car, facing away] "I have no nerves for that, ask someone else." [Stuchlik ctd]: The only other person that can be found is Zahir Mahmetovich in his dairy shop. There he stands and watches the press-conference that to his people may mean the end on Crimea. [Zahir Mahmetovich]: "In Ukraine we are better off. In 1942, Stalin tried to extinguish us, and now the Russians are going to return? The same all over again? No, I am for Ukraine. Here on Crimea, nowadays people are driving around in fantasy uniforms but wiuth military equipment. We know that they are Russians, and me and my people are afraid of them." [Stuchlik ctd] On the screen now the speaker of the Tatars. He announces that the times of peaceful co-existence on Crimea are over. [Zahir Mahmetovich] "Today, guys with Russian arm wrists drove through the village, 16 to 18 adolescents in cars. They said they just wanted to look around - that was a clear threat against us. We told them to leave. But they want us out." [Stuchlik] "Are you afraid of being attacked now?" [ZM ctd] "I don't want this, honestly." [Stuchlik ctd] And then he even refuses to continue to talk to us. It is causing him too much suffering, he says. In the way back we learned from the Radio that some Tatars are apparently leaving Crimea. This doesn't seem implausible now anymore.</p>

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	the West and policy recommendations. <sup>617</sup>	

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<sup>617</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

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	the West and policy recommendations. <sup>618</sup>	

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<sup>618</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>

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The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

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<sup>619</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	<p>Brennpunkt: Ukraine before separation?, Michael Stempel; a) Introduction, Michael Stempel with reporting from Stefan Stuchlik; b) Report on reaction of Crimean Tatars, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik on parliamentary decision to join Russian Federation; d) Military-Balance Ukraine-Russia, Report by Norbert Hahn; e) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (I) on war threat, German Institute for International Affairs and Security, SWP; f) EU crisis summit: self interest vs common interest, Reports from several EU capitals; g) Interview Hans Henning Schröder (II) on unity of</p>	<p>Q: Do you believe that now a situation can emerge in which the Ukrainian government sees itself respond militarily, despite the overwhelming Russian superiority? A.: The situation is tense. <b><u>The Ukrainian government would be ill advised to respond militarily. On the one hand, it first requires legitimation. It has been empowered by a rump-parliament. This means we need elections; we need a true legitimation for the government. Secondly, it doesn't know which parts of the country will follow, nor which parts of the military.</u></b> Therefore, it would be well advised to refrain from such a response. Q.: Does the decision by the regional parliament to secede have a constitutional base? Was the parliament entitled to decide on this? A.: No! In principle, of course it is possible, if a majority of the population wants to leave - then there is a legitimation by referendum. But that would first and foremost have to be negotiated with the government in Kyiv. And if that is not able to act, then within the framework of the OSCE or the UN [Catalunya?] But, as we know, representatives of both UN and OSCE have even been refused access to the peninsula. <b>What we are witnessing at the moment is the coup d'état of a provincial parliament, obviously supported from Russia.</b> Q.: Do you believe that the risk of a war on Crimea has increased? Because Russia is the guarantor of this parliament, as well as of the outcome of the referendum next week. A.: I would not assume a military confrontation first. <b>There is no Russian troop mobilization on the Russian Ukrainian border., there are no tank divisions being moved there, no logistics are being put in place - no, so far this is all business as usual. On Crimea there is a re-enforcement of the Black Sea Fleet by soldiers without insignia - the way they look they are special or airborne-divisions, that were added to the 13.000 [already stationed] on Crimea.</b> They control the region, and at the moment I do not see any fighting going on. A possible problem are ethnic tensions, you have already mentioned the problem of the Crimean Tatars.</p>

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<sup>620</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

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The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
06.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) <b>Report of day in Brussels, EU Summit</b> by Armin Stauth ; b) Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington; c) Report on Decision of Crimean Parliament; Referendum by Stefan Stuchlik; d) Interview Stefan Stuchlik; e) Interview with Udo Lilischkies, Moscow; DeutschlandTrend, opinion poll on German public opinion, Jörg Schönenborn; f) Commentary, Marion von Haaren. <sup>622</sup>	a) Intro Roth: The crisis about Crimea virtually develops by the hour. However, not in the sense of a calming down, but the opposite. <b>Russian president Putin's overt and covert manoeuvres, and the actions of the troops associated with the Russian government created a threatening situation, that hardly anyone in Europe could have imagined a few days ago. Only yesterday, it was still uncertain whether the EU will impose sanctions against Russia. With today this has changed. And that is probably also because today way marked by yet another escalation, as the new Crimean [regional] parliament decided to join Russia. At the meeting of the EU heads of state, the usually so hesitant Chancellor saw no other way than to decide in favour of punitive actions against Russia.</b> b) Report Stauth: Concern about the future of their country [images show Ukrainian protesters in Brussel] These Ukrainian demand simple solutions: 'We don't want war', 'Russia go home!', or 'Putin keep your bloody hands of Ukraine'. 'Russia returns to the methods of the Cold War!' - that has also been said by a European head of state [Lithuania], but all those involved in the Brussels summit knew that it would be difficult to find a smart and constructive response. There was unity among the European leaders that they will strengthen the back of the new Ukrainian leadership, and safe the country from bankruptcy. The Ukrainian Prime Minister directed an emotional appeal at Russia: [Yatseniuk]: "Mr. Putin, tear down this wall of aggression and military threats. Let us establish a wholly new relationship between Ukraine and Russia. We are ready to cooperate, but not surrender and be the subordinates of Russia." [Stauth ctd]: <b>The obvious plan of Russia to annex Crimea requires a tougher stance - but no one wants to end diplomacy either.</b> Therefore, the summit decides on a <i>three-step plan. Immediately, the stopping of the negotiations for visa-free travel for Russian citizens in Europe. And if Russia doesn't quickly agree to negotiations, level two of the sanctions.</i> [Merkel]: <b>"Therefore, if neither the [International] Contact Group is established, nor results are being made, then we will support travel restrictions for specific individuals and the freezing of accounts for specific people</b> that are having a particular responsibility for the situation in Ukraine." [Stauth ctd]: The president of the EU council announced even tougher sanctions should Russia support the breaking away of additional parts of Ukraine. [Herman van Rompuy] "Any further step by Russia to destabilize the situation in Ukraine will lead to grave consequences in the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation." [Merkel]: We don't wish for that, we wish for a diplomatic process, and will direct all efforts in this direction. <b>But it must also be clear that - we have now experienced many disappointments in this regard - we are also ready to act."</b> [Stauth]: The EU tiger has presented itself not as wholly toothless. The <i>Polish head of government, Donald Tusk</i> , later said: [Donald Tusk] <b>"We have achieved more than we could have expected only a few hours ago"</b> .

<sup>621</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377368.html>

<sup>622</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>



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<sup>623</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>

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<sup>625</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>

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06.03.2014	Tagesthemen, Thomas Roth; a) Report of day in Brussels, EU Summit; b) Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington; c) Report on Decision of Crimean Parliament; Referendum by Stefan Stuchlik; d) Interview Stefan Stuchlik; e) <b>Interview with Udo Lilischkies, Moscow;</b> DeutschlandTrend, opinion poll on German public opinion, Jörg Schönenborn; f) Commentary, Marion von Haaren. <sup>626</sup>	Q.: Was Putin aware of the reaction his grip would trigger? A.: <b>I fear yes. He could not have believed that he would get away with it like before in South Ossetia or Abchasia in Georgia, when the West relatively soon after the incidents returned to business as usual. For this, the pictures going around the world from Maidan were too symbolic.</b> There, protesters first peacefully, then violently have ousted a kleptocratic leader to free the way to Europe, to democracy, and freedom. <b>That is the way it was perceived in the West, and that is [also] how it has been characterized. That to take away Crimea from them would be a massive provocation must have been known to Putin.</b> I therefore believe that he has not expected to fly below the radar, but that this was a <b>targeted challenge [Kampfansage]</b> to the West. Q: Must Putin not fear that the isolation of Russia, and the sanctions that will become known to the public, cause public fear, and that he may lose the backing of the population? A.: I don't believe that. For this, Putin controls the mass-media too perfectly. I was shocked myself when I saw the images of Russian TV about Kyiv. Even my [Russian] colleagues fear travelling there, although I was there myself for months. This is a parallel world that is being established. 'In addition, as a constant of Putin's policy almost, Putin is portraying himself as a counter-pole to the West, a brave adversary of the West. And it works wonders here. And it is a Russian reflex to join up in the face of external threats. Not for nothing, Ukrainians are called fascists, because this creates a lot of relations to World War II. No, Putin controls this parallel world very perfectly, and the <b>real consequences of economic or political sanctions are indeed limited. We have to pay for his oil and gas. I think we have to live with that. He is having a very strong position.</b> Q.: I think the <b>big worry in Ukraine, but also in the West, is that Putin will grab the East of Ukraine next.</b> Are there <b>any signs that he will not hesitate</b> to do so? A.: <b>I fear yes.</b> If I observe <b>how the media is reporting</b> about what is happening in Donetsk, Kharkov, and other cities - that is really always the same story: the newly installed 'fascist' governor gets chased out by brave, Russia-friendly Ukrainians. That is a sort of preparation for what could happen there. And the <b>logic of Crimea works just as well in the East. One may ask - what does Putin have to fear, what would the West do if it were to happen there? An even louder outcry, but possible nothing else. And, the laws that were announced here today that is that the association of foreign territories will become easier, as will the handing-out of passports to ethnic-Russians, sound more as if Putin just announced the beginning.</b>

<sup>626</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>

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<sup>627</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>

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<sup>628</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesschau.de, 03:13am, Obama urges diplomatic solution in phone conversation with Putin. <sup>629</sup>	President Barack Obama spoke on the phone with the Russian president Wladimir Putin on the Russian- Ukrainian conflict. In the conversation, he justified the sanction his administration imposed . 'President Obama emphasised that Russia's actions violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which led us to respond - in cooperation with our European partners -with several measures' a press release by the White House said after the conversation which last one hour. According to the press release, Obama made clear that a diplomatic solution to the conflict was still possible. <b>Condition</b> for that would be that Moscow accepts direct talks with the new government ion Kyiv, supported by international mediation. He called on Putin again to send his troops on Crimea back to their bases. <b>According to the Kremlin, Putin emphasized the importance of the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. These [Putin/Kremlin] "are of utmost importance to global stability and security" and should not be gambled with because of the conflict with Ukraine. Putin stressed again that he does not consider the current leadership in Kyiv to be legitimate.</b>

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<sup>629</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377584.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesschau.de, Interview with Prof. Stefan Talmon, Professor for Public Law, International Law and European Law at Bonn University, on legal base for referendum; Russian military	<p>Q: The Crimean parliament voted with a large majority in favour of joining Russia. Does this decision have any legal validity? A.: The Parliament of course can decide this and that. The decision, however, to want to belong to Russia, does not have any legal effect, because it is not in accordance with the Ukrainian constitution. [Therefore] It is constitutionally, as well as in international law, completely irrelevant. Q.: How about the referendum that Crimea want to hold? Would its result be legally binding? A.: The Ukrainian constitution foresees the right for Crimea to hold local referenda on political issues. Changes of the territory, however, are the reserve of national referenda. A region, even the autonomous Republic of Crimea, cannot declare by referendum to not want to be part of a country, but another one. On this question the entire Ukrainian population would have to decide. Hence, this local referendum is lacking a legal basis. Q: Can Crimea not call upon the right to self-determination? A.: Firstly, the right to self-determination is the right of all Ukrainians. The right to self-determination for parts of the population in the sense of a secession only exists under certain specific conditions which are not given on Crimea. And even if that would be the case, the right to secession is excluded from the outset if there is external interference, like in this case by Russia. Due to the fact that Russia has brought Crimea under its control by using military force of by irregular forces controlled by it, a rightful exercising of the right to self-determination is not possible on Crimea anymore. Q. <b>Were Russia's actions a breach of international law? A.: Yes, and it is important to say this loud and clear over and over again. Because of this, no declaration of intent by Crimea to join Russia is legitimate in terms of international law. There even is an international legal obligation of the non-recognition of situations that have been created by the use of force by a third country. This is the case on Crimea.</b> Q. The Ukrainian government declared it will not accept Crimea joining Russia, and now threatens a military response. However, it is not democratically legitimized. It is entitled to take this decision. A.: The government has <b>come to power by a revolutionary act that was not in accordance with the constitution. It therefore indeed does not have a constitutional legitimacy in Ukraine.</b> In International Law however, this is viewed differently, as it is based on the principle of effectiveness. For the International Community, the leadership on Kyiv is the government of Ukraine, because it emerged victoriously from a revolutionary process, and is capable of exercising state powers. After the escape of Yanukovich, it is the point of contact for the international community. <b>We are thus faced with the somewhat bizarre situation that a government, that is illegal in its own constitution, is legitimate according to international law.</b> Q. The government in Kyiv may also try to win back Crimea militarily? A.: A military response by Kyiv would be an attempt to re-establish the territorial integrity and would be covered by International Law. Q.: <b>Why does Putin take such risks? He could try to indirectly control Crimea, why does he want the "Anschluss"? A.: Putin has three options.</b> 1) He can try to indirectly control Crimea but leave it within Ukrainian territory; 2) Or he bets on a one-sided declaration of independence of Crimea - in other word, the establishment of a new state. 3) The third option is a joining with the Russian Federation. From Putin's perspective - also after his experience with the new "states" [emphasis original] by the grace of Russia, Georgia and Moldova - this last <b>option appears to be the variant offering the least potential for locally limited sanctions b the International community. In the case of an admission, it is not about Crimea anymore, but about Russia.</b> Q.: Could the situation on Crimea get out of control? A.: <b>If there is armed conflict on Crimea, then the situation could quickly get out of control. If Ukraine and official Russian troops were to engage, then we have a war in the region. So far, Russia has tried to cover-up the intervention, by making uniforms and number plates unidentifiable, and speaks of Crimean "self-defence forces".</b> Q.: The West is now imposing first <i>sanctions</i>. Is this the <i>right weapon</i> against violations of international law? A.: International law is difficult to impose [Orig.: durchsetzungsschwach]. You can impose sanctions. But their effect is highly questionable. At the end, they may hurt us more than them. Let us take a historic comparison. In 1940, the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states. The international community never recognized this and considered the states to formally continue to exist. This was highly symbolic and made it a lot easier for the Baltic states to regain sovereignty. This is what could eventually happen in regard to Crimea. <b>But before that, Russia will annex Crimea, force the Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the peninsula and establish its' border posts. . And the West will let this happen, because the global political implications of a military reaction would be way too serious.</b> Q: How can Ukraine call for legal verdict about Russia's violation of international law? A.: At the moment there is no legal institution that Ukraine could call upon, as this institution would also have to be accepted as legitimate and responsible to resolve the issue by Russia. Q: International Law is thus a weak sword? A.: <b>International Law is a weak sword - and a sword of the weak. If once upon a time there is a democratic government in power in Russia, then Ukraine can call for a settlement of the question on Crimea. A democratic government would have difficulties evading this concern.</b> Q. Poland and the Baltic states fear further Russian aggression and requested NATO-support. Is there a risk of further escalation? A.: Russia will not be so careless to extend its grip for power into Poland or the Baltic states. These states are under NATO's umbrella. He [Putin] will not step beyond this red line, because this would indeed mean risking a new world war.</p>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	intervention in Crimea. <sup>630</sup>	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesschau, 15:00; a) <b>Sigmar Gabriel visits Kyiv, Report by Michael Heussen;</b> b) Pro-Crimea Demonstrations on Red Square in Moscow, Interview with Udo Lilischkies; c) What can be done by Obama? Interview with Stefan Niemann. <sup>631</sup>	Sigmar Gabriel on the Maidan in Kyiv. The street barricades are still up, the signs of fighting in the streets on Maidan are visible everywhere. The Minister for the economy is notably impressed. Yesterday he spoke with Putin in a one-on-one meeting. This morning, with the Ukrainian government. <b>[Gabriel]: "The most sensible first step is to return to the negotiating table immediately. And to talk about how to return to an intact Ukraine, without pre-conditions, and without attacking its [Ukr] territory. And secondly, to end the extortive situation in which Ukraine is being caught"</b> . [Heussen ctd.] Still, soldiers loyal to Russia are besieging Ukrainian military bases on Crimea. And again, the military observers from international organisations were denied access to military installations. The Ukrainian prime minister chooses tough word. No one in the civilized world would recognize the outcome of the referendum, Yatseniuk said. However, he is willing to speak with the Russian government. [Yatseniuk]: Before that, our Russian neighbour must withdraw its army from Crimea, and declare that they will stick to the agreements signed [between UKR and RUS]. Furthermore, they must stop supporting terrorists and separatists that are on Crimea." [Heussen ctd]: <b>Last night around 200 pro Russian activists tried to storm a government building in Donetsk. They sought to free the provincial governor, who was arrested [by Kyiv] two days ago. Ukraine charges him with separatism.</b>
07.03.2014	tagesschau, 15:00; a) Sigmar Gabriel visits Kyiv, Report by Michael Heussen; b) <b>Pro-Crimea Demonstrations on Red Square in Moscow,</b> Interview with Udo Lilischkies; c) What can be done by Obama? Interview	Q: Currently, in Moscow, thousands are assembling on the red square to participate in a concert in support of Crimea joining the Russian Federation. Songs like 'We belong together' are played. How must this event be rated? A.: Apparently, according to official figures, there are 50.000 people now. Everything is shown live on TV. <b>The extent of mobilization is not surprising, because Ukraine is very close the Russians, it is a brother nation. This is how many Russians feel, and for months now they have seen that Ukraine is in the hands of terrorists, fascists and other thugs. This means that there is a genuine feeling 'we must help them' and that is why everyone want Crimea to join the Russian Federation;</b> also, as many people here on the square are saying today, much Russian blood has been spilled on the peninsula. Q.: Has the critique by the U.S. impressed Putin in any way? A. No, this does not appear to be the case at all. Today, again the OSCE observes on Crimea were pushed back by armed men, kept from entering the location of their interest. <b>In the meantime, observers say that is is clearly apparent that there are efforts to cover the fact that this is Russian soldiers.</b> Here, in the Kremlin today, a Crimean delegation was welcomed with a grand reception by both chambers of the parliament. The President of the Council of the Russian Federation assured the members [of the delegation] that if the outcome of the referendum is positive, Crimea will become a full member of the Russian Federation. <b>Interestingly, a local station on Crimea did a snap survey about who would vote in favour, and who against the joining up with Russia. Caution: 12% were in favour, 88% against. There is still a lot of work to be done for the Kremlin, to bring about a successful result on Sunday.</b>

<sup>630</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/krim218.html>

<sup>631</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377580.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	with Stefan Niemann. <sup>632</sup>	
07.03.2014	tagesschau, 15:00; a) Sigmar Gabriel visits Kyiv, Report by Michael Heussen; b) Pro-Crimea Demonstrations on Red Square in Moscow, Interview with Udo Lilischkies; c) <b>What can be done by Obama?</b> Interview	Q.: We just heard that Putin remains unimpressed by the sanctions. What will, what can Obama do in this situation? A.: Well, that is the mother of all questions her in Washington. Indeed, there is not much left in the diplomatic toolbox, and apparently the <b>hesitance to impose tougher sanctions on Russia in the White House. Maybe this hesitance can be explained by the consideration that it is better to wait and see if Putin will also go for Eastern Ukraine - because if that was to be the case, then the U.S. would have to find a response to that as well.</b> No, <i>Barack Obama has done a lot.</i> He appealed, he warned, he <b>spoke on the phone with the man in Moscow whom he doesn't like</b> , as it is being held. All of this was to no avail, not much that can be done remains left. It is therefore now expected by many here that Obama will take himself aback now, and leave the negotiating to John Kerry, who is said to have an easier relationship with the Russians. He [Kerry] could, together with Sergei Lawrow, achieve more than Barack Obama did with Wladimir Putin. At the very least that the dialogue does not break off, and that OSCE and UN - observers are accepted on Crimea. That appears to be the hope in Washington.

<sup>632</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377580.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	with Stefan Niemann. <sup>633</sup>	
07.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15; Linda Zervakis; a) <b>Gabriel in Kyiv</b> , Report Michael Heussen; b) International Reactions, US Gen. Says there was prior warning about Russias intent, Report by Tina Hassel. <sup>634</sup>	[see report Michael Heussen on visit of Sigmar Gabriel tagesschau, 07.03.2014, 1500]. [Added closing commentary]: " <b>That the population of Crimea will vote in favour of joining Russia can not be taken for granted anymore, it seems. A survey from a source considered reliable finds that a majority may favour to stay with Ukraine.</b> Putin still has enough time to influence the result in his interest.

<sup>633</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377584.html>

<sup>634</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47154.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:15; Linda Zervakis; a) Gabriel in Kyiv, Report Michael Heussen; b) <b>International Reactions, US Gen. Says there was prior warning about Russias intent,</b> Report by Tina Hassel	<p>a) Intro Zervakis: Internationally, Russia's actions continue to be criticized. Poland and France today spoke favourable of tougher sanctions. In Paris, Hollande received the former boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, one of the leaders of the Maidan protests in Ukraine [image also shows Pedro Poroshenko and the Ukrainian oligarch that hosted the Yalta Conference in Nov. 2013] The U.S. re-emphasised that Russia's actions are violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine. b) Report Hassel: President and First Lady on their way to Florida. A welcome break from the telephone - marathon of the last hours. Extensively, Obama exchanged views with Putin. But except for the re-assuring fact that there are talks at all, Obama did achieve anything. <b>Today, with a large majority, congress voted in favour of financial aid worth 1 billion U.S. Dollars for Ukraine. Compared to the almost 15billion the EU has agreed to, this is a drop of water on a hot stone.</b> The Europeans are hoping for more, and there are compromising signs from the otherwise perpetually blocking opposition. [John Boehner, Majority Speaker, Rep.] " We welcome these first sanctions and support the President with all leverages he requires to keep Putin in check." [Hassel ctd.] Today, <b><u>Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn surprises with a public statement that the military intelligence had evidence of an upcoming Russian invasion 7-10 days prior to the actual invasion. This warning had been handed to the government.</u></b> [Hassel ctd.]: Meanwhile, a high-end destroyer armed with cruise missiles has passed the Bosphorus, headed for the Black Sea. Both sides are increasing the pressure in this game of poker. That now even the EU has finally made up its' mind on sanctions, and is already considering tougher one, was received very positively her. <b><u>American and Europeans are clear about the fact that an apparent split between them would only play to the favour of Russia.</u></b></p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay, a) <b>Report Stefan Stuchlik on situation on Crimea;</b> b) Interview tih Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; c) Interview with Udo	<p>Intro Atalay: We might think whatever about Europe, we cannot get around it. Europe is part, present, and future [...]. That the self-confident Putin gives in in the conflict about Crimea, after the West punished Russia with sanctions was not seriously expected by anyone. He still does not want to talk to the current Ukrainian government. Instead, Russia again stood by the side of the Crimean government, which is currently preparing to throw itself into the supposedly protecting arms of the big brother Russia. Self-confidently, armed men denied OSCE-staff access to Crimea. U.S. and European politicians can be as diplomatic as they want, even if equipped with stick and carrot now - they are not bringing about an easing of the tensions. b) Report Stuchlik: The road o Privalnaja [phonetically]. Here, one of Ukraine's largest military bases on Crimea is located. IT has been under siege for days now. A single cast of the eye over the area is enough, to see what has changed since yesterday.: The occupants besiegers have re-enforced tremendously overnight, including trucks and a field kitchen [images show a large amount of modern RUS made military trucks and patrol vehicles]. From their barracks, the Ukrainians view down on their allegedly Russian colleagues - a scene just like from a bad comedy, because all here claim that this is normal. Even those under siege. [Stuchlik asking Ukrainian Armed Forces guard of Prewalnaja base]: Hello, we are from German TV, can we speak with you? How is it inside there? [Guard]: "Everything is normal, all quiet." [Stuchlik} You call it normal that the Russians are at your doorstep?" [Guard]: No. I am not afraid" [images shows guard, and behind the gate a Ukrainian tank aimed at entry gate] [Stuchlik ctd.]:Also different to yesterday, today there is a group of women that has assembled before the base's gate. I suspect they are Russian teachers from the area, that came here to give moral support to the Russian side. [Woman]: "We want to have normalcy and not such a chaos like in Kyiv." [Stuchlik to Woman]: "You are saying this is normal?" [Woman]: "Look, there is a group of soldiers marching here; down there they are clearly Russians, they don't harm anyone". [Stuchlik ctd.] Really not? Two minutes later a Ukrainian woman appears before the base, and suddenly the peace is over. [Ukrainian woman to other women that have assembled before base]: " My son-in-law is in there. I have a right ot be here, I am a relative. And you are just standing around talking stupid." [Same UKR woman, now being interviewed by Stuchlik, other women still in the background]: "I just ask for one thing - that the spilling of blood is prevented." [Stuchlik ctd] However, this does not make it any quieter before the base. A bus arrives. The Russian side is bringing so-called self-defenders. Men with orange-black signs, hardboiled, and ready to do anything it takes. That also has not happened a few days ago. The heated atmosphere does not even spare the representative of the holy church. [Stuchlik speaking to Kyiv-orthodox priest]: "Two brother-nations ae facing each other with arms her. What do you say? [Priest] "I think that definitely no one should invade foreign territory with arms, like here... [interrupted by someone shouting from behind, not visible, Stuchlik translates] "Don't believe a word he says, he is from the Ukrainian church, he is not a real priest." [priest to shouter] "Quiet, I am giving an interview. The most honest answer we got from one of the newly arrived soldiers. [Stuchlik]: " How do you feel about what you are doing?" [uniformed, masked, armed men]: "Bad." [pushes away micro, turns away]. [Stuchlik, ctd]: Yes, there is definitely no more precise description of the situation here on Crimea today.</p>

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	Lilischkies, Moscow. <sup>635</sup>	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay, a) Report Stefan Stuchlik on situation on Crimea; b) <b>Interview tih Stefan Stuchlik</b> , Simferopol; c) Interview with Udo Lilischkies, Moscow.	Q: About an hour ago, we received very unsettling news, that said that a Ukrainian military base was apparently literally run over by pro-Russian fighters. What do you know about this incident? A.: This news are a good case in point to illustrate the level of nervousness on Crimea. Also, the nervousness of the newsmakers. The first news today was that regular Russians troops had stormed a missile base - which doesn't make any sense as the missile base for 2 days is officially in Russian or pro-Russian hands. The, <b>it was said that Cossacks</b> [first time mentioning Cossacks since Pussy Riot arrest in Sochi], or self-organized Russian defenders had broken through the gate of a normal military base with a truck. Again, no one speaks about this anymore. According to our research and a couple of phone calls, could it, notabene, could it be that 100 to 150 Cossacks drove before the base, and demanded in a loud chorus of voices the handing over - but unarmed. <b>That, at least, pictures about the incident on the Internet are suggesting. An armed provocation would not make any sense, Russia want to maintain the semblance of legitimacy, and is likely to prevent any aggressive action until the day of the referendum, 16th of March.</b>

<sup>635</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5320.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
07.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay, a) Report Stefan Stuchlik on situation on Crimea; b) Interview tih Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; c) Interview with Udo Lilischkies, Moscow. <sup>636</sup>	<p>Q.: Are there any indications about the possible outcome of the referendum? A.: There is a new survey which I personally find very interesting. It was <b>conducted by a highly regarded Institute based in Kyiv, the Institute for Sociology. They say that on Crimea, 40% would vote in favour of joining Russia, 60% against.</b> This is very interesting. Also, there are <b>numbers from Eastern Ukraine, which are even more drastic. In Donetsk, only a third (33%) of the population is in favour of joining Moscow; in Luhansk, close to the Russian border, it is only a fourth (25%).</b> A small, local TV station on Crimea conducted a snap-survey amongst its viewers. The result here - only 12% favour the "Anschluss". <b>Does this mean that we now have the chance that there is a different outcome to the referendum than desired by the Kremlin, that we can expect a de-escalation by public demand? I think it would be naive to assume that. This would be a tremendous ignominy for Putin, if the very people that he wants to protect and rescue from the evil Ukrainians, tell him in the face that they don't want that, they don't want to be saved by him.</b> In a nutshell: Observers believe that of course the referendum will not be held freely and fairly, there will be no international observers allowed, all is happening under the gun-barrels of those that have a known, vested interest. Therefore, most observers believe that the outcome is already certain. It will be in favour of joining the Russian Federation. Q.: Obama spoke on the phone today with Putin. He does not seem really impressed by the sanctions. Are there nonetheless signs he might move? A.: No, to the contrary. You already showed images of the demonstrations on the red square [see ts. 07.03.2014, Interview U. Lilischkies] in front of Putin's doorstep, so to speak. Media continues to provide us with a barrage of the known kind and warn that Ukrainians want to leave their country because they are threatened by nationalists. An interesting figure about this, by the way: The same Institute for Sociology in Kyiv that did the survey on the referendum, asked who would have a chance to be Ukrainian president. The candidate of the 'Right Sector' the movement bedevilled by Russian state media, receives only 1,6% support. Thus, the real dangers are completely different to those shown here on TV. No, what we hear about are massive threats to impose countersanctions, if the Europeans would get serious. None of that leaves the impression that Putin is willing to give in. <b>It seems much rather that two trains are driving towards each other with ever greater speed.</b></p>

<sup>636</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5320.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
08.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Judith Rakers; a) <b>Report on the situation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Michael Heussen;</b> b) Situation on Crimea, live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Timoshenko arrives in Berlin for medical treatment, news by Judith Rakers. <sup>637</sup>	a) Intro Rakers: In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the situation remains tense. According to Ukrainian information, Russia reinforced its troop presence on Crimea further. International military observers of the OSCE were denied entry again. On Crimea, supporters as well as adversaries to joining Russia took to the streets. b) Report, Michael Heussen: Crimea is our home, we are many. You cannot win against us - today, the Maidan in Kyiv was in the hand of women. Traditionally, flowers are gifted on international women's day. Many did not want to keep them today. They put them down to commemorate the victims shot by snipers. <b>From different military bases across the country, military vehicles started to move out, for exercises only it is being said. These exercises were not announced.</b> In Moscow, the government stressed again that it did not provoke the crisis on Crimea. Foreign Minister Lawrow accused the government in Kyiv to be dependent on radical nationalists. [Lawrow] The so called 'Right Sector' decides what is happening in Ukraine. They work with the methods of threat and terror." [Heussen ctd] Today in Kyiv, the leader of 'Right Sector' Dmitrij Jarosch, confirmed that he will run for president. He is not expected to have any realistic chances. Just before, in the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre, the Ukrainian foreign minister reminded that lessons from history must be learnt, and <b>bloody conflict like in earlier conflicts on Russian soil must be prevented, [Andrej Deschtschiza, interim foreign minister]: "In the case of South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, the agreements that stopped the conflict were only signed when there was people killed already - too late."</b> [Heussen ctd.] <b>To prevent this, the foreign minister said, steps had been taken to establish a international contact group.</b> And indeed, a meeting between the sides has occurred already. In Moscow, the deputy foreign minister met with the Ukrainian ambassador. He on the other hand was put into this position by the old government, which was considered loyal to the Kremlin.

<sup>637</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47166.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
08.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Judith Rakers; a) Report on the situation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Michael Heussen; b) <b>Situation on Crimea</b> , live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Timoshenko arrives in Berlin for medical treatment, nes by Judith Rakers <sup>638</sup>	The situation remains tense here on Crimea today. OSCE staff was again denied access to the peninsula-. Manifestly, Russia wants to prevent a detailed inspection of the military forces employed here. And then, almost by the hour, news is coming in about smaller and larger incidents. The last being that <b>Crimean self-defence-forces, by firing into the air, forced a Ukrainian military aircraft to turn away</b> . Still, by the way, on what de iure is Ukrainian territory. Everything here in Simferopol moves in the direction of Russia. Today we <b>were told here that they are capable to hold a referendum that fulfils international standards [see statement by Merkel on legality of referendum, 06.03.2018]</b> . Small, but not irrelevant: In parts of <b>Simferopol, access to Ukrainian TV was switched off, and replaced with Russian programs</b> . [no reporting about pro-Ukrainian protests on Crimea]
08.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Judith Rakers; a) Report on the situation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Michael Heussen; b) <b>Situation on Crimea</b> , live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) <b>Timoshenko arrives in Berlin for medical</b>	Yuliya Timoshenko has arrived in Berlin for medical treatment. She is suffering from back pain after several ruptured discs, her doctors from Berlin Charité hospital announced, who treated her in Ukraine even while under arrest. The ousted government did not allow her to leave the country for medical treatment despite an intervention by the EU.

<sup>638</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47166.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	treatment, news by Judith Rakers. <sup>639</sup>	

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<sup>639</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47166.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
08.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay, a) <b>situation on Crimea</b> , Report Stefan Stuchlik; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik; <sup>640</sup>	Intro Atalay: To state that there is haggling about Crimea would be too positive. Because there are no negotiations, but only threats. While the U.S. and France are already speaking of imposing the next level of sanctions, <b>Putin, unimpressed gambles for power. The Russian president plays roulette. He bets everything on Crimea, on the pro-Russian forces present on the peninsula that rather wants to be East than West.</b> Again, armed men showed international observers that they are not welcome. Again, with warning shots. <b>One almost gets the impression that Putin has long won this conflict.</b> b) Report Stuchlik: Cossacks, come here - the Russian side mobilizes everything today that could impress the population of Simferopol - on the government seat, the Russian flag is waving. On the Lenin Square - yes, it is still called that - out of the blue a stage is built, bands are playing marching tunes. 'Festival of friendship' the event is called - one can already guess who the friend is in this case. Only the police on the sides, with their blue-yellow badges on their uniform remind us about the fact that this is actually still Ukrainian territory. [Stuchlik asking policeman]: " How do you feel in your uniform if everyone is for Russia?" [Policeman] "Don't try to get me to talk because I don't talk while I am on duty." [Stuchlik ctd] Even World War II veterans are brought by the Russian propaganda machine - once against fascism, now against Kyiv, that was the message. [Stuchlik to WW2-veteran]: "Tell me, why are you here?" [Veteran] " I am one the last surviving Red Army officers. I know what you have to fight against. And when I was called today, and asked to come, I happily agreed to the request of our leadership." [Stuchlik ctd] On the stage, the moderator congratulates all women on international women's day. <b>The girls dancing next to the stage of course would prefer to party, but they have to appear - also by higher orders. [Stuchlik asking young girls dancing next to stage] "You don't even know why you are here? [Girl]: "No. We were called and told we should dance as a present to the people"</b> [Stuchlik ctd.] Every day, with pop-music and dance, unity and strength are to be demonstrated. Besides the Cossacks, the martial pro-Russian self-defence-forces [shows volunteers with orange-black arm wrists, stops for close up of old man with glasses amongst them]. Until the day of the referendum, there is only one message here. [Old lady in uniform] "I have learned German at school and want to tell the Germans that everything will be alright, and the right side will be triumphant." [Stuchlik ctd] The right side, however, feel like the winner already. <b>In all of a sudden, we were attacked from bystanders, who told us that we were liars and should disappear [images show Stuchlik in an argument with bystanders].</b> Opinions differing from the official line are not in high demand on Crimea anymore.
08.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay, a) situation on Crimea, Report Stefan Stuchlik; b)	Q.: Despite all this, pro Ukrainian assembled in Crimea today - could they at all make their voices heard? A.: <b>We all found this to be very brave.</b> There was a small demonstration before the parliament, not many people, 20-40 maybe, with Ukrainian flags. Brave, as I said, but also brief, as the protest was over within 30 minutes, which speaks of itself. <b>The only ones that dare to walk through town with Ukrainian national insignia are the police. One almost feels sorry for them,</b> because they may not talk to anyone, they can't control anyone - which they don't do anyway. They know that they are doomed to a puppet-status. Q.: International Observers appear not particularly welcome. You seem to

<sup>640</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5322.html>

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	Interview with Stefan Stuchlik; <sup>641</sup>	have experienced some of the aggression yourself today. A.: The OSCE observers are not allowed in. <b>In my opinion, because Putin wants to prevent them from finding that there are indeed regular Russian troops on Crimea</b> , despite him being in constant denial of this. Regarding the journalists, the climate simply is getting rougher. Yesterday an AP journalist was physically attacked. <b>We are experiencing more and more problems to enter conversations with people here, because everyone thinks that this is over anyway</b> - so why react to the questions of a critical, Western, journalist?
09.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00 Jan Hofer; a) <b>Report on situation in Russian-Ukrainian conflict</b> , Michael Heussen; b) Developments on Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik, live. <sup>642</sup>	a) Intro Hofer: Diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia are treading water. Again, Chancellor Merkel spoke with Putin on the phone. According to her spokesman, <i>Steffen Seibert</i> , <b>Merkel called the Referendum about the breaking off of Crimea from Ukrainian territory as illegal</b> . Putin maintained that the referendum is in accordance with International Law. The Ukrainian government categorically ruled out a separation of Crimea b) Report Heussen: A leading figure in the fight for freedom and independence. Every Ukrainian schoolchild knows the poet Tarus Shevchenko. His 200th birthday falls exactly in the time in which Ukraine is facing a tensile test. Threatened from within and from the outside. [Yatseniuk speaking on the occasion of birthday commemoration, next to him Interim President Turtschinow behind him Ukrainian clerics. Ukrainian flags and red-black flags are being waved.] <b>"Our forefathers spilled blood for this country. And we will give not away a centimetre of the Ukrainian earth. Russia and his President must know this!"</b> . Last night, Kremlin-critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky came to Kyiv [living in exile with personal support of Merkel, Dec. 2013]. 'You must defend your freedom' he told the fighters of Maidan. He spoke of Russian lies, of propaganda - but also that there is a different, peace-loving Russia. The old, Soviet Russia, was celebrated on Lenin-Square in Simferopol today. The Russian navy was playing patriotic songs, campaigning for the referendum next weekend. Military observers of the OSCE were denied access for the fourth day. They want to try every day anew, as long as the government in Kyiv so desires. A Ukrainian reconnaissance aircraft is targeted - the Ukrainian border guards publish a video that allegedly shows Russian soldiers in their position on Crimea [source give: "Internet video"]. The plane is being shot at but can turn without suffering damage. <b>Russia sent out one of its largest war ships to Ukraine today, and the government in Kyiv decided to increase defence spending None of these signalling a de-escalation of the conflict.</b>

<sup>641</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5322.html>

<sup>642</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47178.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
09.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00 Jan Hofer; a) Report on situation in Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Michael Heussen; b) <b>Developments on Crimea,</b> Stefan Stuchlik, live	Despite heavy criticism from the West, the preparations here for the referendum are running on full steam. Today, the distribution of electorates was decided and announced. There are rumours that, once Crimea joins the Russian Federation, wages would rise threefold. it is unknown where these rumours are coming from, officially this was never claimed. <b>Moscow today announced a financial aid package worth 800 Mio. U.S. Dollars for Crimea, after yesterday Kyiv stopped all financial flows to Crimea.</b> Small, but maybe interesting detail: the Ukrainian national railway stopped services to Crimea because travelling to Crimea is too dangerous for Ukraine, it was said.
09.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; reports from tagesschau, 20:15. <sup>643</sup>	Intro Atalay: A common enemy unites. In attempts to make the best of a bad job, countries are uniting their efforts that are not necessarily best friends. <b>Turkey and China are now siding with Germany in the diplomatic fight against Putin. Today, the phone wires around the globe turned red: On the one end - always chancellor Merkel. First, in the presence of British Prime Minister David Cameron, she spoke with Putin. Then, she dialled the number of the Turkish colleague Erdogan. After that she spoke with the Chinese president Xi Jinping.</b> The closer the referendum is approaching, the more intense the diplomatic efforts are becoming. Putin, however, seems unimpressed by being more and more isolated - because he is hoping for new friends to strengthen his country. The large Russia is calling, and Crimea responds with ever more self-esteem.

<sup>643</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5324.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	audio, Markus Sambale, WDR Moskau: <b>Fronts Hardening</b> as Referendum approaches. <sup>644</sup>	<p>The pro-Russian government on Crimea is pushing the tempo. It wants to continue to pave the way to split Crimea as quickly as possible from Ukraine and join Russia. Against all protests from Kyiv, and threats of sanctions by the West. The chairman of the pro-Russian regional parliament, Wladimir Konstantinov, said that the change to a different legal system will be challenging, but that he is nonetheless sure that Crimea will be able to adopt it within a month. [Konstantinov]: "I believe the inhabitants of Crimea will, provided everything works out fine, after the referendum, towards the end of March, feel like citizens of a new country. Namely as citizens of their homeland. They are not travelling anywhere - they are coming home." [Sambale ctd.] The government in Simferopol has called for a referendum next Sunday. The inhabitants of Crimea are to decide whether they want to continue to belong to Crimea, or officially joining the Russian Federation. With its decision to join Russia, the parliament has already given a direction. Additionally, chairmen of the parliament Konstantinov is also luring with, a financial aspect. He promised that the wages of bureaucrats, soldiers, police, and doctors will quadruple after joining Russia. Indeed, a majority in favour is likely - 60% of the Crimean population are ethnic Russians, that do not feel represented by the new government in Kyiv. Many declare that they do not want to be governed by the 'fascist' and 'nationalist' in Kyiv and are worried about their rights. And the pro-Russian head of government of Crimea, Sergei Aksionow is happy that Russia interfered as protecting power. [Aksionow]: "We want that no one is hurt, neither civilians nor soldiers. Today, we live in peace and tranquillity. The crime rate has gone down by a third". [Sambale ctd.] But the other inhabitants on Crimea, the minorities are alarmed. Especially the Crimean Tatars fear suppression, if Russia takes over full control. As a reaction to the plans to separate, the government in Kyiv has frozen the accounts of the members of the regional government. <b>A military reaction was again excluded by Ukrainian [interim] foreign minister Andrij Detschizja in an interview with the Russian channel FO Moskvi [phonetically]. "In this question Ukraine maintains its peaceful position. We want to collaborate with our EU and U.S. colleagues to exert pressure on Russia in order to bring about talks about a settlement of the conflict. If we cannot lead direct talks, then we can at least voice our concern through our partners"</b> [Sambale ctd.] Internationally, this week will also be marked by continued efforts to start talks. <b>But so many facts have been created already that Crimea seems lost for Ukraine.</b></p>
10.03.2014	tagesschau 15:00, Report on <b>domestic German debate on Russia - Ukraine conflict</b> , Hans Jessen	<p>With decisive strides defence minister UvdL appeared before the camera. She believes targeted sanctions are possible, with political support also from the opposition. [UvdL]: " Sanctions, if they are chosen smartly, particularly <b>target the rich, the oligarchs in Russia.</b> They are the ones that will quickly feel it, if they are not able to travel for business anymore, if their accounts are frozen, if the purse is getting a bit tighter, if their business-continuity is interrupted - and <b>they have influence on Putin.</b>" [Cem Özdemir, Chairmen, Alliance 90/Greens]: "<b>Therefore there is a high degree of agreement with the course the government, especially of chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier, in regard to the measures taken</b>". [Jessen ctd] Before the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin, flowers and candles for the victims among the Kyiv-Maidan-protesters. Also, the [Ukrainian] ambassador [in Berlin] demands targeted sanctions. [Pavlo Klimkin, Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin, later foreign minister of Ukraine]: "It is also important to note that such sanctions are not aimed at the Russian population. We need also the support of Russians. <b>Russia also belongs to Europe. That is why we need effective sanctions</b> targeting the Russian leadership." [Jessen ctd]: The solidarity with the victims is as high as the challenges are to identify sanctions that don't hurt the wrong ones.</p>

<sup>644</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio119168.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	audio, Jens Borchers, HR: <b>The hour for</b>	<p><b>Talking, negotiating, fathoming agreements, striking compromises - federal foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier believes in these measures.</b> This is how he is doing politics when the protests in Kyiv are running the danger of turning into a bloodbath. Together with his foreign minister colleagues from Poland and France he travels to Kyiv. The three want to talk, negotiate, fathom agreements, and strike compromises. Frank Walter Steinmeier knows of the risks associated with such a mission. [Steinmeier, before negotiations in Kyiv, 20/21.02] " I believe we are of course uncertain about what we can achieve here." [Borchers ctd] Then the three ministers disappear in negotiating rooms. 36 hours later, Frank Walter Steinmeier reappears at Hamburg Airport, saying that he is happy with the agreement reached. But first of all he warns caution. [Steinmeier]: "We do not want to cheer pre-maturely. This is a framework agreement that now must be filled with real politics." [Borchers ctd]. On the next day, the Ukrainian president Yanukovich has disappeared, the first troops without insignia appear on Crimea. In the following days, The Russian government claims that it is answering calls for help of the population from Crimea. <b>The peninsula is de-facto annexed without open violence. The federal government, and its foreign minister fan out their diplomatic line. The aims are: 1. Prevent escalation; 2. if nothing helps, then at some point there could be sanctions against Russia; 3. a negotiated solution. We want a contact group for all parties affected, so there can be talks.</b> Negotiations? Contact Groups? For Werner Schuly, Green MEP, this all sounds too dull, too weak, and too soft. [Schuly]: "Putin is a criminal - <b>how many more contact groups do you want to establish?</b> We have the Minsk Group to settle the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh, we have the 5+2talks to bring the Transnistria conflict to a settlement, we have the Geneva talks for about South Ossetia and Abkhazia." [Borchers ctd] And all these are territories, Schulz reminds, that were illegally occupied by Russian forces. And now another talking circle about Crimea - Schulz expects Putin to just laugh at that. And while the government continues to push for negotiations, the debate on sanctions is picking up pace. Everyone knows that sanctions always have negative consequences for both sides. And in the case of punitive actions against Russia, Germany would also be affected. <b>No other European country is so closely linked to Russia.</b> Sanctions would hurt Germany badly. <b>In addition, it also looks as if Germany would have to say goodbye to the modernisation-partnership with Russia,</b> for want of a partner willing to modernise, since Putin would need to be such a [willing] partner after all. Furthermore, there is a <b>risk of a return of the Cold War to Europe.</b> To top it all, the government's diplomatic efforts are side-lined by voices from the past. <i>Horst Teltschik</i>, former security advisor of chancellor Helmut Kohl, rants about the lack of creativity of the European Russia policy in general, and specifically the German policy. [Teltschik] " Two to three weeks ago, Putin was in Brussels and picked up on an old idea developed by Romano Prodi, to establish a pan-European free trade area. That means that would be an idea, if we want to sign an association agreement with Ukraine, and want to offer something to Russia in parallel, and thereby consider all parties' interest." [Borchers ctd] Former chancellor <i>Gerhard Schröder</i>, SPD, who now earns his income from the Russian Gazprom warns about sanctions. [Schröder]: <b>Don't get yourself lured into a sanctioning spiral,</b> because first of all it destroys a lot, which then eventually must be repaired again, and secondly, it hurts us more than others." [Borchers]: <b>Thus, the critique, also on diplomacy of the European lead-state Germany: First you did the wrong Russia policy. And now you bet on punitive measures that will hurt yourself.</b> Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel, last week on a diplomatic mission, responds to the criticism in the following way: [Gabriel] "<b>None of what has happened here justifies the breaking of international law.</b> That is why it is so important that Gerhard Schröder made clear that nothing justifies this breach. WE just must do anything to prevent our continent from being drawn back into terrible times. <b>At some point, then the arms-race begins anew - that, I believe, is the largest worry we must have at the moment.</b>" [Borchers ctd] How to rid oneself of this worry quickly, not even Germany diplomacy has a smart response. <u>Talking, negotiating, fathoming agreements, striking compromises - all that only works if the counterpart feels duly taken into consideration. And, if he is ready to talk.</u></p>

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<sup>645</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119182.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	tagesschau, Linda Zervakis 20:00, a) <b>NATO sends AWACS planes to Eastern</b>	<p>a) Intro Zervakis: In response to the Crisis on Crimea, <b>NATO sends AWACS reconnaissance plane to the two neighbouring countries of Ukraine, Poland and Romania.</b> This was decided by the NATO-ambassadors in Brussels. The aircraft are to observe the crisis in Ukraine. Next Sunday the population on Crimea is asked to cast their vote about a joining with Russia. <b>The government in Moscow today announced own steps to settle the crisis.</b> a) Report Heussen: They want to take into consideration the interest of all Ukrainian, and resolve the crisis on the basis of international law - this was stressed in a [screened] one-to-one meeting between President Putin and his foreign minister Lawrow, in Sochi. But here on Crimea, this does not seem to count. <b>Pro-Russian Berkut-militias strictly control the access to Crimea,</b> at a border, that should not exist. In Kyiv, again the masses took to Maidan. Most had the day off due to a public holiday. Behind the walls of parliament, however, work continued: The secretary-general of the Council of Europe (SGCoE) visits the president. [Thorbjörn Jagland, SGCoE]: "I will try to send an observer mission to Crimea and the east of the Republic - to make sure that the rights of minorities are being guaranteed". [Heussen ctd] The U.S. ambassador to Kyiv speaks of a Russian invasion on Crimea. Washington moved ahead a military exercise on the Polish - Ukrainian border. NATO send AWACS planes to Poland and Romania. The U.S. ambassador, Geoffrey Pyatt, assuages: [Geoffrey Pyatt] "<b>From a U.S. perspective, there can be no military solution. We must applaud the military forces of Ukraine that they did not let themselves be provoked.</b>" On Crimea, already despite all protests, the ballot boxes are standing ready. <b>The electoral list for the referendum is being put together surprisingly quickly. That the referendum is going to be called off is unlikely.</b> Europe and the U.S. must expect that a majority of the Crimeans will vote in favour of joining Russia. <b>But then what? More sanctions, more military on the borders? Now, a plan for the time after the referendum must be developed.</b></p>

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	Europe, Report by Michael Heussen. <sup>646</sup>	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	tagesthemen; Pinar Atalay: a) <b>CoE Initiative; Ukraine Minister of Defence orders combat readiness</b> , Report on developments of day, Golineh Atai; b) Crimea establishes army, Report Stefan Stuchlik c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) World Bank offers 3bn financial aid to Ukraine, Atalay <sup>647</sup>	Intro Atalay: The image of a tensile test - it fits frighteningly well for the situation in Ukraine. And almost by the day, it becomes more plastic. Already split within, the country is torn back and forth. By powers of the West and in the East. The question is who wins this power-struggle at the end. Although NATO took a decision today to send AWACS reconnaissance plane to Poland and Romania, but Putin continues to remain unimpressed by the threatening gestures of the West. But Europe is not giving up yet. Again today, diplomatic strings were pulled. b) Report Atai: Preparations for the emergency. Full combat readiness was ordered by the [Ukrainian] minister of defence [see statement by Ukrainian foreign minister 09.03.2014, no military reaction] - part of the nationwide exercises are also these roadblocks by the border guards close to the Crimean Peninsula. In Kyiv, a new Western player appeared on the stage today. <b>The Council of Europe, like the OSCE, belongs to the broad coalition that Berlin wants to mobilize tomorrow to increase the pressure on Moscow.</b> Both sides, government and Council, agreed to establish a truth-commission to establish who fired the shots on Maidan. [Thorbjörn Jagland, SGCoe]: "One of the large problems here is that citizens distrust the public institutions. That's why we need such a commission". [Atai, ctd] The former president of the European Court on Human Rights will lead the investigation on who is responsible for the murder on Maidan. Kremlin speaks about snipers belonging to the opposition who wanted to escalate the situation; the Ukrainian say that intelligence services had positioned the snipers. The medic Maxim Popov wan on Maidan on the 22.02.2014, he only saw protesters dying, by shots through head, heart, lung. [Popov] "I don't think the perpetrators will ever be identified. You know, too much time has passed already. All evidence of what happened is covered up, destroyed by now. Such an investigation should have taken place the day after the killings. Now it is almost useless." [Atai ctd] Decision number 2 [of the agreement between CoE and Ukraine]: The Council of Europe will try to send observers to Crimea, to find out about the rights of minorities, Jews and Muslims, on Crimea. Recently a synagogue was smeared over with swastika graffities on Crimea. This is new and very strange, says the chief-rabbi of the Kyiv-Jews. For decades, the Jews lived unharmed on Crimea. His friend, a journalist, sees Russian propaganda at work on Crimea. After all, Russia need to justify its invasion, he says. [Schimon Briman, Ukrainian journalist] "I truly have the suspicion that there is a connection between the vandalism and the invasion. As if someone vandalized the buildings, to later on be able to say 'we came to protect and safe the Jews against pogroms'." [Atai ctd]: The Jewish Community in Kyiv is annoyed that Russian media speaks of a fascist power grab in Kyiv. Moscow should stop to invent attacks on Jews.

<sup>646</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47200.html>

<sup>647</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5326.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	tagesthemen; Pinar Atalay: a) CoE Initiative; Ukraine Minister of Defence orders combat readiness, Report on developments of day, Golineh Atai; b) <b>Crimea establishes army</b> , Report Stefan Stuchlik c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) World Bank offers 3bn financial aid to Ukraine, Atalay. <sup>648</sup>	Intro Zervakis: Although de iure Crimea still belongs to Ukraine - the closer the date of the referendum is approaching, the stronger grows the impression that Crimea is already Russian. A self-announced head of government [?] already exists, and, as our correspondent Stephan Stuchlik reports, also an army is being built up. b) Report Stuchlik: Even the Ukrainian national flag was quickly painted over with the Russian colours. Soldiers, in masses as if this was an action movie. Absurd is not strong enough a word to describe this event. It is supposed to be the official birth of the Crimean Army. Inside, military music is played from a cassette-deck, then quickly the text of the new oath glued on [unclear on what exactly, images show booklet, which is later handed to each new member]. And here, the pride of the Crimean forces is standing, 50 volunteers that were recruited with lightning speed - men in woollen masks. The pro-Russian side directs the spectacle on the inner court of a Ukrainian administration building. [Stuchlik asking old man present at event]: "Can you actually do this? This is still Ukrainian territory... [Old men] "Well, still. You rightly pointed out still. I hope that these soldiers soon serve another great state. I believe in that." [Stuchlik ctd] But first of all they serve a friend of this other, great nation. Sergei Aksionow, self-proclaimed prime minister of Crimea, as of today is commander in chief [of the new Crimean Army]. The swearing the oath ceremony. and if one goes really close, you realize that the soldiers that are supposed to protect the entire peninsula are afraid of television. Allegedly, the new Crimean Army is already more than 1000 soldiers strong. <b>But one question Sergei Aksionow must be asked: [Stuchlik asking Aksionow] " This is not legal; you are not the elected president" [Aksionow]: " I never claimed that. Eleven days ago, the Crimean Highest Council empowered me with the warrant to establish an army before the referendum." [Stuchlik ctd.]</b> Against whom he wants to defend himself he does not say. His army is standing. At least, until we journalists disappear.

<sup>648</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5326.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	tagesthemen; Pinar Atalay: a) CoE Initiative; Ukraine Minister of Defence orders combat readiness, Report on developments of day, Golineh Atai; b) Crimea establishes army, Report Stefan Stuchlik c) <b>Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol</b> ; d) World Bank offers 3bn financial aid to Ukraine, Atalay. <sup>649</sup>	Q.: In your feature we just saw one of the separatist groups on Crimea. Is this a new state already, establishing itself? A.: Well, for that one would have to assume that the government of Crimea acts autonomously. <b>And if you look at what happened over the past days: the establishment of the electoral commission; the distribution of the electorates; the handing out of the electoral lists; the distribution of the ballots; the establishment of a new army; and of course the massive propaganda snake that moves through Crimea and Simferopol - then I dare to doubt that the government of Crimea, with its limited resources, manages to get all this machinery rolling by itself.</b> No, there must be a mastermind in-between, probably from Moscow. And then the direction is also clear, and that is Russia. Q.: How are the minorities between all these growing pro-Russian groups? A: At the moment there is a tug of war about the minorities, especially the Crimean Tatars representing 12-15% [earlier reporting Stuchlik: 20%] of Crimea's population. They refuse en bloc to even participate in the referendum. They do not recognize it. Apparently, and we also believe that, behind closed doors there are negotiations with the Tatars to change their mind. Not to vote in favour of Russia, but to participate in the referendum. Because the Crimean governments want to have a referendum that appears democratic - and it would be very difficult to explain to international observers why 300.000 people refused to even participate in the referendum.

<sup>649</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5326.html>



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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	tagesthemen; Pinar Atalay: a) CoE Initiative; Ukraine Minister of Defence orders combat readiness, Report on developments of day, Golineh Atai; b) Crimea establishes army, Report Stefan Stuchlik c) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik, Simferopol; d) <b>World Bank offers 3bn financial aid to Ukraine</b> , Atalay. <sup>650</sup>	News announcement Atalay: World Bank will support the Ukrainian government with 3 billion U.S. \$ - the Crimea crisis and its possible economic consequences increasingly affect the global financial marketplaces. For the first time, U.S. markets are also affected. However, the fear of a new Cold War faded and is increasingly replaced by hopes for a diplomatic crisis. This is the reason why the downward spiral on the markets is now slowing down. b) Markus Grüne, Frankfurt stock Exchange: The stock markets continue in crisis mode. Besides the crisis on Crimea, there are weak indicators from China and Japan that cause the markets to worry.

<sup>650</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5326.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
10.03.2014	audio, Achim Wendler [no affiliation given]: The German governments art of suppression. <sup>651</sup>	<p>Where is actually Volker Kauder? It would be time now for the favourite sentence of the leader of the CDU faction in Bundestag. 'Politics starts with looking at the realities'. Because in the case of Ukraine, the government persistently denies looking at the realities. And, as a consequence, it is not doing policy. It really is a <b>kind of suppression what is happening in Berlin</b>. For days, the announcement from Berlin to Moscow is that 'any further escalation will have consequences'. The reality is that Putin for days now does nothing else to de-stabilise; he broke international law; he threatens; he let's his soldiers annex Crimea little by little; he lies to the international community; he refuses serious communications; in a nutshell: Putin simply does his thing - undeterred, and without compromising on it. That is the reality that neither Merkel nor her foreign minister want to acknowledge. <b>Accordingly, their policy: It is guided by two unrealistic premises: hope and fear.</b> <i>Hope</i>, that Putin - at some point - will allow OSCE observers on to Crimea; that he will recall the so-called referendum planned for this Sunday - or at least postpones it; that Putin will stop threatening and call his troops back. Merkel and Steinmeier don't want to let any of these hopes die. That is why they continue to keep the dialogue channels open, as they call it. <b>Unrealistic.</b> With someone who does not want to talk, you can't talk. And on the other hand there is, as said earlier, <i>fear</i>: Fear that Russia might close the gas-tap [war-threat? arms race? new Cold War? division of Europe? It is this fear that keeps Europe from imposing effective sanction. Thus, instead of policy, hope and fear. Two equally bad advisors in a situation like this. Angela Merkel has experienced it herself often enough. The only thing that impresses Putin is steadfastness. But steadfast can only be who is completely visionary, or who has both feet firmly on the ground - respectively, looks at the realities. Kauder's favourite phrase has never been as important as now.</p>

<sup>651</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119190.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Judith Rakers, a) <b>Developments in Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Report Golineh Atai;</b> b) EU lowers import tariffs for Ukraine, News, Rakers; c) Steinmeier	<p>a) Intro Rakers: The regional parliament on Crimea increasingly pushes for a secession from Ukraine and joining Russia. <b>With a large majority, the parliamentarians today voted in favour of a declaration of independence</b>, which shall come into effect immediately after the referendum, if the population votes in favour of joining Russia. The interim government in Kyiv responded with strong criticism, and again demanded that Russia withdraws its troops. b) Report Golineh Atai: Everything goes, according to plan. The parliamentarians that came to power by a coup d'état [when?] of the regional parliament of Crimea, today already are preparing a declaration of independence - for the day after the referendum. They are planning to confiscate Ukrainian state property. The parliamentarians in Ukraine are fighting against time. <b>Many believe Crimea is lost already</b> - today, the Prime Minister reminded of the Budapest Memorandum, in which the U.S., United Kingdom and Russia agreed to respect the borders of Ukraine 20years ago. [Yatseniuk] "Our country is the victim of a military aggression. Those that once guaranteed that there may be no such aggression must withdraw their troops. And the others should defend an independent and sovereign state". Meanwhile, in Russian exile, <b>Victor Yanukovich stepped before the press again. He insisted that he still is the legitimate president of the country.</b> Addressing the new leadership, he said: [Yanukovich] " Your actions have led to the secession of Crimea". [Atai ctd] The Russian parliament want to decide how [Russian] passports can be handed out in the fastest possible way - already next week, the peninsula could become part of the Russian Federation. Tomorrow the <b>Ukrainian prime minister will visit Washington</b>, and together with the support of the U.S. seek to halt the development on Crimea.</p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	visits Baltic States, Report A. Henze. <sup>652</sup>	

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Judith Rakers, a) Developments in Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Report Golineh Atai; b) <b>EU lowers import tariffs for Ukraine, News, Rakers</b> ; c) Steinmeier visits Baltic States, Report A. Henze. <sup>653</sup>	Rakers: The European Union wants to support the Ukrainian economy by lowering import tariffs. The idea presented by the European Commission will need to be ratified by the EU-Parliament. If passed, the Ukrainian economy would be relieved by 500 million Euros.

<sup>652</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47220.html>

<sup>653</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47220.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Judith Rakers, a) Developments in Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Report Golineh Atai; b) EU lowers import tariffs for Ukraine, News, Rakers; c) <b>Steinmeier visits Baltic States, Report A. Henze.</b> <sup>654</sup>	a) Intro Rakers: Foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier continued his diplomatic efforts today. Consecutively he held talks in the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The three states are EU members and share a border with Russia. Because of this, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is watched with great concern. b) Report Henze: Today's spring weather contributed little to the joy of the foreign minister - the concern about a new ice-age with Russia is accompanying him to any of his steps through the three Baltic republics, which are also EU and NATO members. The fears he heard were large. <i>[Edgars Rinkevics, foreign minister of Latvia]</i> " <b>The crisis on Crimea in many aspects reminds us of 1940, as the Soviet Union first threatened and destabilized us, and then occupied us with armed force</b> ". [Henze ctd] Frank-Walter Steinmeier could only repeat in response what he already promised in the morning in Estonia: [FWS] " I am also here to say: We will not let Estonia and the Baltic states alone". [Henze]There are currently conflicts with the large Russian minorities in the Baltic states, for example in education policy. And only a few years ago, Moscow also fuelled the conflict about Russian memorials [2007] - with riots as a consequence. It is feared now that Russia could kindle with the population groups again. Germany's position towards tougher sanctions against Russia as response to the crisis on Crimea was of particular interest. [FWS]: " <b>If the referendum takes place next Sunday</b> , then at the very latest on Monday we will have reached the next decision-level" [Henze]This would include the freezing of accounts and travel restrictions. The hosts, however, were not satisfied with warm words of solidarity only. Over and over Steinmeier had to re-assure that Germany is willing to contribute to far-reaching sanctions, if there is no other way out of the crisis on Crimea. But in that, even the German foreign minister does not appear to believe anymore."

<sup>654</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47220.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; a) <b>Michael Heussen reports about propaganda war in Kyiv;</b> b) Steinmeier visits Baltic states, Report Claas Oliver Richter; c) Commentary on Steinmeier's diplomatic efforts in the Baltics, Claudia Buchenmeier. <sup>655</sup>	<p>a) Intro Atalay: <b>Putin sadly misses the Soviet Union - that is not a secret. He dreams of a USSR reloaded.</b> A part of this would be Crimea, where the parliament today already declared its independence. This does not mean independence however - it means more dependency on Russia. Also, the referendum on Crimea is nothing more than farcical. The rift between the governments in Kyiv and on Crimea, however, is getting ever deeper. Day by day the danger increases that it could turn into a trench. There is enough inflammable matter, as Michael Heussen Reports. b) Report, Heussen: Just a few hundred meters away from the Maidan in Kyiv, are the headquarters of the Ukrainian interior secret service. Only rarely journalists are invited into this building. Therefore, many followed today's invitation. The new director, in office since only two weeks, wanted to announce a sensation. [Valentin Nalywaischenko, Director Secret Services Ukraine] "Last night we have arrested the leader of a radical youth-movement in Luhansk. This organisation has a radical, illegal character. It is a threat for the security of the citizens of Luhansk." [Heussen ctd] Then he leaves, and lets his speaker present the evidence. The alleged perpetrator, a gun and material to build a bomb can be seen on blurry pictures. <b>Can we believe this alleged investigation success, or is this supposed to be anti-Russian propaganda?</b> [Marina Ostapenko, spokeswoman, Secret Service Ukraine] " I do not understand your question - why should you not trust us? We work very correctly with very concrete evidence. If you love doubts, then you will have to wait until the investigation has been concluded". [Heussen ctd]: Propaganda also comes from Russia. The toppled president speaks from exile, insisting that he still is the legitimate president and commander-in-chief of Ukraine. [Yanukovych]: "A group of ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists have taken control in Kyiv. I want to ask the Western patrons of this government: Have you turned a blind? Have you forgotten what fascism is?" [Heussen ctd] So, apparently, they are fascists that came to power in a coup d'etat - tha parliamentarian in Kyiv. They demanded Russia to stop the aggression. The firing power of their own army is to be improved a quickly as possible. [Alexander Turtschinow, interim President Ukraine]: "<b>We have decided to <u>establish a Ukrainian national guard. We will not draft in 18 year olds but will sign on those that have already served. This guard is being established to protect the Ukrainian population against all enemies within, and all aggressions from abroad.</u></b>" [Heussen ctd]. [Today] the Ukrainian ministry of defence published images of military exercises. It is, however, not clear when these images were taken. War-propaganda, here also. The parliamentarians in the Crimean regional parliament remained unimpressed by this. Kyiv threatens to resolve their parliament tomorrow. They, however declared the peninsula's independence already - before the referendum.</p>

<sup>655</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5328.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
11.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; a) Michael Heussen reports about propaganda war in Kyiv; b) <b>Steinmeier visits Baltic states</b> , Report Claas Oliver Richter; c) Commentary on Steinmeier's diplomatic efforts in the Baltics, Claudia Buchenmeier. <sup>656</sup>	a) Intro Atalay: In face of these facts, deep inside, one or the other European politician may have wished farewell to diplomacy already. But the mills are steadily continuing to grind. <b>Because a Cold War reloaded, and particularly something worse, nobody wants.</b> Today, foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled to the three Baltic states to demonstrate that Europe is on their side. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all three are NATO and EU members in the last 10 years. Well, and now, the Baltics worry that Putin's arm will also reach for their countries. b) Report Claas-Oliver Richter: [...] Frank Walter Steinmeier wants to calm down the Baltic States, take their fears about aggressive Russian policy. [FWS] " I am also here to say: we don't leave Estonia and the Baltic states alone with that". [Richter ctd] The fear of the Baltics cannot be taken away with this alone. 25% of the Estonian inhabitants are Russian, many feel deprived. So far, no one here is calling for Russian support, but many fear a further split between the Baltic and the Russian parts of the population. [...] Even Steinmeier, who is usually focussing on de-escalation, can now imagine tougher sanctions against Russia - after the planned referendum on Crimea. [FWS]: If the referendum is held on Sunday, at the very latest on Monday we will have reached the next decision -level."
11.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; a) Michael Heussen reports about propaganda war in Kyiv; b) Steinmeier visits Baltic states, Report Claas Oliver Richter; c) <b>Commentary on Steinmeier's diplomatic efforts in</b>	Showing solidarity; building trust; the big hug. Were it just nice words of a cunning [gewiefter] diplomat, or did the trip really bring about something? Frank-Walter Steinmeier had one message for the Baltic states - we, the EU and NATO, we will not leave you alone. But in his luggage, <i>the German foreign minister had nothing but expressions of solidarity. He couldn't, and did not want to, promise more. Because Steinmeier does not want to cut the dialogue channels with Russia.</i> And therefore, he pointed to Monday, when the EU foreign ministers will discuss further sanctions. But this alone does not take the fears of the people in the Baltic countries. For this, they are too deeply rooted. 50 years of Soviet rule define the self-perception of the small countries on the northern periphery of the EU today. And with that, their policy. Particularly in Estonia and Latvia, were a large Russian minority lives. For many Balts, the enemy within, whom they mistrust. <b>What, if these want to be part of Russia. Will the EU and NATO then interfere? To this, the Germany foreign minister has not given an answer. Whether this is a realistic scenario or not does not play a role, the fears are there. The journey was important, the minister tried.</b> But to take the fear away from the people in the Baltic states, he could not possibly achieve. Because to draw a clear red line for Russia, that many here desire, is not in the German interest.

<sup>656</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5328.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	the Baltics, Claudia Buchenmeier. <sup>657</sup>	

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<sup>657</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5328.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
12.03.2014	audio, Michael Götschenberg, MG [no affiliation given]: Cluelessness in the Ukraine Crisis. <sup>658</sup>	<p>Cluelessness is creeping in, ever more. And in the federal government, this is not kept secret. [Gernot Erler, Special Federal Envoy for Russia and the Eastern Partnership Countries]: "<b>The big question is what are actually the plans of the Kremlin for the time after the referendum - and that no one can really answer</b>". [MG ctd] Erler is actually known as Russia-friendly - but in these days, even he has no better plan. [Erler] "<b>There are people - and I am much more cautious - that speak of a new Cold War. But a further deterioration cannot be fully excluded, because we don't know how the Russian side will continue to act.</b>" [MG ctd] Yesterday evening, <i>Angela Merkel</i> had found clear words on the CDU parliamentary group meeting - <i>it was permissible to speak of an annexation of Crimea by Russia, Merkel apparently said</i>. The Russian actions, she said literally, must be answered "with a certain toughness" - whatever that is supposed to mean. This is the way it is seen in Poland also, which accuses the Germans of lacking just that [toughness]. Therefore, Angela Merkel today will meet the Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, to disperse the Polish concerns. Germany, the Polish accusation goes, is too timid towards Russia, because Berlin is worried about Russian gas deliveries. However, the German dependence on gas is not that strong, let alone that Russia is also dependent on this business. But - the government is taking the concerns of the neighbours by all means serious. Foreign minister Steinmeier flew to the Baltic states at the beginning of this week. Here, the concerns loom particularly large. After all, the three countries once belonged to the Soviet Union. [Erler] " They are closely watching the developments in Russia, and then in all of a sudden it is about the 25 million foreign Russians [Auslandsrussen]. People that can indeed not be considered radical are saying that Russia must do more to protect the foreign Russians - well and in Estonia or Latvia there are more than 25% of the population Russians. That they are worried can be fully understood, I believe" [MG ctd] <b>That Russia is indeed planning on integrating Crimea fully into the Russian Federation is doubted by hardly anyone in the federal government</b>. Laws are being prepared for it, the Crimean parliament has already voted for independence from Ukraine, and on the weekend, a referendum on joining the Russian Federation is being held. Therefore it is considered quite certain that the foreign ministers will decide in favour of the next, second phase of sanctions against Russia. They are about travel restrictions for individual high-ranking Russian politicians, and about freezing their bank accounts in the EU. Who exactly will be targeted is currently being discussed in Brussels. [Erler]: "<b>What we don't know is what comes next. Will it be the case that Russia then tries to do the same, using the same patterns, in Eastern Ukraine? And then also to prepare that parts are being cut from Ukraine to become Russian?</b>" [MG ctd] But how far should one go to counter Russia? The cluelessness can be grasped with bare hands.</p>

<sup>658</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119258.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
12.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Jens Riewa; a) <b>Merkel visits Poland, Report Ulrich Adrian;</b> b) Germany treats Maidan casualties, News Jens Riewa. <sup>659</sup>	a) Intro Riewa: In the conflict about the joining of Crimea with Russia, international pressure is mounting on Russia. Few days before the referendum on the peninsula, the finance ministers of the seven leading economic nations called on Russia to turn around. Moscow must observe the territorial integrity of Ukraine, otherwise massive sanctions will be imposed. Fully on this line were the Polish prime minister and chancellor Merkel after a meeting in Warsaw; b) Report Adrian: IT was like always. Merkel and the Polish PM meet, and after a short one-to-one conversation they agree on all points - also today in Warsaw. For three hours Merkel visited the Polish capital - the topics: Ukraine crisis, the situation on Crimea, Energy dependence, sanctions on Russia, clear language. <b>[Merkel] " If the Contact Group is not established, if the talks are not successful, then sanctions are inevitable. Therefore: Help for Ukraine, readiness for dialogue to resolve the conflict, and thirdly sanctions if this is not moving ahead". [Tusk] " This crisis is going to last for a while, we should not deceive ourselves about that. In addition of thinking about sanctions against Russia it is also important now that Europe is in agreement, if it turns out in the next months, or even years, that we do not find a political solution for this crisis." [Adrian ctd] The first stage of the Association Agreement with Ukraine - this was jointly announced by the two politicians in Warsaw - shall be signed already next Thursday on an EU-summit. Apparently, the EU also wants to establish facts.</b> At the beginning of the week Tusk ranted on Polish TV that the German dependence on Russian gas threatens Europe's sovereignty. Of that, no more today - instead demonstrated unity in the next steps against Russia. Tusk hit the nail on the head. "Bad words don't help".
12.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Jens Riewa; a) Merkel visits Poland, Report Ulrich Adrian; b) <b>Germany treats Maidan casualties,</b> News Jens Riewa. <sup>660</sup>	24 individuals heavily wounded on Kyiv Maidan arrived today aboard a Luftwaffe flying hospital for medical treatment in Berlin. The majority of the cost for treating the victims is covered by a private Ukrainian foundation.

<sup>659</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47242.html>

<sup>660</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47242.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
12.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; a) <b>Developments on Crimea,</b> Stefan Stuchlik; b) Merkel visits Poland, Report Ulrich Adrian. <sup>661</sup>	<p>a) Intro Atalay: What has the West got left in its arsenal against Russia in the crisis on Crimea? It appears almost desperate, how EU politicians are trying to not just stand on the side-lines while Crimea sees off to Russia. Today, the G7 states - the world's seven leading industrial nations - jointly warned Russia not to annex Crimea - but who is interested? Four days before the pro-forma referendum, again facts are being established on Crimea. The local minorities have almost no say anymore - in charge are the pro-Russian rebels, as Stephan Stuchlik experienced again today. b) Report Stuchlik: "Explain to us why we are not allowed in, we are invited to the press conference" - <b>we are discussing with a pro-Russian Cossack before the main entry.</b> In front, his colleagues in fur hats parading. We wanted to get a feeling on just how quickly the wheels are turning towards Russia only needed to try to enter the office of the prime minister today. We were invited by the spokeswoman with the black hair [shown on images] - she is still paid by the Ukrainian government. She is trying hard. But inside it is also clear who is calling the shots - the pro-Russian security guards. In the inner court of the building, there is, what is apparently Russian military technology [images show jeeps]. After we are allowed in, it quickly becomes apparent why the new masters were so resistant: another, secret view through the window [image shows close up of Russian military truck]. And then, <b>behind the intimidated wardrobe-lady stand the infamous Berkut special units.</b> No, there is no doubt about the balance of power here. Anyway, everything is different today. The Tatar-leader is in the room, we are being told. But instead of the cross-grained old man we knew, it is a young student. With astonishingly Russia friendly views. [Stuchlik] "Are you really the representative?" [Ruslan Balbek, "Tatar Representative for Ethnic Minorities on Crimea"; screened in inverted comma]"We have been given a guarantee that our interests will be respected; therefore we will also participate in the referendum. We were also offered the opportunity to participate in the future government." [Stuchlik ctd.] Sergei Aksionow, the self-proclaimed [Crimean] prime minister, excuses for the 'difficulties in the interim period' and welcomes the referendum next Sunday. [Stuchlik] "Where do you take the hope that anyone in the West is going to recognize this referendum?" [Aksionow] "We have prepared a declaration for all Western journalist that shows that this referendum is legally sound. And we will hold the referendum in all the required transparency. __In the afternoon, the presswork is fully re-organized. Suddenly, a new centre is unveiled, with state-of-the-art technology. A new information minister appears, and all journalists must seek accreditation anew. In the future, there will be no more mistakes. The future began today, and it is Russian.</p>

<sup>661</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5330.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
12.03.2014	tagesthemen, Pinar Atalay; a) Developments on Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; b) <b>Merkel visits Poland, Report Ulrich Adrian [see report Adrian, tagesschau 12.03.2014, 20:15]</b> <sup>662</sup>	a) Intro Atalay: Well, the crisis now requires a Plan B, a plan for the time after the referendum on Sunday. There are talks about tougher sanctions by the West against Russia. But there are wholly different scenarios likely also. Like a ghost, suddenly the term war goes around Europe. No one says it loud yet, but Belarus requested fighter-jets from Russia - safe is safe. On the other side, the states that have in earlier times already felt the cold breath of the Soviet Union, frantically re-assure themselves of their allies. After foreign minister FWS visit to the Baltic states yesterday, chancellor Merkel today visited Poland. A sign of solidarity with the European partner and NATO member. b) Report, Adrian: [Tusk, visiting a US-Polish military exercise earlier this week] "It is about the German energy and environmental policy: What Germany is doing there is a threat for the security and sovereignty of Europe as a whole. We cannot defend ourselves against Russian aggression if ever more countries are dependent of Russian gas and become ever more dependent." Unity between Poland and Germany [after this statement] should have bygone quickly. Already, Tusk has asked the Americans for help. Six f16 fighter jets including their crews arrived for an exercise in Poland today. Many Poles have primordial fears of Russia, as a consequence of the policies of Russia for centuries, when Poland vanished from the map completely twice. [...] Even Polish political scientists think Putin is capable of anything. [Marcin Zaborowski, Polish Institute for International Relations]: " <b>The appetite comes while you are eating. If there is no reaction by the West to the annexation of Crimea, then Putin will perceive this as a signal that he can continue.</b> " [Adrian, ctd] -Polish primordial fears...

<sup>662</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5330.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
13.03.2014	audio, Jochen Zierhut, WDR, ARD Nariobi: In the end, the West is helpless. <sup>663</sup>	<p>Russian president Putin cannot be impressed by threatening sanctions and continues his plan to annex the Crimean peninsula. Sadly, the government declaration by the chancellor [today] will not change this either. Angela Merkel wants diplomatic recommendations for Russia, but now has considerably accentuated her tone, and threatens massive sanctions, because <b>she cannot accept the law of the jungle; because Putin's actions are those of the Cold Warriors from past centuries.</b> The clear words are good, even though Putin will remain unimpressed. That is why the EU countries must get serious with tougher sanctions, should Putin not give in. Who demands harsh economic sanctions must be willing to accept that we in the West may also suffer from them for a while? <b>Putin, the Polit-Macho in Moscow is difficult to predict. It must be feared that he reacts only impulsively, because he has no real strategy in the Crimea Crisis, but wants to distract from domestic, also economic problems. The uneasy question is how unscrupulous Putin is really. The clear words of the chancellor are correct, as amongst the Western state only Merkel appears to still have access to Putin.</b> The government declaration by the chancellor however also showed how powerless the West is. At the end, only the hope remains that economic sanctions by the EU render any effect. Because a military interference must remain excluded, absolutely. It may be annoying, but Merkel must continue to reach out to Putin. <i>Doing so, she would, however, also have to acknowledge that the West has made mistakes in its Russia policy. Examples: The forced eastward-expansion of NATO, above all however the poker with Putin about Ukraine, or the obsession about luring Ukraine with billions into the EU. For years, the European community has ignored Russian interests.</i> It is thus not very credible, if Merkel now wants to calm Moscow by stating that help for Ukraine is not directed against Russia, but neighbourhood-policy. Even if some rant Russia - understander. It doesn't help - to prevent worse the interests of Russia must be taken into better consideration in a more unagitated manner than hitherto. This does not mean to tolerate the interest in aggressive power expansion, of course it must be valid: 'no annexation of Crimea'. Yes, Angela Merkel is right - it will require a long diplomatic breath. There is simply no silver bullet.</p>

<sup>663</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119316.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
13.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Susanne Daubner; <b>a) Merkel explains policy in Russia-Ukraine crisis to Bundestag, Report Markus Spieker;</b> b) News, OECD stops membership negotiations with Russia. <sup>664</sup>	<p>In her government declaration on the government's position on the conflict about the Ukrainian peninsula Crimea in Bundestag, chancellor Merkel called Russia to show relent. She reaffirmed the threat of the EU to impose tougher sanctions. If Moscow would continue to refuse negotiations, on Monday travel restrictions and the freezing of accounts will be decided, Merkel said. On Sunday, Crimea will hold a referendum about joining Russia. Moscow wants to implement a yes as fast as possible. a) Report Markus Spieker: From the visitor stages, the Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin, grimly followed the debate in Bundestag today - despite the chancellor clearly taking the sides of his country in <b>the conflict against Russia and threatens sanctions in the case that Crimea is annexed from Ukraine.</b> [Merkel]: "If Russia continues its course of the last weeks, then this would not only be a catastrophe for Ukraine. Then we would perceive this, not only as neighbouring countries to Russia, as a threat. Then this would not only change the relationship of the EU as a whole with Russia; no, it would not least - and I am fully convinced about this - also massively hurt Russia." [Spieker ctd] Die Linke [German Socialist Party] also criticized Putin's course today. But Gregor Gysi [leader of the Linke parliamentary group] also sees part of the blame with the West, who promoted the expansion of EU and NATO without taking into account Russian sentiments. [Gysi] " <i>Russian fears that after the EU, NATO will follow into Ukraine. It feels ever more surrounded. And it was only pulled on Ukraine. The EU and NATO foreign ministers have completely disregarded the Ukrainian and Russian history. They never understood the meaning of Crimea to Russia.</i>" The Alliance 90/Greens parliamentary group spokeswoman praises the governments and condemns the upcoming referendum as farcical. [Karin Göring Eckart]: "This is not a referendum about independence, but an illegal legitimation for an illegal annexation". [Spieker ctd] As sanctions, travel bans and freezing of accounts are being talked about. The special envoy of the government for Russia, Gernot Erler warns that [Erler]: [...]"between every of these steps there is an open door with a sign 'Exit', with the invitation for a common search for a political solution. And that it is never too late to walk through that door." [Spieker ctd] <b>There is agreement among all parliamentary groups - a military interference is not an option.</b></p>

<sup>664</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-30357.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
13.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Susanne Daubner; a) Merkel explains policy in Russia-Ukraine crisis to Bundestag, Report Markus Spieker; b) <b>News, OECD stops membership negotiations with Russia.</b> <sup>665</sup>	Because of the situation on Crimea, the OECD suspended accession talks with Russia. Instead, the alliance wants to strengthen its cooperation with Ukraine. Also, U.S. Foreign Secretary Kerry threatened tough sanctions if Russia remains relentless. Tomorrow, Kerry wants to give it a last attempt to reach an agreement in a meeting with Sergei Lavrov in London.

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<sup>665</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts-30357.html>



The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
13.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) <b>Report on parliamentary debate on Ukraine-Russia crisis, Report by Mathias Deiß</b> ; b) First casualty in riots in Eastern Ukraine, Report Michael Heussen <sup>666</sup>	<p>a) Intro Miosga: If Putin would have taken the time to listen to what Angela Merkel said in her government declaration in the Crimean crisis today, the he probably would have been interests in one sentence only: 'There is no military option for Germany' the Chancellor emphasised. For Putin, this must sound as if the West won't do much against Crimea joining Russia on Sunday. At the same time, it also doesn't mean that the Europeans are putting their heads in the sand. Astonishingly sharp, <b>Angela Merkel threatened sanctions today</b> - which certainly will have been greeted by someone in the audience, whose country has suffered before under Russian power-aspirations, then under the Soviet flag.</p> <p>b) Report Mathias Deiß: Military honours today at the Chancellery for the <b>Czech prime minister - for decades his country was a Soviet satellite state - Crimea is now facing the same threat</b>. For the chancellor, Putin's military invasion there is a falling back into the Cold War - instead of soldiers, diplomats are now in demand, Merkel declared today. [Merkel] Militarily, the conflict cannot be resolved. I am telling this to those people that have fears and worries. Military action is not an option." [Deiß ctd] <b>Merkel's Crimea crisis concept for the coming weeks: continuous talks with all conflicting parties, financial aid for Ukraine, and additional painful sanctions against Russia if Putin sticks with his Cold War course.</b> [Merkel]: "The clock cannot be turned back. Conflicts of interest in the centre of Europe, in the 21st century, can only be overcome successfully if we do not fall back to the patterns of the 19th and 20th century". [Deiß ctd] Merkel and Putin, despite regular meetings, never developed a close and cordial relationship. But they are talking with each other - also during the last days. That these talks remained without result, for Die Linke party also to with Putin's experience that Europe and the U.S. don't keep their promises for example to not expand NATO further after German re-unification [see Adomeit]. [Gregor Gysis]: "This promise was broken. There was a vehement expansion of NATO towards Russia. And Russia fears that after the EU, NATO will come to Ukraine. It feels ever more surrounded. But is was only pulled on Ukraine. The EU- and NATO foreign ministers have completely disregarded the Ukrainian-Russian history. They never understood the role of Crimea in Russian history." [Deiß ctd] The understanding for Putin's action on Crimea remains limited despites such arguments. The government declaration today was a clear warning in the direction of Moscow. Only one day after the referendum will the EU decide about new sanctions, says Merkel. The Greens agree with this approach: [Karin Göring-Eckart] "And if on the weekend the referendum on Crimea has the expected outcome that we are assuming at the moment, then it must be said clearly that it is not a referendum about independence, but an illegal legitimisation for an illegal annexation." [Deiß] <b>Hardly anyone in Berlin still believes that Putin will change his course of action and calls off the referendum after all.</b></p>

<sup>666</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5332.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
13.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Report on parliamentary debate on Ukraine-Russia crisis, Report by Mathias Deiß; b) <b>First casualty in riots in Eastern Ukraine; Russia conducts military exercises close to eastern Ukrainian border; Report Michael Heussen</b> <sup>667</sup>	a) Intro Susanne Daubner: Riots occurred during pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protests in Donetsk. Several hundred protesters clashed with each other, official sources say. B) Report Michael Heussen: Grievance now also in Donetsk. <b>For the first time since the Crimean Crisis, there were deadly clashes during demonstrations.</b> Supporters of the new government in Kyiv clashed with twice as many pro-Russian protesters. Stones were flying, fire-crackers lit, and there was stabbings. The protests began peacefully in the late afternoon. With loud parades, but peaceful. 'We want no EU, we don't want NATO, we want to belong to Russia'. The police positioned itself between the groups. When the situation escalated later on, it was helpless. <b>Almost 200 kilometers to the East, the Russian military is conducting exercises. Many in Donetsk fear that Moscow is just waiting for a reason to stand on the side of the Russian speaking inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine; that the soldiers are training for an invasion.</b> Actually, the military observers of the OSCE wanted to drive to the eastern border of Ukraine today - but for security concerns the mission was aborted.
14.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Linda Zervakis; a) <b>Kerry meets Lawrow in last attempt, Annette Dittert;</b> b) Developments in	a) Intro Zervakis: In the Crimea Crisis there are no signals for a détente. A meeting between the Russian foreign minister Lawrow and his U.S. colleague John Kerry in London did not bring about a rapprochement. Lawrow said that there is no common view of the issues. He also emphasised that his country does not want to interfere militarily. The U.S. Foreign Secretary showed disappointment. The result of the controversial referendum will not be recognized under any circumstances. b) Report Annette Dittert: Showing little signs of hope, a preoccupied John Kerry appeared this morning already before Downing Street. <b>The meeting between these two foreign ministers is the last chance for a diplomatic solution,</b> it was said before the meeting. And after Kerry and Lawrow remained long hours behind closed doors, while the embassy published garden picture of the two, there was some hope. It was disappointed afterwards, however, when Lawrow declared without Kerry <b>'The referendum on Crimea will take place as planned'</b> . [Lawrow]: 'We could not find a common view on the situation - but talks are nonetheless always useful.'. [Dittert ctd] An exhausted and visibly disappointed John Kerry declared later: [Kerry] " As I said to foreign minister Lawrow: that is a decision of enormous consequences, with respect to the global community." [Dittert ctd] The Russian foreign minister did not move a millimetre in the direction of his counterpart. With this, the last chance for a diplomatic solution appears lost. The EU will have to impose tougher sanctions on Monday. Russia and the West continue their collision course.

<sup>667</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5332.html>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Olaf Bock. <sup>668</sup>	

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<sup>668</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47284.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
14.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Linda Zervakis; a) Kerry meets Lawrow in last attempt, Annette Dittert; b) <b>Developments in Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Olaf Bock</b>	<p>a) Intro Zervakis: In light of the growing tensions in the crisis on Crimea, UN Secretary Ban called on Ukraine and Russia to remain cal. Both sides should refrain from provocations after the referendum. Meanwhile, the nervousness in Ukraine is growing. As a response to Russia's military activities, the parliament in Kyiv voted in favour of establishing a national guard with up to 60.000 men. b) Report Olaf Bock: Barricades on the Maidan. U.S. Senator John McCain is taking a picture for himself while Ukraine is threatened by a possible breaking up. Not only on Crimea, in Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine there were heavy clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups as well. One person was killed, many wounded. [Man, Donetsk citizen: This is terrible. Someone will profit by bringing the two sides to clash - kept apart by only a few policemen. This happens on purpose!].[Bock ctd] On Russian TV, right-wing forces, who cause unrest in Donetsk are made responsible for the clashes, agents provocateurs of the so called 'Right Sector'. On the Internet, however, there are videos that show that also the pro-Russian protesters attack the buses of the Maidan-supporters. A battle is raging about public opinion - dissenting voices on Russian internet are muted. Just now, several homepages that reported critically about the Russian Ukraine-policy were shut down. Officially for illegally calling for unauthorized conventions. <b>Also, there is military sabre-rattling: military exercises close to the Ukrainian border. After the riots on Wednesday night, Russia want to be able to protest its people, it was announced by the [Russian] Foreign Ministry today. And in Ukraine, at the moment a so-called National Guard of Volunteers of the Maidan-movement is being established. Right-wing forces, suspects Russia.</b> The conflict about Ukraine is increasingly heating up. Beside military threatening gestures in both sides, <b>now a battle about public opinion in Russia began.</b> And the Russian parliament continued the preparation for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</p>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
14.03.2014	Tagesthemn Caren Miosga; a) <b>Kerry and Lawrow in London, Report Frank Jahn</b> ; c) short interview Frank Jahn; b) situation in Ukraine before the referendum, Stefan Stuchlik. <sup>669</sup>	a) Intro Miosga: We now turn to world politics, and to two men on whose faces it is easy to read the current state of world affairs. Not even a wisp of an agreement was the result of today's meeting between U.S. foreign secretary John Kerry and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lawrow. <b>Most likely, thus, Crimea will vote in favour of joining Russia on Sunday. The West cannot prevent this anymore.</b> John Kerry appeared as if he did not expect anything else. Much larger is the worry that Moscow, after Crimea, is going to grab for other regions in Eastern Ukraine. b) Report Frank Jahn: Last chance London. U.S. chief diplomat Kerry meets his Russian counterpart Lawrow, once more in a one-on-one, before the Crimea referendum, which the West deems unconstitutional. In the residence of the U.S. ambassador they meet and shake hands, but don't seal an agreement. 6 hours later they part, their press conferences are held in different locations in London. 'We have no common view of the situation' concludes Lawrow in the Russian embassy. [Lawrow] "Russia will recognize the outcome of the referendum on 16th of March". [Kerry] "Neither we nor the international community will recognize the referendum!" [Jahn ctd] Stalemate - the situation continues after the meeting. The West wants to protect Ukrainian sovereignty, Moscow continues to portray itself as the protector of the Russian minority [ethnic Russians are the majority of Crimea's population] on Crimea. Pictures taken in the garden suggest a relaxed atmosphere during the meeting, but <b>Russia stubbornly refuses further negotiation on the framework of an international contact group and will decide about the next steps only after the referendum. An invasion, however, is not foreseen, said</b> [Lawrow]: " <b>Russia is not planning an invasion in Eastern Ukraine</b> " [Jahn]: Kerry is still seeing worrying signals. [Kerry]: Should Russia establish facts on the ground that increase tensions or threaten Ukrainians, this will have consequences. There will be costs." [Jahn ctd] The West threatens sanctions but wants to remain in dialogue. However, whoever was hoping for a last-minute solution of the crisis on Crimea was disappointed today.
14.03.2014	Tagesthemn Caren Miosga; a) Kerry and Lawrow in London, Report Frank Jahn; c) <b>short interview Frank Jahn</b> ; b) situation in Ukraine before the referendum, Stefan Stuchlik. <sup>670</sup>	Q.: Today Russian <b>foreign minister said no to a military invasion into Eastern Ukraine</b> - but the Americans are nonetheless gravely concerned. Do they have reasons to be concerned? A.: Indeed, especially if one is looking at the increasing tensions in Eastern Ukraine. Yesterday during a demonstration in Donetsk there were clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces. One person was killed, many wounded. <b>Should there be further attacks in the Russian speaking population, it could well be that Russia will interfere, because today the Russian foreign ministry again emphasized that it is guaranteeing the protection of the Russian speakers. Also, militarily a lot is happening on the Ukrainian border. Several thousand soldiers have moved there - thus there can be no talk about détente.</b>

<sup>669</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5334.html>

<sup>670</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5334.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
14.03.2014	Tagesthemn Caren Miosga; a) Kerry and Lawrow in London, Report Frank Jahn; c) short interview Frank Jahn; b) <b>situation in Ukraine before the referendum, Stefan Stuchlik.</b> <sup>671</sup>	a) Intro Miosga: While West and East are showing off their muscles, but no more, Russian's, Ukrainian's and Tatars today on Crimea truly got into it - namely in an arm-wrestling competition. Just that this competition was more like a hug. Our correspondent Stefan Stuchlik found men that are bursting with power but want anything than having to fight each other. b) Report Stuchlik: Time to reduce prejudices. These men belong to the 'Arm Wrestling Club Simferopol'. Of all people the musclemen have the bravery to stem themselves against the nervousness before the referendum. [Andrej Scharkow, Arm-wrestling Simferopol] "Here on Crimea so many people live together - Ukrainians, Russians, Tatars. So, we said: Let's do a friendship -competition. I fear that the referendum will divide us. That is a bad idea, only a few months ago we were all still friends. If one looks around in the gym, you realize that people sit together that during the last weeks we saw only separately. The Russians, the Ukrainians, the Tatars. [Young tatar woman] "We hope that everything stays the way it is. My friend is Russian, I am supporting him here, we all should live in friendship". [Stuchlik] Arm-wrestling is popular here - but this is a political event. You must to let Ruslan fight Sergei, while on the streets the battle for opinions escalates. Outside, the guest of honour [arrives]. Former Olympic champion Alexander Karelin equally is not overly happy about the referendum. [Stuchlik] Why did you come all the way from Moscow?" <b>[Alexander Karelin, fmr. Olympic Champion in wrestling]: Well, there is the Olympic idea, where competition counts, but not where you are from. Here on Crimea we a seeing dangerous cleavages currently. Politics got involved. But we do not want a cut, we want that life on Crimea continues in freedom of fear and want." His appearance is ever more impressive, if one is aware that in his real life, he is parliamentarian for Putin's party.</b> The organizer is not sparing with symbols. And at the end, not the national anthems with which the people are fighting each other on the streets, but the song of Crimea is played. <b>There are few people with a sober mind on the peninsula. That they are, above all, arm-wrestlers, is surprising. But as stated already, a day to reduce prejudices.</b>

<sup>671</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5334.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
15.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Jens Riewa; a) <b>Developments in Russia-Ukraine conflict, G. Atai;</b> b) Situation in eastern Ukraine remains tense, Report M. Heussen; c) Situation in Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik. <sup>672</sup>	a) Intro Riewa: Russia has vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution on the crisis in Crimea. In the vetoed draft resolution, all states were urged to not recognize tomorrow's referendum. The Moscow-leaning leadership of Crimea want the separation from Ukraine, to then join Russia. The West and the Ukrainian government believe the referendum to be breaching with international law. b) Report Golineh Atai: Special meeting of the Ukrainian parliament. With large majority the parliamentarians declare the regional parliament of Crimea dissolved. <b>[Turtschinow, Interim President] "Now there is a real threat of a Russian invasion."</b> [Atai ctd] 'Russia stand up', the parliamentarians shouted at the end, to show support to the anti-war protesters that took to the streets in Moscow today. 'Crimea belongs to Ukraine' these protesters are convinced. An occupation and annexation are not acceptable for a civilized state [the protesters hold]. [Woman, at protest]: "I am worried because the society is so polarized. And that so many here are under the influence of this terrible nationalist propaganda." [Atai ctd.] The Ukrainian border guard is on high-alert, here, in close proximity of the Crimean Peninsula, <b>Russian soldiers allegedly took control of a gas plant - that would be the first Russian military action inside Ukrainian territory outside Crimea.</b> The foreign minister demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops. He announced a conversation with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen he will have on Monday, to talk about military aid for Ukraine. On Maidan, citizens today demonstrated for the unity of the country and declared their solidarity with the inhabitants of Crimea - they let fly white balloons - against a war.

<sup>672</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47296.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
15.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Jens Riewa; a) Developments in Russia-Ukraine conflict, G. Atai; b) <b>Situation in eastern Ukraine remains tense, Report M. Heussen;</b> c) Situation in Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik. <sup>673</sup>	a) Intro Jens Riewa: In the east of Ukraine there were again violent clashes between radical groups. In Kharkov, pro-Russian and radical nationalist groups allegedly clashed. In Donetsk, a building of the Interior Intelligence Service was stormed by pro-Russian forces. b) Report Michael Heussen: The police remain on the side-line as the pro-Russian protesters beleaguer the seat of the Ukrainian Interior Intelligence service in Donetsk. Even when the building is stormed, they don't interfere [image shows many cameras recording the staking of the building]. Other than broken windows nothing happens, the mob quickly disappears. <b>On Lenin square in the city centre, long queues are building, men, women are waiting to sign a petition. They want a referendum, just like on Crimea - with two choices: shall the Donetsk basin remain Ukrainian, or should it join Russia.</b> The protesters continue to the police headquarters. They demand the freeing of the men that are allegedly involved in the murder on Thursday night. The police officer shows empathy. He explains to us that the demands will be immediately checked. He wants to de-escalate. But as a precautionary measure, heavily armed security forces stand close by. Before the mourning hall of the Donetsk hospital, relatives say farewell to the 22-year-old who was stabbed to death on Thursday night [images of funeral, Ukrainian flag waiving]. He protested against Russia, and for Ukraine. Last night, again two men were killed, this time in Kharkov. According to media reports both victims were pro-Russian protesters. Russia accuses the Ukrainian government of not having the situation under control and declared readiness to protect fellow Russians in Ukraine.
15.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00; Jens Riewa; a) Developments in Russia-Ukraine conflict, G. Atai; b) Situation in eastern Ukraine remains tense, Report M. Heussen; c) <b>Situation in Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik.</b> <sup>674</sup>	Despite massive international criticism, and the possibly far reaching consequences for global politics, here on Crimea the preparations for tomorrow's referendum continue undeterred. 1,5 million people are called to cast their vote, the ballots will be open between 8 am and 8 pm. The question will be whether they want to belong to Russia, or a strengthened autonomy within Ukraine. We were already being presented the international election observers, amongst them two members of the European parliament - who, on request, said they were here in their private capacity. The self-proclaimed prime minister declared already yesterday that he expects a participation of more than 70 %, and a clear vote in favour of joining Russia. For several reasons it appears plausible that his forecast will be correct.

<sup>673</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47296.html>

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The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
15.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) <b>Developments in Russia - Ukraine conflict</b> , Report G. Atai; b) Anti-war protests in Moscow, Ina Ruck. <sup>675</sup>	<p>a) Intro Caren Miosga: <b><u>How long ago is it actually since the Ukrainians in Kyiv on Maidan square forced the toppling of President Yanukovich? Weeks? Months? Let me tell you - 21 days. Twenty-one days in which initial hope was replaced by fear of war.</u></b> In that, it is apparent that even for the interim government in Kyiv, it is not about Crimea anymore. No, there is the fear of a domino-effect. In Donetsk in east-Ukraine there were pro-Russian demonstrations today. In Kharkov, close to the Russian border, two people died. This is clearly not the Ukraine that once was dreamed about on Maidan. And because of the, there were demonstrations there again. b) Report, Atai: A symbol of unity. Peace activists on 'Maidan unfold a flag stitched together from the Ukrainian, the Crimean, and the Crimean Tatars' flag. A present for the inhabitants of Crimea, ornamented with messages of solidarity - no matter the outcome of tomorrows referendum. With events like these, he wants to bring Ukrainians together - Wadim Kodochigov, mother Ukrainian, father Russian, his home - Crimea. There, his wife, a Crimean Tatar, and his child expect him. For three months he is on Maidan. Does he see a way that Crimea remains with Ukraine? [Vadim Kodachigov] "Not anymore, it is too late now. The people have changed. When the government here tried to prohibit the Russian language, I appeared everywhere and said don't do to Crimea what 'Yanukovich did to Western Ukraine. You need to talk to the people there, listen to them, understand them." [Atai, ctd]: <b>Listening, understanding each other - a challenge for these men also. Many belonged to the self-defence units on 'Maidan; now they form the new national guard of Ukraine</b> and are being trained by those they once faced on the other side of the barricades. A national guard is not enough says vice-admiral Igor Kabanenko. He fears a cynical scenario by the Russians [<i>Igor Kabanenko, Vice Admiral UKR Navy</i>]: "The Russians are concentrating on the east, on a special operation deep into Ukrainian territory, with the help of separatists and saboteurs - forces that are specifically trained to cause unrest, and make it look as if Russian speakers now need help." [Atai ctd] The admiral fears that until the men of the national guard learn how to handle weapons, Russia will long have won the propaganda war.</p>

<sup>675</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5336.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
15.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Developments in Russia - Ukraine conflict, Report G. Atai; b) <b>Anti-war protests in Moscow</b> , Ina Ruck; <sup>676</sup>	<p>a) Intro Miosga: Not only in Kyiv, but also in Moscow people took to the streets and protested. <b>And not only for, but also against Putin. This comes as a surprise, as during the last weeks, anyone who voiced dissent, very quickly disappeared in police vehicles.</b> But by now, the president probably doesn't worry about a few dissenters anymore. Because - what are ten thousand, if you know you got millions behind you?</p> <p>b) report Ina Ruck: Ukrainian flags - and Russian ones. An officially authorized demonstration by the opposition. This has not happened for long in Moscow. 20.000 apparently. Only twenty thousand - against Putin's course on Crimea, against Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, and against the looming war. 'Putin must face trial' this sign reads. [Protester, Man] "It leads to war if you break international law. I am a war-veteran myself; I was in Afghanistan which is why I am categorically against war". [Woman] "I am particularly worried that our society is split by force. That so many people are under the influence of this terrible propaganda." [Ruck ctd] Soviet nostalgia elsewhere in Moscow - the Putin-supporters also had their demonstration today. Far less participants than the opposition, but that doesn't matter, because they are representing the silent majority. Since the beginning of the crisis on Crimea, Putin's polls have been skyrocketing. War-rhetoric is just as well received as war-memories. About the victory against fascism. that now is to be repeated. Because Ukraine, as it was said again on Russian TV today, is in the hand of fascists. [Old man, protesting for Putin]: "While we talk with each other, pogroms are taking place there, lawlessness rules - they are not only dictators, they are criminals, that keep the frightened population in check" [Ruck ctd] On a side-event of the demonstration, pictures of Nazi-concentration camps are shown. Like this, or in such fashion, Russian TV reports every evening. 'Russia without Putin', they shout. Not to be influenced by the all dominating propaganda, they are also saying, is becoming increasingly difficult. There are hardly any independent news sources available domestically anymore - and in the wake of the crisis on Crimea, several of them were switched off.</p>

<sup>676</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5336.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Jan Hofer; a) <b>Referendum on Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik;</b> b) live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) Situation in Ukraine, Golineh Atai. <sup>677</sup>	a) Intro Jan Hofer: In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Crimeans today decided about the belonging of the peninsula in a referendum. 1.5 million citizens were asked to cast their vote in the [internationally] criticized referendum. According to official statements, the minimum required participation of 50% was exceeded by far. So far, there are no results. First surveys amongst voters after voting however suggests, that the mainly Russian inhabitants voted in favour of joining Russia. b) Report Stuchlik: It was shortly after 8am local time when the self-proclaimed prime minister, Sergei Aksionow, cast his vote, in the small school Nr. 10 in Simferopol. A step with far reaching consequences for world politics. [Stuchlik]: "You are aware of the fact that this could be the beginning of an international crisis?" [Aksionow] " There will be no world-crisis because of us, we care for our citizens, that is why we are holding this referendum, what are you talking about crisis?" [Stuchlik] "Are you aware of the consequences of what you did here?" [Aksionow]: Everything will remain calm and peaceful - here and on the entire world. There are no far reaching consequences." [Stuchlik ctd] Already during the early morning, people were queuing - more than 1,5 million Crimeans were eligible to vote. The question of the referendum was: Do you want to join Russia, or do you want an autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine? Against the backdrop of a majority of Russians amongst the local population, the outcome appears foreseeable. [old woman] "I voted for Russia, I was born in Russia, I voted for my homeland." [Old man] "I was born in Russia, you see. I would also like to die in Russia". [Woman] "We only want to go to Russia; they will help us" [Stuchlik asking woman] "And the international conflict that is now starting?" [woman] "We are not interested in that!". [Stuchlik ctd.] In the roads of Simferopol, Russian built APVs are visible, in order to protect strategic points, is the official declaration. The autonomous government of Crimea already set some signals. In the inner court of the parliamentary building, a huge Russian flag is waiving.
16.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Jan Hofer; a) <b>Referendum on Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik;</b> b) <b>live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik;</b> c) Situation in Ukraine, Golineh Atai. <sup>678</sup>	40 minutes ago, the ballots closed, but the result appears to be clear already. According to a survey conducted by the Moscow-friendly Crimean government, 93% of the population voted in favour of joining Russia. Behind me, the first car-corsos are celebrating. The Crimean government, however, is putting its foot down. <b>The self-proclaimed prime minister Sergei Aksionow announced that already tomorrow, he will turn to the Russian government, and officially request accession to the Russian Federation. On Wednesday, he wants to introduce the Rubel on the peninsula; and at the end of the week, economic contracts shall be signed with Russia.</b> Apparently, there is a desire to cement the foreseeable result of the referendum, and make the direction Crimea is taking irreversible, the direction that is called Russia.

<sup>677</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47310.html>

<sup>678</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47310.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	tagesschau, 20:00, Jan Hofer; a) Referendum on Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; b) live from Simferopol, Stefan Stuchlik; c) <b>Situation in Ukraine, Golineh Atai.</b> <sup>679</sup>	a) Intro Jan Hofer: For the West, and for Ukraine the referendum is in breach with international law. The European Union, and the U.S. again made clear that they will not recognize the outcome. Tomorrow, the EU foreign ministers will discuss sanctions against Russia. Chancellor Merkel, in a phone conversation with Russian president Putin today, suggested to send OSCE-observers to Ukraine. Here, the security situation in the east of the country remains precarious. b) Report Atai: They are agitated, and not always friendly to Western journalists. Pro-Russian protesters in Donetsk, in the south-east of Ukraine. Around 3.000 people attacked several buildings today and demanded the instalment of a pro-Russian governor. [Old lady protesting] "Yanukovich was, is, and remains our president - he should turn to Putin and ask for help, because in Kyiv, fascists took power, that will try to control us". [Atai ctd] In Kharkov and Odessa, also several thousand took to the streets against the government in Kyiv. For the Ukrainian minister of interior, it is proven that the demonstrations are mainly directed from Russia. [Arsen Awakow, minister of home affairs, Ukraine]: " <b>Our security forces have registered the particulars of members of Russian military intelligence [GRU], we have compromising evidence of their acts of sabotage.</b> " [Atai ctd.] Prime minister Yatseniuk announced a special budget for the armed forces. the Minister of Defence spoke of more than 21.000 Russian troops on Crimea. Responding to the question what this means for Ukrainian soldiers, he said [Igor Tenjuk, UKR minister of defence]: " <b>Not one of our soldiers will leave Crimea. The situation around our bases there has normalized, and we have agreed with the Russian military leadership that our bases will not be blocked until the 21st of March.</b> " [Atai]: Politics must decide if, and when the Ukrainian forces must leave their bases.

<sup>679</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47310.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.03.2014	audio, Markus Sambale, WDR Moskau; The Referendum on Crimea. <sup>680</sup>	<p>The ballots were hardly closed, and already the head of government announced that he will swiftly implement the joining with Russia. Sergei Aksionow spoke of a historic decision. No exact accession date has been agreed upon so far. This notwithstanding, however, the parliament announced to introduce the Ruble in parallel to the Ukrainian currency Hryvnia next Wednesday. And also in Moscow, the parliament quickly wants to create the conditions to allow Crimea into the Russian Federation as soon as possible. As a response, the West threatens to sanction Russia. The European Union, and the U.S.A. call the referendum illegal. They accuse Russia of having forced the separation with a massive military operation, and by breaking international law. The Russian leadership denies this, and declares to only react to calls for help by the ethnic Russians living on Crimea. <b>President Putin again reaffirmed his position in a phone conversation with Angela Merkel.</b> In Simferopol, the Crimean capital, several thousand people gathered on a central square, waving Russian flags and cheering to the result of the referendum. The majority of the population on Crimea is ethnically Russian. Unclear remains how many Crimean Tatars participated in the referendum. The leaders of the Muslim minority called for a boycott of the referendum. They fear repressions if Crimea becomes a part of Russia. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv continues to stem itself against the breaking off of Crimea - but it is not going to interfere militarily. Meanwhile, in the east of the country increasing clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protesters are being reported. In Donetsk, several hundred people stormed the buildings of police and state prosecution.; <b>In Kharkov, thousands of protesters demanded a referendum like on Crimea.</b></p>

<sup>680</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio119408.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) <b>Referendum in Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik;</b> b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik; c) Reactions in Kyiv; Golineh Atai; d) Situation in east Ukraine, Michael Heussen; e) Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier. <sup>681</sup>	a) Intro Caren Miosga: <b>Everything worked out as planned by Wladimir Putin. The West, who wanted to prevent today's referendum on Crimea, because it is not covered by any constitution of Ukraine, had to stand on the side-lines, helplessly.</b> There still is no final result, but according to the election committee, after counting more than 50% of the votes, an overwhelming majority, namely 95% of the voters, voted in favour of joining Russia. Participation was in excess of 80%. <b>This is, even in an illegitimate referendum, without independent international observers, an unambiguous vote.</b> b) Report Stuchlik: It is looking strange, what Hans Johan Bäkman does. He has been invited by Russia as an observer of an election that is not even recognized by his own country. Not Finland, not the European Union, not the U.S.A. - no, actually by very few countries at all. [Stuchlik] "The Russians, one suspects, are using you as a puppet?" [Johan Bäkman, Finnish MEP] "I have duly noted an anti-Russian hysteria in the West - in the media, hence you - as well as by the politicians. As if the Russian speaking part of the population had not the same right to vote as a Western citizen." [Stuchlik ctd] Looking out of the window, APV's of Russian origin can be seen - something like this should not occur during an election. But Johan Bäkman calls them preventive forces. Not surprising to this view from a man wearing a pro-Russian tie [orange and black stripes]. Over there, in school No. 10, the self-proclaimed prime minister casts his vote. He is proud to have international observers, and he is not fearing Western sanctions, Aksionow said. Meanwhile, Johan Bäkman checks the ballot boxes and gives an interview to Russian TV. And there can really be no doubts that the referendum is held soundly. The Crimeans are queuing to vote for Russia. Already, in the polling station, there are celebrations. Actually, today is a public fair, and not a referendum. The Russian majority celebrates the return to the homeland. [Joihan Bäkman] "This is a huge event. I think it will change the foreign policy of the EU and the U.S., and Russia's influence in the world will grow massively." [Stuchlik ctd.] Bäkman comments like a political scientist. After that he is being photographed. It looks strange, but it somehow fits this strange referendum.

<sup>681</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5338.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Referendum in Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; <b>b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik;</b> c) Reactions in Kyiv; Golineh Atai; d) Situation in east Ukraine, Michael Heussen; e) Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier. <sup>682</sup>	Q.: What are the immediate consequences of the outcome for the Crimeans? A.: Beyond all political consequences, there are also practical ones: <b>The banks are of course all in Ukrainian hands. - we have seen queues of people trying to get their money off the bank during the past days, because Kyiv is not sending any more money. Secondly, the electricity and water supply. 80% of the water is from Ukraine; thirdly, the problem of Ukrainian soldiers here on the peninsula, that from one day to the other turn from defenders of the nation to an occupying force. These three complexes are acute and require immediate resolution.</b> Q.: How will Moscow react? Will Crimea, now very quickly be integrated into the Russian Federation, or will Putin, also because of the international outrage, take his time? A.: Well, <b>theoretically, everything will go very quickly. The referendum was already scheduled and moved ahead with lightning speed.</b> Aksionow, the self-proclaimed prime minister, today announced he will apply for an integration into the Russian Federation tomorrow already. It could all go very quickly, because the Duma passed a law that enables such accessions. <b>And if I then hear that it is planned to introduce the Rubel here, I can imagine that things will accelerate</b> - but the final decision on this rests exclusively with Russia.
16.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Referendum in Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; <b>b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik;</b> c) <b>Reactions in Kyiv; Golineh Atai;</b> d) Situation in east Ukraine, Michael Heussen; e) Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier. <sup>683</sup>	a) Intro Miosga: Even though the result was foreseeable, the question remains: how does the interim government in Kyiv react to this referendum? Today's result, certainly represents the biggest possible humiliation for those that took to the streets for months to protest against then president Yanukovych - because, and this explains why they perceive it as a humiliation, they protested against his Moscow-friendly policies. b) Report, Golineh Atai: For the first time he walks over Kyiv Maidan. Until two weeks ago, Sergy Tichy was editor-in-chief of the Krimskaya newspaper, an 80-year-old, famous Crimean newspaper. Then the new masters arrived, and he had to leave the peninsula. Hurriedly, as he recalls. [Sergei Tichy]: "I had to take a decision and call the spade a spade. The Crimean head of government is a liar and extortionist, that the new speaker of parliament there disregarded Ukrainian law brutally and much more. I had no other choice than to leave". [Atai ctd] The first sacrifice Crimea made was the freedom of the press, he says. This was always larger in Ukraine than in Russia. Even though the government showed itself in bellicose fashion, it can hardly react to the loss of a province, or the riots in the east of the country. The adversary is too large. The minister of interior claims he has evidence for act of the Russian military intelligence [GRU], the prime ministers threatens that separatists and saboteurs will suffer. The minister of defence promises that his soldiers on Crimea are not threatened. [...] Then some days remain for the soldiers to leave Crimea, the journalists are thinking.

<sup>682</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5338.html>

<sup>683</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5338.html>

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
16.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Referendum in Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik; c) Reactions in Kyiv; Golineh Atai; d) <b>Situation in east Ukraine, Michael Heussen</b> ; e) Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier. <sup>684</sup>	a) Intro Caren Miosga: Today, Crimea - and tomorrow the east. In Kyiv, the <b>fear that the spark might jump from the peninsula in the South to eastern Ukraine looms large. Here also, if not quite as many as on Crimea, many ethnic Russians live.</b> And the clashes between them and Ukrainian nationalists are turning ever more intense. Already, there were dead and wounded. Today, there were clashes again. b) Report Michael Heussen: At Lenin's feet, the march began. Protesters demand a referendum like the one on Crimea. The majority of the population in the Donetsk basin is Russian speaking, which is why many want to be governed from Moscow, and not from Kyiv. [Young man, protesting]: "It somehow happened that we became part of Ukraine - but historically, this was always Russia. This is deeply rooted in the conscience and memory of the people, and they now want to belong to their homeland again". [Heussen ctd]: 'Freedom for Pavel Gurajew' demand the protesters before the state-prosecutors office, The Moscow-leaning marketing manager declared himself governor of Donetsk a few days ago, he was arrested and since is held in custody. The police today is heavily armed, but hardly acts. One policeman is hurt in a quarrel. The mob destroys the inside of the building and replaces the Ukrainian with the Russian flag - like on many official buildings in the east. <b>The Ukrainian army relocates ever more units into the east, there are news that trenches are being dug, and tank barriers put into position.</b>

<sup>684</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5338.html>



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16.03.2014	tagesthemen, Caren Miosga; a) Referendum in Crimea, Stefan Stuchlik; b) Interview with Stefan Stuchlik; c) Reactions in Kyiv; Golineh Atai; d) Situation in east Ukraine, Michael Heussen; e) Interview with	<p>Q: Mr. Steinmeier, you had warned Russia again emphatically, <b>the chancellor spoke on the phone with Putin again today</b> - all to no avail. Things developed as expected. Has your policy of dialog failed already? A.: <b>It is not allowed to fail, also not for the future.</b> Even if our efforts had no success so far to convince Russia to part from its current course. Therefore, a clear message tomorrow. What happened today, the referendum is not in accordance with the Ukrainian constitutions - neither the one that was valid until recently under Yanukovych, nor the newly re-instated constitution of 2004. And an annexation of Crimea would clearly be a breach of international law. This is exactly what we will say tomorrow. Q.: How concrete will your message be? According to the steps planned by the EU, now accounts will be frozen, and travel bans imposed - who will be targeted? A.: <b>We have always said, from the beginning, that we are not the ones who are interested in confrontation with Russia. We have over and over offered ways out of this spiral of escalation,</b> and therefore we will design our sanction exactly like this. Tomorrow we will agree a stepping up of sanctions, which are about freezing assets in the EU and travel bans to the EU. We will decide it in such a way that in the days thereafter making contact with the Russian side will remain possible, in order to return to the path of negotiations. <b>Because today the future status of Crimea was decided, at least on behalf of those that participated in the election. So far, we don't know which conclusions Russia will draw from this. I assume that the accession into Russian territory is prepared. When - if short term, or longer term - we do not know, but maybe we still have a timeframe to return to dialogue.</b> Q.: There are at least some worrying indicators that Russia, after Crimea, may push for the breaking away of other Ukrainian regions. What will you do then? A.: This is exactly the reason why I am saying that today's decision established facts - but this cannot mean that one can lean back disappointedly, <b>but it is about not allowing the case of Crimea to lead to a division of Europe and unpeacefulness [Unfriedlichkeit] or even military conflict between Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Therefore, to my mind, it is now about sending an OSCE military observer mission as fast as possible,</b> that gets active in great strength in eastern and southern Ukraine, to control the activities of Ukrainian, Russian, and Russian-backed forces. And if Russia really wants to give a signal, this would be the opportunity to say we will keep out of eastern and southern Ukraine. And then, Russia would - finally have to give such an observer mission the opportunity to enter Crimea to fulfil its duty. Q. Simultaneously, you are threatening sanctions. <b>Do you seriously still have the impression that this makes any impression on Putin, or that this has long been taken into account by him?</b> A.: <b>I cannot find what we have undertaken so far was so unwise. We have over and over searched for ways to at least prevent further escalation, we have formulated ways out, we have presented suggestions to Russia.</b> We will now tomorrow not take such an unreasonable decision, to endanger what - at least from my perspective - is required now: the international observer mission. I say it again - we did not look for the confrontation, we will continue to be interested to engage in talks with Russia. We will not ignore that what happened around Crimea is unacceptable in international law. <b>But we want to prevent further escalation, and the division of Europe. We have no choice, we must search for a way how to get there.</b></p>

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Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
	Frank-Walter Steinmeier. <sup>685</sup>	

The Russian Annexation of Crimea 2014: Which Role for Surprise, especially for Germany?

Date	Event	Summary/Transcript
17.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 ; a) <b>EU Foreign Ministers meet in BXL to discuss sanctions, report B. Scharkus;</b> b) Berlin reacts sceptically to sanctions, report M. Spieker. <sup>685</sup>	The referendum on Crimea left a mark - also in Brussels. The EU may not stand on the side-lines if borders are drawn newly in Europe, it is said here. [C. Ashton] "You can't simply lean back and let things just develop by themselves; we must think hard about the correct response. There should be a response". [Scharkus ctd] The foreign ministers plan to negate important actors' entry into the ÄÄÄ, and to freeze their assets. Hardly anyone believes that this can prevent the separation of Crimea from Ukraine. [Jean Asselborn, FM Lux] "I think even with the strongest sanctions in the world will we no re-establish the status quo. De iure and de facto are two different things, but un terms of realpolitik something has happened yesterday related to Crimea". [Scharkus]Germany urges to send observers to Ukraine, up to 1.000 men. The aim of the mission: [Steinmeier]" To watch very narrowly <b>if Russia is active beyond Crimea</b> and destabilizes Ukraine. We can prevent this with an observer mission". Behind closed doors the foreign ministers draft a sanction list with about 20 names on it. Putin's close cohorts, however, shall not be included.
17.03.2014	tagesschau, 12:00 ; a) EU Foreign Ministers meet in BXL to discuss sanctions, report B. Scharkus; b) <b>Berlin reacts sceptically to sanctions, report M. Spieker.</b> <sup>687</sup>	Before the CDU headquarters this morning, it was not the usual internal party issues that caused discussion, but the conflict with Russia. Should there be sanctions, and if so, which ones? [Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy, and member of CDU]: "There are a lot of arguments that speak in favour of not allowing people close to Putin, both from politics and state-affiliated industry, to enter the EU". [Phillip Mißfelder, Member of CDU Presidium, Spokesman Foreign Policy]: "I am sceptical about trade sanctions, as they of course would also hurt the German economy and employment". [Spieker ctd] This is also exactly the fear of the Green party, who in principle are in favour of sanctions, but worry that [ Simone Peter, Chairwoman Alliance90/Greens] "we are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies, not only in relation to gas, but also in terms of coal, uranium - this means it is about finding ways to not sanction each other in a way that would lead to massive economic consequences". [Spieker ctd] And how is the federal government's position on the crisis? Angela Merkel lets her speaker state that [Steffen Seibert, Spokesman Federal Chancellery] "This referendum is at odds with the Ukrainian constitution, and it is at odds with international law. From our view, it is illegal. Germany condemns the holding of this illegal referendum. We, and our European partners, not only contest the legality of the referendum, we will also not recognize its outcome". [Spieker ctd] The exact consequences are not talked about in Berlin, but in Brussels.

<sup>685</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5338.html>

<sup>686</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1379914.html>

<sup>687</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1379902.html>

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17.03.2014	tagesschau 24, 12:30; a) <b>Interview with Hans Jessen, Reactions in Berlin about Referendum;</b> b) Interview with Arnim Stauth on sanctions from Brussels	<p>Q.: How are the reactions in political Berlin? A.: <b>Berlin is fully in line with other European nations.</b> This is congruent with the assessment we have just heard from Brussels. The result of the referendum is not accepted, while at the same time there is awareness that facts were established that are not reversible anymore. Therefore, even if no one says it loud here, the assessment here is no different to the one the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn has made. Q.: Political observers warn to push Putin into a corner, the crisis on Crimea could escalate. From your view are sanctions the right response. A.: <b>The question is what the alternative would be.</b> If you just let this annexation - and that at least is the German view of what happened, an illegal annexation - happen, would that then not be a signal to Putin that he has a free hand, to pursue Russian interest robustly with violence. That would not be particularly conducive either. Therefore, I think the double offer of on the one hand - still limited - sanctions, that are being felt in Russia, and on the other hand readiness for dialogue, and the will to it. This simultaneity, I think, is a reasonable weighing - in such a package, sanctions are required and important. Q.: <b>Germany until now appeared particularly well positioned for a mediator role, Merkel spoke on the phone with Putin only yesterday - but it did not achieve much. Is the German role in the conflict overstated?</b> A: I don't think it is. The fact alone that Angela Merkel keep the dialogue - channels open with Putin, that she over and over confronts him with the position - which of course is not only the German, but also the European and U.S. American position - that she confronts him with that, that he has to deal with that, shows how important that role is. And, importantly, another aspect that has been mentioned already: <b>The vehement German urging for an OSCE observer mission to ensure that there is no further Russian aggression against Ukraine.</b> That Putin at least notionally considers this idea, which he calls "support group" - maybe tomorrow we will hear more about that from him - if that happens, this would be a first step in the direction of a diplomatic solution, and a confirmation that Germany's role is not that marginal and ineffective.</p>

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17.03.2014	tagesschau 24, 12:30; a) Interview with Hans Jessen, Reactions in Berlin about Referendum; b) <b>Interview with Arnim Stauth on sanctions from Brussels</b>	Q.: There seems to be an agreement about the requirement to respond to the referendum on Crimea - what could this look like? A.: As Mrs. Ashton said - the Europeans want to send a very clear signals that this referendum is considered illegal, and that words will be followed by deeds. On the other hand, it is actually a diplomatic balancing act. On the one hand showing teeth, on the other hand to keep the doors open for dialogue. The sanctions will have to fit this balancing act. They [the sanctions] are about travel restrictions and freezing of assets for certain individuals on Crimea, and in Russia. Currently, the signs are that this will not for example include the Russian foreign minister, also maybe not the heads of the symbolic energy business, but more the second tier of Russian business and politics. Q. Can the annexation of Crimea still be prevented? A.: Of course, no one has said anything to the effect that Crimea is lost. But if one looks how string the nationalist card is already being played on Crimea and in Russia. There are even talks about changing the clocks on Crimea to Russian time, there are talks about introducing the Rubel - <b>I think ghosts have been called that even Putin is able to call back anymore</b> . Also, the population on Crimea, after this unambiguous vote, and also many people in Russia that support the absorption of Crimea, this cannot be revoked. This has also been said today by one of the EU foreign ministers, Jean Asselborn: "Even the toughest sanctions will not re-establish the status quo". before the crisis. Q.: What are the remaining chances for a diplomatic solution? A.: My impression is that the diplomatic efforts are now more focused on the South and East of Ukraine. A diplomatic fire-service that has seen that one house, Crimea, is fully ablaze and most likely lost, logically turns to at least prevent new fires to break out. Steinmeier has very vehemently demanded an OSCE observer mission for the East and South of Ukraine. Allegedly, Putin has said he might agree to it, but if so, the situation in entire Ukraine must be observed.
17.03.2014	Axel Dorloff: China does not take a clear position on Crimea-referendum, audio, rbb Beijing. <sup>688</sup>	China's position in the Ukraine conflict remains ambiguous. In his response to the question whether the referendum was legal, vice foreign minister Li Bao Dong remained vague. Before journalists in Beijing, Li did not want to specify whether China recognizes the referendum, or not. Even after being asked repeatedly, Li limited his statement to an urging of the conflicting parties to prevent further escalation of the conflict. He hopes that all sides keep a cool head, and search for dialogue. Before the visit of President Xi in Europe, the situation remains the same: <b>In the Ukraine-conflict, China is confronted with a dilemma</b> . On the one hand, China does <b>not want to scare its strategic partner Russia</b> . Therefore, the result of the referendum is not criticized or even called illegal, as the U.S. or Europe are. On the other hand, the principle of non-interference is the most important principle of Chinese foreign policy. Particularly in <b>view of its own domestic conflicts in Tibet or Xinjiang Province, China cannot support the notion that the people on Crimea secede from Ukraine by referendum</b> .

<sup>688</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio119418.html>

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17.03.2014	tagesschau, 20:00, Thorsten Schröder: a) <b>Situation in Crimea, Report Stefan Stuchlik</b> ; b) reaction in Kyiv, Report G. Atai; c) Reactions in Brussels, report by R.D. Krause. <sup>689</sup>	a) Intro Schröder: In the referendum on Crimea an overwhelming majority of the voters cast their votes in favour of joining Russia. Today, Crimea declared itself independent, and applied for accession to the Russian Federation. Russia and Ukraine have been arguing about the peninsula in the Black Sea for long. Of the roughly 2 million Crimeans, around 35% are Ukrainians, almost 60% are ethnic Russians. b) Report Stuchlik: Waking up in a different country. That was the feeling in Simferopol. In the day after the referendum, suddenly militiamen appear in the streets of the Crimean capital. In parliament, the election coordinator announced the 96,7% in favour of joining Russia. Immediately the next step followed. [Ruslan Temirgalijew, deputy prime minister of the regional government of Crimea]: "Today, after this overwhelming referendum, we officially went to Moscow with the request to integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation". [Stuchlik ctd] Behind closed doors, it continued blow on blow: Introduction of the Rubel, introduction of Moscow's time-zone, alignment of the social security systems. [Sergej Aksionow, Crimean prime minister] "The wages and pension system, as well as the unemployment support are much better in Moscow. We will introduce the Russian system in this respect as soon as possible. But on the other hand, with our specific abilities, we will also enrich the Russian Federation". [Stuchlik ctd] Additionally, the Crimean government nationalized severely energy suppliers on the peninsula, which until then belonged to Ukraine. The news about Western sanctions just made the marginal notes, only the joining of Russia rules the proceedings here. A day after the referendum, the Crimean government has decided steps towards Russia at an almost breath-taking pace. The impression: The annexation shall be made irreversible practically also. This notwithstanding problems still persist - for example the future of several thousand Ukrainian soldiers on the peninsula. If this problem is not solved as soon as possible, the next conflict is looming.

<sup>689</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47324.html>

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<sup>690</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47324.html>

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<sup>691</sup> <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47324.html>



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17.03.2014	Brennpunkt, 20:15: Who stops Russia; Michael Strempel: a) <b>Report on the role of water-supply on Crimea after referendum, Stefan Stuchlik</b> ; b) Interview with Golineh Atai on reactions in Kyiv; c) Sanctions by Brussel, report by Nikolas Steiner; d) Interview with Ekkehard Cordes, Ost-Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft / East-Caucus of the German Economy; d) Global Challenges of Ice-Age. <sup>692</sup>	a) Intro Strempel: It has become a reality what has been looming for the past two weeks - Crimea is breaking away from Ukraine. Again, today the apparent Russian militias dominated the streets on Crimea. The party-stages remained empty - the night before this looked very different, when Crimean prime-minister Aksionow was cheered by thousands for the referendum and its unsurprising outcome. of more than 97% in favour of seceding from Ukraine. The accession into the Russian Federation appears to be a mere formality now. The E.U. and the U.S.A. are responding with sanctions against Russia. But if they suffice to discourage Putin from his expansionist course - highly doubtful. The pro-Russian forces on Crimea feel strong today, knowing that the strong Russia is covering their back. But are they really [strong]? b) Report Stuchlik: That <b>the issue of water supply is highly current</b> we realize at least since we are trying to interview the Ukrainian official responsible for it. No one knows where they are, and if so, they would not give an interview, thank you. The large freshwater reservoir for Simferopol has a volume of almost 20 mio m <sup>3</sup> , theoretically. If you look at the watermarks you realize that the reservoir is running empty - the main feeding channel is closed until today, the water remains in Ukrainian hands. [Stuchlik, asking by passers on the streets] " <b>There are plans, now that Crimea is Russian, to cut the water supply</b> ". [Men]: " <b>Then we will live without water</b> ". [Woman] " <b>I fear for the children, it will be hard for them, but me - I will take it</b> ". [Old woman] "We built this Dnepr-channel during the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian cannot simply cut off the water, it is our channel!" [Stuchlik ctd] Meanwhile, we are making a third attempt to get the responsible Ukrainian official before the camera. The security-guard is so impressed with out stubbornness, that he drives with us directly to his bosses. [Valerik Pantjuschkin. Director Crimea Water] "What will happen next week? Well, our government decides, and then we act". [Stuchlik] "But your government is in Kyiv?" [Pantjuschkin]: "Well, until today our institution is called Crimea Water, which means it is actually controlled by the Crimean government. The overall-control, you are indeed correct in this regard, is with the Ministry in Kyiv, which we are subordinated to". [Stuchlik] The water-levels on Crimea's Rivers are low - exactly like the North Crimea channel, who brings 85% of the peninsula's freshwater directly from Ukraine. And should the channel not be opened like every year punctually on March 19, Sergei Aksionow will have a massive problem to deal with. [Stuchlik] " <b>The people here on the street are afraid that now, with Crimea becoming part of Russia, Ukraine will stop the flow of freshwater!</b> " [Aksionow:] "I had already explained to you that we have a Plan B. We know ourselves that the freshwater comes mainly from Ukraine. But the people tell me - and I also say that - they should go ahead and switch everything off. Then Russia will bring water to Crimea". [Stuchlik ctd.] This morning, the Crimean government nationalized several energy plants - it is not that easy with water supplies.

<sup>692</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1380102.html>

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<sup>693</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1380102.html>

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<sup>694</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1380102.html>

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17.03.2014	Brennpunkt, 20:15: Who stops Russia; Michael Stremmel: a) Report on the role of water-supply on Crimea after referendum, Stefan Stuchlik; b) Interview with Golineh Atai on reactions in Kyiv; c) Sanctions by Brussel, report by Nikolas Steiner; <b>d) Interview with Ekkehard Cordes, Ost-Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft / East-Caucus of the German Economy;</b> d) Global Challenges of Ice-Age. <sup>695</sup>	<p><b>Q.: You warned to not isolate Russia further. You also warned about economic sanctions, which the EU wants to discuss as a next step. But is it not exactly what Putin is betting on, that the West is not decisive enough, that if in doubt they are not able to sustain economic sanctions? A.: Economic sanction can only be the very last resort,</b> in the frame of politics. Furthermore, they can only be imagined when diplomacy has fully exploited its options. Secondly, I am convinced that Russia, Putin, will not give in if sanctions are imposed, quite to the contrary - we will evoke countermeasures. Thirdly, if we were to introduce sanctions, the country we want to protect, Ukraine, would suffer the most. <b>Q. These words may sound very well tonight in Putin's ears. What do you suggest that if the now imposed sanctions, which are still limited, are not taking effect - when is the point reached when one has to resort to economic sanctions? A:</b> I understand the recently announced sanctions as a signal that the diplomatic channels remain open, and there is room for further talks. I believe that I am convinced that in a situation that we are having now, only communication will help. All channels that we are having must be kept open. And I know that there is need for talks in Russia also. I also would like to add that in the framework of such a policy, such a strategy, German politics has a special responsibility, but also the private sector. <b>Q: But the threat with economic sanctions is now in the room, therefore again - when would the acceptance limit be reached that you would say we have to accept this [risk] now? A.:</b> I repeat: Economic sanctions can only be the very last resort. I trust that the diplomatic channels will remain open so that we can still find a political solution of the problem. <b>Q.:</b> A sensitive issue is the <b>large (German) dependence from Russian gas and oil.</b> Is it not the time now that the EU and Germany reorient themselves, as gas can be bought elsewhere in the world? <b>A.:</b> <b>Russia has always been an exceptionally reliable deliverer of oil and gas,</b> even during the coldest times of the Cold War. The exports of Russia to the West play a big role. From my view, we have no reason to fear that Russia will employ gas and oil as, or more simply put, will continue to deliver in the same fashion as it did in the previous decades.</p>

<sup>695</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1380102.html>

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17.03.2014	Tagesthemen <sup>697</sup>	EU imposes sanctions on Russia.
18.03.2014	Tagesthemen <sup>698</sup>	Putin signs treaty of accession with Ukraine, delivers speech at Duma.

<sup>696</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1380102.html>

<sup>697</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5340.html>

<sup>698</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5342.html>

## **Annex 2: Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung**

### **1. Forschungsinteresse und Relevanz**

Die vorliegende Untersuchung analysiert, welche Rolle die Überraschung für die russische Annexion der Krim 2014 im Allgemeinen und für Deutschland im Speziellen hatte.

Das Interesse an dem Thema wurde durch Zufall geweckt, während einer Podiumsdiskussion über Deutschlands zukünftige Rolle in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Frühjahr 2014, kurz nachdem die Krim von Russland annektiert worden war. Thema der Diskussion war die Frage, wie Deutschland mehr internationale Verantwortung übernehmen und seinem wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gewicht in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik besser gerecht werden kann - ein Thema, das in der deutschen Debatte seit 2012 immer wieder auftaucht. Damals wurde mit Blick auf die anstehende Bundestagswahl 2013 ein Papier des damaligen Who-is-Who der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik mit dem Titel *Neue Macht, neue Verantwortung*<sup>699</sup> veröffentlicht und löste eine Debatte aus, die bis heute nicht abgeschlossen ist. Das Kernargument des Papiers: Das internationale Umfeld, in dem Deutschland agiert, hat sich verändert, und damit auch die Rolle Deutschlands in diesem Umfeld. Es hat neue Macht gewonnen, und damit geht, vor dem Hintergrund der eigenen Geschichte und den Triebfedern des Machtzuwachses eine neue internationale Verantwortung einher. Dazu müsse Deutschland auch strategischer agieren.

Einer der Diskussionsteilnehmer, ein Mitglied des Planungsstabes des Auswärtigen Amtes, argumentierte in der Diskussion mit Blick auf die völkerrechtswidrige russische Annexion der Krim 2014, dass Deutschland dazu seine Fähigkeit verbessern müsse, mit Überraschungen umzugehen. Diese Aussage war der Funke, der das Interesse für dieses Vorhaben entfachte.

Es sind insbesondere die seither eingetretenen Entwicklungen, die die Relevanz für dieses Unterfangen unterstreichen. Denn, betrachtet man die unerwarteten Ereignisse, die der Krim-Annexion folgten, erscheint der Diplomat fast wie die mythologische Pandora: Der unerwartete Aufstieg von ISIS im Juni 2014, die Migrationskrise in Europa im Sommer 2015, der BREXIT

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<sup>699</sup> Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Marshall Fund Berlin (Hrsg): *Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung – Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in einer veränderten Welt*, Berlin, Oktober 2013.

und die Wahl von Donald Trump im Jahr 2016, und eine globale Pandemie, die die Welt im Jahr 2020 zum Stillstand bringt. Sie alle markieren Ereignisse, die unerwartet waren, aber gravierende Auswirkungen, nicht nur auf Deutschland, sondern auch auf das Geflecht der Beziehungen der Staaten untereinander hatten. Die Welt schien "aus den Fugen geraten"<sup>700</sup>, wie der deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier im Februar 2016 beobachtete.

Der Außenminister und der Diplomat waren nicht die einzigen Deutschen, die die zunehmende Häufigkeit von unerwarteten Ereignissen mit schwerwiegenden Folgen feststellten. So bemerkt beispielsweise der ehemalige Botschafter Wolfgang Ischinger, heute Vorsitzender der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz: "In der Außenpolitik ist sie [die Überraschung] ein neues - und ein erhebliches - Problem ... wir können uns nicht auf das vorbereiten, was kommt, und müssen ständig auf das Unerwartete vorbereitet sein."<sup>701</sup>

Aufbauend auf der Beobachtung der zunehmenden Prävalenz von Überraschungen, aber mit dem Optimismus, dass "neue Normal" "managen" zu können, wurden seit 2014 zahlreiche Anstrengungen unternommen, um zukünftigen Überraschungen zu begegnen - von der Etablierung spezieller Foresight-Institutionen und -Studiengänge<sup>702</sup> über neue Methoden und Mittel zur Sensibilisierung für zukünftige Entwicklungen<sup>703</sup> bis hin zum Versuch, Bereiche zu identifizieren, in denen Überraschungen wahrscheinlich sind<sup>704</sup>. Auffallend ist dabei, dass im Gegensatz zu den Bemühungen, sich gegen zukünftige Überraschungen abzusichern, und trotz der allgemein geteilten Beobachtung unter deutschen Politikern, Experten und Akademikern über die zunehmende Häufigkeit von Überraschungen dem Phänomen selbst und der Untersuchung seiner Ursachen in der deutschen Debatte kaum systematische Aufmerksamkeit zuteilwurde - weder im Allgemeinen noch im Kontext eines der Überraschungsereignisse zwischen 2014 und 2020. Die Frage, warum Deutschland überrascht wurde, schien weniger

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<sup>700</sup> Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: „Die Welt aus den Fugen – was hält uns zusammen?“, speech held at the Bertelsmann Forum 2016, 15.02.2016, online available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/160215-bm-bertelsmann-forum/278660>, zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021.

<sup>701</sup> Ischinger, Wolfgang: *Welt in Gefahr*, Econ, Berlin 2018, S. 37.

<sup>702</sup> So bietet die Freie Universität Berlin ein Masters Programm in Futurologie an, siehe: <https://www.ewi-psy.fu-berlin.de/v/master-zukunftsforschung/index.html>, zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021.

<sup>703</sup> So unternahm die Universität der Bundeswehr München ein umfangreiches Forschungsprogramm zu ‚Methoden der Zukunftsanalyse‘, siehe: <https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-ip/projekte/weiterentwicklung-der-methoden-der-zukunftsanalyse>, zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021.

<sup>704</sup> Fischer, Sabine; Klein, Margarete (eds): *Denkbare Überraschungen: Elf Entwicklungen, die Russlands Außenpolitik nehmen könnte*, SWP-Studie, 2016 S 15, Juli 2016, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2016.

relevant als die Frage, wie zukünftige Überraschungen verhindert werden könnten. Während der zukunftsorientierte Fokus angesichts der oftmals gravierenden Folgen unerwarteter Ereignisse nachvollziehbar ist, bleibt es wichtig zu verstehen, ob sich generalisierbare Ursachen sich für das Phänomen identifizieren lassen und ob es spezifische Ursachen gibt, die dazu führen, dass insbesondere die deutsche Politik sich in jüngerer Vergangenheit immer wieder überrascht zeigen musste.

Dies zeigt sich auch in der deutschen Debatte im Kontext der Krimannexion 2014. So stellt beispielsweise Hans Kundnani in Bezug auf die Krim fest, dass "die Annexion der Krim durch Russland im März 2014 ein strategischer Schock für Deutschland war"<sup>705</sup>. Doch, obwohl der Autor die Russlandpolitik Deutschlands bewertet und ob sie sich mit der Annexion der Krim verändert hat, zeigt Kundnani weder auf, was genau der Schock war, warum er für Deutschland strategisch war, noch diskutiert er, was das Schockereignis ausgelöst hat oder was Putin und Russland damit zu tun gehabt haben könnten.

Hans Kundnani ist keine Ausnahme von einer allgemeinen Beobachtung: Das Phänomen der Überraschung spielt in der deutschen Debatte über internationale Beziehungen im Allgemeinen und in Untersuchungen von Krieg, internationalen Konflikten und Krisen im Besonderen kaum eine Rolle. Zwischen Waldemar Erfurths 1938 erschienenem Werk *Die Überraschung im Kriege*<sup>706</sup>, das einen Großteil der Offensivoperationen der Wehrmacht in den ersten Tagen des Zweiten Weltkriegs prägte, und heute konnte nur ein einziger deutschsprachiger Artikel zum Thema Überraschung gefunden werden, der aus dem Jahr 1988 stammt: ein Zwei-Seiter in der Zeitschrift *Europäische Wehrkunde*, verfasst vom ehemaligen Bundeswehr-Generalmajor Hanno Graf von Kielmannsegg<sup>707</sup>. Von Kielmannsegg argumentiert, dass selbst im Falle eines Endes des Kalten Krieges die Sowjetunion immer noch die Neigung hätte, mit einem konventionellen militärischen Angriff die Überraschung zu suchen. Von Kielmannseggs Befürchtungen wurden jedoch durch das überraschende Ende des Kalten Krieges schnell als obsolet bewertet: Der Kalte Krieg endete friedlich, ohne militärische Entscheidungsschlacht zwischen den Supermächten. In Abwesenheit ideologischer Rivalität herrschte das Gefühl vor,

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<sup>705</sup> Kundnani, Hans: 'Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East', in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94 No. 2, S.175. März/April 2015.

<sup>706</sup> Erfurth, Waldemar: *Die Überraschung im Kriege*, Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1938.

<sup>707</sup> Kielmannsegg, Hanno von: 'Die vergessene Gefahr der strategischen Überraschung', in: *Europäische Wehrkunde*, 4/ 87, Bonn, 1988, S. 211-212.



dass es keinen Grund mehr gab, einen sowjetischen Überraschungsangriff zu fürchten, weder nuklear noch konventionell. So spielen deutsche Beiträge in der Debatte über das Phänomen der Überraschung, die insbesondere während des Kalten Krieges sehr lebhaft war, keine Rolle. Vieles davon lässt sich aus der deutschen Geschichte heraus erklären, auch die Sprache ist hier ein Faktor<sup>708</sup>.

Die Beobachtung der Überraschung einerseits, aber ihre Vernachlässigung als potenziell entscheidender Faktor für das Gesamtergebnis und der Erforschung ihrer verallgemeinerbaren Ursachen kann jedoch nicht nur im Kontext der deutschen Krim-Debatte beobachtet werden, sondern auch in der breiteren, ‚westlichen‘ Debatte über die Annexion der Krim. Obwohl die Überraschung ein häufig beobachteter Aspekt bei der Annexion der Krim ist, lag der Fokus, der die Debatte im Anschluss an die Annexion leitete, auf zwei anderen Aspekten: Zum einen auf der Frage nach der Rechtmäßigkeit des russischen Vorgehens<sup>709</sup>. Zum anderen spielte die Frage, ob es sich bei der Annexion der Krim um einen sorgfältig ausgeführten Plan handelte, oder ob es ein Schnellschuss war, dem ein russisches Durchwursteln folgte, eine zentrale Rolle.

Schon am Tag, nachdem die Krim offiziell in die Russische Föderation aufgenommen wurde, kommt John Simpson von der *BBC* zu dem Schluss "Die gesamte Operation war sehr klug geplant und durchgeführt. Aber es gibt absolut keinen Zweifel daran, was es war - ein bemerkenswerter, schneller und größtenteils unblutiger Staatsstreich."<sup>710</sup> Wenig später enthüllt Thomas Gutschker, der für die deutsche *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* schreibt, "Putins Schlachtplan", und verfolgt ihn bis ins Jahr 2013 zurück, als westliche Geheimdienste feststellten, dass kleine Gruppen russischer Spezialkräfte heimlich auf die Krim verlegt wurden, und vor einer möglichen russischen Invasion auf der Krim warnten<sup>711</sup>. Im Februar 2015 berichtet die deutsche Wochenzeitung *DieZeit*, dass ein russisches Strategiedokument, das der Annexion der Krim vorausging, in der russischen *Nowaja Gazeta* veröffentlicht wurde, was die weit verbreitete Annahme bestätigte, dass die Annexion der Krim das Ergebnis eines

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<sup>708</sup> Um im internationalen Diskurs wahrgenommen zu werden und anknüpfungsfähig zu sein, reichen deutschsprachige Beiträge nicht aus. Aus diesem Grund ist diese Arbeit in englischer Sprache verfasst, in der Hoffnung sowohl zum deutschen als auch zum internationalen Diskurs über strategische Fragestellungen beizutragen.

<sup>709</sup> Merkel, Reinhard: 'Die Krim und das Völkerrecht: Kühle Ironie der Geschichte', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 08.04.2014, Frankfurt, 2014.

<sup>710</sup> Simpson, John: 'Russia's Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful', in: *BBC World Affairs*, 19.03.2014, London, 2014.

<sup>711</sup> Gutschker, Thomas: 'Putin's Schlachtplan', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07.09.2014, Frankfurt am Main, 2014.

langfristigen Plans war<sup>712</sup>. Der Plan, so argumentiert der Artikel, wurde von einem Think Tank entwickelt, der den Kreml in Sachen Marketing und Strategie berät.

Gleichzeitig gab es aber auch die gegenteilige Annahme - dass Putin und Russland spontan handelten und die Annexion der Krim eher durch russischen Ad-hocerismus als durch russische strategische und operative Kunst gekennzeichnet sei. Kurz nachdem die Krim in die Russische Föderation aufgenommen wurde, schreibt Shaun Walker für den *Guardian*, dass die Suche nach dem russischen Plan vergebliche Mühe sei. Die Entscheidung selbst, so argumentiert der Artikel, sei eine Schnellschuss-Entscheidung gewesen, die tiefere Wurzeln in Putins Biografie und der russischen Geschichte habe; eine "reflexartige Reaktion" auf die jüngsten Ereignisse in der Ukraine und das Gefühl, in einem ungerechten internationalen System zu leben. Dass es sich um eine kurzfristige Entscheidung handelte, die von einer sehr kleinen Anzahl von Leuten unter der Führung Putins getroffen wurde, zeige überdies die Tatsache, dass selbst russische Zeitungen zu dieser Zeit "berichteten, dass alle ihre Regierungsquellen völlig überrumpelt worden waren"<sup>713</sup>. Als weiteren Beleg für die Annahme, dass die Entscheidung, die Krim zu annektieren, an Ort und Stelle getroffen wurde, zitiert der Artikel einen mit dem Kreml verbundenen Analysten, Sergej Markow, der erklärt, dass "der ursprüngliche Plan nicht war, die Krim zu annektieren[...]". Es sei daher zielführender, statt nach Putins Masterplan zu suchen, der Frage nachzugehen, warum Putin die Krim annektiert hat und warum "der russische Präsident einfach ausgerastet ist und entschieden hat, dass es an der Zeit war, unilateral zu handeln"<sup>714</sup>. Welche Rolle Überraschung für Russland spielte, sowohl als möglicher Auslöser für das Schnapp-Entscheidungs-Argument, als auch als mögliches Mittel, um das Gesamtziel, die Annexion der Krim, zu sichern, wurde jedoch von keinem der beiden Lager, die sich mit Russlands Plan für die Annexion der Krim befassten, berücksichtigt.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Betrachtung, welche Rolle Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim 2014 im Allgemeinen und für Deutschland im Speziellen hatte, mehrere Lücken schließt: Erstens betrachtet sie ein Phänomen, dessen Häufigkeit steigt und dessen Auswirkungen negativ für Regierungen sind, und fragt nach generalisierbaren Ursachen; zweitens betrachtet sie es im Kontext der Annexion der Krim 2014, eines Falles von historischer

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<sup>712</sup> Dobbert, Steffen; Grosev, Christo; Dülffer, Meike: ‚Putin und der geheime Ukraine-Plan‘, in: *Die Zeit*, 26.02.2015, Hamburg, 2015.

<sup>713</sup> Walker, Shaun: ‚Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?‘, in: *The Guardian*, 23.03.2014, London, 2014.

<sup>714</sup> Walker, Shaun: ‚Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?‘, in: *The Guardian*, 23.03.2014, London, 2014.

Bedeutung, bei dem das interessierende Phänomen zwar weithin beobachtet, aber keine zentrale Rolle in der Debatte spielte. Und drittens betrachtet sie das Phänomen mit besonderem Augenmerk auf Deutschland, dessen Anspruch, mehr internationale Verantwortung zu übernehmen in einer von Überraschungen geprägten Welt besonders herausfordernd scheint. Sie tut dies, viertens, in englischer Sprache, um so auch einen deutschen Beitrag zur internationalen Debatte über strategische Fragestellungen zu leisten.

## **2. Aufbau**

Die vorliegende Untersuchung besteht aus fünf Teilen. Im Gegensatz zum üblichen Ansatz der theoretischen Antizipation, bei dem zunächst theoretische Erklärungen für das betreffende Phänomen in Betracht gezogen werden, um dann zu prüfen, welche Theorie die empirisch erfasste Realität am überzeugendsten erklärt, betrachtet diese Untersuchung zunächst die Empirie, bevor sie einen Rückgriff auf die Theorie vornimmt, um die Erkenntnisse über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim besser zu erklären.

## **3. Überraschung als Trivialität der Annexion der Krim?**

Zunächst wird eine Auswahl bisher veröffentlichter Arbeiten zur Annexion der Krim sowie zu Deutschland im Kontext der Krim-Annexion betrachtet, um zu beurteilen, welche Rolle der Überraschung für den Ausgang der Krim-Annexion in diesen bisherigen Arbeiten zugewiesen wurde. Es zeigt sich, dass Überraschung zwar einhellig beobachtet, aber nicht im Hinblick auf ihre Rolle für das Gesamtergebnis analysiert wurde<sup>715</sup>. Obwohl sich verschiedene Erklärungen für das Auftreten von Überraschungen im Zusammenhang mit der Annexion identifizieren lassen, ist für die meisten der untersuchten Arbeiten die Rolle von Überraschungen für die Annexion der Krim und für Deutschland für das Gesamtergebnis vernachlässigbar, und eher ein Nebeneffekt der Annexion als ein Schlüsselement dafür. Ein Aspekt, der es in einem

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<sup>715</sup> Trotz der Ähnlichkeit der Befunde in Bezug auf die Rolle des Überraschungsmoments bei der Annexion der Krim ist ein genereller Unterschied in der Literatur zur Annexion im Allgemeinen und zu den Bemühungen speziell in Bezug auf Deutschland in Bezug auf den Zeitrahmen der Analyse zu beobachten. Diejenigen, die sich mit der Annexion befassen, betrachten in der Regel den Zeitraum ab dem Verschwinden des ukrainischen Präsidenten Wiktor Janukowitsch in der Nacht zum 21. Februar als Beginn der Annexion der Krim. Diejenigen, die sich auf Deutschland konzentrieren, betrachten dagegen einen viel längeren Zeitraum, da sie die Annexion der Krim als untrennbar mit den vorangegangenen Monaten der Krise in und um die Ukraine verbunden sehen, beginnend mit dem Austritt von Viktor Janukowitsch aus einem Abkommen mit der Europäischen Union am 29. November.

Filmlexikon in die Rubrik "Triviales" schaffen würde, wäre die Annexion der Krim ein Film und keine bittere Realität. Die Literaturübersicht zeigt, dass dies auch die Schlussfolgerung derjenigen ist, die die Annahme prüfen Russland habe durch gezielte Täuschung und Informationsoperationen dazu beigetragen, die Bedingungen für die Überraschung zu schaffen. Auch diese Ansätze können nicht erklären, wie genau die gezielte Täuschung zur Überraschung im Kontext der Annexion beigetragen hat, und was dies für den Ausgang der Annexion bedeutete. Somit bleibt die Rolle der Täuschung für die Annexion der Krim ebenso zufällig – und damit nicht nachvollziehbar.

#### **4. Die Herausforderung, Überraschung nachzuvollziehen.**

Nachdem aus der betrachteten Literatur einige Annahmen darüber, warum Überraschung auftrat und welche Rolle sie für den Ausgang hatte, identifiziert wurden, bestand die Herausforderung darin, wie man von hier aus weiter vorgehen sollte. Durch die Analyse, wie die überprüfte Literatur zu ihren Schlussfolgerungen gekommen war, konnten Anhaltspunkte für das weitere Vorgehen in diesem Forschungsvorhaben eruiert werden. Zum einen zeigte sich, dass die meisten der rezensierten Arbeiten methodologische Überlegungen und theoretischen Erwägungen wenig Aufmerksamkeit schenken. Zum anderen findet sich eine Gemeinsamkeit in dem Blickwinkel, von dem der Fall betrachtet wird: Der Fall wird aus der Rückschau betrachtet - das heißt, der Startpunkt der betrachteten Arbeiten ist der nur aus der Rückschau bekannte Ausgang. Diese Herangehensweise erscheint jedoch für das Forschungsinteresse, die Überraschung und ihre Rolle für die Annexion der Krim und für Deutschland im Speziellen zu untersuchen, wenig geeignet. Um die Rolle der Überraschung zu verstehen und besser nachvollziehen zu können, warum sie geschah, argumentiert diese Forschung, dass zunächst festgestellt werden muss, was man erwartete, bevor der unerwartete Ausgang bekannt wurde. Dies erfordert die Einnahme der Perspektive, die sich bot, als der Ausgang – die Annexion der Krim durch Russland – noch unbekannt war.

Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Perspektiven lässt sich am Beispiel eines Puzzles beschreiben. Die untersuchten Arbeiten betrachteten alle die Teile des Puzzles in Kenntnis des Bildes, das die richtig zusammengesetzten Puzzleteile ergeben. Anders gestaltet es sich bei der Frage, warum etwas überraschend wirkte, und welche Auswirkungen das unerwartete Ereignis auf den weiteren Verlauf hatte. Hier muss der Forscher herausfinden, welches Bild bei der

Betrachtung ausschließlich der Teile des Puzzles von den beteiligten Puzzlespielern erwartet wurde, ohne jedoch das richtige Bild zu kennen. Es geht also darum, zunächst die sich in der Rückschau als falsch herausgestellte Erwartungen zu betrachten, bevor Rückschlüsse darüber gezogen werden können, was genau überraschend war, warum es überraschend war und welche Rolle die Überraschung für den Ausgang der Annexion der Krim spielte.

## **5. Welche Quellen, welche Daten? Wie viel Information ist genug?**

Eine weitere Frage, die sich nach der Literaturschau stellte, war, welche Quellen für Daten konsultiert werden sollten, um das zu finden, was vor dem Unerwarteten erwartet wurde. Hier war das erste zu überwindende Hindernis die Validität der Daten - ein Problem, das wie diese Arbeit feststellt allen Bemühungen, die Annexion der Krim zu untersuchen, innewohnt. Dies erklärt auch, warum bis heute vieles an der Annexion und wie sie vonstattenging, umstritten bleibt. Fakt ist, dass bis in den heutigen Tag Daten von hoher Qualität, wie beispielsweise Besprechungen von Regierungsprotokollen für den Forscher nicht zugänglich sind, und dies auch absehbar so bleiben wird. Andererseits ist die Frage der Quellen und Daten besonders herausfordernd, da im Gegensatz zur mangelnden Verfügbarkeit zu Quellen und Daten hoher Qualität, das Universum verfügbarer Sekundärdaten unüberschaubar ist. Der Fall hat in den Medien und in der Wissenschaft große Aufmerksamkeit erregt, so dass die verfügbare Gesamtdatenmenge den einzelnen Forscher überfordert.

Zusammengenommen stellen diese dem Fall innewohnenden Aspekte den Forscher vor ein Dilemma: Entweder man bricht die Untersuchung an diesem Punkt ab, da die Erfüllung akademischer Standards durch die verfügbaren Daten verunmöglicht wird; oder man geht Kompromisse bei den akademischen Standards ein, mit der Begründung, dass der Fall von historischer Bedeutung ist, und in der Hoffnung, dass, auch wenn akademische Standards kompromittiert werden müssen und akademisch bestenfalls eine spezifische Erklärung eines Einzelfalls zu erwarten ist, wertvolle Einblicke in den Fall und die Politikgestaltung gefunden werden können. Die vorliegende Untersuchung löst das Dilemma, in dem sie sich für zweiteres entscheidet. Sie unterscheidet sich jedoch von der diskutierten Literatur über Annexion der Krim, in dem sie das für die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung inhärente Problem des Falls benennt, es reflektiert, und einen nachvollziehbaren und falsifizierbaren Ausweg beschreibt.

## **6. Eine kontinuierliche Analyse der täglichen Berichterstattung einer Medienquelle vom Beginn der Ukraine-Krise im Oktober 2013 bis zur Annexion der Krim im April 2014**

Anstatt sich auf mehrere Sekundärquellen ohne a priori definierte Auswahlkriterien zu stützen, wie dies in der betrachteten Literatur häufig zu beobachten war, beschränkt sich der dritte Teil dieser Untersuchung auf die eingehende Analyse einer einzigen Quelle: die Berichterstattung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD). Um das Risiko einer Selektionsverzerrung der ausgewählten Beiträge und den darin enthaltenen Daten zu minimieren, wurde eine kontinuierliche, tagesaktuelle Analyse der Berichterstattung der ARD vom 29. Oktober 2013 bis zur offiziellen Begrüßung der Halbinsel durch die russische Duma als Mitglied der Russischen Föderation am 18. März 2014 durchgeführt<sup>716</sup>. Insgesamt wurden für den dritten Teil dieser Untersuchung 349 Meldungen und Nachrichten der ARD berichtete, identifiziert, transkribiert, übersetzt und analysiert. Fokus der Untersuchung ist die Frage, welche Erwartungen über die weiteren Entwicklungen sich aus der Berichterstattung, insbesondere aus deutscher Regierungsperspektive, feststellen lassen, die sich, nachdem die Krim am 18. März durch Russland annektiert wurde, als falsch herausstellten.

## **7. Eine diametrale Schlussfolgerung über die Rolle der Überraschung: Geschaffen durch die russische Täuschung, und entscheidend für den Ausgang.**

Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse, die im vierten Teil dieser Untersuchung wiedergegeben und diskutiert werden, sind diametral zu den bisherigen Schlussfolgerungen über die Rolle der Überraschung für die russische Annexion der Krim, insbesondere aber für Deutschland. Sie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein unerwartetes Ereignis - das Verschwinden des ukrainischen Präsidenten Wiktor Janukowytsch in der Nacht zum 21. Februar - die Entwicklungen auslöste, die zur Annexion der Krim führten, und dass die Ankündigung während des Krisengipfels des EU-Rats am 06. März 2014 der Regionalregierung der Krim, ein Referendum über die Entscheidung des Regionalparlaments über den Beitritt der Krim zu russischen Föderation abzuhalten, den Ausgang bestimmte.

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<sup>716</sup> Dies hat überdies den Vorteil, dass damit die beiden unterschiedlichen Beobachtungszeiträume, die in der deutschen und der breiteren Debatte über die Annexion der Krim festgestellt wurden, abgedeckt werden, s.a. Fn 17.

Die beiden überraschenden Ereignisse sind unterschiedlicher Natur: Das Verschwinden von Janukowitsch kam wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel und überraschte sowohl Deutschland als auch Russland. In Bezug auf die entscheidende Überraschung am 06. März 2014 kommt die Analyse der ARD-Berichterstattung jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass diese durch gezielte russische, insbesondere Putins, List herbeigeführt wurde: Anstatt die Bedingungen für die Überraschung durch die Erhöhung der Mehrdeutigkeit zu schaffen, wie in früheren Versuchen wenig konkret argumentiert wurde, stellt diese Untersuchung fest, dass Putin List darin lag, Gewissheit über die falsche Alternative zu kreieren.

Putin wollte seine Gegner glauben lassen, dass ein weiterer Georgien-Krieg unmittelbar bevorstehe. Sein Stratagem, um diese Erwartung zu erreichen, war das Militär. Die Erwartung einer unmittelbar bevorstehenden Wiederholung der Entwicklungen in Georgien 2008, als Russland den neuen georgischen Präsidenten Michail Saakaschwili in der falschen Erwartung, die NATO werde ihm zu Hilfe kommen, zu einer Reaktion auf russische Militärmanöver nahe der georgischen Grenze köderte, schuf die Voraussetzungen für das überraschende Ereignis, das den Ausgang prägte: die Ankündigung der Regionalregierung der Krim während des EU-Gipfels am 6. März. Doch während Russlands militärische Manöver, die ein Georgien-ähnliches Szenario widerspiegeln sollten, Putins zentrales Stratagem waren, war der russische Präsident selbst Russlands oberster "Stratagematist" - und Angela Merkel das Hauptziel seiner List. Die Analyse der ARD-Berichterstattung macht deutlich, dass Putin diese Anrufe nicht nutzte, um die Zweifel der deutschen Kanzlerin an den russischen Absichten zu zerstreuen, sondern um ihr bereits bestehendes Bild von Russland und seinem Präsidenten zu bestätigen und zu verstärken. Das Prinzip galt sowohl in Bezug auf die Rolle des Militärs als auch bei der Telefondiplomatie mit der deutschen Kanzlerin: Putins Georgien-Strategem nutzte Vorurteile seiner Gegner aus, um die falsche Erwartung zu erzeugen, dass ein weiteres Georgien bevorstehe.

Der Effekt der von Putin inszenierten Überraschung am 6. März 2014 war, dass sie den Ausgang bestimmte. Das am 06. März angekündigte Referendum über die vom Regionalparlament der Krim bereits beschlossenen Beitritt zur russischen Föderation konnte nicht mehr abgewendet werden, und wurde am 16. März 2014 abgehalten. Wenig überraschend fand die Entscheidung des Regionalparlaments überwältigenden Zuspruch, und am 18. März



wurde die Halbinsel Krim, zuvor autonome Republik auf dem Staatsgebiet der Ukraine, Teil der Russischen Föderation.

Die unterschiedliche Bewertung der Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim, insbesondere für Deutschland im Vergleich zu den in der Literaturübersicht besprochenen Arbeiten könnten nicht größer sein. Sie ist diametral. In früheren Arbeiten war die Überraschung zufällig und ihr Effekt für das Gesamtergebnis vernachlässigbar. Ebenso die russische Täuschung. Die Analysen der ARD-Berichterstattung, die diese Untersuchung vorgenommen hat, gelangt jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass Überraschung für Ausgang entscheidend war, und durch russische List bewusst herbeigeführt wurde. Russlands strategische List war dabei, den Gegner der falschen Option gewiss zu machen. Statt die Ungewissheit zu erhöhen, erhöhte es die Gewissheit über diese falsche Option.

#### **8. Wie man zur Überraschung steht, hängt davon ab, wo man in der Strategie sitzt.**

Doch wie lässt sich diese unterschiedliche Bewertung der Rolle der Überraschung erklären? Im fünften Teil dieser Arbeit wird versucht, den Unterschied durch einen Rückgriff auf die Theorie besser zu verstehen und zu erklären<sup>717</sup>. Während die Annexion der Krim allgemein als ein Fall der Internationalen Beziehungen betrachtet werden kann, ist die Frage, die diese Arbeit aufwirft, zu spezifisch für die großen Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen. Sie fragt, ob Überraschung im Wettbewerb und Konflikt zwischen Staaten ausschlaggebend sein kann, und wie sie herbeigeführt werden kann. Anstatt also zu versuchen, die diametralen Schlussfolgerungen über die Rolle von Überraschung (und Täuschung) besser zu erklären, indem man sich der Rolle von Überraschung in den großen Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen zuwendet, betrachtet diese Forschung die Rolle von Überraschung und Täuschung in den theoretischen Überlegungen über Strategie, da in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage, was für den Ausgang von Konflikt, Wettbewerb, Krise und Krieg zwischen Staaten entscheidend ist, axiomatisch ist.

Dabei wird festgestellt, dass die Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Überraschung, Täuschung und Strategie so alt ist wie die intellektuellen Überlegungen zur Strategie, das Phänomen der

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<sup>717</sup> Auch hier unterscheidet sich diese Untersuchung von den diskutierten Vorhaben, die fast gänzlich auf eine theoretische Diskussion beobachtbarer Phänomene im Kontext der Annexion der Krim verzichten.



Überraschung also kein neues Problem ist. Während in der Debatte über die Rolle der Überraschung in der Strategie im vornuklearen Zeitalter Einigkeit darüber besteht, dass Überraschung ein temporärer psychologischer Effekt ist, der als großer Kraftmultiplikator dienen kann, lassen sich zwei unvereinbare Positionen auf die Frage, ob Überraschung auch entscheidend für den Ausgang eines Krieges sein kann, identifizieren: der direkte Ansatz, dessen berühmtester Vertreter der preußische Kriegstheoretiker Carl von Clausewitz ist, und der indirekte Ansatz<sup>718</sup>, dessen wichtigster Vertreter im ‚westlichen‘ Kontext der britische Kriegsberichterstatteer Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart ist<sup>719</sup>. Zwar erkennen Clausewitz und der von ihm vertretene direkte Ansatz in der Strategie den Nutzen von Überraschung auf der taktischen Ebene des Krieges an, den strategischen Nutzen der Überraschung jedoch zieht der preußische Pate der Strategie grundsätzlich in Zweifel. Für ihn ist die Überraschung im Krieg selten entscheidend, da im Krieg nur der Einsatz auf dem Schlachtfeld entscheidend sein kann. Die Fokussierung auf Entscheidungsschlacht ist auch der Grund, warum Clausewitz den Mitteln zum Erreichen von Überraschung, List und Täuschung, kritisch gegenübersteht. Für ihn sind sie eine Verschwendung von Zeit und Mühe, eine letzte Instanz in militärischer Notlage und sogar moralisch verwerflich. Für Sir Liddell-Hart und die Anhänger des indirekten Ansatzes hingegen bewirkt die Überraschung die Dislokation des Gegners, und ist somit entscheidend für den Ausgang. Folglich steht der indirekte Ansatz der Täuschung positiv gegenüber und hat wenig moralische Bedenken, sie einzusetzen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass im Gegensatz zu den Anhängern des direkten Ansatzes, die die Entscheidungsschlacht der Vernichtung suchen, die Anhänger des indirekten Ansatzes es als den Gipfel der Kunst ansehen, ohne Kampf zu gewinnen, und nach Mitteln und Wegen suchen, kostspielige Gefechte auf dem Schlachtfeld zu vermeiden.

Die beiden Positionen machen die Beantwortung der Frage nach der Rolle der Überraschung für die Strategie unlösbar. Wie man zur Überraschung steht, hängt davon ab, wo man in der Strategie sitzt.

Dies ändert sich auch nicht in der Diskussion über den Zusammenhang zwischen Strategie und Überraschung im nuklearen Zeitalter. Zwar bleibt sie ein zentrales Element der

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<sup>718</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, edited and translated by Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter; Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984.

<sup>719</sup> Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: *Strategy*, Praeger, New York, 1967.

Strategiedebatte, allerdings stellt sich angesichts der Gefahr eines vernichtenden, unerwarteten nuklearen Erstschlags die Frage nach der Rolle von Überraschung für den Ausgang nicht mehr. Die technologische Entwicklung der Nuklearwaffe löste die Zweifel die Clausewitz und die Schüler des direkten Ansatzes an der Rolle der Überraschung für die Strategie hatten auf. Dies hatte Folgen für die Debatte über die Überraschung in der Strategie. Statt der Frage nach der strategischen Relevanz der Überraschung, das heißt ihrer Eignung den Ausgang des Krieges zu entscheiden, nachzugehen rücken zwei andere Fragen in den Mittelpunkt der Strategiedebatte im nuklearen Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges. Zum einen die Frage, warum Regierungen Opfer von Überraschungen werden; zum anderen, ob sich Überraschungen in der Zukunft verhindern lassen würden.

Die Untersuchung der Strategiedebatte zum Phänomen der Überraschung im nuklearen Zeitalter zeigt, dass gegen Ende des Kalten Krieges weitestgehend Einigkeit über die Ursachen für das Entstehen von Überraschungen herrschte. Im Kern liegt die Erkenntnis, dass Überraschung entstehen, obwohl sich in der Rückschau feststellen lässt, dass Informationen vorlagen, die auf die spätere Überraschung hingewiesen haben könnten<sup>720</sup>. Die Frage war also wieso vorhandene, korrekte Informationen keine Beachtung fanden. Von besonderer Relevanz wurde dabei der menschliche Faktor identifiziert, und die kognitiven Filter die das korrekte Interpretieren neuer Informationen erschweren. Als weiterer Faktor wurden die Gruppen und bürokratischen Strukturen innewohnenden Idiosynkrasien als Filter für die korrekte Interpretation von Informationen erkannt, wobei diese als von besonderer Bedeutung im Umfeld nachrichtendienstlicher Behörden beschrieben wurden. Und schließlich, wobei als von untergeordneter Rolle im Vergleich zu den einer von Überraschung betroffenen Regierung innewohnenden Ursachen dargestellt, wurde auch List und Täuschung des Gegners als potenzielle Ursache für Überraschungen beschrieben. Der Grund für diese Verdrängung des planmäßigen, gegnerischen Handelns als ursächlich für Überraschungen lässt sich mit der Beobachtung dieser Arbeit begründen, dass die Strategiedebatte im nuklearen Zeitalter einseitig auf den Axiomen über den strategischen Wert der Überraschung von Carl von Clausewitz und dem direkten Ansatz beruht<sup>721</sup>.

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<sup>720</sup> S. insbesondere: Wohlstetter, Roberta: *Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962. In diesem für die Studien der Überraschung grundlegenden Werk dass den japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbor 1941 untersucht, wird erstmals auf das Paradox hingewiesen, dass Regierungen überrascht werden obwohl Informationen vorlagen die der späteren Überraschung hätten vorbereiten können.

<sup>721</sup> Diese Ansicht vertritt insbesondere Barton Whaley, s. Whaley, Barton: *Stratagem*, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint).

Einigkeit herrschte in der umfangreichen Debatte über das Phänomen der Überraschung während des Kalten Krieges auch über die Frage nach der Abkehr zukünftiger Überraschungen: Zukünftige Überraschungen lassen sich nicht verhindern. Es ist dieser Punkt, an dem sich gegen Ende des Kalten Krieges, erneut unter dem Eindruck technologischer Entwicklungen, diesmal im Bereich der Informationsgewinnung und Datenverarbeitung, eine neue Haltung entwickelte. Im Gegensatz zu den pessimistischen Einschätzungen gelangen sie zu dem Schluss, dass die technologischen Fortschritte zumindest Anlass zur Hoffnung geben, Überraschungen in der Zukunft auszuschließen<sup>722</sup>. In der Debatte zwischen den beiden Schulen wird auch erstmals die Frage der Vorgehensweise bei der Untersuchung des Phänomens Überraschung debattiert. Bisherigen Ansätzen wird unsauberes wissenschaftliches Arbeiten vorgeworfen, so dass sich trotz der Einigkeit der Forschung nicht von einer Theorie über das Entstehen von Überraschungen für Regierungen sprechen lasse<sup>723</sup>. Dieser Kritik wurde entgegengehalten, dass das Phänomen der Überraschung den Forscher vor ein grundsätzliches Dilemma stelle, da seine Eigenschaften ein Erfassen durch ein Prokrustes' Bett wissenschaftlicher Strenge nicht zulassen, und damit die Entwicklung einer generalisierbaren Theorie im strengen wissenschaftlichen Sinne unmöglich wird<sup>724</sup>.

Die Debatte über die Wissenschaftlichkeit der bisherigen Forschung markierte gleichermaßen das Ende der Strategiedebatte über das Phänomen der Überraschung. Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, und der Wahrnehmung des Endes der nuklearen Bedrohung verlor sich auch das Interesse an Überraschungen, und rückte aus dem Zentrum der Strategiedebatte. Allerdings lässt sich feststellen, dass in der jüngeren Forschung bis zur Wiederentdeckung des Schwarzen Schwans durch Nassim Taleb<sup>725</sup> in Folge des Zusammenbruchs der Weltfinanzmärkte im Jahr 2008 die Erwartung, Überraschung ließe sich mittels verbesserter Technologie und Prozessoptimierung in den bürokratischen Abläufen, vorherrsche. Dies gilt auch im Zusammenhang mit den Ansätzen, die sich in der aktuellen Debatte zeigen. Erst neueste Veröffentlichungen insbesondere aus dem Bereich von Militärstudien in den USA nehmen

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<sup>722</sup> Levite, Ariel: *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987.

<sup>723</sup> Levite, Ariel: 'Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy"', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, 345-349.

<sup>724</sup> Betts, Richard K.: 'Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*', in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 329-343.

<sup>725</sup> Taleb, Nassim K.: *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Random House, New York, 2007.

wieder die Erwartungshaltung ein, Überraschungen werden auch in der Zukunft das internationale Umfeld dominieren. Statt sie zu verhindern, gelte es einen Umgang damit zu finden<sup>726</sup>.

## **9. Kontinuierliche Relevanz von Strategie oder die alarmierenden Anzeichen von "Strategieblindheit"?**

Unabhängig von der Frage nach der Abwendbarkeit von Überraschungen in der Zukunft, fällt in der jüngeren Forschung mehr noch als in der Strategiedebatte über die Überraschung im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges die Entkoppelung von der in der Strategiedebatte des vornuklearen Zeitalter grundsätzlichen Frage nach der Rolle der Überraschung für den Ausgang eines Krieges, vor allem aber die zwei grundverschiedenen Haltungen die sich hierzu in der Debatte finden lassen, immer mehr in den Hintergrund rücken.

Dies zeigt sich auch in der Forschung und Debatte über die Annexion der Krim insgesamt, in der die Kernfrage: „was war entscheidend für den Ausgang“ losgelöst von früheren Erkenntnissen der Strategiedebatte zu dieser Fragestellung geführt wurde.

Setzt man jedoch die beiden Annahmen über die Rolle von Überraschung für den Ausgang der russischen Annexion der Krim, die diese Arbeit in den vorigen Kapiteln herausgearbeitet hat in Zusammenhang, wird deutlich, dass diese durch die Strategiedebatte über das allgemeine Verhältnis von Überraschung und Strategie aus dem vornuklearen Zeitalter erklärt werden können. Diejenigen, die argumentieren, dass die Rolle von Überraschung und Täuschung für die Annexion der Krim vernachlässigbar und zufällig ist, finden ihre Bestätigung in Carl von Clausewitz und dem direkten Ansatz zur Strategie. Und die Schlussfolgerung, die aus der für diese Forschung durchgeführten Datenanalyse gezogen wurde, kann mit den von Basil H. Liddell Hart vertretenen Thesen über den strategischen Nutzen von Täuschung und Überraschung erklärt werden. Beiden Perspektiven wird ein Bündel an möglichen, generalisierbaren Ursachen für die Überraschung im Kontext der Krim an die Hand gegeben, ohne jedoch mit Sicherheit feststellen zu können was genau ursächlich für die Überraschung, im allgemeinem wie speziell für Deutschland, war.

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<sup>726</sup> Cancian, Mark F.: *Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts*, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.

Dies bedeutet jedoch, dass es die Gegensätzlichkeit der Annahmen über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim, insbesondere für Deutschland, nicht auflöst, sondern beide Ansichten bestätigt: wie man zur Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim steht, hängt davon ab wo man in der Strategie sitzt.

Wenngleich dieses Ergebnis eine klare Beantwortung der Frage, welche in dieser Arbeit herausgearbeitete Annahme über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim eher von den theoretischen Einsichten über die Rolle der Überraschung in der Strategie gedeckt ist verhindert, und insofern nicht restlos zufriedenstellend ist, ergeben sich aus der Beobachtung der Entkoppelung der Debatte über die Annexion der Krim ebenso wie im Zusammenhang mit dem Phänomen der Überraschung von ihrer Kernfrage Schlussfolgerungen. Die erste ist, dass aus der Perspektive der Strategie die Überraschung, auch wenn ihr Wert für das Gesamtergebnis umstritten ist, ein Faktor ist, der, wenn er beobachtet wird, nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte. Überraschung ist wichtig. Und wenn keine Überraschung vorliegt, sollte stets damit gerechnet werden. Denn Überraschung liegt stets in der Zukunft. Zweitens hat diese Untersuchung gezeigt, dass das Nachdenken über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Strategie zwar so alt ist wie das Nachdenken über das Gewinnen von Kriegen, die Debatte aber erhebliche Schwerpunktverschiebungen erfahren hat - von der Untersuchung ihrer Rolle für das Gewinnen von Kriegen vor dem Aufkommen der Atomwaffe zu der Frage, was Regierungen dazu veranlasst, Opfer von Überraschungen zu werden, und ob und wie dies in Zukunft verhindert werden kann. Drittens wurde wie bereits im Kontext der Debatte über die Krimannexion beobachtet, dass die Debatte über die Rolle von Überraschung in der Strategie zunehmend von ihren theoretischen Grundlagen entkoppelt wurde. Noch wichtiger als eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen der Überraschung, scheint daher vor dem Hintergrund des theoretischen Rückgriffs die Kenntnis über Strategie.

Während die abnehmende Strategiekompetenz und ihre theoretischen Grundlagen in allen für diese Studie untersuchten Arbeiten zur Annexion der Krim festgestellt wurden und Anlass zur Sorge einer wachsenden ‚Strategieblindheit‘ geben, argumentiert diese Studie, dass Deutschland in besonderem Maße davon betroffen ist.

Dies zeigt sich zum einen in Bezug auf das Phänomen der Überraschung. Die vorliegende Studie über die Rolle der Überraschung für Russlands Annexion der Krim liefert gute Gründe für Deutschland, sich im Rahmen seiner laufenden Bemühungen mehr internationale Verantwortung zu übernehmen näher mit dem Thema Überraschung zu beschäftigen. Erstens, weil die Erfahrung Deutschlands, wenn es, wie im Fall der Krim, internationale Verantwortung übernimmt, zeigt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, überrascht zu werden steigt. Zweitens, weil entgegen der in Deutschland beobachteten Vorstellung, Überraschung sei neu und eine Begleiterscheinung einer aus den Fugen geratenen Welt, das Phänomen und die intellektuelle Auseinandersetzung damit so alt sind wie die Auseinandersetzung über die Beziehungen zwischen Staaten, insbesondere im Konfliktfall, selbst. Drittens zeigt sich diese ‚Strategieblindheit‘ in der deutschen Debatte über die Annexion der Krim, da hier eine fast vollständige Entkoppelung beobachtet werden kann.

## 10. Politik-Empfehlungen

Vor diesem Hintergrund schließt diese Untersuchung mit zwei Empfehlungen für weitere Überlegungen im Kontext der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Die erste besteht darin, eine gründliche, regierungsweite Untersuchung der wichtigsten Ereignisse vorzunehmen, die die deutsche Regierung seit dem Arabischen Frühling 2011 überrascht haben. Die Ergebnisse sollten einer breiten öffentlichen, insbesondere einer parlamentarischen Debatte zugeführt werden. Solche Untersuchungen und Debatten sind nicht ohne Präzedenzfall und wurden zum Beispiel in den Vereinigten Staaten nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 im Auftrag der Regierung durchgeführt<sup>727</sup> oder als Teil großer und angemessen finanzierter Forschungsprojekte, die verschiedene Überraschungsereignisse und ihre Entstehung untersuchten<sup>728</sup>. Während keines der beiden Beispiele zukünftige Überraschungen verhindern konnte, haben beide Bemühungen zu einer besseren Selbstwahrnehmung beigetragen, die die Anfälligkeit für Überraschungen verringerte und strukturelle und prozedurale Veränderungen in der Politikgestaltung auslöste, die zu einer widerstandsfähigeren und anpassungsfähigeren Politik beitrugen.

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<sup>727</sup> Zum Beispiel die Untersuchung über die Terroranschläge auf das World Trade Centre am 11. September 2001, online einsehbar unter: <https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>, zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021.

<sup>728</sup> Zum Beispiel: Nolan, Janne E.; MacEachin, Douglas; Trockman, Kristine: *Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic Surprise: Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, 2006.

Die zweite Empfehlung zielt darauf ab, die Kompetenz in Fragen der Strategie in Deutschland durch die Einrichtung eines akademischen Lehrstuhls für Strategische Studien zu erhöhen - von denen es in Deutschland derzeit keinen gibt. Es gab zwar gute Gründe, warum Deutschland in der Vergangenheit nicht über Strategie nachgedacht hat, aber die Erfolgsbilanz der letzten dreißig Jahre als souveräne Nation legt nahe, dass das Öffnen der Strategiekiste wahrscheinlich nicht dazu führen wird, dass Deutschland den nächsten Angriffskrieg plant. Vielmehr könnte es dazu beitragen, dass Deutschland besser in der Lage ist, mehr internationale Verantwortung zu übernehmen, und dass die deutsche Debatte über strategische Fragen weniger von Annahmen geleitet wird, die von der Vergangenheit geprägt sind. Darüber hinaus wäre es eine Chance für Deutschland, ein eigenes, zeitgemäßes und zukunftsorientiertes Strategieverständnis zu entwickeln, das, wie diese Untersuchung zeigt, über das Engagement auf dem Schlachtfeld hinausgeht: Während die Prinzipien der Strategie nach wie vor Relevanz besitzen, hat sich das Gesicht ihres Gegenstandes, des Krieges, des Konflikts, der Krise und des Wettbewerbs zwischen und unter Staaten, ebenso grundlegend verändert wie der geopolitische Kontext, in dem sie stattfinden. Sich mit diesen Veränderungen des strategischen Umfeldes nicht auseinanderzusetzen, birgt stets das Risiko, überrascht zu werden. Und schließlich könnte ein solcher Lehrstuhl dazu beitragen, eine deutsche Perspektive in die breitere Strategiedebatte einzubringen.